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Introduction
The aim o f  this thesis is to show that eighteenth-century Scottish sentimental 
literature is founded in contemporary Scottish philosophical theory; that is, 
that during the eighteenth century, Scottish sentimental literature assimilated 
in various ways the empiricism central to Scottish Enlightenment thought. 
Sentimental literature was intended to improve the reader, morally, and the 
key to the connection between Scottish literature and philosophy o f the 
period lies in the way the concept o f moral and societal ‘improvement’ was 
understood during the latter half o f the century. Three texts have been used 
to explore the influences on Scottish sentimental fiction: Adam Smith, The 
Theory o f  M oral Sentiments (1759), which puts forward a theory o f the 
development o f moral concepts; Henry Mackenzie, The M an o f  Feeling  
(1771), an extremely successful novel, now considered paradigmatic o f 
sentimental fiction o f the period; and James Macpherson, Fragments o f  
Ancient Poetry (1760), allegedly authentic third-century bardic poetry, 
collected, transcribed and translated into English by Macpherson, which 
became extremely popular as sentimental literature, while also raising a 
storm o f academic controversy over its authenticity as the product o f a 
primitive and hence unimproved society.1 The claim is that the concept o f 
moral and social improvement which is at play in M ackenzie’s novel and 
which is also central to the debate over the authenticity o f the Fragments, is 
that which is developed in Sm ith’s M oral Sentiments.
The idea that M ackenzie’s The Man o f  Feeling  draws on Sm ith’s moral 
theory is not new. For example, Gerard Barker finds in M ackenzie’s work 
generally, evidence o f  ‘a comprehensive theory o f individual psychology’ 
which he ascribes to Smith, while E.A. Baker claims more strongly that ‘The
1 Adam Smith, The Theory o f  M oral Sentiments (1759, 6th edn 1790), ed. D. 
Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1984); hereafter 
TMS; references are given by part, section, chapter and paragraph nos; Henry 
M ackenzie, The Man o f  Feeling  (1771), ed. Brian Vickers (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), hereafter MF; James Macpherson, Fragments o f  
Ancient Poetry, repr. in The Poems o f  Ossian and Related Works (1760-73), 
ed. H. Gaskill (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).
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Man o f  Feeling  is The Theory o f  M oral Sentiments in action.’2 However, the 
account o f the connection between the two texts which is developed here is 
distinctive in that it depends on a strongly revisionist interpretation o f the 
structure and content o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments. Frequently, present-day 
commentators are eluded by Sm ith’s intention in the M oral Sentiments, and 
regard it as a normative ethics driven by obscure moralising. By contrast, the 
claim here is that the M oral Sentiments is a rigorously empiricist, strongly 
Newtonian, hypothetico-deductive theory o f the origin and development o f 
morality and virtue. That is, the claim is that Smith was not prescribing 
morally correct behaviour -  not describing how men ought to behave -  but 
attempting to analyse the moral elements in m an’s actual behaviour, that is, 
he was attempting to identity and characterise the fundamental elements o f 
behaviour which was already generally recognised to be moral. This 
revisionist reading o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments yields a model o f m an’s 
conceptual development which subsequently can be seen at work in Smith’s 
writing generally. Sm ith’s various inquiries into law, language, rhetoric and 
belles-lettres, economics and religion, amongst others, each furnish the same 
kind o f explanatory model o f development, and consequently, each area o f 
study can be regarded as contributing to an attempt at a comprehensive 
scientific account o f the nature o f man and o f society.3
The model is context-sensitive, but none the less its parameters draw 
Sm ith’s work together. The model also dissolves 'Das Adam Smith
2 Gerard A. Barker, Henry Mackenzie (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975), pp. 
28-9; E.A. Baker, The History o f  the English Novel, X vols (London: H.F. 
and G. Witherby, 1929-39), vol. V, p. 35, quoted in James Buchan, Crowded  
with Genius: The Scottish Enlightenment: Edinburgh’s M oment o f  the M ind  
(New York: HarperCollins, 2003), p. 303.
3 As noted by Dugald Stewart, who during the course o f  a discussion o f 
Sm ith’s dissertation on the origin o f language, describes his work generally 
as showing evidence o f an interest in ‘a particular sort o f inquiry ... entirely 
o f modern origin, and which seems, in a peculiar degree, to have interested 
Mr Sm ith’s curiosity’. Stewart continues: ‘[A similar line o f inquiry] may be 
traced in all [Smith’s] different works, moral, political, or literary; and on all 
these subjects he has exemplified it with the happiest success’ (Dugald 
Stewart, ‘Account o f the Life and Writings o f Adam Smith, LL.D .’ (1793), 
repr. in Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects with Dugald  
Stew art’s Account o f  Adam Smith  (1795), ed. I.S. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), pp. 269-351,11.44).
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problem ’, an alleged contradiction in Smith’s theory o f  man, which has 
exercised scholars since the publication o f the Wealth o f  Nations was first 
published in 1776.4 What has been understood as contradiction between 
Sm ith’s ascription to man o f a natural capacity for sympathy and sociability, 
which is central to the M oral Sentiments, and the innate self-seeking drive 
instrumental in Sm ith’s analysis o f economic forces in the Wealth o f  Nations 
is shown to be the result o f  failing to appreciate the context-sensitivity o f 
Sm ith’s model-theoretic explanation o f the nature o f social interaction.5 That 
is, the seeming incompatibility between Smith’s accounts o f  m an’s nature 
vanishes under the revisionist reading.
The revisionism is a consequence o f taking seriously the importance that 
Smith and his contemporaries gave to constructing a thoroughgoing 
empirical and hence verifiable account o f the nature o f man. It is axiomatic 
to any empiricist theory that knowledge o f conceptual content is founded in 
experience. We acquire a concept o f blue, for example, by experiencing 
instances o f the colour blue. Similarly we acquire the concept colour through 
experiencing what is coloured. When a theory treats conceptual content as 
necessarily derived from experience, it introduces an intuitive ordering on the 
acquisition o f concepts. For example, according to empiricist epistemology, 
we learn to understand the general concept colour by abstraction from the 
conceptual content associated with individual colour terms. Our 
understanding o f the concept colour is epistemically dependent on our prior 
understanding o f individual colour terms, and, intuitively, this dependency 
orders concepts from less to more abstract, and from simple to complex.
The idea that concepts are intrinsically ordered is presupposed in most 
Enlightenment thought. It is particularly important to Scottish eighteenth-
4 The phrase ‘Das Adam Smith problem’ was used by German economist 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) to refer to what he deemed an 
incompatibility within Smith’s writings, and the phrase has subsequently 
been adopted as the name for this particular incompatibility issue. One o f 
the first to attempt to compare Smith’s economic man on the Wealth o f  
Nations with the naturally virtuous man in the M oral Sentiments was Dugald 
Stewart, professor o f moral philosophy at Edinburgh University from 1785 to 
1820, and Sm ith’s first biographer; see Stewart, ‘Account’, pp. 314, IV, 11- 
12 .
5 A mistake made by Janet Todd (Sensibility: An Introduction  (London and 
New York: Methuen, 1986), pp. 27-8).
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century accounts o f the nature and moral development o f man and society. 
In these accounts, it underpins the notion o f improvement: what is taken to 
be evidence o f use by an individual or by a society o f increasingly complex 
or abstract concepts is regarded as indicative o f progress or improvement. In 
an individual, such progress is towards increased moral and social refinement, 
or sensibility; and in a society it indicates development from the primitive to 
the civilised.
Sm ith’s M oral Sentiments, in giving an account o f the origin and 
development o f morality and virtue, concerns m an’s capacity for moral 
improvement -  i.e. it concentrates on how and why man can improve -  and 
as such it is a project which entails no moral imperatives. Sentimental 
fiction, on the other hand, was written with the intention o f actually 
improving the reader, morally. Today, ‘sentimental’ describes an indulgence 
in emotion purely for the sake o f the resultant pleasurable sensations. During 
the eighteenth century, the term had a richer connotation, and until late in the 
century, carried none o f the pejorative overtones often implied in current 
usage.6 Sentimentalism was a philosophical movement which held that man 
is instinctively good, and that if he is able to act in accordance with his 
nature, he will be happy. Love o f humanity was deemed the highest o f 
virtues, and human nature was believed perfectible in this regard as well as 
others, by appeal to feelings rather than reason.
By the second half o f the eighteenth century, sentimental literature had 
achieved cult status. Sentimentally instructive fictional writing aimed to 
evince from the reader an emotional if  not physical response to a display o f 
virtuous distress. The distressed are usually blameless victims, and their 
miserable predicaments were described with the intention o f prompting the 
reader to admiration, or pity, or sympathetic tears. Scenes depicting virtue 
beleaguered by fate or by the forces o f evil were considered pathetically
6 Mitzi M yers discusses Mary W ollstonecraft’s reviews o f sentimental 
literature written in the 1790s, showing her to have become bored with 
‘infallible creatures’ who according Wollstonecraft ‘love and weep by rule’ 
(Mitzi Myers, ‘Sensibility and the “Walk o f Reason’” , in Syndy McMillen 
Conger (ed.), Sensibility in Transformation: Creative Resistance to Sentiment 
from  the Augustans to the Romantics (London and Toronto: Associated 
Universities Presses, 1990), pp. 120-44, p. 127).
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beautiful and morally powerful, whether virtue emerged triumphant or 
suffered defeat.
The Man o f  Feeling has become paradigmatic o f late eighteenth-century
sentimental literature. Published in April 1771, it was M ackenzie’s first
novel. Although it was given a tepid reception at the hands o f the critics, the
first impression sold out within three months.7 It quickly became a gauge
against which a reader might measure her emotional responsiveness, and its
capacity for provoking tears was one o f the few positive remarks made by an
otherwise less than enthusiastic contemporary reviewer: ‘the Reader, who
• • • • 0weeps not over some o f the scenes it describes, has no sensibility o f m ind’.
The Man o f  Feeling is a curious novel. A slender volume, it has no 
obvious plot, little action, and no continuity. The main character, Harley is 
invariably and, at times, vexatiously unsuccessful, and the reader is denied 
even a happy ending. According to M ackenzie’s fictitious editor, the book is
7 ‘[T]he libraries o f Tunbridge Wells, Bath, and Cheltenham were besieged 
by ladies demanding to be the first to read it’ (Henry Grey Graham, Scottish 
Men o f  Letters in the Eighteenth Century (London: Adam & Charles, 1901), 
quoted in Barker, Henry M ackenzie, p. 50). Mackenzie commented on the 
unfavourable attitude o f reviewers towards The M an o f  Feeling  in a letter to 
his cousin, Elizabeth Rose: ‘I am told, for I have not yet seen that Number, 
that they have treated it very roughly’ (17 June 1771, Henry Mackenzie, 
Letters to Elizabeth Rose o f  Kilravock: On Literature, Events and People, ed. 
H.W. Drescher (Munster: Verlag Aschendorf, 1967), p. 89). In the same 
letter Mackenzie remarked on a very different reaction from the general 
readership: ‘The reception which the public Indulgence has given it has 
exceeded all my expectations: the copies allotted for Edinr were all sold out 
in about a W eek’s Time, and when a fresh Demand was made on London it 
was found that the whole Impression had been already exhausted’, and on 1 
June 1771, James Elphinstone, had written from London that The Man o f  
Feeling was receiving a ‘unanimous reception’ from the public, and that the 
first edition had almost sold out. However, Elphinstone noted later (15 June 
1771) that ‘the Monthly Reviewers' had treated Harley ‘as they do every one 
o f a different cast from their own’ (Henry Mackenzie, Literature and Literati: 
The Literary Correspondence and notebooks o f  Henry Mackenzie, vol. I: The 
Letters 1766-1827, ed. H.W Drescher (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter 
Lang, 1989), p. 55). Mackenzie read the review on 22 June, referring to it as 
‘the sentence o f the M onthly Reviewers' in his reply to Elphinstone, and 
commenting: ‘A judgment, so generally delivered, is not easily controverted; 
nor should it be my business to contradict it, tho I could’ (24 June 1771, 
Letters 1766-1827, p. 55).
8 Anon., Monthly Review, XLIV (1771), quoted in Barker, Henry Mackenzie 
p. 50.
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‘a bundle o f little episodes, put together without art, and o f  no importance, 
with something o f nature, and little else in them ’ (M F , p. 5) and a first 
reading is liable to leave one in complete agreement.
However, one conclusion o f this thesis is that the editor’s description o f 
the book is false. It is argued here that, far from being a medley o f episodes, 
The Man o f  Feeling  is a highly structured collection o f moral essays; that the 
essays are ordered according to the complexity o f the moral puzzle posed by 
each essay for Harley, and so also for the reader; and that the concept o f 
ethical complexity which supplies the architecture for the book is that which 
is developed by Smith in his M oral Sentiments.
The Man o f  Feeling  has the form o f an edited version o f  a patchily 
incomplete manuscript. The most obvious pattern for M ackenzie’s use o f 
this form is James M acpherson’s Fragments o f  Ancient Poetry, which really 
is a bundle o f little episodes.9 There are enough tributes to Ossianic poetry in 
The Man o f  Feeling to leave the informed reader with little doubt that 
Mackenzie drew on M acpherson’s Ossian poems. The Ossian poems 
appeared originally in three volumes: Fragments o f  Ancient Poetry (1760), 
Fingal, an Ancient Epic Poem in Six Books (1760-1) and Temora, an Epic 
Poem in Eight Books (1763). The poems are presented as English 
translations o f authentic Gaelic poetry dating from the third century AD, 
gathered in the Highlands by Macpherson. However, Macpherson professed 
to have done more than just translate the poems; he claimed to have pieced 
together various sources and restored the poems to their original voice, 
reversing the corruption by bardic, and so oral, transmission through the 
generations. The end result was embraced as a national epic and the 
enthusiasm shown by the intellectual elite in Edinburgh quickly spread first 
to England, then to Europe and even to North and South A m erica.10 The
9 Contra e.g. Brian Vickers who suggests that M ackenzie’s choice o f 
structure was influenced by the disjointed narrative found in Lawrence 
Sterne, A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy  (1768) (Vickers, 
‘Introduction’ to Henry Mackenzie, The Man o f  Feeling  (1771), ed. Brian 
Vickers (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. vii-xxiv, pp. x ii-x iv ).
10 Fiona Stafford, The Sublime Savage: James M acpherson and the Poems o f  
Ossian (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), p. 83; Uwe Boker, 
‘The M arketing o f M acpherson’, in Howard Gaskill (ed.), Ossian Revisited 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), pp. 73-93, p. 74.
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poems became very well known during the 1760s and in a letter written to 
his cousin, Elizabeth Rose, in 1770, Mackenzie shows his familiarity with 
the Ossianic corpus.11
Like The Man o f  Feeling , the Ossian poems became a ‘standard o f 
feeling’. For example, in his London Journal (1762-3), Boswell records 
Thomas Sheridan’s comment that he and his wife ‘had fixed [the poems of 
Ossian] as the standard o f feeling, made it like a thermometer by which they 
could judge o f the warmth o f everybody’s heart’.12 The sagas Fingal and 
Temora honour Fingal, Ossian’s father and the tribe leader. The former saga 
describes how Fingal and his warriors aided the Irish prince, Cuchullin, in 
defending his land from the Danes. Temora relates the end o f  Fingal’s 
leadership and the tribe’s involvement in what was effectively civil war in 
Ireland.
As with Mackenzie’s The Man o f  Feeling, what captured the attention o f 
contemporary readers was the poem s’ sentimental content, which is most 
obvious in the Fragments. The Fragments is a collection o f short, 
emotionally intense accounts o f romantic love thwarted by death. Readers 
were fascinated by the natural refinement o f Ossianic heroes and by the ‘joy 
o f g rie f that came from contemplating an irretrievably lost past. The strange 
imagery and the poetic prose reminiscent, stylistically, o f the Bible, led 
eighteenth-century readers to believe they had been made privy to the 
thoughts and emotions o f a preliterate, primitive society. Sheridan’s reaction 
is representative: ‘These poems give us great light into the history o f 
mankind. We could not imagine that such sentiments o f  delicacy as well as
1 3generosity could have existed in the breasts o f  rude, uncultivated people.’
The Ossian poems moved readers to tears with the plight o f pure, 
unselfish, romantic love worsted by fate. However, the appeal o f the poems 
lay in more than their ability to induce the pleasures o f  vicarious sorrow. As
11 In this letter Mackenzie mentions seeing the manuscript o f  a verse 
transcription o f M acpherson’s Fingal (1762) by John W odrow (published 
1771). Mackenzie dismisses W odrow’s version as he considers ‘Rim e’ to 
disfigure ‘the wild Sublimity o f Ossian’ conveyed so successfully by 
Macpherson (12 May 1770, Mackenzie, Letters, pp. 45-6).
12 James Boswell, B osw ell’s London Journal 1762-1763, ed. Frederick A. 
Pottle (London: Reprint Society, 1951), 8 February 1763, p. 182.
13 Ibid.
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Sheridan’s remark indicates, eighteenth-century readers were intrigued by the 
unexpected tenor o f feelings demonstrated by Ossian both through his choice 
o f events to chronicle and by the consideration with which he treated his 
subjects. Members o f primitive societies were not thought capable o f 
harbouring, much less celebrating, the kind o f  selfless, generous sentiments 
lauded by Ossian.
Although the pedigree claimed by Macpherson for the poems became the 
focus o f heated controversy, their sentimental nature was taken by the 
general reading public as evidence o f Ossian’s genius. Ossian was deemed a 
remarkable exception to the rule which predicted that primitive cultures 
would not exhibit generosity o f spirit. Literary arguments for the 
authenticity o f the Ossian poems aimed to demonstrate that they conformed 
to the norm in most other importantly relevant ways; for example, in 
linguistic style and through the concreteness o f descriptive detail, both o f 
which were characteristics associated with barbaric societies. The surprise, it 
was claimed, came solely in the portrayal o f social interaction between tribe 
members, which revealed a level o f concern for others at odds with the 
volume o f evidence for the primitivity o f the tribe.
One o f the more puzzling aspects o f eighteenth-century responses to 
M acpherson’s Ossianic corpus is the reasoning behind Ossian’s status as a 
meritorious cultural anomaly. This is rarely addressed in current secondary 
literature, where the reception o f the Ossian poems tends to be explained by 
general reference to the popularity o f sentimentality. However, the reasons 
why Ossian was accorded an anomalous status merit investigation, not least 
because they show the degree to which Enlightenment theory had permeated 
popular thought.
The selfless and generous content o f the poems both startled and charmed 
M acpherson’s readership because the development o f  the related emotions 
was considered dependent on a more civilised social environment than that 
depicted in the Ossianic corpus. The basis for this idea lies in eighteenth- 
century empiricism, and Smith’s M oral Sentiments explains why. It 
transpires that one consequence o f Scottish Enlightenment thought was that 
individual moral refinement and societal improvement could not be 
considered intrinsically independent o f each other. Their connection was
8
important to the eighteenth-century Scottish moralists -  as was the converse: 
that individual and societal degeneration were similarly inextricably linked. 
These connections motivated much debate and social commentary by the 
Scottish literati.
One o f the more overt indications o f M acpherson’s influence on 
M ackenzie’s The M an o f  Feeling is the inclusion by Mackenzie o f  an 
encounter between a primitive warrior and a contemporary soldier. The 
warrior is Ossianic. The encounter occurs in a section decrying British 
colonial practice -  a section particularly replete with pitiful scenes. Current 
commentaries on the text tend to fail to give an adequate explanation o f  the 
purpose o f this section o f the novel, suggesting either that Mackenzie was 
pandering to the demand for sentimentality, or that he was overindulging his 
love o f pathos. By contrast, the claim here is that the context in which the 
incident occurs suggests that Mackenzie was not merely alluding to Smith’s 
M oral Sentiments but applying Smith’s account o f the connection between 
individual and societal moral values to Scottish eighteenth-century economic 
policy at both domestic and imperial levels, to spell out the disastrous 
consequences for Scottish society o f policies which he and others regarded as 
motivated by nothing more than greed and similar base objectives.
It has become evident that the proposed revisionist reading o f Smith’s 
M oral Sentiments imparts a unity o f purpose to Sm ith’s writings as a whole, 
one which is consonant with the preoccupations o f Scottish Enlightenment 
thought generally. This sheds light on why ‘the mob o f  the literati’ became 
‘very loud in its praises’ for the Theory o f  M oral Sentiments soon after its 
publication; and why Smith was regarded by his peers as ‘the First o f  our 
W riters’. 14 Reconsidering the work o f Macpherson and Mackenzie from 
within the framework o f Smith’s theory suggests new approaches for 
research into the work o f these three significant Scottish writers o f the mid- 
to late eighteenth century.
14 David Hume, Letter to Adam Smith, 12 April 1759, repr. in Dugald 
Stewart Account, pp. 296-9, p. 298; Henry Mackenzie, Letter to William 
Carmichael [1784], in Letters 1766-1827, p. 124.
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1 Stadial history and moral improvement
Reference has been made to Smith’s use o f a model o f  concept-development 
in the Moral Sentiments which is also found generally in his writings. The 
model evolves out o f his empiricism, which, as indicated above, imposes an 
intuitive ordering relation on concepts, arraying them from simple to 
complex and from concrete to abstract. The idea pervades Scottish 
Enlightenment thought but is most accessible through Enlightenment writing 
on history. In this context, the model is referred to as stadial or conjectural 
history. Stadialism is at the core o f Hugh Blair’s influential argument for the 
authenticity o f the Ossian poems, and it is pertinent to the discussion o f the 
structure o f both the Moral Sentiments and The M an o f  Feeling. Since it is 
frequently misrepresented in secondary literature it requires articulation.15
Enlightenment historians placed great investment in the stadial 
account o f society, according to which, there are four discrete stages in the 
development o f a society: hunter-gatherer, pastoral, agricultural and 
commercial. The move from one stage to another is progressive: the pastoral 
stage is an improvement on the hunter-gatherer stage; the agricultural, an 
improvement on the pastoral, and so on. The four-stage theory o f societal 
progress was described first by Adam Smith in the course o f a set o f lectures 
on jurisprudence.16 Smith was concerned to give an account o f property law, 
the one area that did not appear to yield to a natural-rights theory:
15 A good example o f confusion about the nature o f stadial history is found in 
Katie Trumpener’s discussion o f Johnson’s use o f stadial history in his A 
Journey to the Western Isles o f  Scotland  (1775) (in Samuel Johnson and 
James Boswell, Journey to the Hebrides, ed. Ian McGowan (Edinburgh: 
Canongate Classics, 1996)). Trumpener understands stadialism to be 
determinist, and mistakes the context in which Adam Smith introduced the 
stadial model o f social development -  his use o f it to explicate the evolution 
o f property law -  as an explanation o f workings o f the model itself, and 
consequently incorrectly glosses all contexts in which the literati 
subsequently used the model as based in considerations o f property and 
wealth; see Bardic Nationalism'. The Romantic Novel and the British Empire 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 72-82.
16 The lectures were delivered in 1762/3, but the doctrine possibly occurred 
in lectures he gave in Edinburgh as early as 1750 (Christopher Berry, The 
Social Theory o f  the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1997), p. 93).
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The only case where the origin o f naturall rights is not altogether plain, is in 
that o f property. It does not at first appear evident that, e.g. any thing which 
may suit another as well or even better than it does me, should belong to me 
exclusively o f all others barely because I have got it in my power; as for 
instance, that an apple, which no doubt may be as agreeable and as usefull to 
an other as it is to me, should be altogether appropriated to me and all others 
excluded from it merely because I have pulled it o f  the tree.17
Sm ith's theory is that a society’s economic basis determines the kinds o f 
property laws that that society will develop; and that as society progresses, 
the concept o f property becomes increasingly abstract, because its members’ 
experience o f  property alters, and the concomitant relation o f possession 
becomes more abstract. Hunter-gatherers have very few possessions; they 
can be said to own the creatures they kill and the fruit and plants they gather, 
but since food is eaten immediately, members o f hunter-gatherer societies 
will not accumulate property. Property and possession are inseparable. What 
may loosely be referred to as ‘property laws’, laws prohibiting theft, so 
protecting the right o f a person to his possessions, in hunter-gatherer 
societies, according to Smith, concern only murder.
The second stage, the pastoral, introduces tangible possessions in the form 
o f herds and flocks. The notion o f property at this stage will therefore be 
markedly different from that o f the hunter-gatherer stage. Property includes 
objects which a person may accrue -  it acquires temporal sustainability. 
‘Property’ can also become extended to include symbolic marks o f 
possession -  flocks marked in a specific manner will be regarded as the 
property o f their master simply by virtue o f being recognisably distinguished 
as his. Since property and here-and-now possession are no longer equivalent
17 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, in Alexander Broadie (ed.), The 
Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology (Edinburgh: Canongate Classics, 
1997), p. 478. Smith is here disputing John Locke’s theory o f property, 
according to which a man owns what he has laboured for, because he has 
laboured for it. Locke’s theory o f property starts from the premise that a 
m an’s own body is his own property, which, he argues, entails that ‘the 
labour o f his body and the work o f his hands we may say are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out the state that nature hath provided and left it 
in, he hath mixed his own labour with and joined to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property’ (Locke, Two Treatises on Civil 
Government, Second Treatise, sect. 27).
11
-  a shepherd’s flock remains identifiable his property even when the sheep 
are allowed to roam freely -  property becomes a more abstract concept.
The third and fourth stages introduce more changes in the notion o f 
property. The second stage is considered nomadic. The third stage is not. 
At the third, agricultural stage, property laws become more complex by 
virtue o f the different kinds o f objects which can become property -  in 
particular, land and houses. Property and possession also become clearly 
distinguishable. One may own a house or land without occupying either, for 
example, and laws protecting property, in accommodating this kind o f non­
physical relation with one’s property, will be accordingly more complex -  
and more abstract -  than the property laws o f societies in the previous stage. 
The fourth stage, the commercial stage, sees the introduction o f movable 
property. There is commerce in land for example; bartering gives way to 
fiscal exchange and eventually credit.18 The conclusions Smith reaches in 
his Lectures on Jurisprudence are given in precis form in the Moral 
Sentim ents:
The most sacred laws o f justice ... those whose violation seems to call 
loudest for vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and 
person o f our neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and 
possessions; and last o f all come those which guard what are called his 
personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises o f others. (II.ii.2.3)
The important features o f Smith’s stadialism are that the four-stage theory 
o f societal progress is an heuristic; and that a change in a society’s property 
laws is dependent on a change in its m em bers’ concept o f property. A 
society is said to progress in this regard as its concept o f  property becomes 
increasingly abstract. Justice in a society is ensured by a set o f laws which 
prohibit those actions which the society regards as punishable. Given 
Sm ith’s empiricism, it follows that a society’s property laws can only 
become increasingly more abstract when its members recognise that a 
person’s property rights range over correspondingly increasingly more 
abstract possessions. In other words, Smith’s four-stage theory encapsulates 
the empiricist credo that concept-formation is dependent on experience. If  a 
hunter-gatherer has no experience o f possession, then he will have no
18 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, p. 479.
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concept o f possession, and consequently no recognition o f his right to 
possession being violated.
Smith, like other Enlightenment thinkers, believed there to be universal 
truths about human nature; truths to which people’s behaviour conformed. 
The stadial theory was thought to be based on such universal truths, but 
Smith was clear that stadialism was descriptive only -  that fundamental 
truths about human nature generated the stadial model which he was then 
able to use as part o f his explanation o f the development o f property law. In 
other words, fundamental to Smith’s approach to social explanation is the 
belief that social phenomena should be treated as evidence o f the behavioural 
trends o f a society’s members, and not as determinants o f  that behaviour. 
Any set o f people under the circumstances o f one or other stage o f  societal 
development will naturally develop the same law-like patterns o f behaviour 
resulting in, for example, the same kinds o f property laws, as any other set o f 
people at the same stage o f societal development.
Enlightenment thinkers believed that observation o f different kinds o f 
societies and the study o f contemporary descriptions o f  past civilisations 
would reveal law-like patterns in human behaviour which would be 
descriptive (and not prescriptive) o f human nature in general. To make these 
inductions, they had to assume that all men are equal: that under the same 
environmental, social and psychological conditions, any person would 
behave in the same way as any other. But given the scope o f  the variable 
parameters in these explanations -  the variety o f kinds, and o f combinations 
o f kinds, o f environmental and social conditions in which man might find 
him self -  it made sense to observe as many different kinds o f  social 
groupings as possible.19 Only in this way could they be sure o f identifying
19 Boswell explains that these kinds o f considerations fuelled his and 
Johnson’s tour o f the Highlands and Islands: ‘Dr. Johnson had for many years 
given me hopes that we should go together, and visit the Hebrides. M artin’s 
Account o f those islands had impressed us with a notion that we might there 
contemplate a system o f life almost totally different from what we had been 
accustomed to see’ (James Boswell, The Journal o f  a Tour to the Hebrides 
(1785), in Samuel Johnson and James Boswell, Journey to the Hebrides, ed. 
Ian McGowan (Edinburgh: Canongate Classics, 1996), p. 163). As Boswell 
explains, the lure o f the Hebrides -  o f their promised stark unfamiliarity -
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the true regularities in m an’s behaviour, that is, o f  being able to differentiate 
between actual law-like patterns o f behaviour and coincidental or contingent 
or accidental convergence o f kinds o f behaviour. For the eighteenth-century 
theorist, the truly idiosyncratic had no place in the overarching explanatory
90endeavour.
Nothing in this account says anything about the movement from one stage 
o f  society to another, and there are several reasons why the literati will have 
shunned any kind o f determinism in their accounts o f the progress o f  society 
-  o f its historiography.21
First, they believed that all men are created equal -  in the sense that there 
is no inherent difference between members o f different societies. This 
thought is expressed by Hume:
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs 
us o f nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to
was their primitive state: their ‘simplicity and wildness’, their ‘circumstances 
o f remote time or place’ (ibid.).
In addition, Johnson records his disappointment at finding the Island 
communities recognisably altered by, and homogenous with, English mores 
(disappointed, in fact, that the governmental measures to bring the Highlands 
into line with the rest o f the country had taken effect, in the Islands at least): 
‘We came thither too late to see what we had expected, a people o f  peculiar 
appearance, and a system o f antiquated life. ... Such is the effect o f  the late 
regulations, that a longer journey than to the Highlands must be taken by him 
whose curiosity pants for the savage virtues and barbarous grandeur’ 
{Journey, p. 50).
Arguably, Johnson’s organisation o f material in the Journey  is influenced 
by a stadialist perception o f societal development.
20 Katie Trumpener gives a different account o f the difference between 
cultural historians and Enlightenment historians: the former ‘place their 
emphasis very differently, insisting on a notion o f  cultural tradition left out o f 
the natural and national histories o f the mainstream Enlightenment’ {Bardic
Nationalism, p. 29).
21 This is frequently misunderstood. For example, although Katie Trumpener 
correctly characterises the Enlightenment model o f history as ‘evolutionary, 
emphasizing the inevitability with which each developmental stage, each 
historical culture is replaced by the next, more advanced one’ {Bardic 
Nationalism, p. 29), she understands Enlightenment accounts to depend on an 
impersonal and endlessly recurring historical process to explain societal 
change. But the impersonal changes in Enlightenment accounts are just those 
which they cannot accommodate by natural laws, because these are 
unpredictable, and so certainly would not represent them as ‘endlessly 
recurring’.
14
discover the constant and universal principles o f human nature, by showing 
them in all varieties o f circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with 
materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted 
with the regular springs o f human action and behaviour;22
by Adam Ferguson:
Nature, therefore, we shall presume, having given to every animal its mode 
o f existence, its dispositions and manner o f life, has dealt equally with those 
o f the human race; and the natural historian who would collect the properties 
o f this species, may fill up every article now, as well as he could have done 
in any former age. Yet one property by which man is distinguished, has been 
sometimes overlooked in the account o f his nature. Or has only served to 
mislead our attention. ... [I]n the human kind, the species has a progress as 
well as the individual; they build in every subsequent age on foundations 
formerly laid; and, in a succession o f years, tend to a perfection in the 
application o f their faculties, to which the aid o f  long experience is required, 
and to which many generations must have combined their endeavours;2
and by William Robertson:
Our human mind, whenever it is placed in the same situation will, in ages the 
most distant, and in countries the most remote, assume the same form, and be 
distinguished by the same manners.24
It also underpins M illar’s justification for history and anthropology:
To investigate the causes o f different usages [of law] has been likewise 
esteemed an useful as well as entertaining speculation. When we 
contemplate the amazing diversity to be found in the laws o f different 
countries, and even o f the same country at different periods, our curiosity is 
naturally excited to enquire in what manner mankind have been led to 
embrace such different rules o f conduct; and at the same time it is evident, 
that, unless we are acquainted with the circumstances which have 
recommended any set o f regulations, we cannot form a just notion o f their 
utility, or even determine, in any case, how far they are practicable.25
22 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Nature (1748), quoted in Alexander 
Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment: The Historical Age o f  the Historical 
Nation  (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2001), p. 63.
23 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f  Civil Society  (1767), part I 
sect. 1, quoted in Broadie, Anthology , p. 502. Ferguson here states only that 
generation o f experience serves to perfect the use o f faculties; it does not 
endow them. M an’s capacity for certain behaviour is brought out by certain 
societal conditions, not created by them.
24 William Robertson, quoted in Broadie, The Historical Age o f  the
Historical Nation, p. 69.
25 John Millar, The Origin o f  the Distinction o f  Ranks (1771/1779), in 
Broadie, Anthology, p. 490.
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Second, the literati were well aware that the collapse o f  the Roman 
Empire, which precipitated the cultural impoverishment o f western Europe, 
demonstrated that movement from one stage to another is not always 
forwards, so not always lineal. Furthermore, a community may move from 
one stage to another through all manner o f accidental and so unpredictable 
causes -  as is acknowledged by both John M illar and Dugald Stewart:
Various accidental causes, indeed, have contributed to accelerate or to retard 
this advancement [in human society] in different countries. It has even 
happened that nations, being placed at a particular period, have been so 
habituated to the peculiar manners o f that age as to retain a strong tincture o f 
those peculiarities, through every subsequent revolution.
... when different theoretical histories are proposed by different writers, o f 
the progress o f the human mind in any one line o f exertion, these theories are 
not always to be understood as standing in opposition to each other. I f  the 
progress delineated in all o f them be plausible, it is possible at least, that they 
may all have been realized; for human affairs never exhibit, in any two 
instances, a perfect uniformity. But whether they have been realized or no, is 
often a question o f little consequence. In most cases, it is o f more 
importance to ascertain the progress that is the most simple, than the progress 
that is the most agreeable to fact; for, paradoxical as the proposition may 
appear, it is certainly true, that the real progress is not always the most 
natural. It may have been determined by particular accidents, which are not 
likely again to occur, and which cannot be considered as forming any part o f 
that general provision which nature has made for the improvement o f the 
race, to again occur.26
And Hume aside, the literati had to accommodate God, or Providence in their 
accounts, Adam Sm ith’s ‘invisible hand’ perhaps being the most well known 
o f such accommodations.
Finally, and most significantly, according to Enlightenment thought, 
m an’s behaviour could not at bottom be regarded as fully explicable, because 
he is essentially a moral agent, which implies he has free will, and hence has 
both the capacity for decision-making, and the capacity for irrationality, 
which is by definition, behaviour which is unpredictable. According to 
Adam Smith, the non-rational components o f m an’s make-up -  the senses, 
passions and appetites -  were superintended by the moral faculties:
26 Millar, ibid. p. 492; Dugald Stewart, ‘Account o f  the Life and Writings o f 
Adam Smith LLD’ (1793), in Broadie, Anthology, pp. 673-4.
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Upon whatever we suppose that our moral faculties are founded, whether 
upon a certain modification o f reason, upon an original instinct, called a 
moral sense, or upon some other principle o f our nature, it cannot be doubted 
that they were given us for the direction o f our conduct in this life. ... they 
were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters o f  all our actions, to 
superintend our senses, passions, and appetites, and to judge how far each o f 
them was either to be indulged or restrained. ... what is agreeable to our 
moral faculties, is fit, right, and proper to be done; the contrary, wrong, unfit, 
and improper.
and although man acts rationally only when he acts in accordance with the 
dictates o f the moral faculties, this far from implies that he has no option but
to do so:
... The happiness o f mankind, as o f all other rational creatures, seems to have 
been the original purpose intended by the Author o f  nature ... by acting 
according to the dictates o f our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the 
most effectual means for promoting the happiness o f mankind ... By acting 
otherways, on the contrary, we seem to obstruct, in some measure the scheme 
which the Author o f our nature has established for the happiness and 
perfection o f the world ... (TMS, III, 5.5-5.7)
However, m an’s nature was not considered in principle fully explicable. 
From a philosophical and methodological perspective (one which limited 
human inquiry even for a non-believer such a Hume) this followed from the 
belief that man’s nature inherently comprised irrational elements -  elements 
that by definition could not yield up law-like descriptions o f behaviour. 
From a theological perspective, this was in keeping with the idea that the 
discerned patterns were part o f G od’s universal architecture, and therefore 
m an’s understanding would necessarily be incomplete.
In 1729, Father Thomas Innes (1662-1744) published his Critical Essay 
in which he undermined the evidentiary foundations o f the Fergusian 
argument by exposing the forged regnal line on which Boece had based his 
early account o f Scottish kings. Innes then argued that the monarchy was 
founded in a Pictish hereditary crown. Innes undermined the evidentiary 
foundations o f the traditional Dalriadic argument, which, until he cast doubt 
on the veracity o f the Fergussian regnal line, was cited in evidence o f the 
ancient pedigree o f the Scottish constitution and, as such, used against claims
17
97to English suzerainty. Enlightenment historians took Innes’s Critical Essay 
(1729) as some kind o f watershed.
After Innes, a historical account o f Scotland no longer had to work round 
the Dalriadic myth. Instead o f iterating a list o f  kings, historians were able to 
work from the patterns they saw emerging in the histories o f other societies 
and civilisations. More liberating still, they were no longer constrained by 
theological considerations: by Mosaic history, and Calvinist predestination. 
History after Innes, could be built up using environmental and psychological 
considerations rather than the mythological and supernatural, and so became
98explicable to a much greater degree than was possible before.
27 See Colin Kidd, British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and  
Nationhood in the Atlantic World 1600-1800  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 123ff.
28 There is evidence o f this in Johnson’s Journey for example. Davis notes 
that Johnson conceived o f the idea o f writing a book about his journey when 
he became first aware o f the fundamental unfamiliarity o f  the country he was 
travelling in (Leith Davis, Acts o f  Union: Scotland and the Literary 
Negotiation o f  the British Nation, 1707-1830  (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 95-6). At the time in question, Johnson and 
Boswell had been travelling on horseback through the Great Glen with the 
aid o f Gaelic-speaking guides, for almost three days. On the first day out 
from Inverness, despite seeing a Highland hut, Johnson could compare the 
road they travelled as comparable with (but significantly less muddy than) an 
English lane. After three days he is battling with his reactions to the vast, 
forbidding and awesome mountains o f the Great Glen (reactions familiar to 
anyone who has been hillwalking in the area, so travelling only slightly more 
slowly than Boswell and Johnson would have done). It is at this juncture that 
he decides to write a book about his tour: ‘I sat down on a bank, such as a 
writer o f Romance might have delighted to feign. I had indeed no trees to 
whisper over my head, but a clear rivulet streamed at my feet. The day was 
calm, the air soft, and all was rudeness, silence, and solitude. Before me and 
on either side, were high hills, which by hindering the eye from ranging, 
forced the mind to find entertainment for itself. W hether I spent the hour 
well I know not; for here I first conceived the thought o f this narration’ 
{Journey, p. 34). He was hemmed in by mountains that had stirred mixed 
reactions by their unremitting yet barren presence: ‘An eye accustomed to 
flowery pastures and waving harvests is astonished and repelled by this wide 
extent o f hopeless sterility. The appearance is ... that o f  matter ... left in its 
elemental state, or quickened only with one sullen power o f useless 
vegetation’ {Journey, p. 33). With characteristic pomposity, Johnson lets the 
reader know he has never experienced anything like it, and couldn’t have 
hoped to have formulated an idea remotely resembling that experience from 
description or by analogy. He concludes: ‘Regions mountainous and wild, 
thinly inhabited, and little cultivated, make a great part o f the earth, and he
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Enlightenment historians saw their role as providing explanations, and 
furthermore, could justify these explanations in regard to their morally 
practical use in the pursuit o f virtue, as Adam Smith explains:
The design o f historicall writing is not merely to entertain; (this perhaps is 
the intention o f an epic poem) besides that it has in view the instruction o f 
the reader. It sets before us the more interesting and more important events 
o f human life, points out the causes by which those events were brought 
about and by this means points out to us by what manner and method we may 
produce similar good effects or avoid Similar bad ones.29
Most Enlightenment thinkers (an exception in this case being Hume as a non­
believer) perceived a third consequence o f Innes’ work. Innes established 
that the Dalriadic myth was false. The fact that Enlightenment historians had 
found a form o f enquiry which promised to yield truth, had import. Hume 
attempted to explain the difference that truth might make to a tale, without 
much success -  truth doesn’t add anything to the tale itself, but in some way 
serves to fix our attention:
If the importance o f truth be requisite to compleat the pleasure [of study], ’tis 
not on account o f any considerable addition, which o f itself brings to our 
enjoyment, but only because ’tis, in some measure, requisite to fix our 
attention.30
Others were in a better position to explain the difference the pursuit o f  truth 
made to their inquiries. The revelation o f patterns in m an’s behaviour was a 
source o f pleasure, because these patterns revealed something o f G od’s
that has never seen them, must live unacquainted with much o f the face o f 
nature, and with one o f the great scenes o f such human existence’ (Journey, p. 
34).
Johnson continues recounting his reactions. They comprise trying to 
imagine what life in that kind o f environment must be like -  and in so doing, 
is made very aware o f how fragile existence under these conditions will be 
{Journey, pp. 34-5). For the archetypal city boy, this experience must have 
been shattering. For the enlightened historian, it would have been exciting: it 
was as close to the experience o f a hunter-gatherer as could be imagined 
without adopting that lifestyle, although one feels that Johnson just couldn’t 
keep the desolation at a comfortable distance.
29 Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762/3), ed. J.C. 
Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) (hereafter LRBL), ii.16-17.
TO David Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature (1739/40), ed. Ernest M ossner 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969) II, x.
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cosmic architecture, that is, they endorsed the Argument from Design.31 The 
internal logic o f Enlightenment history is motivated by these historians’ 
belief that the patterns they discerned in m an’s behaviour contributed to an 
overarching pursuit o f  truth and virtue.
In addition to there being philosophically and theologically based 
methodological reasons blocking the option o f  determinism for 
Enlightenment historians, there was another set o f considerations which both 
provided an explanation for an inherent incompleteness in their accounts o f 
the nature o f man, and motivated the pursuit o f such accounts. If  m an’s 
make-up contains an inherent propensity for non-rational action, then there 
will always be elements o f m an’s behaviour which will not allow o f 
generalisation. (Theologically, once Calvinist predestination dropped out o f 
the picture, this could be taken to account for the source o f free will.) Yet it 
seemed possible to discern general law-like patterns o f human behaviour. So, 
there had to be an aspect o f man that overrode, or kept in check these non- 
rational propensities. The literati linked this aspect with virtue, and regarded 
this supererogatory facility to be a moral faculty or ability, or set o f moral 
faculties. Observing, collating and analysing behavioural patterns o f 
communities, societies and civilisations, then, revealed truths about m an’s 
capacity for virtue; about the conditions under which virtue flourished and 
those under which it failed to thrive. And it was this possibility for an 
account o f social conditions for the promotion o f virtue, which drove, or at 
least contributed a motivating element to, the pursuit o f  historical explanation; 
o f truths o f history.
The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers regarded m an’s moral behaviour to 
exhibit lawlike regularities in the same way as did other aspects o f his
31 Frances Hutcheson, for example, argues this in the context o f an account o f 
the sense o f beauty: An Enquiry into the Original o f  our Ideas o f  Beauty and  
Virtue (1738), in Broadie, Anthology, p. 223
32 An idea o f the eighteenth-century Enlightened view o f  human nature is 
given by the headings for each o f the three books in Hum e’s A Treatise o f  
Human Nature. Evidently Hume regarded human nature to be described as 
fully as possible in terms o f just three sets o f faculties: Understanding,
Passions and Morals.
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behaviour, and since moral concept-formation was founded in experience, 
changes in these regularities would be concomitant both with changes in 
other forms o f behaviour and with changes at a societal level. These regular 
connections are contingent -  the outcome o f concatenations; and as such they 
are highly likely but not inevitable, and not primarily prescriptive.
Improvement in eighteenth-century Scotland
Smith’s Theory o f  M oral Sentiments articulates the mechanics o f moral 
development at both individual and societal levels; that is, Smith attempted 
an explanation o f how moral concepts are formed, and the reason why certain 
kinds o f experiences can effect that development. His explanation was 
stadial but dependent on experience. This meant that improvement, 
understood as conceptual movement from simple to complex, could be 
considered to exhibit lawlike regularities. It also meant that if factors 
affecting or impeding conceptual development at either individual or societal 
level could be identified and controlled, then moral development could be 
enhanced or at least preserved.
The interest o f the Scottish philosophers and moralists in the nature o f 
moral goodness was much more than academic. As was the case with 
Enlightenment thought generally, it was a response to a perceived, 
potentially serious, set o f societal problems. The Scots literati believed the 
moral fabric o f Scots society to be under threat from the corrosive effect o f 
increased wealth and luxury. Henry Mackenzie referred to the intellectual 
and pragmatic elements o f Scottish Enlightenment endeavour in this field in 
an essay in the Lounger.
To the historian and the antiquary it is a matter o f curious investigation, to 
trace the progress o f expense and luxury through the different stages o f 
increasing wealth and advancing refinement in a country, and to observe the 
war which for some time is carried on between the restraining powers o f 
grave and virtuous legislators, and the dissipated inclinations o f a rich and 
luxurious people. ... The first sumptuary law that is passed is the signal o f 
that growing opulence which is soon to overturn it; and the weak barriers o f 
successive restraints and regulations are in vain opposed to a force which the 
progress o f time and o f manners daily renders more irresistible.33
33 Lounger, no. 54, 11 February 1786.
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Recent developments in London, as well as historical evidence from ancient 
Rome and early eighteenth-century Paris had shown that luxury lured people 
into large cities -  circles o f ‘extravagance, o f vanity, and o f vice’ -  and 
induced them to ‘waste their means, and to corrupt their principles’. The 
literati believed that contemporary social and economic developments were 
making Scotland vulnerable to the same corrosive influences:
In Scotland, at a very early period, attempts were made to control this abuse 
[luxury and dissipation], as it was thought, by law ... In these days o f liberty 
and enlarged ideas, the restraints o f law, or the recommendations o f  royalty, 
are not employed to check abuses o f that sort which do not violate the great 
bonds o f society or openly disturb the good order and government o f the 
state.j4
According to Mackenzie it is left to preachers and moralists to police ‘private 
vices and private follies’. The cause o f the problem was seen as the 
comparatively abrupt change in Scotland’s economic status and concomitant 
enormous change in the distribution o f wealth. The period 1750-80 was one 
o f great economic change in Scotland. Scotland’s economic growth during 
this 30-year span equalled that o f England during the previous two centuries. 
The reorganisation o f the farming system, the development o f the fine linen 
industry in Glasgow, and of ironworks at Carron were all evidence o f a
35change in the economic basis o f the country.
Communications within Scotland had improved dramatically: the gentry 
set up turnpike trusts in the countryside in order to better the roads. These 
changes within Scotland coincided with a period during which the turnpike 
network in England grew considerably. In 1741 the furthest north one could 
travel from London on (almost) continuous turnpike roads was Manchester, 
and the network was then very thin and sporadic throughout England. But by 
1770, the network centring on London had become significantly denser, and 
had spread throughout England and into Wales, with turnpike roads linking
34 Ibid.
35 Rosalind Mitchison, A History o f  Scotland  (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 
344-7.
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London with both Berwick and Carlyle. People and ideas could move more 
swiftly and easily within Scotland and between Scotland and England -  more 
pertinently, between Edinburgh and London.
When the seat of Scottish parliament moved from Edinburgh to London 
after the Treaty of Union, Scottish MPs had to spend the parliamentary 
session in London, and increasingly they began to move their bases from 
Scotland to London, leaving their estates in the hands o f stewards. This trend 
was deplored by the literati not merely because they saw it as detrimental to 
the landowners’ dependants within the agricultural community, but also 
because they believed it encouraged the spread o f London values into 
Scotland. The nobility and landed gentry o f Scotland set standards o f 
conduct within Scotland, and so by adopting those o f London, they 
introduced immoral city values north o f the Border.
The period during which communication with London became more 
efficient coincided with that in which certain sectors o f the Scottish
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population began to gain access to the means to increase personal wealth. 
Economically, the benefits to trade on which, arguably, Scottish support for 
the Treaty o f Union hinged, persistently failed to materialise for the first 
decades o f the century.38 There are several reasons for this, not least o f 
which being heavy taxes on imports levied by the government to meet
36 Paul Langford, ‘The Eighteenth Century (1688-1789)’, in Kenneth O. 
Morgan (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History o f  Britain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), pp. 352—418, pp. 378-9.
37
David Daiches, The Paradox o f  Scottish Culture: The Eighteenth Century 
Experience (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 6-8.
38 A remark by the Earl o f Roxburgh appears to justify emphasising the 
importance placed on access to the English market in Union debates: ‘The 
motives [for Union] will be, Trade with most, Hanover with some, ease and 
security with others, together with a general aversion at civill discords, 
intollerable poverty, and the general oppression o f a bad ministry, from 
generation to generation, without the least regard to the good o f the country’ 
(from a letter from the Earl o f Roxburgh, 28th Novem ber 1705; quoted in 
Paul Henderson Scott, ‘The Boasted A dvantages’: The Consequences o f  the 
Union o f  1707 (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 1999), pp. 22-3). Article 4 o f the 
Union settlement lifted restrictions on access to English home and imperial 
markets, and the treaty also ensured protection for certain aspects o f the 
Scottish economy, for example by providing subsidies for the woollen trade. 
In 1707 the English domestic market was o f more importance to the Scots 
than the imperial.
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interest repayments on the national debt incurred to fund war. By 1750, 
however, Scottish trade had increased enough to outweigh taxation, and 
continued to do so, despite two subsequent lengthy and expensive wars 
increasing taxation levels further.40 Connection with the English led to an 
influx of wealth and skills, particularly to lowland Scotland. It also opened 
up free trade areas to Scotland. British colonisation o f the West Indies 
provided a market for coarser linens for clothing for the slave population, and 
trade with America provided the material for the re-export trade in tobacco
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and cotton. Trade with both the W est Indies and the East Indies 
democratised wealth -  wealth and so power became the provenance o f all 
levels of society, unlike formerly when wealth was tied up in land and so 
restricted to the landed minority.
In addition to new sources o f wealth opening up through trade, there was, 
in Scotland, the opportunity to improve pre-existing sources o f  wealth. The 
population in Scotland increased significantly from 1740, and this had a 
marked effect on food prices in the 1760s, corn prices rising 160 per cent 
during the 60-year period from 1740. It gave an incentive to Scottish 
landowners to improve farming techniques, while improved communication
39 This, because war expenditure was financed by public loans, each loan 
requiring a new tax to enable the government to repay the interest.
40 By 1745, Glasgow imported 13 million pounds o f tobacco per annum, 
which volume increased to 46 million pounds (21,000 tons) by 1775, 
constituting between a third and two-fifths o f the value o f Scotland’s 
imports. Since most imports o f tobacco were for re-export, based on a 
regulatory provision in the Acts o f Navigation which prohibited direct trade 
between Chesapeake and foreign countries, the tobacco trade became victim 
to the American War o f Independence and withered after about 1783 (Bruce 
P. Lenman, Integration, Enlightenment, and Industrialisation: Scotland  
1746-1832 (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), pp. 23-4 , 42-4 ; Lenman, ‘From 
the Union o f 1707 to the Franchise o f 1832’, in R.A. Houston, and W.W.J. 
Knox (eds), The New Penguin History o f  Scotland: From the Earliest Times 
to the Present Day (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 289-90). It took two 
generations for Scotland to have a fair share o f the East India Company, as 
the company was exclusive to London. Tobacco became affordable before 
tea, but by mid-century, tea was found in Edinburgh’s charity workhouse 
(Mitchison, A History o f  Scotland, pp. 325-6; Lenman, ‘From the Union o f 
1707 to the Franchise of 1832’, p. 327; see also Murray G.H. Pittock, 
Inventing and Resisting Britain: Cultural Identities in Britain and Ireland,
1685-1789 (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 72).
41 Mitchison, A History o f  Scotland, p. 343.
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with England gave them access to information about advanced farming 
practices, together with experienced advisors. The landowners’ changes in 
policy to increase the yield o f their land required more intensive farming 
practices from their tenants. Farms were restructured to form larger and 
more coherent separate units; the old runrig system o f fields was dropped; 
and tenants were under pressure to stop overcropping and overstocking: 
increased farm size meant that land could be left fallow, a practice which
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increased the yield o f land three to six times. This practice also required 
more intensive farming from tenants to increase the grain yield o f the land.
The literati, and so Mackenzie, were not so backward looking as to 
condemn the increase in Scotland’s national wealth out o f hand, but sought a 
way both to encourage the improvements to city and country which it 
brought in its wake, and to retain the traditional moral value system. They 
wished to find a way of reintroducing the values o f moral man into a society 
which was rapidly being taken over by the materialistic ambitions which 
grew up with an increase in, and democratisation of, personal wealth in the
43
nation. The solution seemed to be to find a way to encourage the nobility 
and landed gentry to remain in Scotland -  to reduce the influence o f 
fashionable court-based London, and increasingly also o f  Edinburgh -  by 
reinstating the values o f a land-based aristocracy.
The Church o f Scotland, and the legal system were the two hegemonic 
domains in which Scotland remained independent after the Union, but the 
Church itself was in a state o f flux, so it was in no position to provide the
42
Ibid.
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Daiches argues that the issue contributed to concern on the part o f the 
literati that the union with England threatened Scotland’s national identity. 
The retention o f cultural characteristics became o f paramount importance to 
the preservation o f this identity (Daiches, The Paradox o f  Scottish Culture, 
passim, but esp. ch. 1). However, to generalise over even just the thirty-year 
period from 1750 is misleading; for example, Dwyer and Murdoch, argue 
convincingly that the Scottish literati in general, and, Dundas in particular 
and most surprisingly, became decidedly less oriented towards England, after 
the Bute smear campaign; see John Dwyer and Alexander Murdoch, 
‘Paradigms and Politics: Manners, Morals and the Rise o f  Henry Dundas, 
1770-84’, in John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander M urdoch (eds), 
New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture o f  Early M odern Scotland  
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), pp. 210-48.
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kind o f practical strategies for improving the morality o f a nation in the wake 
o f  huge economic change. Although within the Church o f Scotland, the 
rational religion o f the Moderates jostled with, and eventually superseded, 
the fundamentalist Calvinism characteristic o f the previous century, this 
failed to have a schismatic effect on the Kirk. However, by 1740, theological 
debate within the established church had given way to ecclesiastical dispute 
over the question o f patronage, which had been abolished in 1690 on the 
grounds that it opposed the principles o f ‘the call’, but which W estminster 
had restored in 1712, not without controversy, to bring the Church o f 
Scotland in line with the practices o f the Church o f England.44 In 1733, 
Ebenezer Erskine was suspended for refusing to withdraw an objection to 
patronage made to the Synod of Perth and Stirling, as were three ministers 
who supported him. These men rebuffed attempts by the General Assembly 
to appease them in 1734 and 1736, by calling themselves a presbytery. They 
were joined by four more ministers in 1737, and so instigated secession as a 
permanent feature within the Kirk. By 1760, the original secession had 
spawned 99 congregations in Scotland and more in Ireland. In effect, the 
Kirk by Law Established was divided as a result o f  tension between the 
medieval concept o f the nation as a homogenous community, and a social 
and political leadership which contained a significant ‘non-resident’ element 
not quite adhering to Presbyterian establishm ent.45 Schisms within the 
Church undermined any possibility o f it having the kind o f universal 
authority required to instigate the moral readjustment which the literati saw 
as necessary.
44 Patronage was the right belonging mainly to large landowners, town 
councils, universities and others in positions o f wealth and influence to 
present (select) a parish minister. As such, it flew in the face o f the call -  a 
basic tenet of Presbyterianism according to which a congregation as a whole 
selected and signed an invitation to a minister. The Crown was patron o f 
about a fifth of the parishes: o f 944 benefices, 344 were Crown patrons, 309 
were nobility, and 233 landed gentry (Callum Brown, ‘Religion and Social 
Change’, in T.M. Devine and Rosalind Mitchison (eds), People and Society 
in Scotland, vol. I, 1760-1830 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1988), pp. 143-62; 
the actual distribution o f benefices is given in Lenman, ‘From the Union o f 
1707 to the Franchise of 1832’, p. 309).
45 Lenman, ‘From the Union o f 1707 to the Franchise o f  1832’, pp. 306-13; 
Lenman, Integration, Enlightenment, and Industrialisation, pp. 11-12.
26
Hutcheson, Hume and Smith had argued that m an’s nature is intrinsically 
moral. Since the literati were not, in the main, philosophers, they did not 
explore this idea to ascertain its coherence, but they adopted its equation o f 
the intrinsic moral nature o f man with sensibility. The development o f 
sensibility then became the development o f  a moral capacity, and the 
intrinsic sociability of sensibility enabled the literati to argue for a practical 
morality which would achieve the intended end: the reintroduction o f 
traditional morals within a society which would necessarily change as a 
result o f  increased wealth.
Appeal to sensibility could ground the claim that it is part o f m an’s nature 
to act benevolently. A morally refined person has no option but to respond 
benevolently to genuine distress. But the natural capacity for sympathetic 
recognition o f another’s distress has to be developed, and the education o f 
this sense requires a controlled environment. Furthermore, a m an’s capacity 
for benevolence is naturally bounded -  an attempt to alleviate the distresses 
o f a large community is liable to encourage only ‘public acts o f virtue’, that 
is benevolence motivated by duty, which lent itself to abuse. The message to 
the landed society of Scotland became ‘execute your natural sensibility in as 
efficacious a way as possible: restrict your domain enough to ensure that you 
always act out o f genuine compassion’ i.e. remain on your estate and tend to 
the needs o f your dependants, the tenantry; pay heed to the moral education 
o f your children by setting a good example, and engendering the requisite 
environment to ensure the full development o f  their natural sensibility; and 
cultivate only those friends who endorse your priorities. And the motivation 
for this: acting from the dictates o f sensibility is pleasurable.
Philosophy had provided both the means for containing the morally 
destructive effects of increased wealth and the motivation for an individual to 
pursue the moral life.
2 A peculiarly  Scottish sentim entalism
As mentioned above, sentimentalism was an eighteenth-century 
philosophical movement based on the assumption that man is intrinsically 
good; that his capacity for virtue is perfectible; and that moral improvement 
depends on appeal to feelings rather than reason. The influence o f
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sentimentalism is evident in all literary genres o f  the period -  poetry, novels, 
drama and essays -  but for 30 years from 1740, its evolution is most clearly 
illustrated in fiction.
A new reading public had grown up during the first half o f the century in 
France, England and Germany. Non-aristocratic, puritan and practical, this 
readership warmed to literature celebrating virtue in domestic and
46commercial settings. By 1760, preoccupation with the notions o f sentiment 
and sociability had spread to literary circles in Italy, North America and 
Scotland, and sentiment had come to stand for all that was laudable in polite 
society. Earlier in the century, periodicals such as The Tatler (1709-11) and 
Addison’s Spectator (1711-12, 1714) had carried Richard Steele’s 
sentimentalist essays, and in Scotland, these were reprinted in the Scots 
Magazine together with essays and reviews from the G entlem an’s M agazine, 
the Monthly Review and other English periodicals.47 The Scots Magazine 
also carried translations o f Jean F ra n c is  M arm ontel’s Contes moranx, 
sentimental prose tales charmingly depicting French society under Louis XV, 
which appeared initially in Mercure from 1761 to 1786.48
During the 1740s and 1750s, sentimental fiction showed people how to 
behave. Samuel Richardson continually emphasised the morally instructive 
nature o f his novels. He states that Pamela (1740-1) had been written in 
order ‘to cultivate the Principles o f Virtue and Religion in the Minds o f the 
Youths o f Both Sexes’, and described Clarissa (1747-8) as an ‘Example and 
Warning’ about the ‘distresses’ resulting from a marriage contracted for 
morally reprehensible reasons, whether or not with the blessings o f a parental 
figure.49
Sentimental fiction is rich with cautionary tales demonstrating the 
perilous existence o f unchampioned feminine virtue in scurrilous and
46 Buchan , Crowded with Genius, pp. 302-3.
47 H.W. Thompson, A Scottish Man o f  Feeling: Some Account o f  Henry  
Mackenzie, Esq. o f  Edinburgh and o f  the Golden Age o f  Burns and Scott 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 102.
4 8 J.H. Brumfitt. Scotland and the French Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Oliver 
and Boyd, 1967), p. 322; John Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and  
Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland  (Edinburgh: John Donald, 
1987), ch. 1.
49 Emphasis in the original. Quoted in Todd, Sensibility, pp. 70-1.
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avaricious mixed society, and authors were at pains to ensure the reader 
benefited from their salutary effects. The earlier sentimental narrative is 
interrupted by philosophical disquisitions on the nature and practice o f 
benevolence, and major characters illustrate exemplary traits by word, deed 
and reputation. For example, Henry Fielding prefaced each o f the 18 books 
o f Tom Jones (1749), with an essay on a theme connected with the chapters 
that follow, and in Sir Charles Grandison (1753—4), Richardson introduces 
Sir Charles’ moral rectitude before the character him self puts in an 
appearance: Sir Charles’ opinion on matters o f virtue is delivered with a 
sententiousness that demands a reader’s attention; and onlookers express 
approval of, and praise for his displays o f virtue.50
As the genre became established, moralising and authorial direction 
became subtler. The writing encouraged readers to identity less with the 
characters than with the feelings engendered by the situations they 
encountered, and it leaned more and more towards evincing tears. While 
earlier novels laud benevolence, and the concomitant notion o f charitable 
action, the fiction of the 1760s emphasises feelings and sympathetic reaction. 
M ackenzie’s The Man o f  Feeling was published at the end o f a decade o f 
literature celebrating sentimental sympathy including Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
La Nouvelle Heloise (1761), Henry Brookes, The Fool o f  Quality (1766-70), 
Oliver Goldsmith, The Vicar o f  Wakefield (1766) and Laurence Sterne, A 
Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768).
The 1760s also saw M acpherson’s rise to fame. Fragments o f  Ancient 
Poetry was published in 1760, the epics Fingal and Temora appeared in 1762 
and 1763 respectively, and the controversy over M acpherson’s claim that 
these were translations from Gaelic o f authentic bardic literature from the 
third century AD, ensured the Ossian poems remained in the ascendant for 
more than a decade. The poems celebrated and conveyed the ‘joy  o f g rie f  
and were valued for what Hugh Blair described as their capacity to make 
readers ‘glow, and tremble, and w eep’, responses which left them ‘warmed 
with the sentiments o f humanity, virtue and honour’.51 Failure to be moved
50 Ibid., pp. 72-3.
51 Hugh Blair, A Critical Dissertation on the Poems o f  Ossian (1763; revised 
edn 1765), repr. in James Macpherson, The Poems o f  Ossian and Related
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by the poems was taken by devotees as evidence o f a deficiency in the reader, 
as shown by James Boswell’s record o f the response to the poems by Irish 
actor and elocution teacher, Thomas Sheridan: ‘Mrs Sheridan and he had 
fixed it [the poems of Ossian] as the standard o f feeling, made it like a 
thermometer by which they could judge the warmth o f  everybody’s heart.’52 
Mackenzie retained a fondness for the Ossianic cult o f  melancholy. Shortly 
before his death, he wrote o f the pleasures in old age o f the ‘milder 
melancholy’ of entertaining memories o f youth, in the course o f which he 
referred specifically to Ossian’s skilful evocation o f this kind o f gentle 
sadness: ‘I said o f a milder melancholy, because no man would wish not to 
feel it. Ossian expresses the feeling simply tho’ boldly in two Gaelic words, 
the jo y  o f  grief, which McPherson has softened down to the construction o f a 
sentiment: “the memory of joys that are past, pleasant and mournful to the 
soul”.’53
Literature which prompted tears in its readers was considered morally 
uplifting. This led to the expectation that readers would weep in response to 
sentimental fiction, and concomitantly, created an association between a dry­
eyed response to sentimental literature and moral shortcoming. The role that 
tears acquired as a benchmark o f moral refinement explains the Sheridans’ 
use o f the Ossian poems as a measure o f the warm-heartedness o f  their 
friends. It also explains why the more emotive scenes in The Man o f  Feeling  
received critical acclaim, and why readers felt anxiety about their ability to 
respond -  for example, why, when Lady Louisa Stuart first read The Man o f  
Feeling, aged 14, she was ‘secretly afraid lest she “should not cry enough to 
gain the credit o f proper sensibility’” .54
Works (1760-73), ed. H. Gaskill (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1996), pp. 345-99; pp. 396, 397.
52 • •Thomas Sheridan, quoted in Bosw ell’s London Journal 1762-1763, 8 
February 1763, p. 182.
ST Henry Mackenzie, ‘Reminiscence’, in The Anecdotes and Egotisms o f  
Henry Mackenzie, 1745-1831, ed. H.W. Thompson (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1927), p. 246; emphasis in the original.
54 From a letter to Sir Walter Scott, written by Lady Louisa Stuart in 1826, 
quoted in Vickers, ‘Introduction’, p. viii.
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The Man o f  Feeling has been described as a fine example o f sentimental 
writing, bul with little literary value.35 Critics holding this opinion regard 
M ackenzie's characters as indulging in effusions o f feeling to no purpose 
beyond that o f satisfying readers avid for pathos, and consider Mackenzie to 
have confused moral and emotional attitudes with the moral and 
psychological situations in which they arise.56
There are good reasons to challenge this reading o f  The Man o f  Feeling. 
As will be argued below, textual evidence strongly suggests that Mackenzie 
wrote with a didactic purpose, using the account o f the development o f virtue 
put forward by Smith in his Theory o f  Moral Sentiments. However, Smith’s 
theory is evident throughout M ackenzie’s writing.
Crucial to Smith’s Moral Sentiments is the idea that virtue is essentially 
sociable. His empiricist analysis o f moral concept-formation leads him to 
conclude that an individual cannot develop a concept o f virtue in isolation -  
that we are able to make moral judgements about our own behaviour only 
because we have learnt to do so about the behaviour o f others. This 
constitutes Smith’s most important contribution to the eighteenth-century 
debate over the nature of moral goodness.
Mackenzie wrote two further sentimental novels: The Man o f  the World 
(1773) and Julia de Roubigne (1777), and together with The Man o f  Feeling, 
these novels articulate Smith’s claim that the development o f virtue is a 
social process. The Man o f  the World has a standard narrative format in two 
volumes. It is a story of the havoc and distress that result even for those 
educated in virtue when disorientated by exposure to socially influential, but 
unprincipled ‘men of the world’. Harriet and Billy Annesly are brought up in 
a relatively secluded social milieu by their father Richard. Richard Annesly, 
a man of feeling with a high regard for virtue, accordingly gives his children 
a sound moral education. Despite this, both children are defenceless against 
the evils of the world at large, represented by the socially influential and
55 See for example, Daiches’ treatment o f The M an o f  Feeling  and o f 
M ackenzie’s writing generally in Daiches, The Paradox o f  Scottish Culture, 
pp. 75-7.
3 Daiches, ibid., p. 77; see also Vickers, ‘Introduction’, pp. vii-xxvi, esp. pp. 
xvi-xix.
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utterly unprincipled Sir Thomas Sindall, who succeeds in his aim 
systematically to corrupt them both.
Julia de Roubigne is an epistolatory novel set in France. The letters are 
written primarily by the protagonists: Julia; Montaubon, a French nobleman; 
and Savillon, a man of feeling and an intimate o f Julia. The letters reveal the 
complex emotional dynamics between the three characters, which are made 
tenser and more complicated by a great deal o f  second guessing and mistaken 
deduction by each concerning the intentions and actions o f  the others. Julia 
marries Montaubon, in part because this arrangement will ensure her father 
happiness and security in his old age, but also because she believes the man 
she loves, Savillon, to have married while abroad. She learns too late that the 
rumour o f Savillon’s marriage is false and with this information her mental 
state begins unravel. None the less, despite an unexpected appearance by the 
still ardent Savillon, Julia remains true to her husband. Flowever, 
Montaubon learns o f a connection between Savillon and Julia, becomes 
intensely jealous, deludes himself that his wish for revenge is a respectable 
response to an attack on his honour, and poisons Julia.
Despite the emotional pyrotechnics o f each novel, Mackenzie is careful to 
show that the sentimental heroes and heroines remain essentially virtuous 
throughout their respective ordeals. Julia de Roubigne’s behaviour never 
deviates from that o f dutiful daughter and wife. Billy Annesly is corruptible 
only when he leaves home to study in Oxford, a milieu which is at too great a 
distance actually and socially for his father’s sedulous virtue to remain 
actively influential. Flarriet Annesly falls victim to Sindall less through 
moral weakness than through gullibility. SindalTs initial attempts to seduce 
her fail to overcome her sense o f virtue, and his eventual success is wholly 
dependent on an elaborate deception: he arranges for H arriet’s coach to be 
‘w aylaid’ by ‘outlaws’, then appears to rescue her, taking her to recuperate 
from her ordeal in an isolated, empty house, where he sedates her heavily and 
rapes her.
The two later novels complement The Man o f  Feeling. In The Man o f  
Feeling, Harley develops morally as a result o f a short if abrasive exposure to 
the depravities o f London life, after which he returns to the bosom o f his 
family. Harley’s experiences differ enough from those in his domestic
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environment to throw into relief the advantages o f the virtuous life, without 
inhibiting or corrupting his moral development. By contrast, Billy and 
Harriet Annesly are overwhelmed by the depravity o f worldliness to such an 
extent that their connection with their virtuous background is broken, albeit 
in each case temporarily. In Julia de Roubigne the protagonists are similarly 
cut off from the influences of their virtuous mentors, not as a result o f 
intervention by the world but by social isolation. Although each 
communicates by letter with a friend who is close enough to be concerned 
about his or her welfare to take a balanced, dispassionate perspective on the 
situation, this kind o f social contact proves too weak to promote the 
discipline over their emotions that each needs in order to regain a sense o f 
proportion.
M ackenzie’s novels reinforce the idea that the development o f  virtue is 
essentially a social process. Each novel begins in rural innocence. The Man 
o f  Feeling and The Man o f  the World pursue the theme o f urban corruption, 
while Julia de Roubigne shows the difficulty o f retaining a healthy 
objectivity towards one’s emotional circumstances, when alone for long 
periods. In each case the moral o f the story is that the development o f virtue 
depends on an environment which enables an individual first, to learn how to 
make moral judgements through the guidance and example o f morally 
mature mentors, and then to continue to refine this facility through 
interaction with suitable peers.
Mackenzie continued to work with Sm ith’s model o f  moral development. 
He was active in contemporary moral discourse, and, in addition to being a 
leading member o f the Edinburgh literati, he became the editor o f the literary 
journals the Mirror (1779-80) and the Lounger (1785-6), for which he was 
also one o f the primary contributors. The journals resulted from the meetings 
o f  a group o f literary lawyers in the George Square area o f Edinburgh, who 
became known as the Mirror Club.57 The club, and the events that led to the 
publication o f the Mirror were described by Mackenzie in an article for the 
final issue of the journal:
37 Buchan, Crowded with Genius, p. 107.
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The idea o f publishing a periodical paper in Edinburgh took its rise in a 
company of gentlemen, whom particular circumstances o f connection 
brought frequently together. Their discourse often turned upon subjects o f 
manners, of taste, and o f literature. By one o f those accidental resolutions, o f 
which the origin cannot be traced, it was determined to put their thoughts 
into writing, and to read them for the entertainment o f each other. Their 
essays assumed the form, and soon after, someone gave the name o f a
r o
periodical publication.
The journals act as an index to what has been described as ‘the polite 
culture and practical moral discourse o f the late eighteenth-century republic 
o f letters09 and they show that Mackenzie retained an interest in issues he 
had addressed in his novels. For example, the moral questions raised by the 
story o f the seduction of an essentially virtuous but gullible young woman by 
a man too morally weak to withstand the influence o f  corrupt society which 
Mackenzie used in Miss Atkins’ tale in The Man o f  Feeling  is explored again 
in ‘The Story of Louisa Venom’ (1780);60 while ‘The Story o f Father 
N icholas’ which appeared in the Lounger in 1786 with the title ‘The Power 
o f Corrupt Society and False Shame over the Natural Feelings o f V irtue’, is 
highly reminiscent of Billy Annesly’s story in The M an o f  the World', the 
hero, Henry St Hubert, travels to Paris where he gradually falls under the 
influence of sophisticated but corrupt Parisian society. Like Annesly, 
although he is aware o f the depravity o f those with whom he keeps company, 
he is not morally strong enough to divorce him self from it.61
The idea that an individual cannot develop a concept o f  virtue in isolation, 
which recurs in Mackenzie’s novels and underpins the majority o f the 
contributions in the Mirror and Lounger,62 sets Scottish sentimental fiction 
apart from the sentimentalist writing o f the 1750s and 1760s, as well as 
differentiating it from early romantic literature. The lonely sorrow o f 
Goldsmith’s Deserted Village (1770) is more akin to that o f  G rey’s Elegy  
which was published almost twenty years earlier in 1751, than it is to The
58 Mirror, no. 110, 27 May 1780.
59 Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, pp. 24-6.
60 Mirror, nos 8-9, May 1780.
61 Lounger, 82-84, August-September 1786; see also Barker, Henry
Mackenzie, pp. 92-7.
62 This is pointed out by Dwyer, although he argues against its coherence and 
so also its importance (Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, pp. 62ff).
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M an o f  Feeling published only a year later in 1771; while considering 
G oethe’s Werther (1774) from within Scottish sentimental discourse, renders 
the young man’s suicide less romantically heroic than regrettably wrong­
headed.
The differences between M ackenzie’s protagonists and those o f his 
predecessors are subtle. This is unsurprising. Smith’s Theory o f  M oral 
Sentiments is a response to the same issues as those addressed in the 
sentimentalist philosophy influencing M ackenzie’s predecessors, and builds 
on these earlier responses. In other words, Smith refines rather than 
revolutionises the philosophy informing earlier sentimental fiction, and 
consequently the expectation will be that fiction based on Sm ith’s theory will 
reflect this refinement, in its difference from earlier literature, without 
departing radically from the conventions o f the genre.
The problem that bedevilled eighteenth-century empiricists was that o f 
giving an account o f moral goodness which did not rely on reason alone as a 
source o f moral knowledge -  that is, which did not explicitly or tacitly 
import the rationalist tenet that, in principle, moral properties or relations can 
be discovered in the absence of experiential knowledge. Sm ith’s views on 
the possibility of a rationalist account o f moral goodness were categorical: ‘it 
is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perception o f 
right and wrong can be derived from reason’. 63 The empiricist agenda 
became that o f explaining what in human experience leads to the concepts o f 
good and evil. The account had to cohere with moral reality, that is, with the 
way people actually behaved, and so had to accommodate the fact that 
human behaviour embraces both self-interest and altruism.
Egoistic accounts o f morality, for example, Hobbes’ Leviathan  (1651) and 
M andeville’s The Fable o f  the Bees (1721/1732) define good and evil by 
reference to self-interest and argue that what appears altruistic is actually 
modulated self-interest. According to Hobbes, for example, good is whatever 
an individual desires, and evil is what he hates. In an unregulated society -  a
63 TMS, VII, iii 2.7; quoted in Berry, Social Theory, p. 157. Since Smith 
denies only the possibility o f ‘first perceptions’ originating with reason, he is 
not denying that reason plays a role in the acquisition o f moral knowledge. 
This is discussed more fully below, pp. 146-61.
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state of nature -  every man has a natural right to what he judges he needs for 
self-preservation, including a right to his possessions. Since this yields a 
society in which every man acts in his own interests, so life is ‘nasty, brutish 
and short', Hobbes argues that it is in every m an’s interest to inaugurate an 
authorised sovereign to establish appropriate sanctions, and consequently 
morality becomes no more than forced compliance to the sovereign’s edicts.
Eighteenth-century sentimentalists rejected Hobbes’ egocentric account 
on the ground that it failed to yield an accurate description o f  human 
behaviour: humans are not irreducibly self-interested. For example, 
Shaftesbury argued that humans possess a natural moral sense -  a natural 
facility for discerning good and evil.64 Frances Hutcheson, the first Scottish 
Enlightenment moralist to enter the arena, developed Shaftesbury’s idea o f a 
moral sense. He defended it against M andeville’s objection that it was 
unfounded in day-to-day day experience by arguing that benevolence is 
irreducible to self-interest. This was a point on which the Scots moralists 
agreed. However, they disagreed over whether an explanation o f moral 
behaviour required a distinct moral sense.
Hutcheson defined moral goodness independently o f  self-interest by 
reference to some quality o f actions which prompts approval and love for the 
agent from those who receive no advantage from the situation.65 He argued 
that moral approval and disapproval are involuntary responses o f a moral 
sense, which operates independently o f self-interest, although can be 
obstructed by it. While Hume agreed with Hutcheson’s characterisation o f 
moral reactions as unmediated, he referred to the unmediated moral response 
as ‘sympathy’. However, Hume disputed Hutcheson’s equation o f the 
virtuous with the agreeable, arguing that justice, for example, although a 
virtue, is not always agreeable, and so cannot be accounted for by reference 
to a concept o f moral goodness defined in terms o f pleasurable responses to 
the actions of others. Hume also argued that there are also virtues which are 
grounded in utilitarian considerations, and so in reasoned response, rather
64 See Berry, Social Theory, p. 157.
65 Frances Hutcheson, An Inquiry concerning M oral Good and Evil (1725); 
see Berry, Social Theory, pp. 158-60.
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than derived from an unmediated natural moral response. Such virtues, 
which include justice, Hume termed ‘artificial’.
Sm ith’s Theory o f  Moral Sentiments responds to the theories both o f 
Hutcheson and o f Hume. Like Hume, Smith agreed with Hutcheson’s 
characterisation o f moral response as an unmediated reaction by a 
dispassionate observer, but rejected the notion o f these being the responses a 
distinct moral sense. However he disputed the legitimacy o f Hum e’s notion 
o f reason-based artifical virtue, and the M oral Sentiments is intended as a 
thoroughgoing empiricist explanation o f moral concepts which will 
accommodate those complex moral concepts such as justice for which Hume 
required the concept of artificial virtue.
As they stand, nothing in accounts o f moral goodness based solely in an 
unmediated response to another’s situation appears to preclude an individual 
from forming moral judgements on the basis o f his or her experience in 
isolation, whether the response is considered to be that o f a distinct moral 
faculty such as that proposed by Hutcheson or Shaftesbury, or the kind o f 
emotional reaction found in Hume’s theory. It follows that the heroes and 
heroines of sentimental fiction influenced by these kinds o f accounts o f the 
nature of moral goodness could be judged capable o f reaching unequivocally 
virtuous conclusions alone; and hence that literature centring on the 
emotional reactions o f a solitary protagonist would improve readers by 
appropriately eliciting approval or sympathy. By contrast, Smith’s theory o f 
moral goodness argues that an individual can only improve morally through 
interaction with others, and it follows that improving sentimental fiction 
based on Smith’s theory will reflect this. Sentimental literature influenced by 
Sm ith’s theory will elicit moral responses from a reader by way o f  the same 
kinds of emotional reactions o f its heroes and heroines as those found in 
earlier fiction, but these reactions will be regarded as reliable stimuli to moral 
development only if the protagonists are socially integrated.
It follows from these considerations that what critics have construed as 
confusion on Mackenzie’s part between moral and emotional attitudes and 
moral and psychological situations, could instead be explained as due to 
M ackenzie giving due weight to those elements o f Sm ith’s theory which 
differentiate it crucially from its predecessors, namely, the situational. This
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idea is reinforced by the fact that in his essays and novels, he modified 
scenarios familiar from earlier sentimental fiction in ways which emphasised 
the sociability o f virtue.
The similarities between M ackenzie’s Julia de Roubigne and Rousseau’s 
Julie, ou la nouvelle Heloise (1761) are noted by several commentators.66 In 
each novel, the heroine is in love with a young man whose wealth and social 
situation precludes their marrying. Each suitor goes abroad, after which the 
heroine is persuaded by her father to marry a man she does not love. The 
main differences between the two plots is that M ackenzie’s heroine remains 
chaste, while Rousseau’s heroine has an affair with St Preux, the man she 
loves, and becomes pregnant; and Montaubon becomes jealous and attempts 
to kill Savillon, while Julie’s impassive and benevolent husband invites St 
Preux to join the household. These plot differences reflect differences in the 
import of each tale. In Rousseau’s tale, St Preux’s love for Julie is enough to 
ensure his moral development -  and it is the love story that the reader is 
intended to respond to. By contrast, M ackenzie’s readers are encouraged to 
respond to the heroine’s situation, and to her resolutely dutiful behaviour as 
wife and daughter, which takes precedence over her love for Savillon. 
Romantic love in this tale causes sorrow and ultimately death, because it 
affects people in addition to the lovers.
A similar kind o f reworking can be seen in ‘The Story o f Louisa V enom ’
f n-  M ackenzie’s treatment o f the plot in M arm ontel’s ‘Lauretta’. In 
M ackenzie’s tale, Sir Edward is injured while travelling through Piedmont 
and nursed back to health by Venoni, a peasant, and his daughter, Louisa. 
Sir Edward falls in love with Louisa, and his emotions are strengthened when 
he learns that she is to marry, reluctantly, a rich but vulgar neighbour. Since 
the difference in their stations precludes Sir Edward from marrying Louisa, 
he attempts to persuade her to accompany him when he leaves to return to 
London, effectively requesting that she becomes his mistress. Initially
66 For example, Susan Manning, ‘Introduction’ to Henry M ackenzie, Julia de 
Roubigne, ed. Susan Manning (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999), pp. vii— 
xxviii, p. xi; Barker, Henry Mackenzie, p. 70; Thompson, Scottish Man o f  
Feeling, pp. 145-9.
67 Marmontel, ‘Lauretta’, Contes Moreaux (1781); see Barker, Henry
Mackenzie, pp. 89-92.
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Louisa refuses, but when Sir Edward is leaving, quite abruptly changes her 
mind. Once in London, Louisa becomes deeply remorseful about her 
situation, although blames only herself for her situation. By chance, she is 
reunited with her father, now living as an itinerant musician, having left 
Piedmont to search for her. Louisa’s father’s grief at the situation causes Sir 
Edward to feel such remorse that he offers to marry Louisa.
Once the self-absorption o f romantic love has been given free reign, the 
narrative in this story is fuelled by grief and remorse -  emotions which are 
dependent on the characters feelings towards each other. Edward and Louisa 
actively recognise and regret the consequences o f  their actions for Louisa’s 
father. This contrasts with M armonetal’s original version, ‘Lauretta’. 
Although M ackenzie’s plot is very similar to that o f Marmontel, in ‘Lauretta’ 
the heroine embraces the wealth, riches and sensual pleasures that Count de 
Luzy offers; and when Lauretta’s father eventually finds her, because 
Marmontel fails to convey any sense o f the protagonists being aware that and 
how their actions affect others, Lauretta’s remorse and Luzy’s proposal 
which are intended to convey a similar lesson to that o f ‘Louisa Venoni’, are 
developments driven less by the characters than by convention.
Although in each case, Rousseau and Marmontel had written a love story,
when Mackenzie reworked the tale, he moved the readers’ attention away
from the self-absorbed headiness o f romantic love to the inner conflict
suffered by each protagonist. In each case, the characters’ emotional
discomfort is the result o f their recognition o f  the impact o f  actual or
imagined or intended behaviour on others. In other words, the morally
uplifting emotional content depends on interaction between at least two
68people, and the moral discourse occurs in a real or imagined social context. 
Given the crucial role o f sympathy in Smith’s theory o f moral development, 
it is plausible to suggest that M ackenzie’s use o f the ‘joy  o f g rie f  was for 
more specific ends than has been recognised formerly, that is, that Mackenzie 
used the pathetic in his writing to stimulate readers’ moral improvement,
68 Real or imagined because of, for example, Montaubon, in Julia de
Roubigne.
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using the concept o f virtue put forward by Smith in his Theory o f  M oral
Sentiments.
3 The s truc tu re  of the discussion
In conclusion, there are good reasons to contextualise eighteenth-century 
Scottish sentimental literature by the themes and methodology o f  Scottish 
philosophy of the period; and so to regard Mackenzie as doing significantly 
more in his fiction than indulging a cult o f tears. Scottish Enlightenment 
thought was in part a response to social and political changes and 
developments that had been taking place on a national scale within Scotland 
since the turn o f the century -  changes which were seen to threaten what 
might be termed the moral meritocracy. History was understood as the 
discovery o f predictable social trends using records from the past in what 
would now be referred to as ‘longitudinal studies’ o f  the evolution o f 
societies, and history had revealed that the kind o f  economic growth 
experienced by Scotland during the eighteenth century spawned conditions 
which encouraged economic, political and moral deterioration in well 
established, polished society. Ancient Rome provided one example, and the 
more recent events in France under first the Sun King, then the Regency, 
provided another. After the Union, the political situation in Scotland was 
more or less a given, and the upturn in the economy was understood to be 
highly advantageous, in many ways, so the literati directed emphasis and 
energy towards preserving the nation’s moral health.
Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, philosophers had been 
concerned to give a non-egoistic account o f the nature o f moral goodness. 
Rousseau aside, the approach was empiricist. Adam Sm ith’s account o f 
moral goodness in the Theory o f  M oral Sentiments both refined the concepts 
foundational to the theories o f his Scottish predecessors, Hutcheson and 
Hume, and broadened their scope to yield a more thoroughly empiricist 
account from first principles o f the more complex moral concepts such as 
justice, guilt and remorse.
Smith’s explanation o f the formation o f moral concepts applied to 
concept-formation generally. On an empiricist account, all conceptual 
content is founded initially in experience, and non-experiential, complex
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concepts are derived by abstraction from simple, experiential concepts. This 
dependency relation between simple and complex ideas, and between 
concrete and abstract conceptual content imposes an ordering on concept- 
development, from simple to complex. Smith uses this to create the stadial 
heuristic widely found in eighteenth-century Scottish histories: the 
simple/complex conceptual continuum concatenates with the 
primitive/civilised societal continuum.
Central to Smith’s account is the idea that virtue is essentially sociable. 
This idea demarcates both the content and the methodology o f  Smith’s theory 
from those of earlier sentimental philosophers. It also has the potential to 
demarcate between didactic uses o f moral theory based on Smith’s M oral 
Sentiments and didactic uses made o f earlier theories, since the former will 
need to accommodate Smith’s requirement for the development o f virtue to 
be sociable.
Eighteenth-century sentimental fiction was written with a view to 
improving the reader, and there is strong evidence o f this didactic element in 
Scottish sentimental writing, particularly in the essays in the Edinburgh 
journals the Mirror and the Lounger, published during the 1780s under 
M ackenzie's editorship. Mackenzie has often been represented as taking 
advantage of the sentimental cult to indulge his preference for pathos, with 
The Man o f  Feeling being regarded as the last and one o f the finest o f  a long 
list o f sentimental novels published during the decade from 1760. However a 
closer examination o f M ackenzie’s sentimental writings shows him to have 
responded not so much to the popularity o f the sentimental genre, as to the 
publication of Smith’s Theory o f  M oral Sentiments in 1759. Unlike earlier 
sentimental fiction, including M acpherson’s Ossian corpus, plotting in 
M ackenzie’s novels seems to be regulated more by the kind o f  social 
interaction that occurs between protagonists than by stories o f romantic love 
now considered to be the defining characteristic o f sentimental literature. 
This suggests that Mackenzie intended to reflect Smith’s arguments for the 
influence o f social context on an individual’s moral development: for Smith, 
it is as damaging, morally, for individuals to be emotionally insular as is it is 
for them to keep corrupt society.
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The suggested reading o f M ackenzie’s novels is non-standard, and the 
proposed interpretation o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments is revisionist. As a 
result the bulk o f this thesis is devoted to establishing the credentials o f the 
claims: first that M ackenzie’s The Man o f  Feeling  is far from being the 
‘bundle of little episodes, put together without art’ it is billed as in the 
preface to the novel; and second, that Smith’s Theory o f  M oral Sentiments is 
a hypothetico-deductive account o f moral development, and not the 
collection of moral prescriptions it is often taken to be.
Working with Smith’s theory will have placed severe constraints on the 
structure of Mackenzie’s book. According to Smith, an ability to make 
moral judgements is a learned skill, dependent on practised reasoning about 
the right kind o f experience. Furthermore, this skill develops in identifiable, 
if not precisely defined stages, and is cumulative: each level o f moral 
competence is necessary for the next. In chapter I, I show that The M an o f  
Feeling is structured in a way which will provide a reader with the kinds o f 
vicarious experiences and ‘graded’ practice in moral reasoning which will 
encourage the development o f capacity for refined, sensitive moral 
judgements. I shall argue that the lack o f narrative continuity in the book has 
didactic import, because it enabled Mackenzie both to write episodes suitable 
for identifiable stages of moral development and to move from stage to stage 
without using or implying any specific connection between stages, so 
upholding the basic non-determinism that underpins stadialism. The moral 
content o f episodes in the book also reflects the stadial model o f 
development in progressing from simple to complex. Each episode describes 
Harley’s experiences, the progression ensures that Harley improves morally, 
and because the reader is assumed is to share H arley’s experiences, albeit 
vicariously, the reader will also develop morally.
The structure o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments is complex and detailed -  
particularly in the opening sections. This is inevitable. Smith was concerned 
to construct an empiricist theory o f morals from first principles, which means 
that the atomic elements o f the theory must be irreducible by reason, but 
accessible through experience. In other words, Smith could not explain the 
fundamental elements o f his theory, only describe them. Since the theory is 
sentimentalist the atomic elements are feelings, and Smith had to aim to
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evoke the relevant feelings in his readers through his description. Critics 
often fail to appreciate this aspect o f the text and in consequence, fail to 
grasp the intended import o f the book. In addition the aetiology o f the theory 
is complex. Smith builds on Hum e’s work in the moral sciences, refining and 
redefining certain o f his key concepts. Somewhat unexpectedly, New ton’s 
gravitational theory is equally important to the M oral Sentiments’. Smith 
constructs his theory using New ton’s methodology for scientific explanation. 
Although Locke’s influence on eighteenth-century philosophy in general and 
on Sm ith’s work in particular is widely acknowledged in the secondary 
literature, precisely which elements o f Lockean empiricism are in play at any 
given time is rarely made plain, and in regard to Sm ith’s writing, this 
adversely effects the interpretation o f the text. As a result, the justification 
for the revisionist reading o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments proposed here 
requires both a detailed account o f the philosophical background to Smith’s 
work, and a close examination o f the text itself.
The bulk o f chapter II is devoted to a description o f the key concepts in 
the M oral Sentiments in order to demonstrate the way in which Smith 
constructs complex moral concepts from the unmediated irreducible 
emotions he identifies as primitive moral reactions. I explain the relation 
between Sm ith’s work and that o f Hume, and explain the difference between 
their respective concepts o f sympathy. Sympathy in each case refers to an 
analytically primitive, unmediated moral response, and I show how Smith’s 
notion o f sympathy, but not that o f Hume, entails that virtue is essentially 
sociable.
Smith’s theory o f concept development, and concomitantly his notion o f 
impartial spectatorship, are crucial to his account o f  conscience and moral 
self-government. Both are dependent on the presupposition that human 
behaviour exhibits lawlike regularities. I argue that this idea functions in the 
same way in Sm ith’s account o f  rules o f conduct and in his understanding o f  
stadial history, and consequently that Smith’s moral theory is stadialist. This 
conclusion is crucial to the claim made above that the notion o f moral 
improvement which informs M ackenzie’s novels differs from that in earlier 
sentimental fiction.
For his theory to be complete, Smith needed to explain the possibility o f 
moral change. Given the emphasis he places on the sociability o f virtue and 
the regularities in man’s moral behaviour, this threatens to unseat his theory. 
I show how Smith accommodates this difficulty in a way which explains 
moral improvement at a societal level as well as for an individual and argue 
that he uses his account to explain moral deterioration. Finally I show how 
Mackenzie applies Smith’s theory to the idea o f educating for virtue which is 
used in his sentimental fiction.
The final part o f the thesis pursues and strengthens the claim that Smith’s 
moral theory shaped the literati’s idea o f a virtuous education. Hugh Blair’s 
enthusiasm for the M acpherson’s Ossian poems, evident from his Critical 
Dissertation . is partly because the poems appear to give the reader privileged 
access to the thoughts and emotions o f a member o f an ancient and primitive 
society. Blair's discussion o f the poems and o f ancient poetry generally 
depends on a specific theory o f social development, namely Sm ith’s stadial 
theory. Blair's argument for the antiquity o f the poems presupposes that the 
study o f languages and literature also yields to a stadial approach. This 
discovery about the scope of stadialism explains the anomalous status 
accorded by eighteenth-century readers to Ossian’s character: the stadial 
nature of concept-development will be evident in changes in the language o f 
an individual or in the conceptual complexity o f the language o f a society. 
Moral improvement, then, will become evident linguistically.
In chapter III, I first describe the Ossianic corpus and explain Blair’s 
stadial approach to the comparative study o f ancient poetry found in his 
Critical Dissertation. Blair uses a grammatical analysis o f  the Ossian poems 
to support his claim for their antiquity. I explain the assumptions about 
language development on which Blair’s analysis rests and, drawing on 
Sm ith’s remarks on love, the reasons why Blair draws conclusions about 
O ssian’s moral character from the grammar o f the poems. Finally, I argue 
that Mackenzie acknowledges the influence o f both Smith and Macpherson 
in The Man o f  Feeling by using a meeting between an Ossianic hero and a 
British soldier, to comprise the culmination o f H arley’s moral education, as 
well as that o f the reader.
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The centrality o f the notion o f improvement to Scottish Enlightenment 
thought is now well established.69 Often, modernisation and improvement in 
eighteenth-century Scotland are discussed in connection with the legal, 
political and economic effects o f the Union -  the impact o f the Union on 
trade and agriculture in Scotland, for example. ‘Improvement’ as a social and 
moral endeavour tends to be discussed under the general rubric o f ‘polite 
society’. However, the conclusion drawn from this discussion o f  the role o f 
improvement in literary and philosophical contexts not only underlines how 
pervasive the concept was in Enlightenment discourse, but also shows why it 
was given so much weight. ‘Improvement’ in Scotland during the later 
eighteenth century referred specifically to a model o f conceptual 
development first put forward by Smith. According to this model, there are 
lawlike regularities in the ways in which societies or individuals improve -  
or deteriorate. Since Smith’s M oral Sentiments explained the general 
motives and mechanics of social change, as well as indicating signs o f moral 
improvement and symptoms o f deterioration, the theory introduced a degree 
o f structure and precision to the concept and as such seemed to open up the 
possibility of exercising some control over the rate and direction o f societal 
change.
Read in the light o f this interpretation o f Smith’s theory, the structure and 
content of The Man o f  Feeling shows M ackenzie to have modified the 
improving nature of sentimental fiction to accommodate Smith’s findings. 
For Mackenzie and for the eighteenth-century Scottish moralists generally, 
virtue is sociable, and a virtuous education proceeds in identifiable, if  
indefinable, stages.
69 N.T. Phillipson, and Rosalind Mitchison, ‘Introduction to the 1996 edition’, 
in N.T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison (eds), Scotland in the Age o f  
Improvement (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. ix-xi.
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I The Man o f Feeling
Today, it seems surprising to question whether The Man o f  Feeling  is 
accurately characterised as a novel. The frame, structure and narrative have 
all the hallmarks o f the kind o f sustained fictional tale paradigmatic for this 
classification. Furthermore, it is now regarded as representative o f late 
eighteenth-century sentimental fiction; that is, as representative o f a genre, 
the object o f which was to illustrate the alliance o f acute sensibility with 
virtue. Although ‘sensibility’ is variously defined, it is essentially an 
immediacy o f sensation outrunning thought.1 However, there are indications 
that Henry Mackenzie regarded him self as having written something other
than a novel. In a letter written to his friend, James Elphinstone, almost a
2
year before the book was published in 1771, he claimed that The Man o f  
Feeling  is ‘perfectly different than a novel’, and in Anecdotes and Egotisms 
he describes the book as a ‘a novel, different from most others, containing
3
little plot or incident’. In this chapter, I argue that M ackenzie’s claim to 
have written something other than a novel is valid -  that going beyond the 
relatively uneventful narrative, the book may be read as a catalyst for the 
development of sensibility, an aim which was in the ascendant in the late 
eighteenth century; and, following John Dw yer’s thesis in Virtuous
1 J.M.S. Tompkins, The Popular Novel in England, 1770-1800  (1932) 
(Lincoln, NE: University o f Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 95. Mary 
Wollstonecraft writing in the late 1780s, described sensibility as ‘the result o f 
acute senses, finely fashioned nerves, which vibrate at the slightest touch, 
and convey such clear intelligence to the brain, that it does not require to be 
arranged by the judgem ent’ (quoted by Tompkins, ibid., from
W ollstonecraft’s unfinished oriental tale ‘Cave o f Fancy’).
2
23 July 1770, Henry Mackenzie, Literature and Literati: The Literary 
Correspondence and Notebooks o f  Henry M ackenzie, vol. I: Letters 1766- 
1827, ed. H.W. Drescher (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1989), p. 
48.
3
Henry Mackenzie, The Anecdotes and Egotisms o f  Henry Mackenzie, 1745- 
1831, ed. H.W. Thompson (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 186.
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Discourse , that it expounds a practical morality which had particular 
relevance for the nobility and gentry o f Scotland.
I have structured my discussion as follows. In section 1 ,1 give a synopsis 
o f  the plot and o f what might loosely be called the ‘action’ o f The Man o f  
Feeling. In section 2, I consider the structure o f the book and the themes 
underpinning Harley’s experiences in London, with a view to indicating the 
kinds o f pointers given by Mackenzie concerning the way in which he 
intended the book to be approached. This leads to a closer examination, in 
section 3, o f the relation between the themes o f the chapters and the structure 
o f the book. In section 4, I suggest that the chapter sequences up to Harley’s 
departure from London chart the development o f his sensibility, and that 
M ackenzie’s concept o f the ways in which this can be developed ensures that 
a reader may be regarded as similarly experiencing such a development. In 
section 5, I suggest that in addition to writing a manual for the development 
o f sensibility, Mackenzie propounds a practical morality which gives purpose 
to refining sensibility; further I suggest that Edwards’ tale is crucial to the 
practical morality aspect o f the book. I rely heavily on Dw yer’s thesis that 
eighteenth-century sentimentalist philosophy informed a practical morality o f 
a peculiarly and identifiably Scots bent among the Edinburgh literati, o f 
which Mackenzie was a leading member. In section 6 , 1 outline the kinds o f 
national issues which will have preoccupied the literati, and suggest that 
these create the context for M ackenzie’s practical morality. The conclusion is 
that the real action o f the book concerns the course o f moral development in 
Harley, the hero, and that, by implication, Mackenzie aspired to induce the 
same increased moral sensitivity in his readership -  that The Man o f  Feeling 
is less a novel than a primer o f practical morality.
1 Synopsis of The M an o f  Feeling
The plot o f The Man o f  Feeling is straightforward and simple, as was
5
M ackenzie’s intention. Further, with the exception o f momentary high
4
John Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late 
Eighteenth-Century Scotland  (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987).
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drama generated by a case o f mistaken identity, it is very quiet. It is also 
very damp: great moments invariably involve tears, as is characteristic o f 
sentimental fictional writing. It is the story o f an ingenuous, naive and 
highly sensitive young man’s sojourn in London to apply for the lease o f 
Crown lands abutting his small country estate, with a view to improving his 
comparatively lowly financial position; the adventures which there befell him; 
and events subsequent to his return home empty-handed.
Having been persuaded to travel to London in pursuit o f  the lease, Harley, 
the principle character, takes leave o f the maiden aunt with whom he lives, 
and the daughter o f a neighbour for whom he harbours unprofessed love, and 
begins his journey. Before he reaches London he has been relieved o f a 
shilling by a beggar’s dog.
Once in London he is bowled by friends and by chance, from one incident 
to another, meeting with increasingly insistent evidence o f  the corrupt nature
o f life in the metropolis, at that time M ecca for the rich and fashionable and
6regarded by the morally upright as a den o f iniquity. He is misled by an 
excise m an’s dress and conversation, into believing him to be a gentlemen; 
and is, by turn, horrified, bemused and distressed by inmates o f Bedlam 
where he mistakes an inmate for a guide. He has dinner with an intractable 
misanthropist. He has a hectic 24 hours which begins by his being taken up 
by a company of card sharps who relieve him o f most o f his money. 
Extricating himself from their company, he sets out to honour a prior 
engagement, but is accosted by a prostitute on the Strand, and prevailed upon 
to buy her a drink in a brothel, at which juncture the prostitute faints with
In a letter to his cousin, Elizabeth Rose, Mackenzie said o f the narrative: 
‘you wou’d find the Hero’s Story, even if  it were finish’d & I were to send it 
you entire, simple to Excess’, 31 July 1769 (Letters to Elizabeth Rose o f  
Kilravock: On Literature, Events and People, ed. H.W. Drescher (Munster: 
Verlag Aschendorf, 1967), p. 18). In Anecdotes and Egotisms, Mackenzie 
described the book as ‘merely a sketch o f some particulars o f the life and 
sentiments o f a man of more than usual sensibility’ (Anecdotes and Egotisms,
p. 186).
6
Harley’s aunt, for example, considered London to be ‘so replete with 
temptations, that it needed the whole armour o f her friendly cautions to repel 
their attacks’ (ME, p. 18); and his manservant, Peter, ‘choaked’ at the mere 
thought o f London, which he described as ‘a sad place’ (M F , p. 19).
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hunger. Once she has revived, Harley arranges a chair to convey her home, 
and elects to visit the woman the following morning. Giving her the little 
money left to him after his card-playing, he leaves him self without the means 
to settle the bill for their wine, and consequently has to pawn his watch in 
lieu o f payment. Only then does he manage to keep his original engagement.
The following morning Harley’s visit to the prostitute is interrupted by 
unexpected arrival o f her father, who, mistaking Harley for the man who 
caused her downfall, threatens to run him through with his sword. Once this 
confusion is dispelled, Harley arranges for both father and daughter to lodge 
at his house.
On learning that his application for the Crown lease has been unsuccessful, 
Harley promptly arranges to return home. Taking a stage coach for much of 
the journey, he strikes up an acquaintance with a fellow passenger, Ben 
Silton, an elderly man after his own heart; and after alighting to walk the 
remainder o f the way, his path coincides with that o f Edwards, a veteran 
returning from India, and someone o f whom Harley had been fond as a child.
The connection with Edwards is sustained for the rest o f the story. 
Edwards and his family move into a small farm on H arley’s estate. Edwards 
is also the unwitting cause o f Harley’s early death, for, while helping nurse 
him through a fever, Harley contracts the same. During his illness, he plucks 
up courage enough to declare his love for Miss Walton, learns that it is
7
reciprocated, and dies.
The story lacks the passion and intrigue o f a romance, and the hurly burly
o f the picaresque. Villains are sanitised, as are potentially upsetting or
8
distasteful scenes. A woman, but not a maiden, is rescued, and then from
7
Tompkins (Popular Novel, p. 54), and Vickers in his introduction to The 
Man o f  Feeling suggests H arley’s death is from an excess o f joy  (Brian 
Vickers, ‘Introduction’ to Henry Mackenzie, The Man o f  Feeling  (1771), ed. 
Brian Vickers, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. vii-xxvi, p. xvi); 
see Smith’s account o f the deleterious effects o f joy, given below, p. 122, n.
78.
8
For example, Mackenzie does not exploit the potential for wallowing in 
Gothic description o f the incurably mad (M F , p. 30); and treats with delicacy 
the seduction o f Miss Atkins, the prostitute, her subsequent pregnancy and 
miscarriage {MF, pp. 58-9, 64-5).
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destitution and not a dragon. And we are denied a happy ending. Man of 
Feeling he might be, but Man o f Action, Harley is not.
2 The structure of The Man o f  Feeling
The synopsis o f the action o f The Man o f  Feeling given in section 1, follows
the book almost chapter by chapter, and so shows that the narrative both has
a unity, and, as far as charting Harley’s experiences, occurs within a single
9
time-scale. However, Mackenzie chose to present the text as if  it is only part 
o f a complete history of Harley. This required considerable thought in the 
organisation o f the material in order to ensure enough o f the tale is given for 
a reader to follow the narrative while giving plausibility to the alleged 
incompleteness o f the text. Although superficially, the organisation o f the
text invites the description given by the fictive editor as ‘a bundle o f little
10
episodes, put together without art’ closer study o f the text reveals this is far 
from the case. A rationale for M ackenzie’s decision to present the tale in this 
form can be derived from considering the book to have didactic purpose.
The heart o f The Man o f  Feeling is presented as the published version o f 
an edited but incomplete manuscript, the author o f which, though known to 
Harley, is unknown to the editor and remains unknown to the reader, 
appearing in person only in the first and closing chapters o f the alleged
li
manuscript. The chapter numbering is to be understood as that o f the 
original manuscript, but of the implied original 56 chapters plus conclusion, 
we are given only 20 complete sections and 3 fragments. The fictional editor 
explains the reason for the incompleteness o f the original manuscript in his
9
I have qualified the statement because the book is read at two removes from 
the narrative, as a result of Mackenzie introducing both a fictive author o f the 
manuscript writing retrospectively and a fictive editor at a later period again.
MF, p. 5; Mackenzie also refers to it as a ‘very odd M edley’ (8 July 1769, 
Letters, p. 16), and as ‘a sketch o f some particulars o f the life and sentiments 
of a man of more than usual sensibility’ {Anecdotes and Egotisms, p. 186).
Harley’s biographer appears in the body o f the book in discussion with 
Ben Silton in the opening chapter o f the alleged manuscript (ch. XI), and 
again in the closing chapters o f the book where he reveals that Harley was 
one o f a small number of friends remaining after he was struck by ‘the 
malevolence o f fortune’ {MF, p. 127). However the voice o f the author 
appears on occasion throughout.
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introduction: the missing pages had been used as wadding by the curate into
12
whose hands the manuscript fell between author and editor. Towards the 
end o f the book we learn that the editor him self had omitted some o f the 
extant text, because the inroads o f the curate had rendered it too disjointed 
{MF, p. 125). Somewhat curiously, in addition to writing the book with 
implied lacunae, Mackenzie chose to include a section which is presented as 
having been added to the original by an unknown hand {MF, pp. 40-2).
13
Mackenzie wrote the book in fits and starts. Furthermore, in a letter to 
his cousin, he explains that he did not write the episodes in the order in 
which they appear finally: ‘I think I informed you before that the Chapters o f 
the Performance were wrote occasionally at different Periods; frequently not
14
in the order in which they appear.’ The book is therefore far from a 
collection or bundle o f episodes put together ‘without art’. Mackenzie will 
have organised the text to ensure that the reader is given enough information 
about the principle character for the narrative to make sense while also 
sustaining the fiction that the book is taken from an incomplete manuscript.
On the face o f it, Harley’s adventures in London seem to be ordered 
randomly: it hardly matters whether Harley meets the prostitute before or 
after he is fleeced by the card sharps, and whether he has dinner with the 
misanthropist before or after he visits Bedlam, since no narrative action 
hangs on the outcome of any o f the episodes occurring in London -  there is 
no causal chain o f events through this part o f the text. However, 
M ackenzie’s remark to his cousin about ordering the text is made in 
connection with the prostitute’s tale, part o f the London sequence o f chapters,
12
MF, p. 5; the reader is reminded o f the curate’s intervention in a note to the 
opening chapter o f the tale proper {MF, p. 7).
13
In a letter written to Elizabeth Rose, and accompanying a copy o f the 
introduction to The Man o f  Feeling, Mackenzie wrote ‘I began with this 
Introduction & write now and then a Chapter as I have Leisure or Inclination’ 
(8 July 1769, Letters, p. 16).
14
29 November 1769, Letters, p. 29. In an earlier letter, Mackenzie referred 
to ‘some detach’d Essays’ he’d written when in London, on ‘Men & 
M anners’ (8 July 1769, Letters, p. 29), some o f which are found in his Passe- 
Temps, a notebook o f largely unpublished prose and poetry written between 
1763 and 1766; see Gerard A. Barker, Henry M ackenzie (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1975), p. 42.
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so Mackenzie has to be considered to have ordered this material according to 
some alternative train of thought -  an alternative internal logic.
The logic driving M ackenzie’s ordering o f events begins to surface if we 
consider the book’s most obvious, if  limited, formal structure -  the chapter 
numbering, which, with the exception o f one chapter towards the end o f the 
book, occurs in short runs or sequences. Giving weight to the runs in the 
chapter numbering within each sequence, the tale in each chapter can be seen 
to be related to those o f other chapters in the same sequence. Furthermore, 
M ackenzie’s introduction o f chapter fragments can be argued to have 
didactic purpose in addition to their role in sustaining the fictive explanation 
for the incompleteness of the text; and that the divisions o f the text resulting 
from the alleged lacunae in manuscript correspond to movement from level 
to level as Mackenzie guides his reader through the stages o f moral 
maturation (see section 4).
The first four chapters take us up to the point where Harley, having left 
home for London, pauses for the first time in his journey. Alighting from the 
chaise which took him from his house, and deciding against his original 
intention to breakfast at the inn at which they have drawn up, Harley opts 
instead to stretch his legs:
He walked out on the road, and gaining a little height, stood gazing on that 
quarter he had left. He looked for his wonted prospect, his fields, his woods, 
and his hills: they were lost in the distant clouds! He pencilled them on the
15
clouds, and bid them farewel with a sigh!
MF, p. 19. Here we are given the impression that Harley is well and truly 
beyond the boundaries o f his familiar domain. It is quite possible that he 
hasn’t travelled at all. We learn later that he was at school at South-hill {MF, 
p. 87) which is ‘distant but a short day’s journey’ from his estate (M F, p. 99). 
And given the lack o f consideration to his education, and presumably his 
financial position he w on’t have been on the customary Grand Tour. The 
extent of his ignorance o f the world at large becomes more evident when 
within minutes o f taking farewell o f his ‘distant’ home, he meets a beggar 
who knows him by name (M F, p. 20). That Harley’s London sojourn is his 
equivalent o f a Grand Tour o f Europe is suggested on MF, p. 100, when he 
returns home without the lease but accompanied by Edwards, his two 
grandchildren, a borrowed horse and a borrowed servant. His return with this 
retinue is described as giving him as much enjoyment ‘as if  he had arrived
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And at this juncture, when he feels very definitely ‘away from hom e’, he 
falls foul of a gentle form of the kind o f trickery which becomes synonymous 
with the name ‘London’: he loses a shilling to a beggar’s dog.
The next sequence of chapters opens with Harley ensconced in London 
long enough to be about to make his second visit to the baronet to whom he
has been advised to appeal for help in obtaining the lease o f the Crown lands
16
-  the sole reason for his being in London. In these three chapters, Harley 
is deceived first by the conversation and appearance o f a young man with 
ambitions above his station -  an ex-footman and pimp who eventually
17
obtains the lease which Harley is hoping for; then by an inmate o f  Bedlam. 
In the third chapter o f this sequence, Harley is him self judged on appearances: 
he is taken by a misanthropist, to be one o f  the corrupt, fashionably wealthy, 
and so a target for the misanthropist’s extended criticism o f contemporary 
polite society.
Each o f these chapters focuses on the inadequacy o f judging a person by 
his appearance -  and the point is driven home in the third, when it is Harley 
whose nature is incorrectly deduced from his apparel.
The third sequence o f chapters is the most sustained and concerns the 
hectic 24 hours described in section 1, in which Harley meets both the card 
sharps, and Miss Atkins the prostitute, and her father.
Mackenzie introduces the first fragment at this point, which explains that 
H arley’s application for the lease has been unsuccessful, and gives the
from the tour o f Europe, with a Swiss valet for his companion, and half a 
dozen snuffboxes, with invisible hinges, in his pocket’.
The first visit to the baronet, we learn from the text, has been detailed in an 
earlier ‘missing’ chapter. Chapter XIX opens with a specific reference to the 
non-existent description o f Harley’s earlier visit: ‘We have related in a 
former chapter, the little success o f his visit to the great m an’ (M F, p. 23). 
We also learn indirectly that Harley has been in London rather longer than 
this mention o f his second visit would imply, Harley not having been as 
sedulous in seeking a second interview as those o f a more single-minded bent 
might have been: his friends in the country wrote to Harley soon after his 
unsuccessful first visit to the baronet, ‘[expressing] their surprise at his not 
having been more urgent in his application’, and recommending ‘the 
blushless assiduity o f successful merit’ (M F, p. 23).
17
And so, presumably becomes Harley’s neighbour -  or perhaps the absent 
landlord o f the land neighbouring Harley’s estate.
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reasons for his lack o f success. It allows M ackenzie to jum p, without further 
explanation, from Harley’s intervention on behalf o f the prostitute, to a 
sequence o f three chapters detailing his journey home.
The account o f Harley’s journey from London, shows him re-entering an 
increasingly more benign environment. On the coach he becomes acquainted
with Ben Silton, to whom readers have been introduced at the outset, as a
18
man who is both warm-hearted and wise. While making the last leg o f his 
journey on foot, he meets Edwards, another man o f  feeling, and the sequence 
ends in rural tranquillity with Edwards and the remnants o f his family, 
accommodated through the goodwill o f  Harley, in a small farm on Harley’s 
estate.
A chapter detailing Harley’s lack o f progress in love is flanked by two 
fragments, the second of which includes a precis o f events by the editor, 
which ties up loose ends enough for Mackenzie to follow it with the final two 
chapters describing Harley’s last hours.
3 The themes of the chapter sequences
The narrative is shaped by the chapter sequences together with judicious use 
o f chapter fragments. If we consider the themes o f the opening sequence and 
the two London sequences, more closely, we can see more o f the reasoning 
behind Mackenzie’s choice o f this architecture for the narrative, and o f the 
purpose o f Harley’s story.
The opening sequence
The first four chapters o f the manuscript describe the cast o f the central 
character and indicate what the book is about. Although by implication, the 
complete text o f The Man o f  Feeling would have been the full biography of 
Harley, the opening chapter o f the spurious extant manuscript explicitly 
concerns the refining effect o f travel on a person’s character. More 
18
A cameo portrait o f Silton is given at the beginning o f the first chapter; 
there he is described as being ‘an honest old m an’ {MF, p. 7) with a heart 
‘uncorrupted by [the world’s] ways’ and ‘ever warm in the cause o f virtue 
and his friends’ {MF, p. 8); the antithesis o f  the misanthropist in short. 
Although unable to substantiate this, I suspect that Ben Silton is a caricature 
o f Adam Smith.
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specifically, travel is said to have an improving, if, abrasive effect on a 
person’s character: the author states ‘There is some rust about every man at 
the beginning’ and Ben Silton’s opinion on the matter is given very soon 
after: ‘Let them rub it off by travel.’ It transpires that while this ‘rust’ will
19
accrue in a man’s nature through of some kind o f disuse, in some it may 
have a protective role: ‘an encrustation, which nature has given for the 
purposes o f the greatest wisdom’ (MF, p. 9).
From Silton’s subsequent remarks, we learn that bashfulness can be 
considered to have this protective role. Silton distinguishes between the 
bashfulness o f a booby, or country fellow -  the awkwardness o f ignorance 
which is quickly shed; and that which accompanies sensitivity and which is 
more tenacious (MF, p. 9). Harley, we are told, is afflicted with the second 
kind o f bashfulness. In this indirect manner, then, M ackenzie describes the 
theme o f the book. It is not an incomplete biography, but an account o f the 
effects of travel on the central character, Harley, a man hampered by both 
naivete and great sensitivity.
The rest of this first sequence o f chapters is devoted largely to fleshing 
out the central character -  revealing the extent o f his sensitivity and lack o f 
experience -  and in explaining why, despite being constitutionally ill-fitted 
for such a place, he is bound for London. Orphaned when a boy, Harley was 
brought up under the jurisdiction o f a group o f guardians chosen by his father 
less with a view to their suitability for the role than from fear o f giving 
offence (MF, p. 11). Since his guardians seldom met, and when they did 
meet, failed to reach agreement over the guidance o f their ward, Harley’s 
education was patchy and makeshift. He reached manhood unmotivated and 
intellectually too undisciplined to follow a profession, and disinterested
19
MF, p. 7. It seems odd to a present-day reader to find rust ascribed to 
something ‘new’. It is possible that the exchange between the author and 
Silton is word-play. The Dictionary o f  the Vulgar Tongue (1811) gives as 
one definition o f ‘rusty’, restiveness in a horse, which meaning was extended 
also to humans. Elsewhere, however, Mackenzie uses ‘rust’ in the more 
familiar sense connoting disuse, but with specific reference to ‘disuse o f 
sociability’: ‘There is a certain learned Rust which Men as well as Medals 
acquire. -  It is, simply speaking, a Fault in both. The social Feelings grow 
languid from disuse; & there wants a Pliancy o f little Affections to sweeten 
the Cup o f Life as we drink it’ (12 May 1770, Letters, p. 44).
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enough in his income to be unperturbed by his relatively lowly status 
according to the by-then norms o f power, wealth or grandeur (MF, pp. 10- 
11). We learn, too, that Harley cannot dissemble. He fails to follow the 
instructions o f his advisors to insinuate him self with a distant wealthy 
relative with a view to benefiting from her will (MF, pp. 12-13). Harley’s 
decision to attempt to increase his estate is reached only with reluctance and 
in response to considerable pressure from his (presumably more worldly wise) 
friends (MF, pp. 13-14).
We have, then, many of the ingredients o f a sentimental hero -  Harley, at 
the start o f the book, is an embryonic man o f feeling: he is unable to motivate 
himself to act for reasons which, when considered by those o f a more 
realistic (and materialistic) bent are not merely prudent, but compelling, and 
has little patience with those who exhort him to ‘see sense’ and adopt a more 
sophisticated attitude towards fiscal matters (MF, p. 11). The description o f 
his conduct when allegedly attempting to win a wealthy relative’s approval 
shows him to be entirely at the mercy o f his natural responses. It also shows 
what is missing from Harley’s make-up. While it is laudable that Harley 
refuses to enter the proposed deceit and win the relative’s affection solely for 
the purpose of ensuring an inheritance, his actual reactions to her company 
are on occasion simply ill-mannered (MF, p. 13).
At this stage Harley seems as likely to develop into a dolt as an ideal. His
potential for the latter hangs on the well-respected opinion o f Ben Silton,
20
himself a man of virtue. However, the revelation that Harley is in love with 
his neighbour’s daughter, Miss Walton, goes some way to justify the 
expectation that he will indeed mature into a sentimental ideal.
Miss Walton is the perfect sentimental heroine: essentially retiring in all 
respects. Physically she is has an ‘interestingly’ pale complexion and a 
natural elegance; she is mild-mannered; and conversationally she is good- 
humoured, soft-voiced and always accommodating. She is muted in all 
respects except her goodness; and her sensibility is perfectly developed -  she 
acted according to the dictates o f her heart rather than reason: ‘her humanity 
20
The curate responsible for the spoiling o f the manuscript, a man of a 
strenuous rationalist bent (MF, p. 5), mentions that generally Harley was 
considered ‘a whimsical m an’ (MF, p. 4).
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was a feeling, not a principle’. Miss Walton shows no capacity for passion, 
or for intellectual acuity, but part o f her appeal to Harley is just this lack o f 
verve in all respects.
By contrast, Harley’s reaction to Miss Walton definitely is not o f the 
calibre o f the refined sensibility which she exemplifies: he verges on the 
passionate, albeit only when not in her company (M F, p. 17); and is so far 
from urbane in her presence as to be tongue-tied (M F, p. 16). Nevertheless 
the fact that he responds to the tiny vibrations o f Miss W alton’s nature is 
sufficient to mark him out as having the potential to become her suitor.
Harley’s love for Miss Walton encourages the reader to anticipate a 
specific outcome to the story. In addition to Harley returning from London 
in possession o f a lease and burnished by the experience o f London life, the 
reader is now led to expect him to marry Miss Walton. That Mackenzie was 
fully aware o f this is evident from a remark he made in a letter to his cousin, 
Elizabeth Rose, about ‘the winding up o f a Story’, which he describes as ‘one 
o f the dullest Things in the W orld’. He continues: ‘You remember a Miss 
Walton; you have nothing to do but to imagine [Harley] somehow or other
wedded to her & made happy; -  so must all stories conclude you know; the
22
Hero is as surely married as he was born.’ In fact the reader’s expectations 
are frustrated by Harley’s unforeseeable early death, although this too is 
consonant with the book having an improving purpose.
As stated above, in the last chapter in the opening sequence Harley leaves 
for London, and encounters the beggar with the dog. In effect the nature and 
content o f this encounter foreshadows most o f those he has in London. The 
beggar offers to tell Harley’s fortune, a suggestion which Harley dismisses 
with brusque scepticism (M F, p. 20). The beggar responds to this with a 
speech which is tantamount to the bare bones o f a credo for men o f the world:
‘Master, ... I like your frankness; God knows I had the humour o f plain- 
dealing in me from a child; but there is no doing with it in this world; we 
must live as we can, and lying is, as you call it, my profession: but I was in
21
MF, pp. 14-16, quotation from MF, p. 16. The nature o f the sentimental 
heroine tends to make one think in terms o f the conversational equivalent o f 
invalid food.
19 April 1770, Letters, p. 41.
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some sort forced into the trade, for I dealt once in telling the truth.’ (M F, p. 
20)
This short speech contains two ideas which underpin the melancholy tales 
which Harley is to hear in London: that children are naturally good (or 
virtuous); and that the world can impose on a person enough to deflect him 
or her from their natural tendency to virtue.23
The beggar’s subsequent explanation -  which he evidently considers a 
justification -  o f his life o f deceit contains a third tacit theme o f the book. 
The beggar was reduced to penury by a series o f natural disasters: his health 
was ruined by a bout o f jail-fever when prison-visiting, and while in the
24
throes o f this illness, his house burnt down. His broken health prevented 
him from resuming work as a labourer, and he freely admits that he had no 
savings to fall back on. However, the beggar isn’t entirely worthy o f pity. 
He visited prisons for less than laudable reasons: he sought out the company 
o f convicts for their mirth and thoughtlessness. Further, we are told not that 
he had  no living relatives to whom he could appeal for help, but that he knew 
o f  wo living relatives, that is, that he had lost contact with his family. He had 
lived voluntarily as an itinerant, so had no ties o f friendship; and he had lived 
so much for the moment that he had no savings to bolster him against loss o f 
work. In short, he had lived entirely for himself, and so was in part to blame 
for his destitute condition.
During his meeting with the beggar, we see Harley acting appropriately 
for the first time. Even before being accosted by the beggar, Harley has 
decided to give the man sixpence:
The beggar had by this time come upon him and pulling o ff a piece o f hat, 
asked charity o f Harley; the dog began to beg too: -  it was impossible to 
resist both; and in truth, the want o f shoes and stockings had made both 
unnecessary, for Harley had destined sixpence for him before. (M F, p. 20)
This danger is touched on in the opening chapter when, discussing the 
abrasive nature o f travel or experience o f the worldly life, the author says:
‘the friction is so violent, that not only the rust, but the metal too is lost in the 
process’ (M F, p. 8).
This is a comparatively restrained litany o f disaster. The idea that the ill-
fortunes o f fate spare no man, regardless o f their virtuousness, is
demonstrated in the case o f Edwards, in which injury is heaped upon injury 
(M F, pp. 87-95, 97-9).
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More interestingly, during this episode, Harley begins to show a glimmer o f 
discrimination. As the beggar takes his leave, Harley hesitates over giving 
the beggar a further shilling. His initial impulse, described as springing from 
an unidentifiable source ‘not as severe as virtue, nor so serious as pity’, is 
tempered by reason -  Harley questions whether the beggar merits further 
charity. However, the reader is left in no doubt that Harley still has a long 
way to go to before he sheds his natural gaucheness. He apparently becomes 
so absorbed in considering this issue that he drops the coin, which is snapped 
up by the dog, which has been trained for such exigencies, and given to his 
master {MF, p. 22). Harley’s hesitation shows that the abrasion by the world 
has begun it seems -  and this, despite Harley being still close enough to 
home for the beggar to know him by name {MF, p. 20).
The opening sequence of chapters therefore indicates the subject matter o f 
the book. Harley’s journey is to be a rite o f passage and the expectation is 
that, encountering residents in a city ‘replete with tem ptations’ {MF, p. 18), 
Harley will lose some of his naivete -  his adolescent rust. Mackenzie makes 
a glancing reference to this in a letter: ‘[the book] consists o f some episodical 
adventures of a Man of Feeling; where his sentiments are occasionally 
expressed and the features of his mind developed, as the incidents draw them
25
forth.'
The fir s t  London sequence
As mentioned above, in this sequence o f chapters, Harley repeatedly comes 
up against the deceptive nature o f appearances. He has already learnt that the 
apparel o f poverty guarantees nothing about the nature o f  its wearer. He 
meets and falls in with an excise man on the steps o f the baronet’s house (ch. 
XIX), and despite the man’s manners belying the rank o f  the gentleman he
25 To James Elphinstone, 23 July 1770, Letters 1766-1827, p. 48. That 
Harley learnt from his encounter with the beggar is made plain in connection 
with his later recorded encounter with a beggar in London. Harley states: 
‘Yet I agree in some measure, ... with those who think, that charity to our 
common beggars is often misplaced; there are objects less obtrusive, whose 
title is a better one’ {MF, p. 45). Unfortunately, this statement is made 
during an encounter in which Harley loses significantly more than shilling as 
a result o f once again failing to judge on more than appearances.
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seeks to convey in his dress and conversational subject matter, Harley has to
be relieved o f his misconception by someone who knows the excise m an’s
26
history. This mistake on Harley’s part is juxtaposed against the still 
inefficient workings of Harley’s reason. He allows him self to be conducted 
away by the ‘young gentleman’ just as he reaches the conclusion that he 
should remain indifferent to his fellow men regardless o f their financial 
status. Harley draws this conclusion at the end o f a ‘rumination’ about the 
power o f wealth against breeding, and the ability o f the wealthy to reduce 
their less wealthy social equals to a state o f servility, from which we gather 
that Harley was fortifying himself against being humiliated a second time by
27
the baronet.
In London it seems, no one is as they appear. The excise m an’s 
suggestion that Harley dine with him leads to Harley meeting with two men 
who appear to be well below the station o f both him self and the excise man. 
One, Mundy, a grazier, is dressed very shabbily; the other, Sam Wrightson, 
is only marginally better attired. Neither says a great deal during the meal, 
largely because the conversation is dominated by the excise m an’s endless 
store o f anecdotes about high society, although they attempt to begin a 
political discussion which is quickly quashed by the excise man {MF, p. 27). 
Once the excise man and Mundy have departed, Harley learns that his new
26
MF, p. 28. That Harley is better versed in the manners o f a gentleman than 
the excise man is evident from the very beginning o f the encounter. The 
excise man bows to Harley as they pass on the steps o f  the house. This 
startles Harley, although he returns the bow, as ‘he could not remember ever 
having seen him before’ {MF, p. 24), that is, they hadn’t been introduced and 
the bow was therefore inappropriate. The ease with which the excise man 
can insinuate himself into the socially elite company he boasts o f  keeping 
{MF, p. 25) becomes evident. The disparity between the excise m an’s actual 
and professed social position becomes increasingly more overt over the 
dinner he and Harley take together: his claim to being unused to eating ‘at 
the horrid mechanical hour’ o f artisans is undermined by his healthy appetite 
and enthusiasm for the food {MF, pp. 26-7); his introduction o f talk o f a 
fight as ‘something o f the fine arts’ {MF, p. 27), being two o f his grosser 
mistakes. There is added irony in H arley’s mistake about the rank o f the 
excise man: earlier in the book he is said to have been tutored in arithmetic 
and book-keeping by an excise man {MF, p. 12).
27
MF, p. 23. That he found his first meeting unnerving is alluded to slightly 
earlier in the text: ‘To people o f equal sensibility, the influence o f those 
trifles we mentioned on his deportment will not appear surprising.’
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acquaintance, far from being a young gentleman is an ex-footman and pimp. 
He is also not at all wealthy. Mundy, by contrast is worth a considerable sum 
-  ‘nine thousand if he’s worth a farthing’ {MF, pp. 28-9). The full extent o f 
H arley’s misinterpretation o f the nature o f the company at this meal is only 
revealed much later in the book. Shortly before he leaves London, he learns 
that both Wrightson and the excise man had applied for the lease o f the same 
Crown lands as he {MF, pp. 74-5).
Harley’s education in the shiftless world o f profligate London continues 
with a visit to Moorfields, a lunatic asylum. In this connection Harley is 
persuaded once again to overrule his principles: ‘Harley objected to [the visit] 
because ... “I think it an inhuman practice to expose the greatest misery with 
which our nature is afflicted.’” That Harley is not in harmony with received 
opinion on this matter is made plain by the opening statement o f this chapter: 
‘O f those things called Sights, which every stranger is supposed desirous to 
see, Bedlam is one.’ The majority o f  visitors to London lack sensibility -  
Harley gives a further reason for not wishing to visit Moorfields: ‘it is a 
distress which the humane must see with the painful reflection, that it is not 
in their power to alleviate it’ {MF, pp. 29-30). Far from being an
entertainment, then, for those o f a sensitive disposition, the experience is
28
painful. The majority, it seems, do not react in this way.
After the unnerving experience o f witnessing the bestial state o f the 
incurably mad, Harley is shown three inmates whose wits have been turned 
by single-minded dedication to respectively mechanistic science; the stock 
market; and the (deliciously absurd) academic question o f the pronunciation
29
o f Greek vowels. Harley’s guide at this point, a ‘decent looking m an’, turns
That it is viewed as entertainment -  as a show -  by the acquaintance who 
proposes the visit is implied by the statement: ‘To that place, therefore, an 
acquaintance o f Harley’s, after having accompanied him to several other 
shows, proposed a visit’ {MF, p. 29).
29
MF, pp. 30-3. M ackenzie’s choice o f causes o f insanity are topical: the 
follower o f Newtonian physics became unhinged when his calculations about 
the path o f a comet failed to be confirmed by the comet itself -  Mackenzie 
refers to ‘Comet-gazing’ in a letter to Elizabeth Rose dated 15 September 
1769 at which time Messier’s comet, first discovered in August o f that year, 
was easily visible to the naked eye; see Letters, p. 2, no. 11. The stock­
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out himself to be an inmate: victim to delusions o f grandeur, he believes 
him self to be the Chan of Tartary (MF, pp. 30-2).
Despite his expectation that his visit to the asylum will be a painful 
experience, Harley is unmoved by these four inmates. However, the history 
o f  the next inmate he meets reduces him to tears. The man she loved died in 
his attempt to accrue enough wealth in the W est Indies to persuade her father 
to agree to their marriage. Her distress at his death was not merely 
discounted by her father, but compounded by his insistence that she marry a 
rich miser. The madwoman’s insanity is the outcome o f her having being 
victim to two sources o f intense distress, simultaneously. On hearing her 
history from her keeper, Harley gives the keeper a large sum o f money as 
incentive for him to treat the madwoman with consideration, bursts into tears 
and leaves (MF, pp. 32-5).
The final chapter o f this sequence is a splendid muddle o f scrambled
30
thinking -  albeit by one who is introduced as ‘one o f the w ise’. Harley is 
exposed to the thoughts o f a man who was so deeply disappointed in love 
and in friendship in his youth, that he has withdrawn as completely as 
possible from all forms o f social interaction: a misanthropist who lectures on 
the value o f friendship; a man who extols the value o f truth and excoriates 
the contemporary tendency to place emphasis on appearance while 
incorrectly deducing from H arley’s dress that he is one o f the fashionable 
court-oriented set o f London and so dedicated to ‘avowed insincerity’ (MF, p. 
39); who disparages politeness as no more than ceremonious jargon, i.e. 
empty communication, while also brooking no conversation o f any kind with 
another. This man (correctly) tracks the extent to which overemphasis on
jobber will be representative o f the frequent spates o f bankruptcies at that 
time.
30
MF, p. 35. The dubious nature o f H arley’s acquaintances in London is 
gently, if insistently, implied throughout the London sequences, by the kinds 
o f expeditions proposed for Harley’s entertainment. The acquaintance’s 
assessment o f the misanthropist’s merit, questionable at the outset, becomes 
more dubious still when he pronounces the m isanthropist’s thought to be 
valuable: ‘disagreeable in its operation, but hard metals may be the brighter 
for it’ (MF, p. 43). While the misanthropist’s lecture missed its mark entirely 
with respect to Harley, it seems it might have struck a chord with his 
acquaintance.
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wealth and the trappings o f wealth corrupt the social fabric, but he refuses to 
countenance the possibility that anyone now eschews these values -  he is 
convinced that all benevolence is tainted by vanity, i.e. it is motivated by
31
self-interest. In short, his life belies his beliefs, and his understanding o f 
Harley’s nature is turned upside down and inside out in the process. Truth, 
which he regards as ‘the most amiable, as well as the most natural o f virtues’
32
{MF, p. 39) can’t possibly find a way into his thinking. This is particularly 
ironic in the light o f his complaint against philosophers who ‘adopt modes o f 
truth to follow them through the paths o f error, and defend paradoxes merely 
to be singular in defending them ’ {MF, p. 39).
The second London sequence
The third, and longest, sequence o f chapters is still set in London. This raises 
a question o f whether there is any obvious reason for Mackenzie to introduce 
a putative break in the narrative at this point. Harley continues to meet 
people whose lives have been detrimentally affected by the social mores o f 
London. However, there are two differences between the episodes in the first 
London sequences, and the second. In the first sequence, Harley is 
essentially a spectator, a passive observer: his sole independent act is that o f 
giving money to the keeper at Moorfields, while in the second London 
sequence, he becomes agent. Again, in the first London sequence Harley is 
chaperoned, but in the second London sequence he is no longer
33
accompanied.
The second London sequence concerns two separate encounters: with the 
card sharps; and with Miss Atkins, the prostitute. The first o f  these is 
disastrous. Harley seems doomed to be ever the victim o f  deceit in London, 
and in this case his failure to discern the unmeritworthy is made even more
31
That there is some truth in the m isanthropist’s views is evident from the 
echoes o f these found in Harley’s later conversation with Silton {MF, pp. 8 0 - 
3). The misanthropist has drawn the wrong pragmatic conclusions.
32
In a letter to Elizabeth Rose, Mackenzie wrote: ‘recluse People ... like dead 
Liquors, you may force them into Fermentation for a while, will, like them, 
be afterwards all the deader for it’ (12 February 1770, Letters, p. 36).
33
This point is made in Barker, Henry Mackenzie, p. 27.
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tragic by the fact that he seems to be trying to find some kind o f method by 
which he can overcome continually being taken in by people’s appearances. 
He opts to rely on ‘the science o f physiognom y’, being confident in his skill 
in this approach.
In the episode with the card sharps we become increasingly aware o f 
Harley’s main downfall: he naturally believes that people are good; kind, 
truthful, benevolent; and persists in this belief about an individual despite all 
evidence to the contrary. In the case o f the con man, Harley’s persistence 
reaches ludicrous levels. Bolstered by his confidence that using 
physiognomic criteria, he has fallen in with a genuinely benevolent 
gentleman, he explains away everything which conflicts with this idea: he 
gives a beggar a shilling in appreciation o f the con m an’s ‘good intentions’ 
which he ascribes on the basis o f a conversation between the beggar and con 
man in which the con man expresses compassion but professes him self 
unable to help in any pragmatic way, because he has no change. Later, when 
the con man produces ten shilling coins to act as counters in a game o f cards, 
Harley explains to himself the con m an’s earlier claim to have no change by 
ascribing to the con man a sentimental attachment to the coins -  disarmingly 
comparing this imputed attachment with his own for a pair o f brass sleeve 
buttons {MF, pp. 46-7). His conviction that the con man is genuinely 
benevolent (and hence that his own skill in physiognomy is confirmed) 
deepens during discussion with him on the nature and value o f public acts o f 
charity. The outcome of this encounter is, as mentioned above, that Harley is 
lured into a card game and loses a considerable sum o f  money. And even 
then he tries to turn the experience to some virtuous end, by consoling 
him self with the thought that the accomplice who won the money must have 
been miserably poor, because he had had to borrow money from the con man 
for the game {MF, p. 52). He is only relieved o f this illusion later that 
evening when recounting his escapade to friends, he learns that the pair o f
34
card sharps were known as such.
34
And then only persuaded with difficulty {MF, p. 52). H arley’s naivete is 
the cause o f much mirth, despite one o f the company recently having been 
fleeced for a much larger sum.
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He lurches from the encounter with the card sharps to his meeting with 
the prostitute, which eventually results in Harley’s one successfully 
beneficent action in London, as mentioned in section 1. This is a surprising 
development in the narrative because everything has been put in place for 
Harley once again to be gulled. He has no more than the prostitute’s word 
that her situation is as bad as it is, yet he parts with his last half guinea, more 
than ten times the amount he gave to the beggar he encountered earlier, 
wishing it were still more (M F, p. 50). The plight o f the prostitute and her 
eventual rescue is one o f the more tearful episodes in the book. And indeed it 
is tears to which Harley responds initially; T h ere  is virtue in these tears; let 
the fruit of them be virtue’ (M F, p. 50).
Two aspects of this episode differentiate it from others in this and the first 
London sequence. The woman is depicted as essentially virtuous; and 
Harley’s involvement requires a degree o f commitment not found in his 
earlier acts o f charity -  his involvement with each o f the two beggars and 
with the madwoman ends with his donation o f money. In the case o f Miss 
Atkins, he follows up his first encounter with a further meeting the following 
day, and, subsequently takes on the responsibility o f finding lodgings for her 
and her father, in the house in which he is staying -  the implication being 
that contact with the Atkinses does not end with the end o f the associated 
narrative.
Harley’s sensibility matures -  and so the story becomes more tearful -  as 
he approaches home. In addition, his benevolence demands more 
commitment in that he takes on the patronage o f Edwards and the remnants 
o f Edwards’ family (M F, pp. 100-1), but it also becomes driven less by 
melodrama than by pathos. Harley’s journey to London although 
unsuccessful materially, has achieved what Ben Silton would have 
anticipated: the maturation and tempering o f H arley’s highly emotional 
nature by prudence.
4 The Man o f  Feeling as a manual for the development o f sensibility
The development o f  sensibility
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If we take The Man o f  Feeling to chart the maturation o f Harley’s nature then 
we should be able to identify what this growth consists of. It is this: common 
to Harley’s successful acts o f benevolence is an unmediated response on 
H arley’s part to the plight o f another. Harley’s initial reaction to the beggar 
with the dog at the start o f his journey to London is prompted by the ‘want o f 
shoes and stockings’, and his response is occasioned by the fact that 
moments before he had had to remove a pebble from his shoe {MF, p. 19): 
‘Our delicacies ... are fantastic; they are not in nature! that beggar walks 
over the sharpest o f stones barefoot, while I have lost the most delightful 
dream in the world, from the smallest o f them happening to get into my shoe’ 
{MF, pp. 19-20). Harley had to some extent ‘entered the experience’ o f the 
beggar; and it was this which prompted him to give him alms.
The same ‘mechanism’ is at work during Harley’s visit to Bedlam. He is 
horror-struck by the incurably mad; left indifferent to the madness caused by 
scientific, economic and academic pursuit; but is completely overwhelmed 
by the history o f the madwoman, whose insanity has been caused by the 
death o f the man she loves. If we consider this incident a little more closely 
we can perhaps see why.
The wom an’s father withheld permission for Billy to marry his daughter 
because Billy was not wealthy enough. Billy travelled to the West Indies 
with the intention o f making his fortune and re-requesting the w om an’s hand 
in marriage, but fell ill and died shortly after reaching his destination. The 
w om an’s madness, as mentioned above, was the outcome o f her distress and 
despair -  two powerful emotions in response to two separate states o f affairs: 
the death o f the man she loved and the unavoidability o f concurring with an 
impending and distasteful marriage o f convenience. From the text we know 
that the madwoman is the wreck o f a woman o f sensibility: in addition to her 
nature being sensitive enough for extremes o f emotion to tilt her irrevocably 
into insanity, her appearance echoes faintly that o f Miss Walton: she is said 
to have a superior dignity; her face is pale and wasted but ‘less squalid’ than 
those o f other inmates; and she has an expression o f restrained dejection -
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one which moves people to pity unmixed with horror. She is quite mad, but
35
with refinement.
There is enough resonance between H arley’s hopeless love for Miss 
Walton and the madwoman’s hopeless love for Billy, for Harley to feel an 
affinity with both Billy and the madwoman. Miss Walton is superior socially 
to Harley -  her father is well connected enough to be able to give Harley a 
letter o f introduction to the baronet providing entry into a realm o f ‘the great’ 
to which Harley would otherwise have been denied access {MF, p. 13). 
Much later we learn that there is an enormous discrepancy between Harley’s 
financial status and that o f Miss Walton: Harley has an annual income of 
only £250, while Miss Walton is heiress to £4,000 p.a. {MF, p. 126). Using
36
London values, this disparity o f wealth is too great to be bridged by love.
In effect, Harley is in the same position as Billy was. He can also resonate 
with the madwoman, in the hopelessness o f her love for Billy. The 
similarities are compounded when the madwoman remarks on a resemblance 
between Harley and ‘her Billy’, albeit in expression -  presumably sorrow. 
Harley is reduced to tears by the keeper’s description o f the events which led 
to the woman’s insanity. He is transfixed by astonishment and pity after 
interacting with the woman. He then gives the keeper two guineas to ensure
T7that she is well looked after, bursts into tears, and leaves.
Mackenzie comments on the difficulty o f writing with restraint in a letter 
to Elizabeth Rose, albeit in connection with the chapter describing the 
anguish o f Mr Atkins: ‘These are Scenes I delight to describe; but it is 
delicate to describe them with Propriety: Feelings must appear but not 
obtrusive; just so much as to call forth the Hearts o f our Readers’ (8 
November 1769, Letters, p. 29).
36
Harley is o f this opinion too. In the editor’s precis o f the ‘missing 
narrative’ following a section detailing Harley’s despair when misinformed 
about Miss W alton’s impending marriage to another, the editor comments: 
‘for according to the conception o f  the world, the love for a man o f H arley’s 
fortune for the heiress of 4000 1. a-year, is indeed desperate’ {MF, p. 126).
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MF, pp. 34-5. Simpson points out that it is significant that Harley bursts 
into tears after he has donated alms as this highlights a self-conscious aspect 
to his benevolence. Simpson suggests that this be considered in the light o f 
the misanthropist’s cynicism about the motivation o f those who claim to act 
motivated by sensibility, by ‘natural impulse o f the heart’, which he believes 
to actually be motivated by vanity: ‘this secret satisfaction is truly excellent -  
when we have some friend to whom we may discover its excellence’ {MF, p.
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Harley again in some way shares the experience o f a victim in regard to 
Miss Atkins, the prostitute. His distaste for her soliciting and the moral 
depravity it implies, are overridden when, having fainted from hunger, Miss 
Atkins explains that she hasn’t eaten for two days. Harley responds by 
entering the experience -  imagining her hunger: ‘“ Two days!” -  said he 
“and I have fared sumptuously every day’” (M F, p. 50). Harley’s 
identification with her state turns her from a miserable creature (M F, p. 49), 
to a woman he treated ‘with as much respect as if  she had been a dutchess’ 
(M F, p. 50). Harley’s reaction to her at this stage is a far cry from the self- 
conscious ‘ideas o f pity suitable to the scene around him ’ which he entertains 
as he walks ‘amidst a croud o f those wretches who wait the uncertain wages 
o f prostitution’ just before he is approached by Miss Atkins (M F, p. 48).
During Harley’s meeting with Miss Atkins the following morning, and 
having heard her history; he is encouraged to resonate with her experience 
first by direct appeal, and later by indirect appeal. Miss Atkins says:
‘Amidst all the horrors o f such a state, surrounded with wretches totally 
callous, lost alike to humanity and to shame, think, M r Harley, think what I  
endured : nor wonder that I at last yielded to the solicitations o f that miscreant 
I had seen at her house, and sunk to the prostitution which he tempted ...
‘Oh! did the daughters o f virtue know our sufferings! did they see our 
hearts torn with anguish amidst the affectation o f gaiety which our faces are 
obliged to assume; our bodies tortured by disease, our minds with that 
consciousness which they cannot lose! D id they know, did they think this, M r 
Harley! -  their censures are just; but their ^>ity perhaps might spare the
wretches whom their justice should condemn.’
Miss A tkins’ speech reduces Harley to tears (M F, p. 66). The use o f indirect 
invitation to enter into the feelings o f a sufferer by Miss A tkins’ father 
similarly induces a tearful response from Harley: ‘Could such tales as mine, 
Mr Harley, be sometimes suggested to the daughters o f levity, did they but 
know with what anxiety the heart o f a parent flutters round the child he loves,
42) (Kenneth Simpson, The Protean Scot: The Crisis o f  Identity in 
Eighteenth Century Scottish Literature (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University 
Press, 1988), p. 148).
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MF, p. 65; emphasis added. It is unlikely that Harley had entertained 
anything remotely resembling feelings to which Miss Atkins so eloquently 
appeals while he was walking through the crowd o f prostitutes on the Strand 
the previous evening.
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they would be less apt to construe into harshness that delicate concern for 
their conduct’ (MF, p. 73). In each case the emotional ferment described is 
one o f which Harley would not have had any direct experience, yet he is able 
to respond unselfconsciously with sincerity to the speaker’s anguish.
Harley’s ability to connect non-rationally and sympathetically comes into 
its own while he hears Edwards’ history. Edwards’ account o f his eviction 
from the farm he and previous generations had occupied, compounded by the 
death o f his dog as the family were leaving, causes Harley to weep so hard 
his face is bathed in tears (MF, p. 89); and he becomes immersed in 
Edwards’ subsequent ill fortune to the extent that, while Edwards recounts 
the intrusion on Christmas Eve by a press gang, Harley is so swept up by the 
narrative that he loses all sense o f time and place, and seizes Edwards’ sword, 
to defend the family from the press gang: ‘At these words Harley started with 
a convulsive sort of motion, and grasping Edwards’ sword, drew it half out o f 
the scabbard, with a look of the most frantic wildness’ (MF, p. 91).
Sensibility isn’t just the provenance o f  the benefactor. While recognition 
o f another’s distress can produce tears, the victim ’s recognition o f another’s
39
sincere response to their plight also produces tears. For example, Miss 
Atkins weeps tears o f gratitude at Harley’s generosity after her denouement 
in the brothel (MF, p. 49); she weeps again when her father unbends enough 
agree to listen to her explanation o f her downfall (MF, p. 68); and Edwards is 
reduced to ‘blubbering’ like a child at Harley’s recognition o f the hardship he 
suffered when dishonourably discharged from the army in the wake o f an act
40
o f compassion on his part. Edwards gushes again when Harley offers him
41
and his grandchildren a home on his estate.
Curiously, today, responding with tears to sympathy is taken to be a 
symptom o f depression.
Harley’s reaction to Edwards’ story at this point is melodramatic: ‘when he 
had given vent to the fulness o f his heart by a shower o f tears’, he pressed 
him in his arms and said ‘Edwards, ... let me hold thee to my bosom; let me 
imprint the virtue of thy sufferings on my soul’ (MF, pp. 94-5).
41
MF, p. 101. It is symptomatic o f the m adwoman’s imbalanced state o f 
mind that she is unable to cry; she responds to H arley’s tears with ‘I would 
weep too, but my brain is dry’ (MF, p. 34).
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Responding to melancholic tales with tears was considered as ‘giving
42
convincing testimony of one’s sensibility’. An ability to elicit tears was 
also proof o f a developed sensibility, and the height o f refined sensibility was 
to be able to do both -  which explains Edwards’ glance at Harley after 
recounting the death of his dog, which memory produced in Edwards ‘one 
tear and no more’ (.MF, p. 89)
We may conclude that it is this ability to respond immediately and 
unthinkingly to others’ distress which marks Harley’s maturation as a man o f 
feeling -  to his achieving a ‘proper sensibility’ -  in the vocabulary o f the 
period, to his having developed sufficient ‘pliancy o f m ind’ or
43
‘complacency’.
Harley’s London experience doesn’t merely demonstrate that a refined 
sensibility gives an unmediated means by which people can determine how 
to act virtuously -  how to respond appropriately and with sincerity to those 
they meet, as benefactor or friend. The story actually guides the reader 
through the stages o f refinement. Natural sympathy prompts Harley’s
decision to donate sixpence to the beggar with the dog. A less
straightforward, more complexly based sympathetic reaction prompts his 
response to the madwoman -  a resonance with her emotional distress rather 
than physical discomfort; and then a resonance with an imagined physical 
and then mental distress prompts his response to Miss Atkins. At each stage, 
Harley is required to dissociate from the circumstances o f the victim to focus 
on the victim him- or herself, until with regard to Miss Atkins, he has to 
disregard a plethora o f reasons why she might be dismissed as irredeemably 
morally depraved. A reader able to respond with tears appropriately -  that is, 
as and when Harley weeps -  is assumed to have developed her sensibility in
Harriet Lee from The Errors o f  Innocence (1786) quoted in Tompkins, The 
Popular Novel, p. 96. Lee goes on to define sensibility as ‘a certain tender 
sympathy o f disposition, which, tho’ originally deriv’d from the passions, is 
meliorated into something gentler and more pleasing than those’.
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M ackenzie refers to the development o f sensibility as the development o f 
nerves o f the soul, which improve with use: ‘the Soul as well as the body has 
nerves, which are only affected in a certain indescribable Manner, & gain by 
frequent Exertion a very Superior degree o f Feeling’ (8 July 1769, Letters, p. 
14).
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the same way as Harley. In this way, the book tutors the sensibility o f the 
reader.
The nature o f  sensibility
If  we take Harley’s maturation to consist in his growing ability to enter 
others’ situation in some manner, regardless o f whether their experience is 
one remotely related to any personal experience on H arley’s part, then, by 
implication, the reader should be able to learn to do the same. That is, by 
reading about and becoming absorbed by Harley’s adventures in London, the 
reader may be considered to be exposed to the same kinds o f stimuli as 
Harley, and so be in a position to develop the same kind o f responses.
In this sense, then, sentimental literature which ‘works’ -  which produces 
tears in the reader -  is potentially a powerful tool for educating the 
readership. There is nothing in The Man o f  Feeling  to suggest that Harley’s 
reactions are primarily the result o f his actual encounters with those who 
merit his attention. Harley’s tears, an indication that sensibility is at work, 
are prompted not by witnessing the events which befall the victim, but by the 
story o f their downfall. Harley weeps at the story o f the madwoman: 
‘Though this story was told in very plain language, it had particularly
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attracted Harley’s notice: he had given it the tribute o f some tears.’ He 
weeps at the end o f Miss Atkins’ long and detailed account o f her downfall 
{MF, p. 66); he weeps at the end o f Mr A tkins’ account o f the distress he felt 
at his daughter’s disappearance; and he weeps at the end o f Edw ards’ 
extraordinary litany o f woes leading to his returning an old soldier {MF, p. 
94). However, he does not weep when the prostitute faints -  he panics:
Harley started from his seat, and, catching her in his arms, supported her 
from falling to the ground, looking wildly at the door, as if he wanted to run 
for assistance, but durst not leave the miserable creature. It was not till some 
minutes after, that it occurred to him to ring the bell, which at last however 
he thought of, and rung with repeated violence even after the waiter appeared. 
Luckily the waiter had his senses somewhat more about him. {MF, p. 49)
MF, p. 34. The reference to ‘plain language’ here indicates that Harley 
wasn’t responding to rhetoric.
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But tellingly he weeps the following morning at the recollection  o f the 
episode: ‘he recalled the languid form o f the fainting wretch to his mind; he 
wept at the recollection o f her tears’ {MF, p. 53). Keeping one’s head 
during an emergency is definitely not a characteristic o f developed sensibility, 
it appears.
If we look at the gradual change in the nature o f Harley’s responses to 
situations through the book it becomes apparent that these evolve to the 
extent that, eventually, he feels some kind o f resonance with the victim ’s 
distress which is independent o f whether he has experienced anything
45
remotely resembling its cause. It is almost as if  sensibility is a sixth sense. 
This is consonant with the then prevalent idea that sensibility was a natural 
propensity which people could develop with practice, until it ‘responded’ in 
an unmediated way. It isn’t an appreciation o f som eone’s experience -  it isn’t 
an intellectual response: it is more like the response o f  windchimes to a 
breeze.
Sensibility was considered to be capable o f development to such an extent
46
that people were able to respond to the slightest o f stimuli. This highly 
complex, ultimately ineffable, natural capacity involved some kind of 
interaction, either actual, or remembered or imagined or by association. It 
appears that a sensibility-informed response on the part o f one can stimulate 
a similar response in the other. In a sense then, sensibility responds not to 
the anguish o f an individual but to evidence o f their humanity, which in part 
explains why benevolence evinces tears o f gratitude. It isn’t the benevolent 
act per se which counts, but the sensibility which informs it, and it is this to 
which the recipient responds. And the ability o f  a reader to respond to the
Contemporary literature also referred to this as harmonising or 
synchronising with the victim’s reactions; see Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, p.
126.
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The madwoman’s former refined sensibility is demonstrated by the cause 
of her insanity: extreme emotion has overstimulated her sensibility and 
tipped her into insanity.
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humanity in the victims o f The Man o f  Feeling  is taken as evidence o f a
47
developed sensibility.
Reacting to minute stimuli was regarded as a sign o f refined sensibility, 
but this leaves people with a highly developed sensibility vulnerable to the 
more full-blooded experiences; hence Harley’s overreaction when Miss 
Atkins fainted, and the madwoman’s reaction to the strong stimuli o f deep 
emotion. Further, because evidence o f humanity on the part o f one evinces a 
response in the other, to react to a sad tale with an outburst o f weeping is 
likely to overstimulate those victims o f a highly developed sensibility. The 
aim, then, is to produce a restrained response: a single tear -  and to respond 
to minute stimuli, as the book’s fictitious author does in dropping a single 
tear in memory o f Silton at the sight o f his empty chair, and again even when 
merely recalling the sight o f his empty chair: ‘I gave thee a tear then: accept 
o f one cordial tear that falls to thy memory now’ {MF, p. 8).
The conclusion is that one can learn to fine-tune one’s natural sensitivity, 
and to do so without actually experiencing face-to-face encounters with 
victims o f disaster. One can lose one’s adolescent rust merely by reading 
about such disasters.
Didactic purpose and the text
However, if The Man o f  Feeling  is to provide a practical guide to the 
development of sensibility, then the reader has to be exposed to the 
melancholic tales in as near a fashion as Harley is depicted as doing. Harley 
has to act as conduit but not a mediator to ensure a direct connection between 
reader and victim’s tale. Hence Harley cannot have any characteristics o f the 
more familiar romantic hero. The reader m ustn’t be swayed in her reactions 
by passion. Harley has to remain ‘out o f the way’ -  must be insubstantial
Hence Lady Louisa Stuart’s concern, mentioned above (p. 30). Writing to 
Walter Scott in 1826, she described herself reading The Man o f  Feeling  when 
14 and worrying that she ‘should not cry enough to gain the credit o f  proper 
sensibility’ (quoted in Vickers, ‘Introduction’, p. viii).
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enough to vanish completely from the reader’s mind as and when a lesson is
48
on the way.
The potential didactic function o f the text, then, determines the nature o f 
the hero. He has to be bland. Arguably it also informs M ackenzie’s choice 
o f structure. If  the hero has to get out o f the way in order for a reader to be 
able to respond to a victim’s history, to ensure that no irrelevancies disturb 
the reader’s response; then Harley’s story has to be similarly pared down -  
which is precisely what is achieved by the structure Mackenzie chose for the
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book. The gaps in the story, the missing chapters o f the fictional manuscript, 
allow Mackenzie to restrict the amount o f detail he gives in the tale; and to 
forego any requirement for some kind o f causal link between events; which 
in turn allows him to leave out those elements o f a narrative which set up a
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reader’s expectations. Everything is subordinated to the incidents on which 
Mackenzie wants his readers to focus. We know little o f the details o f 
H arley’s education, for example, bar that it was formally inadequate. We are 
not told what happened to Miss Atkins and her father subsequent to their 
being installed in Harley’s London lodgings.
Arguably the book isn’t merely a vehicle for the development o f 
sensibility. It is also a selection o f cautionary tales suitable for adolescents, 
issuing in such rules of thumb as ‘Do not judge a person by his appearance’ 
(because the overtly poor are not always worthy (the beggar’s tale); the
The fact that novels could manipulate readers in this way is perhaps why 
Mackenzie worked so hard to establish that both the author and the editor 
were o f suitable temperament to work on a biography o f such a man has 
Harley. The editor remarks that he would have wept had he known that the 
author was reliable (M F, p. 5). This is neatly juxtaposed against his 
comment that his dog is good despite his having lost its pedigree. The dog 
can be regarded to function well enough without its antecedents being 
provable, but a book may not (M F, p. 5).
Mackenzie states one o f his intentions in writing The Man o f  Feeling  as 
being to ‘have it as different from the Entanglement o f a Novel as can be’ (31 
July 1769, Letters, p. 18).
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The curate complains about this as a feature o f the complete manuscript -  
even before he had made inroads into the fictive text, he couldn’t find the 
author ‘in one strain for two chapters’ (M F, p. 5). The exception to the lack 
o f movement internal to the narrative between incidents is provided by 
H arley’s love for Miss Walton, which is mentioned in the opening sequence.
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overtly mad are not always frightening (the madwoman’s tale); the overtly 
fallen are not always irretrievably depraved (Miss A tkins’ tale); the overtly 
wealthy are not always honourable (remember the baronet’s susceptibility to 
bribery), or well bred (remember H arley’s encounter with the excise man)); 
judge a man by his ‘deeds not his w ords’ (recollect Harley’s meetings with 
the card sharp and with the misanthropist); and ‘Choose your friends w isely’ 
(think about the misanthropist’s tale; and about Harley’s meeting with his 
friends after the episodes with the card sharps and Miss Atkins; and Sedley’s 
discovery about his ‘friend Respino’s treacherous behaviour’ (‘The Pupil’ 
fragment)). In fact, reading The Man o f  Feeling  is not unlike reading a series 
o f Mackenzie’s contributions to the M irror Club’s moralistic periodicals The 
Mirror and The Lounger. And again the structure o f the book encourages the 
reader to consider each chapter individually. With little reliance on causal 
movement within the text to link the separate episodes, and neither suspense 
nor horror, there is no great temptation for the reader hurry through the book
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‘to find out what happens next’. Hence, the reader is encouraged by the 
nature of the text itself, to read each chapter as an insular morality essay.
Throughout the book, Harley meets individuals whose lives have been 
devastated in the wake o f a set o f values skewed by the corruptive influence 
o f increased wealth. In some cases, the link between wealth and catastrophe 
is straightforward: for example, the madwoman’s incarceration is the 
outcome of the course of true and virtuous love being perverted by her 
father’s overriding ambition to attain greater wealth. In other cases the link 
is more complex. In fact, the extent o f the destructive effect o f placing 
wealth and its trappings above all else is shown in Miss A tkins’ tale.
Superficially Miss Atkins’ fall from grace is the result o f  her seduction by 
the free-thinking Winbrooke. Superficially then, W inbrooke is the villain o f 
the story, but the seduction itself is the outcome o f a plethora o f wrong turns, 
not only by Miss Atkins and Winbrooke, but also by their respective fathers. 
Miss Atkins and Winbrooke reach adulthood lacking a firm moral grounding
51
That the outcome was deliberate on M ackenzie’s part is evident from a 
letter in which he wrote o f ‘... the want o f connection in the Parts’ making it 
‘bear being read at Intervals [better] than some other books should’ (8 
November 1769, Letters, p. 27).
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to act with propriety as a consequence o f insufficient parental guidance. 
Winbrooke has just returned from a Grand Tour well versed in the art o f 
flattery and seduction; and Miss Atkins has been left to glean knowledge o f 
the world from novels.32 The upshot o f Miss A tkins’ lack o f supervision is 
that, for her, the world is full o f romantic heroes, and she automatically casts 
Winbrooke as one such. In Miss Atkins’ vicarious novel-based experience, 
romantic love leads to marriage; in W inbrooke’s experience, since Miss
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Atkins is unlikely to bring a large dowry, so marriage to her would be 
impossible, flattery leads to seduction and the acquisition o f a mistress. Each 
has enough natural virtue to hesitate over committing themselves to the 
inevitable satisfaction o f their respective expectations, but neither is 
sufficiently grounded, morally, to act on their naturally virtuous inclinations. 
However, neither Miss Atkins nor W inbrooke can be considered solely to 
blame for their respective shortcomings. Winbrooke has been brought up to 
adhere to ‘maxims of vulgar doctrine’ (MF, p. 56), that is, the pursuit and 
enjoyment o f increased wealth, and Sir Winbrooke has little influence over 
his son, questions of inheritance aside. The gaps in Miss A tkins’ moral 
education have a more complex aetiology. Her father brought her up to 
revere honour above virtue -  to give importance to being seen to have acted 
with propriety. Her father is not entirely to blame for this: his adherence to 
the tenets o f honour is a consequence o f his having been exposed to the 
dogmatism of a religious code which defines virtue only in relation to one’s 
destination in the next life, rather than one’s passage through this (MF, p. 55). 
Mr Atkins rejected the religious code, and reinterpreted virtue as honour. 
The destructive effects o f aspirations to wealth in this case then are not the 
direct cause o f Miss Atkins’ downfall nor o f W inbrooke’s knavery -  rather
52 This is the theme of Charlotte Lennox, The Female Quixote, in which 
Arabella, the heroine, is eventually persuaded that her Romances are not 
histories, by reference to their heavy reliance on coincidence, and consequent 
lack o f casual connection between elements o f the tales (Charlotte Lennox, 
The Female Quixote, or the Adventures o f  Arabella  (1783), ed. Margaret 
Dalziel (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), Bk IX, ch. XI).
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Winbrooke obviously considered the possibility o f disinheritance well- 
founded reason enough to give for breaking his alliance with Miss Atkins, 
although the text intimates that Miss Atkins believes he had other -  perhaps 
less honourable -  reasons for his precipitate disappearance (MF, p. 59).
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each is vulnerable to these effects because they haven’t been brought up to be 
sufficiently well armed against them: each has gaps in their moral armour.
The conclusions to be learnt from Miss A tkins’ experience do not follow 
straightforwardly from the tale. The possibility o f a reader failing to grasp the 
full import of her tale is increased by the style in which it is written, as here, 
Mackenzie adopts the melodrama and high register o f contemporary ‘bad’ 
novels -  o f  precisely that kind o f novel which has been instrumental in 
forming Miss Atkins’ dangerously unrealistic expectations o f  an encounter 
with a romantic (and honourable) hero.54
The story is punctuated by detailed descriptions o f  the gestures and 
postures o f the protagonists. An example is provided by the description o f 
Miss Atkins’ faint:
Harley filled the lady’s glass; which she had no sooner tasted, than dropping 
it on the floor, and eagerly catching his arm, her eye grew fixed, her lip 
assumed a clayey whiteness, and she fell back lifeless in the chair. (M F, p. 49)
A little later she is described as ‘the dying figure’. M r A tkins’ entrance is 
similarly a moment o f high drama:
the door burst open, and a man entered in the garb o f an officer. When he 
discovered his daughter and Harley, he started back a few paces; his look 
assumed a furious wildness! he laid his hand on his sword. ... ‘Villain,’ he 
cried, ‘thou seest a father who had once a daughter’s honour to preserve; 
blasted as it now is, behold him ready to avenge its loss!’ (M F, p. 66)
with the climax provided by the description o f a closing scene -  which can 
only be described as theatrical:
His daughter was now prostrate at his feet. ‘Strike,’ said she, ‘strike here a 
wretch, whose misery cannot end but with that death she deserves.’ Her hair 
had fallen on her shoulders! her look had the horrid calmness o f out-breathed 
despair! Her father would have spoken; his lip quivered, his cheek grew pale! 
his eyes lost the lightening o f their fury! there was a reproach in them, but 
with a mingling o f pity! He returned them up to heaven -  then on his
Tompkins gives a description o f the common features o f the romantic 
novels o f the period (The Popular Novel, ch. 2).
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daughter. -  he laid his left hand on his heart -  the sword dropped from his
55
right -  he burst into tears.
The story seems to proceed in a series o f stills -  but at a pace, nevertheless. 
Tompkins identifies this as a characteristic feature o f  romantic novels, which 
she sums up beautifully as: ‘Fortune’s wheel is wrenched round at a giddy 
rate, and the entire cast are jerked from posture to posture, with barely
56
enough time to gasp out the appropriate com m ents.’ The dialogue is 
conducted in absurdly high language, again characteristic o f the romantic 
novel o f the period -  for example, the father is sufficiently compos mentis to 
express his shock at finding Harley in Miss A tkins’ company in
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extraordinarily eloquent and complex language. Another feature o f the 
romantic novel on which Mackenzie relies in this episode is the use o f 
coincidence: Miss Atkins happens to alight at the inn at which Winbrooke is 
staying when she pursues him to London (M F, p. 60); and her father happens 
to relocate his daughter after a considerable time, just on the morning that 
Harley visits after his accidental encounter the previous night, leading to the 
histrionics when Mr A t k i n s  mistakenly assumes that he is Winbrooke. So, 
despite the elements o f the tale having considerable importance to the 
didactic function o f the book, they are buried in an uncharacteristic
MF, pp. 66-7. It’s actually quite difficult to work out which way up the 
daughter has prostrated herself, given the account o f  her look: face down or 
face up? Tompkins suggests that use o f ‘prostration’ (frequently found in 
romantic novels) is always to be understood as hyperbole; that it might mean 
kneeling (The Popular Novel, p. 107). Tompkins discusses the use o f 
theatrical gesture in sentimental novels o f the period on pp. 107-9.
Tompkins, The Popular Novel, p. 60. Harley seems to catch the pace o f 
the bad novel too. Mackenzie gives a delightful description o f  Harley’s 
frenzy as he tries to leave to meet his appointment with Miss Atkins. He had 
to return to his rooms twice, first for Miss A tkins’ address, and then for his 
purse, and having retrieved his purse he couldn’t make him self stop to lock 
his bureau, although only ‘two vibrations o f  a pendulum would have served 
him to lock his bureau; -  but they could not be spared’ (M F, p. 54).
Tompkins discusses the use o f register in dialogue in sentimental fiction, 
and gives several o f the florid excesses as examples (The Popular Novel, pp. 
108, 352-65). Harley seems to be afflicted with the same inability to use 
mundane language when he meets Edwards -  see, for example, the quoted 
text in n. 40.
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maelstrom of exactly the kind o f detail Mackenzie has taken pains to avoid 
elsewhere.
However, Harley has developed sufficiently to be able to disentangle what 
is, and what is not, irretrievable. He recognises that Miss Atkins is 
essentially virtuous even before hearing her history (M F, p. 50), and is 
sufficiently convinced o f her intrinsic virtue -  despite her having been 
seduced, and imprisoned, and worked as a concubine and a prostitute -  for 
him to be able to convince her father that even given the dishonour, she 
merits his forgiveness (M F, p. 68). This conclusion generalises: the moral 
rot can be stopped if people adjust their perspectives and are guided by their 
sensibility. Mackenzie uses this conclusion as the basis o f a practical 
morality propounded in the sections o f the book located away from London.
Mackenzie takes pains here as elsewhere to ensure that a reader w on’t fail 
to draw the right conclusions from the cautionary tales forming the bulk o f 
the London sequences o f chapters. Nor does he leave it to the reader to 
identify the true villain in these tales. During a sustained speech in which he 
defends a more romantic, less prosaic attitude, Harley cites ‘the immense 
riches acquired by individuals’ as the cause o f the general deterioration in the 
moral community (M F, pp. 82-3). Increased wealth has ‘erected a standard 
o f ambition’, which ambition undermines the twin pillars o f a stable moral
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community: private morals and public virtue. Young people have adopted 
the ambitions concomitant to increased personal wealth, and recast all in 
their light: ‘their desire for pleasure is warped to the desire o f wealth’. Even 
love has yielded to wealth in this way: marriages are contracted with one eye 
on the dowry; and since wealth defines a person’s status and merit, other 
discourse becomes unnecessary: appearing wealthy is sufficient to guarantee 
a person’s good reputation. Harley ends this speech with a powerful 
statement about the cumulative effect o f this misplacement o f values: virtue 
is forgotten and vice is no longer recognised as such:
MF, p. 82. ‘Private’ here is used to refer to the domain o f the estate rather 
than in the sense o f ‘domestic’ -  and is opposed to a m an’s public or civic 
life. This is discussed in Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, pp. 95f.
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This I hold to be an alarming crisis in the corruption o f the state: when not 
only is virtue declined, and vice prevailing, but when the practices o f virtue 
are forgotten, and the infamy o f vice unfelt. {MF, p. 83)
The sojourn to London has worked: Harley leaves the city in no doubt about 
the lure o f luxury and its invasive nature. But he has also learnt that the 
situation isn’t irretrievable, providing one places emphasis in the right 
quarters: on virtue; and providing one trusts to one’s sensibility rather than in 
appearances or rational judgement to guide one’s behaviour. By fiat the 
reader will have learnt the same lessons, from experiencing the exercise o f 
sensibility and by absorbing the content o f Harley’s speech.
One strong theme of The Man o f  Feeling is that, once you go beyond the 
bounds o f familiar territory, the world becomes one o f ‘trickery, sham and 
broken dreams’. The solution to this is not to attempt to shun the world 
entirely, not to follow the misanthropist’s strategy.59 Harley retreats from 
London, but only as far as his estate, to live ‘sequestered from the noise o f 
the multitude’ {MF, p. 104) -  unlike the misanthropist who sold up his land 
and so gave up his responsibilities to, and ties with, his tenants. However, it 
is unrealistic to consider  that one will never come into contact with those 
who live by the corrupted tenets o f the city, not least because the influence o f 
the city is seeping into the country too, as is shown by the reference to the 
newly wealthy being in possession o f much o f the land in H arley’s parish 
{MF, pp. 9-10), and by his aunt’s scathing comments about the mushroom 
gentry ‘who wear their coats o f arms in their purses’ {MF, p. 109), whom she 
met at the W altons.60 London cupidity, in the book, is shown to have 
penetrated all levels o f society even in the country: the grocer’s wife on the 
coach from London speaks approvingly o f the crossing-sweeper’s rise in 
stature {MF, p. 78); the beggar with the dog has absorbed something o f it; the 
parish minister, too, acknowledges wealth before breeding: ‘a bow at church 
from [the newly wealthy] to such a man as Harley, -  would have made the
39 The inability to retain a healthy objectivity towards one’s emotional 
circumstances, when alone for long periods, is the theme in M ackenzie’s 
Julia de Roubigne (1777) (ed. Susan Manning (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 
1999)).
60 The Mushroom family make several appearances, later, in M ackenzie’s 
contributions to the Mirror (1779-80).
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parson look back into his sermon for some precept o f Christian hum ility’ 
{MF, p. 10). Nevertheless, the moral is, providing one acts according to the
dictates o f sensibility, then one will be able to negotiate the hazards o f the
61
materialistic world successfully.
5 A practical morality
From the discussion so far, The Man o f  Feeling  can be understood as a series 
o f cautionary tales, and a guide to self-preservation, as well as a manual o f 
sensibility. However, the book is more than a guide to self-preservation. 
Mackenzie describes both the nature and cause o f the corruption which 
informs people’s deceitful and self-interested behaviour; and the way in
which its growth can be halted if not reversed. In effect, then, The Man o f
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Feeling is also a book of practical morality. Edw ards’ tale is essential to 
this aspect o f the book’s didactic function.
If  M ackenzie’s intention was only to write a book which guided the young 
through the development of sensibility, and to warn o f the pitfalls into which 
they will fall through relying on standards other than those o f virtue in 
judging their fellow men, then Harley’s story would be complete at the point 
at which he demonstrates that he has learnt these lessons. Without 
incongruence, Harley could leave London, and return home to marry Miss 
Walton to live happily ever after in rural tranquillity. Instead, Mackenzie 
chose to add Edwards’ lengthy tale o f misfortune, followed by a long speech 
by Harley in which he acknowledges the advantages o f  increased wealth for 
a nation, but condemns the contemporary colonisation practices {MF, pp. 
102-3). This is followed by a twist in the plot familiar in romantic novels, 
frustrating the smooth passage o f love between Harley and Miss Walton, 
during which Harley falsely believes Miss Walton to be about to marry 
another, someone consonant with Miss W alton’s social standing. In the 
sentimental climax of the novel, H arley’s misconstrual o f the situation is
Which can be understood to guide in friendship as well as indicate sincere
distress.
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It is a practical morality in that its foundations, premises concerning the 
essential nature o f man, are simply assumed, not established.
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revealed, he and Miss Walton declare their love for each other, and Harley
63
dies.
If the didactic intention behind the book is taken seriously, then Edwards’ 
tale raises the question o f whether Mackenzie considered it to contribute to 
the instructive content o f the novel, or whether it is a literary equivalent o f a 
Baroque coda, allowing Mackenzie to indulge his love o f pathos and the 
dexterity with which he can manipulate readers’ reactions. Some take this 
latter line, regarding Edwards’ tale as adding nothing to the overall
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architecture of the book. However, there is sufficient evidence in Edwards’ 
litany o f woes to consider Mackenzie here to have been writing as a practical 
moralist and further as a Scots practical moralist, with a message specifically 
for the nobility and landed gentry o f his country. Reading Edw ards’ tale in 
this way, the perils o f London described in the earlier sequences, take on a 
different role too. They no longer appear to be just a collection o f cautionary 
tales about the hazards facing the naive in slippery polite London society; 
they also become a series o f warnings about the effects o f exchanging a 
traditional provincial value system for one that is driven by greed. The 
London sequences show how corrosion by wealth can spread within the city; 
Edwards’ tale shows that it has serious ramifications in the country too; and 
given colonisation, potentially also on a global scale. But Edwards’ tale is 
more than a series o f prohibitions: for ‘old m oney’ it describes a morally 
motivated way of life which can stem the corrosive force o f increased 
personal wealth -  a reminder for old money o f traditional mores: that land 
means more than merely revenue; and for ‘new m oney’ it can act as a 
‘pattern book’, a guide to the kinds o f responsibilities and priorities they 
should adopt as land owners. However, while the values which Mackenzie 
wishes to preserve are rooted in tradition, the moral code he develops to
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Joy followed by sorrow is the mark o f sentimental literature (Tompkins 
discusses the cult o f distress in this regard, The Popular Novel, p. 108). 
Mackenzie refers to a well developed mind being able to ‘meet Joy with 
Composure, & Afflictions with Tranquillity’ (31 October 1770, Letters, p. 
60). A sad ending o f this nature to the book should be as pleasurable as a 
happy one to those who have learnt the lessons on sensibility well.
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For example, Barker, Henry Mackenzie, ch. 2; and Simpson, The Protean 
Scot, ch. 6.
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promote them is not trenchantly reactionary. By emphasising the essentially 
interactive, sociable nature o f sensibility, Mackenzie can propose a moral 
code which can both accommodate the inevitable changes to society wrought 
by an influx o f wealth, and give new reasons for preserving the traditional 
web of interaction within communities.
Edw ards1 tale
Edwards’ tale can be seen as giving reasons for a need to work towards 
preserving the fabric o f provincial communities. Edw ards’ litany o f woes is 
the outcome of a land owner adopting the self-interested priorities which he 
is taken to have learnt in the city and applying them in his private -  that is, 
estate-based -  life.
Edwards’ problems began when his landlord followed the advice o f his 
London-trained steward, and restructured his land to increase the size o f 
farms with a view to increasing their productivity. Edwards was faced with 
the choice between leaving the farm he and several generations o f his family 
had worked, and leasing more land. He opted for the latter, for sentimental 
reasons. This increased additional commitment brought in its wake both a 
need for more farm-hands, and a degree o f financial risk. Two poor seasons 
and the loss o f money as a result o f bankruptcy on the part o f his corn factor 
left Edwards financially distressed and unable to pay his rent on the due date. 
The steward acted according to the letter o f the lease, and evicted Edwards 
within days o f his failure to pay the rent. He and his son and family leased a 
smaller farm from a neighbouring land owner and eventually regained 
financial equilibrium.
The same land owner provoked a second, more pernicious run o f disaster 
for Edwards and his family. Edwards’ son, Jack, made an enemy o f the land 
owner’s gamekeeper after the gamekeeper shot Jack’s pointer for straying on 
to the land. Jack assaulted the gamekeeper, and was subsequently arrested 
without bail, tried and fined. Later, at the suggestion o f the justice who tried 
him, a press gang arrived at the farm to conscript him. Edwards persuaded 
the sergeant, with the help o f a bribe, to let him take his son’s place.
Edwards was sent to the East Indies, where he swiftly gained promotion 
to sergeant. However, having witnessed an elderly Indian prisoner
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repeatedly tortured at the instigation o f officers, in the expectation that he 
would reveal the whereabouts o f a store o f some form o f treasure, Edwards 
allowed the prisoner to escape. He was subsequently court martialled, lashed 
and dishonourably discharged without the wherewithal to return to Britain. 
He was helped by the Indian prisoner, who supplied money enough for his 
passage home. Harley meets Edwards as Edwards is approaching his former 
home.
Edwards’ trials don’t stop here. On reaching South-hill, the area in which 
he originally farmed, he learns that his son and daughter-in-law have died o f 
despair after crop failure left them in debt. Their two children remained in 
the area, having been taken in by a local woman. Edwards is reunited with 
his grandchildren, and rescued from the inevitability o f life on parish charity 
by Harley, who accommodates them all in a farm on his land.
It is true that the story is larded with pathos. Edw ards’ old dog, Trusty, 
dies exactly when the family are leaving under eviction, for example, and the 
description o f the dog’s last moments is replete with sentimental detail {MF, 
pp. 88-9). The press gang intrudes on Christmas Eve, which is also the 
grandson’s birthday, disturbing the family in a game o f Blind M an’s Buff. 
Again, Mackenzie doesn’t stint in his description o f the reactions o f the 
family to this infraction {MF, p. 91). The verbatim report o f the Indian’s side 
o f his conversation with Edwards, when he meets Edwards after his court
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martial, is remarkably eloquent. However, the disasters which overtake 
Edwards are far from irrelevant to M ackenzie’s overall purpose, which is to 
show that unless landed gentry remain at home and fulfil their 
responsibilities to tenants, rural communities will fragment, causing innocent 
people undue and deep distress. Further the pathos in the tale is part o f 
M ackenzie’s strategy to re-educate the aristocracy on this issue.
Edwards is unlike the victims o f ill fortune whom Harley has met in 
London in that he didn’t in any way precipitate the chain o f disasters which 
overtook him. He is a model tenant: attached to his original farm by family 
ties {MF, p. 87); careful to pay his rent and remain out o f  debt. He is also a
Simpson focuses on the sentimental aspect o f Edw ards’ tale to the 
exclusion o f any didactic purpose {The Protean Scot, p. 159).
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man of feeling -  his sensibility is apparent in his compassion for the Indian 
(MF, p. 93), and for the ‘cordial tear’ dropped when describing the death o f 
his dog (MF, p. 89).
The villain in this tale is Edwards’ landlord, and the general moral o f the 
story for land owners is that success as a land owner is judged by more than 
just healthy finances. Further, that failure to respect this will have
repercussions not only for their tenants, but for the agricultural community as
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a whole.
Mackenzie makes specific reference to the landlord’s steward being from 
London, the implication being that he has allowed him self to be advised by 
one with no first-hand experience o f farming and no working knowledge o f 
the kind o f relationship that grows up between land owner and long-standing 
tenant. The decision to increase the size o f his farms was reached on purely 
economic grounds, without consideration o f the repercussions, financial or 
otherwise, that this would have for his tenants. A good landlord would be 
expected to exercise a degree o f flexibility with regard to Edwards’ failure to 
pay his rent -  to recognise the nature o f the antecedents to this unprecedented 
occurrence and to give credence to Edwards’ long history o f reliability and 
trustworthiness in this matter by allowing him time to recoup his losses from 
the series o f financial disasters. The London steward’s decision to activate 
the tenancy agreement to the letter shows he lacked both personal knowledge 
o f the tenants and comprehension o f the vagaries o f farming life. The land 
owner is equally culpable albeit by omission -  for leaving such decisions in 
the hands o f someone without requisite experience, and so, for failing to 
fulfil his expected paternalistic role with regard to his tenants’ distress.
Land owners are again targeted in connection with the accident with 
regard to Jack’s dog. The gamekeeper had, presumably been ordered to 
adopt a ‘shoot on sight’ policy with regard to dogs straying on to the land to 
protect the game. However since Jack’s dog is a gun dog, a pointer, the dog 
would have been unlikely to damage the game. Had there been more
That the land owners’ revenue depends on industrious and dedicated tenant 
farmers isn’t mentioned.
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connection between land owner and tenants, or indeed gamekeeper and 
tenants, the dog might have been recognised, and left unharmed.
Edwards’ son and daughter-in-law later die o f  heartbreak having run into 
debt as a result o f poor harvests. It is within the remit o f a good land owner 
to encourage enthusiastic tenants to remain on their land and to help out 
those who are victims of natural disaster to recover their equilibrium. It is 
also to the land owner’s advantage.
The role o f  Edw ards’ tale
The most insistent message o f The Man o f  Feeling  is that London life is 
corrupt, and that that corruption is the outcome o f  people’s ambitions to 
increase personal wealth. Edwards’ tale introduces a further and more 
endemic consequence of the cult o f wealth: that it is impossible to confine its 
effects to the city. Its effects are evident in the behaviour o f  land owners 
who are adopting agricultural policies driven by economic considerations 
alone; distancing themselves from their tenants and their responsibilities to 
tenants by employing mediators with little or no first-hand experience o f 
agriculture; and becoming dissociated generally from the day-to-day life o f 
the tenants on which the revenue from the estate depends.
Taking Edwards’ tale together with those o f the London sequences reveals 
Mackenzie’s view about how the corruption o f  society has come about and, 
more importantly, what Mackenzie believes can, and should be done to 
prevent deeper incursions into the provinces and perhaps even to reverse the 
trend. In short, Edwards’ tale contains the features which make The Man o f  
Feeling  a handbook o f practical morality.
We know from the opening chapters that Harley is a member o f the
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minor landed gentry, is ‘old money’. We are told that the antiquity o f his 
family commands the respect o f long-standing local residents but that the 
parish in which his estate is located is gradually becoming the domain o f the
Dwyer places Harley in the rank o f minor gentry on the basis o f his 
income being £250 p.a. -  which isn’t an insignificant amount but not enough 
to enable him to take up the benevolent role o f landed gentry ( Virtuous 
Discourse, p. 165, n. 36).
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newly wealthy. The fact that concern with increasing wealth informs the 
opinions of Harley’s friends is quietly indicated right at the start o f  the book 
(MF, p. 10). In Edwards’ tale, and the following fragment, M ackenzie places 
responsibility for the spread o f ‘London am bition’ from city to country, 
firmly at the feet o f old money -  the aristocracy and landed gentry: 
Edwards’ landlord’s family has long been connected with the land; Edwards 
explains that the farm he lost ‘had been possessed by my father, grandfather, 
and great-grandfather, which last was a younger brother o f that very m an’s 
ancestor who is now lord o f the manor’.69 Edw ards’ tale also shows that the 
ramifications o f the landlord’s new policies for running his estate affect not 
only Edwards’ family but the agricultural community as a whole -  which, 
like Edwards’ family, threatens to be dislocated and displaced.
The agricultural community is depicted as tightly knit. A neighbouring 
farmer’s daughter had joined Edwards’ family on Christmas Eve, for 
example. The family’s maidservant had been with them since Edwards was a
The attitudes o f the newly wealthy are beginning to be adopted by others 
in the locale: Harley is encouraged by his friends to increase his wealth by 
acquiring land (MF, p. 10); Mr Walton provides a letter o f introduction to a 
baronet who has influence with the first lord o f the Treasury (MF, p. 13); 
Mrs Walton suffers the aspiring incomers (MF, p. 108-9). Presumably, since 
the excise man acquired the lease which Harley hoped to apply for, he too 
will become one o f the newly landed in the area.
69 MF, p. 87; this is a reference to a typical clan relation. There is an 
explanation of traditional clanship, and especially the non-commercial nature 
of the relationship between clan chief and tacksman in Johnson’s Journey. 
Early in the book, Johnson comments on the civility and politeness o f 
Highlanders, characteristics that he believed to result from the paternalistic 
influence o f their clan chief (Journey, p. 24). He explains the role o f the 
tacksmen as overseer o f the land and people in the c h ie fs  absence; takes 
pains to make clear that the tacksman stands in for the chief in every way, 
and not merely as a land manager or steward (ibid., pp. 75-6); and contrasts 
the breadth o f a tacksman’s responsibility for his tenants’ general welfare, 
with the money-based contractual relationship o f  a factor (ibid., p. 78). 
Johnson emphasises that the relationship between chief and tacksman is 
familial rather than contractual, by referring to the fact that tacksmen were 
often ‘collateral relations’ (ibid., p. 75); and by describing fosterage (ibid., p. 
119). He draws attention, too, to the fact that clans were not invariably at 
war with each other; and that allegiances between clans on occasion had a 
very long history: ‘One o f the old Highland alliances has continued for two 
hundred years, and is still subsisting between M acleod  o f  Raasay and 
Macdonald o f Sky' (ibid., p. 52).
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child (MF, p. 91); a neighbouring land owner offers Edwards a farm on his
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land. The land owner’s action led indirectly to the departure o f Edwards 
for the East Indies, and to the death o f his son and daughter-in-law, so it also 
had repercussions for the children and presumably also for the maidservant. 
In short, the heart o f community life is disturbed by such policies on the part 
o f the land owner. Edwards’ grandchildren can remain in the area only 
because taken in by someone who knew their parents. The children’s school 
has such importance that the land owner’s decision to raze it to the ground 
caused the schoolmaster to die o f sorrow, but the education o f the children is 
considered important enough for someone to step in and continue their 
education while they wait for a new teacher. The kind o f charitable activities 
practised by the members o f the community are dependent on long-standing 
ties within the community. The woman substituting for the schoolmaster 
expresses what may be understood as the fundamental tenet o f the 
community in her reproach o f those who fail to honour family ties: ‘it is a 
shame for some folks to forget their relations, at a time when they have most 
need to remember them ’ (MF, p. 97).
The ramifications o f the squire’s actions spread through, and threaten to 
dislocate and disperse, the society on which he is dependent for the revenue 
from his land. The fabric o f the whole community is threatened by a wrong 
move on the land owner’s part.
The general implication o f Edwards’ tale is that without a change o f heart 
on the part o f those at the apex o f society, the fabric o f society as a whole 
will shred. Taking Edwards’ tale together with the London sequences, the 
outcome is that, if allowed to continue unchecked, the situation can only 
worsen. Without a suitable precedent set by those in the upper echelons o f 
the social structure the cult o f wealth will continue to seep down via their 
children, who are already seen to be acting in accordance with the misguided 
ambitions o f a wealth-oriented society -  this is the import o f the 
misanthropist’s diatribe against contemporary education (M F, p. 40), and 
Harley’s speech to Silton (M F, p. 82): young men are allowed to embark on a
70
One assumes this offer must have been made as a result o f  Edw ards’ long­
standing good reputation, as eviction for non-payment o f rent is not liable to 
make one seem a promising tenant.
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Grand Tour to complete their education ill-equipped for such an experience 
and return with their wealth-oriented values only deepened further -  as 
shown in the case o f Winbrooke. Young women are left without suitable 
mentors. Marriage has become yet another domain in which money plays a 
major role.
The destructive effects o f wealth spread not only from the city to the 
provinces, but beyond. Edwards describes the attitude o f the officers towards 
the indigenous population in the East Indies (MF, p. 93); and Harley 
extrapolates: the wealth the British have taken from the ‘treasuries o f 
N abobs’ will be replaced through the oppression o f the indigenous subjects -  
that is, the wealth o f Indian princes depends on their subjects and it is these 
people who will feel the weight o f British greed.
There is additional reason for the nobility to adjust their values -  their 
behaviour is already mimicked by the newly affluent, by dint o f the authority 
this echelon of society has always had. In the country their attitude has more 
far-reaching consequences -  it threatens to cause the fragmentation o f the 
agricultural community; and will be emulated at all levels o f society: trade 
and commerce have opened opportunities formerly denied to all bar the 
aristocracy and landed gentry. Wealth has been democratised so tradesmen -  
for example, the grocer’s wife in the coach -  and the poor -  for example, the 
beggar Harley meets on his journey to London -  harbour ambitions for 
wealth which are now, for the first time, realisable in principle.
The solution is for the land owner to stay at home and honour his 
responsibilities as a land owner. However, Mackenzie also has to show that 
it is ultimately in the land owner’s interest to take this option and do so 
without relying on increased revenue as incentive.
Edwards’ tale pinpoints the source o f the contagion o f increased personal 
wealth to be London. However, the responsibility for containing the 
phenomenon lies within the peripatetic nobility and landed gentry. Edwards’ 
tale demonstrates their pivotal role in this. The agricultural community is 
dependent on the land owner honouring his responsibilities and although the 
community is tightly knit, and in certain respects autonomous, the existence 
o f the ties within the community is dependent on the landlord generating 
conditions under which they may be maintained. This is because such ties
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can only evolve within a stable society, and the landlord is crucial to the 
creation or destruction o f the stability o f the community.
By identifying the cause o f fragmentation within the agricultural 
communities to be the landlord’s agronomic policy, Mackenzie also provides 
the means by which this fragmentation can be halted and possibly reversed. 
By making Edwards’ land owner the cause o f the fragmentation, a change o f 
heart on his part will be sufficient to prevent the community dislocating 
further; and by ensuring that the children o f those in this pivotal position are 
inculcated with similarly benevolent views, not only will the agricultural 
communities be preserved from generation to generation, but a suitable 
example will be set for those coming into land ownership for the first time. 
This influence will percolate down through society generally -  the ambitions 
and priorities o f the upper echelons o f society will therefore become those o f 
society as a whole.
Further, to ensure that the right principles are passed down through the 
generations, the education o f children needs close attention, so that they are 
well enough equipped to withstand the lure o f less morally based environs, 
and to maintain correct attitudes through to adulthood, when they become 
members o f the most influential sector o f society.
Effectively Mackenzie motivates this change in two ways. First, the 
whole moral programme depends for its efficacy on a tacit assumption o f  the 
inherent authority o f the aristocracy and landed gentry. Land ownership is a 
source o f revenue, but within society, land ownership also commands respect, 
and with that respect come certain responsibilities to which only the 
traditional land owners will be sensitive. Implicitly, and perhaps unwittingly, 
Mackenzie is flattering those whom he wishes to influence. W ealth alone is 
not sufficient to generate the authority and respect given to the upper classes. 
What is necessary is a command o f the mores o f land ownership which are 
part and parcel o f ‘breeding’.
Mackenzie goes further than this. Estate management will not be 
successful without the kind o f day-to-day involvement on the part o f the land 
owner which engenders a network o f communication and ties between 
people, rather than between elements o f an economic unit -  the kind o f day- 
to-day working knowledge o f tenants which would inform, for example,
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discretion in the implementation o f the conditions o f  a lease, and so preclude 
the injustice o f the eviction o f a model tenant such as Edwards.
This strain o f thinking isn’t independent o f that which informs the London 
sequences in the book. The ability to relate to people in the kind o f way 
which acknowledges their humanity depends on the development o f 
sensibility, as is exemplified by Harley’s encounters in London. In sum, then, 
The Man o f  Feeling is not only a manual for the development o f a refined 
sensibility, but has a specific end in mind, which end is revealed by Edwards’ 
tale. The aristocracy and landed gentry need to develop a refined sensibility 
to inform the benevolence they extend to their tenants, and this paternalism is 
deemed a concomitant o f land ownership.
The didactic function of The Man o f  Feeling  has broad scope. Edwards’ 
tale reveals that the education, or re-education o f society depends on the 
development o f sensibility, and the London sequences show -  in fact guide 
the reader through -  the process. In each case, the lessons in the book are 
learnt in the same way: the reader’s natural sensibility is stimulated by some 
melancholic tale, which is followed by a section which explains what it is 
that has been highlighted by the unmediated response on the part o f the 
reader. Tears come unprompted by an intellectual appreciation o f  a situation 
for those with a refined sensibility as they are a reaction to the distress o f
humanity, and not to the specific situation; and comprehension o f that
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situation and o f what may be done to alleviate it follows after.
Following this interpretation o f the didactic ‘mechanism ’ used in The Man 
o f  Feeling the seemingly excessive pathos in Edwards’ tale can be 
understood to have a didactic function too. To make his point, Mackenzie has 
to show that the tenantry deserve consideration for their humanity, that there 
are aspects o f their lives which respond to, and provoke response from, 
sensibility. To demonstrate this point, M ackenzie emphasises features o f 
their everyday life and uses them to stimulate a melancholic response from 
the reader. Furthermore, Mackenzie has to show that the agricultural
7>
The use o f fragments or incomplete text, as in H arley’s speech about 
colonisation, and the misanthropist’s speech allows Mackenzie to put across 
those aspects o f a general situation which he regards as pertinent without 
having to give an argument for his points.
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community is an essentially moral community -  where morality is defined by 
reference to sensibility.
As mentioned above, the agricultural community is depicted as tightly 
knit. Without these community ties, and the fortuitous meeting with Harley, 
Edwards’ prospects of regaining contact with his grandchildren, and o f 
living other than as a destitute would have been thin. Since the ties are based 
on interactions which are prompted by sensibility -  the ties are sociable -  the 
community becomes a moral community.
The upshot o f Edwards’ tale, then, is not only that o f giving an account o f 
the way the upper classes should live in order to maintain the moral fabric o f 
the nation, but of giving a moral purpose to the development o f sensibility. 
If one lives quietly and acts according to the dictates o f sensibility towards 
one’s fellow men, then one will be able to negotiate the swiftly changing 
patina o f society caused by the influx o f wealth without forfeiting the 
traditional mores on which the existence o f  a moral community depends. A 
proper sensibility becomes necessary to the preservation and reinstatement o f 
morality.
The conclusion is that The Man o f  Feeling  can be interpreted as a manual 
o f practical morality. The justification for this rests in part on demonstrating 
that Mackenzie was indeed concerned to re-educate the influential sectors o f 
society, and in part on showing that the book was written with a view to 
educating not the higher echelons o f society in Britain as a whole, but 
specifically those o f Scotland -  the aristocracy and landed gentry.
6 A Scottish practical morality
The claim that Edwards’ tale shifts the purpose behind The Man o f  Feeling 
from being a primer in sensibility for the young to a book o f practical advice 
for determining the morals o f a nation is somewhat audacious. Its 
plausibility depends on showing that the concerns within Edwards’ tale in 
particular and the book as a whole are part o f a general trend in M ackenzie’s 
thought during the period in which he was writing. If  we consider the cultural 
environment in which Mackenzie was significantly active and the period in 
Scots history during which he lived, then there are enough parallels between 
the issues attracting attention generally from Mackenzie and his peers and
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those which function within The Man o f  Feeling to give it an overarching and 
morally motivated structure, to at least make the claim that the book provides 
a set o f moral precepts which had particular relevance to the upper echelons 
o f Scots society at that time.
We don’t have to look far for the source o f ideas for the London 
sequences in the book. Mackenzie explains in letters to his cousin Elizabeth 
Rose, and in Anecdotes and Egotisms that the book grew out o f ideas and 
experiences he had noted during the two years he was in London, learning 
the workings o f the English Exchequer.72 He began writing the book in 1767, 
after he had returned to Scotland to work in a legal practice in Edinburgh.
As mentioned above, Mackenzie was an active member o f the Edinburgh 
literati and the Mirror Club. The concerns o f  the M irror Club were generally 
to cultivate the virtue o f the Scottish citizen, and to condemn the vices which
• 7Twere becoming increasingly more insistent. The literati saw themselves as 
responding to the threat to the moral fabric o f Scottish society, posed by the 
increase in national wealth and by changes in the distribution o f  wealth. 
These changes were pandemic to Britain during this period, and it is 
particularly interesting that Mackenzie responded to a national problem with 
a specifically Scottish solution.
Scottish identity
There is a glaring lacuna in this interpretation. Amongst other 
presuppositions, it relies on the idea that Mackenzie, and those for whom he 
was writing, regarded themselves to be identifiably Scots, and that, in turn, is 
dependent on being able, now, to pinpoint what can have been taken, then, to 
have constituted identification as Scots. In other words, this interpretation 
necessarily depends for its plausibility on being able to reconstruct to what 
Mackenzie and his readers, as Scots, felt allegiance.
For some commentators, teasing out the concept o f Scottishness which 
can be considered as foremost during the period which supplies the context
Anecdotes and Egotisms, p. 185. 
Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, pp. 24-5.
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for Mackenzie’s novels,74 implies that M ackenzie may not be considered to 
hold an allegiance to Scotland at all; for, such commentators argue, as a 
member o f the Edinburgh literati and so advocate and practitioner o f 
Enlightenment principles, his primary allegiance must be considered to have 
been, at best, to a newly created Britain, and, more probably, to England. 
This conclusion is a corollary to a model o f eighteenth-century social and 
cultural history in which Britain is understood as effectively the result o f 
England having conquered Scotland by the 1707 Treaty o f Union -  a model 
according to which a country’s nationalism is defined culturally in terms o f 
its difference from, or defiance towards, other countries. Such models 
presuppose that there is a set o f identifiable cultural criteria for a nationalist 
allegiance, which are both necessary and sufficient for that allegiance, and 
which, in the case o f eighteenth-century Scotland, are incompatible with, and, 
more emphatically, often contradictory to, the modus operandi o f  the literati. 
A prime example o f this kind o f account o f Scottishness is given in Katie 
Trumpener’s Bardic Nationalism .75
Trumpener explains the cultural attitudes o f the British peripheries (Wales, 
Ireland and Scotland) using the assumption that each o f these cultures was 
bifurcated by England’s imperialism, during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. She uses a Marxist interpretation o f this perceived 
bifurcation to generate a nationalist explanation o f the two cultures, by which 
I mean she draws a Marxian categorical distinction between the well-to-do 
and the people based on a perceived opposition, or tension, between the 
polite and the popular cultures o f the period; and then argues that the polite is 
essentially foreign -  English -  and imposed; and that the popular culture, 
being indigenous (and accordingly, by her, exalted), has to be taken as that in 
which a nation’s identity resides.
By contrast, Linda Colley argues that evidence from popular culture 
demonstrates that it was this sector o f eighteenth-century society in both
74 It is arguable that all three o f M ackenzie’s novels address the same issue o f 
the morality o f the nation, although each takes a different approach to the 
issue. For example, Julia de Roubigne (1777) charts the disastrous effects o f 
failing to recognise the necessity o f sociability to moral thinking.
73 Katie Trumpener, Bardic Nationalism: The Romantic Novel and the British
Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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England and Scotland which was instrumental in generating a full-blooded
7/r
concept o f Britain. Colley explains the evolution o f Britain as the 
consequence o f a series o f events during the eighteenth century, the effect o f 
which she interprets using evidence o f popular interest in initially, 
Protestantism, then, from mid-century, imperialism. Like Trumpener, she 
works from the assumption that national identity is forged in terms o f 
difference, but unlike Trumpener, she argues that imperialism, far from being 
divisive, smoothed over differences between the constituents o f Britain. The 
catalytic difference, according to Colley’s thesis, was that resulting from the 
need to maintain the British Empire against erosion by the rest o f the world.
By 1750, it would appear that the Scots had no option but to consider 
themselves North Britons politically, and little cause not to, economically. 
The failure of the ’45 Rising and the harsh governmental recriminations that 
followed rendered the Hanoverian succession and Protestant settlement 
unchallengeable. Politically then, Scotland was apparently committed to the 
Union.
As discussed above (pp. 23-4, by 1750 Scottish trade had increased 
enough to outweigh taxation, and continued to do so. If  we assume, then, 
that during the period from 1750 until the French Revolution, the British 
nation, considered as a political and economic entity, became only 
increasingly robust, it follows that we have to look to other spheres in which 
to establish a concept o f Scottish identity.77 However, none o f the cultural 
aspects o f eighteenth-century Scottish life, which were left untouched by the 
incorporative union per se, can be said to contribute to, or to constitute the 
core o f Scottishness without qualification. On the face o f it, Scottish culture 
was deeply divided, with high culture on one side o f the crevasse, and an 
informal, indigenous, vernacular culture on the other; and the differentiating 
factor in each case appears to be Anglicisation.
76Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837  (London: Vintage, 
1996).
77 This general interpretation o f British politics and economics seems to 
underpin much discussion o f Scottish cultural identity, and for the given 
period comprises the main thread o f Colley’s argument for a pan-British 
identity in Britons. Colley’s overall interpretation for this period is plausible, 
but requires qualification.
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Although, within the Church o f  Scotland, the rational religion o f the 
Moderates jostled with, and eventually superseded, the fundamentalist 
Calvinism characteristic o f the previous century, as described above (pp. 2 5 - 
6), this failed to have a schismatic effect on the Kirk. So, it might appear that 
the Kirk could be taken to provide a focal point for Scottish identity during 
the eighteenth century. However, the subsequent series o f secessions over 
patronage meant there was no focal point on which Scotland could focus.
The education system in Scotland differed from that in England, but 
formal institutions, such as universities, and philosophical and scientific 
societies were definitive centres o f empirical methodology, and 
Enlightenment principles in general. In addition, by the middle o f the 
eighteenth century, polite culture, which flourished among the professional 
classes -  lawyers, clergymen, physicians and professors -  had become the 
norm in universities.78 Furthermore, the universities benefited from reforms 
that established a ‘modern’ system o f lectures by specialised professors, in 
place o f regenting. These reforms began in Edinburgh in 1709, and had 
spread to include all universities except King’s College, Aberdeen by 1753. 
Many o f the specialist positions had sympathetic patrons with strong links 
with Westminster, for example, the Duke o f  Argyll and the 3rd Earl o f 
Bute.79 Again, a Scottish institution which survived the Union intact, could 
be considered subsequently to have sold out to the English.
78 G.E. Davie describes the Scottish education system and the principles 
behind it, in The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her Universities in the 
Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1961); esp. pp. 
1-6, 20-1, 26-56, 201, concerning the ‘peculiar institution’ and 
contemporary opinion o f the benefits o f compulsory philosophy (p. 5). 
However, Davie argues that the Scottish educational system is a paradigm 
case o f the distinctive features o f Scottish ethos, because it combines ‘the 
democracy o f the Kirk elders with the intellectualism o f the advocates’ (p. 
xii).
79 Regenting was the generalist supervision o f a student cohort by a single 
professor, which was replaced by subject-specialist teaching by an expert 
professor (David Allan, Scotland in the Eighteenth Century: Union and  
Enlightenment (London: London, 2002), p. 122; see also Alexander Murdoch 
and Richard B. Sher, ‘Literary and Learned Culture’, in T.M. Devine and 
Rosalind Mitchison (eds), People and Society in Scotland, vol. I, 1760-1830  
(Edinburgh: Donald, 1988), pp. 127-42).
96
In the area o f letters and literature, the high culture o f polished English 
prose and poetry contrasted with the informal, indigenous oral and vernacular 
culture of ‘the people’, o f whom ballads and the poems o f Robert Fergusson 
and Robert Burns in Scots, and those o f Alasdair M acM haighstir Alasdair, 
Rob Donn Mackay and Dugald Buchanan in Gaelic, are taken to be 
representative. But it is in this realm that the division between high and 
popular culture, required for a two-culture theory o f Scottish identity, 
becomes overtly problematic.
When considering the potential o f formal institutions representative o f 
post-Union Scottishness, it seems they fail in this regard either as a result o f a 
general tendency towards Enlightenment principles and English polite 
culture, or as a result o f an apparent ambivalence towards one culture or the 
other; but in each case the disregard for, or ambivalence towards what two- 
culture theorists regard as the indigenous culture, can be ascribed to 
movements or factions within the institutions. In these cases, then, a two- 
culture theory at least is viable.
However, with regard to letters and literature, ground for the division 
becomes blurred by evidence that the individuals representing each culture,
themselves display ambivalence. Fergusson and Burns both had substantial
80links with English and Scots literary culture. Enlightened and high-born 
Scots ‘shared’ popular culture by speaking Scots and singing or composing 
Scots poems and ballads. The association o f nationalism with ‘the people’ is 
upset by the fact that the gentry, clergy and men o f letters adopted 
indisputably national causes, such as the mid-century campaigns for a Scots 
militia.
Justification for a two-culture thesis often relies on demonstrating what is 
considered to be the literati’s dismissive attitude towards the Scots language, 
by way o f highlighting the lengths to which they went to ensure they used 
only ultra-correct spoken and written English. Examples in support o f this 
thesis are provided by the Easy Club set up in 1712, by Alan Ramsay and 
friends, for the purpose o f ‘mutual improvement in conversation’, with a
80 With regard to Burns, see Carol McGuirk, Robert Burns and the 
Sentimental Era (Athens, GA: University o f Georgia Press, 1985), esp. ch. 7.
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view to becoming ‘more adapted with the politer part o f m ankind’; the 
Select Society, which included Hume and Adam Smith, which changed its 
name to the Society for Promoting the Reading and Speaking o f the English 
Language, and, in 1761, to this end hired an elocution teacher; Hum e’s 
(1752) collection of Scottish usages to be avoided together with their
OT
‘correct’ English counterparts; and James Beattie’s Scoticisms, Arranged in 
Alphabetical Order, Designed to Correct Improprieties o f  Speech and  
Writing (mi).
But then the two-culture theorist has to explain such anomalies as Hum e’s 
splenetic outburst against Parliament and the English in a letter written in 
1770:
Our Government has become a Chimera; and is too perfect in point o f 
Liberty, for so vile a beast as an Englishman, who is a Man, a bad Animal 
too, corrupted by above a Century o f Licentiousness.84
The theorist needs, too, to accommodate significantly subtler retractions from 
rampant anglophilia such as Beattie’s ‘The M instrel’ (1768), a lyrical poem 
in which Beattie praises the Scotland familiar from bardic description -  the 
Scoticisms:
A nation famed for song, and beauty’s charms;
Zealous, yet modest; innocent, though free;
Patient o f toil; serene amidst alarms;
Inflexible in faith; invincible in arms.
(B k  I, 11. 9 6 - 9 )
81 Quoted in Lenman, ‘From the Union o f 1707 to the Franchise o f  1832’, p. 
328.
82 Thomas Sheridan, an Irish actor and friend o f Boswell; see above p. 30. 
Lenman points out that this wasn’t as self-defeating as it sounds, owing to a 
connection between Ireland and that part o f England in which English 
evolved from an eleventh-century Anglo-Saxon-based patois o f Latin and 
Norman French (Lenman, ‘From the Union o f  1707 to the Franchise o f 1832’, 
p. 330). Johnson remarks on the lack o f Scots accent in Highlanders’ English 
(Journey, p. 30).
83 Hume’s collection was reprinted in the Scots Magazine in 1760. His 
Scotticisms, became fodder for W ilkes’ xenophobic attack on the Scots 
during the Bute ministry. See below, pp. 104ff.
84 Letter to Gilbert Elliot, quoted in J.G.P. Pocock, ‘Hume and the American 
Revolution: the Dying Thoughts o f a North Britain’, in his Virtue, Commerce 
and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 125-41; p. 
127.
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‘The M instrel’ not only seems at odds with the intentions behind Beattie’s 
Scoticisms; it is at odds with itself. Beattie lauds Scotland’s heritage -  its 
rural beauty and primitivism -  and describes the poem as tracing ‘the 
progress o f poetical genius’, which genius, Beattie implies, is essentially 
Scottish, yet the poem is English in form. Beattie wrote in the Preface: ‘I 
have endeavoured to imitate Spencer in the measure o f his verse, and in the
Q C
harmony, simplicity, and variety o f his composition.’ The hero has an 
Anglo-Saxon name: Edwin; and despite the poem being about ‘a character, 
which, according to the notions o f our forefathers, was not only respectable 
but sacred’ (ibid.), Beattie forgoes use o f either o f the Scots terms ‘bard’ and 
‘senachie’ in favour o f the English ‘minstrel’. It has been argued that English 
bardic poetry centres on a minstrel, rather than a bard o f senachie; that the 
minstrel is associated with fourteenth-century mercantilism, as opposed to 
the agrarian association o f the Celtic bard; and is portrayed as an isolated and 
peripatetic character, essentially dislocated from society, unlike the bard 
‘proper’ who is the mouthpiece o f society. According to these criteria, 
James Beattie’s ‘The Minstrel’ indisputably falls within the realms o f the 
anglo-centric linguistic imperialism side o f the divide. But on closer 
inspection, Scoticisms isn’t quite straightforwardly anglophilic. Beattie 
seems to be writing for a British, rather than just Scottish readership: in the 
introduction, he refers to a wish to preserve the standards o f British, rather 
than English, literature; and, a little later, he takes pains to reassure English 
readers (this anticipated readership itself a surprise), that his book was 
written for young Scots, and that it wouldn’t be necessary for most ‘people o f 
education’ north o f the Border to refer to such a text.
[I have lately observed] a strange propensity, in too many o f our people, to 
debase the purity o f the language, by a mixture o f foreign and provincial 
idioms, and cant phrases; a circumstance which has in other countries 
generally produced, and partly occasioned, the decline o f learning, and which 
o f course must be a matter o f regret to those who wish well to British 
literature ...
85 In Thomas Crawford, David Hewitt and Alexander Law (eds), Longer 
Scottish Poems, vol. II, 1650-1830  (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 
1987), p. 120.
o/:
Trumpener, Bardic Nationalism, p. 6.
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These idioms are thus huddled together by way o f exercise to young Scotch 
people, who may have been reading this pamphlet. But the English readers 
will not suppose that the people o f education in North Britain speak so
• 07
uncouth a dialect. Many of them use a correct phraseology.
There have been several attempts to maintain a two-culture thesis in the 
face o f these kinds o f anomalies. In the 1960s, David Daiches and David 
Craig each proposed a version o f a thesis that defines polite and popular
00
culture as two distinct entities. Daiches takes evidence o f two cultures to 
indicate a dissociation o f sensibility -  ‘cultural schizophrenia’, in his terms. 
Scottish identity isn’t bifurcated: instead the expression o f cultural identity is 
hampered by the thought and feeling associated with that identity naturally 
occurring in Scots, yet being written in another language -  E nglish.89 
Simpson argues that there is no single symptom o f cultural bifurcation, that it 
runs through the gamut of eighteenth-century literature revealing itself in 
such diverse writers as Boswell and M acpherson.90
The relationship between Scots and English is complex.91 It seems that in 
prose and speech it was treated as a dialect o f English, but in poetry a 
language in its own right. However, taking Daiches’ view that the Union 
imposed a need for bilingualism on the Scots is not sufficient to explain the 
problem. There were traditional academic connections between Scotland and
87 Beattie, Scoticisms, p. 5; quoted in Leith Davis, Acts o f  Union and the 
Literary Negotiation o f  the British Nation 1707-1830  (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 9.
88 David Craig, Scottish Literature and the Scottish People 1680-1830  
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1961); David Daiches, The Paradox o f  Scottish 
Culture: The Eighteenth-Century Experience (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964).
89 Daiches uses this interpretation to explain why the literati failed to produce 
good English poetry, and also why they failed to appreciate Scots Gaelic. 
Lenman’s condemnation of the literati’s literary efforts is expressed in no 
uncertain terms: ‘Their own efforts, in prose and verse, in the same field 
were in fact laughably inferior’ (‘From the Union o f  1707 to the Franchise o f 
1832’, p. 342); he dismisses M ackenzie’s Man o f  Feeling  as ‘[a] third-rate 
tear-jerking novel o f sensibility’ (ibid., p. 345).
90 Simpson, The Protean Scot.
91 Janet Adam Smith, ‘Eighteenth Century Ideas o f Scotland’, in N.T. 
Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison (eds), Scotland in the Age o f  Improvement 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. 107-24. Smith discusses 
uses o f English and the vernacular language by Hume, Burns and Boswell, 
and concludes that each illustrates a different notion o f  Scottishness in his 
choice o f language, which choice is context-sensitive.
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Holland, the Calvinistic Dutch universities having attracted a steady stream 
o f Presbyterians. Until 1720, communication was unhampered linguistically 
as the common language for lecturing and academic discourse throughout
• 92Europe was Latin. Thinking in one language and writing in another does 
not therefore seem to be adequate to produce cultural schizophrenia: the 
dissociation has to be considered to be in some way a concomitant o f writing 
in English.
Daiches’ failure to explain, as opposed to describe, the ‘schizophrenic’ 
cases is common to all theories which approach the issue o f Scottish identity 
as being that of reconciling two distinct cultures, or distinct manifestations o f 
culture. But in their favour, such theorists do attempt an explanation. Smout, 
on the other hand, accounts for anomalies by reference to what he terms 
‘concentric loyalties’.
There are attempts to avoid the two-culture thesis, such as those o f Smout 
and Kidd. Smout models an individual’s allegiances as ordered 
concentrically, thus allowing for an individual to hold two conflicting 
loyalties at once, and to retreat to that which is strongest (and hence 
modelled as closest) should a situation bring the opposition to the fore. This 
kind o f idea is articulated most clearly by Colin Kidd. Kidd concludes that 
during the relevant period, while the Scots can be described as anglo-centric, 
this implies neither anglophilia nor anglophobia.94
92 Allan, Scotland in the Eighteenth Century, p. 122; Scoto-Latin was 
traditionally associated with conservative Jacobitism, and the north-east 
Lowlands being a stronghold this tradition, Latin was retained longer here 
than elsewhere in Scotland, dying out eventually in the 1750s. (Fergusson 
was conversant with Scoto-Latin in consequence.) The demise o f  Latin in 
academia, and hence o f its role as an intellectual lingua franca, occurred 
throughout Europe during the early part o f the eighteenth century, when it 
was supplanted by the vernacular (Allan, ibid.; Murdoch and Sher, ‘Literary 
and Learned Culture’, p. 130).
93 If  Daiches’ analysis is taken to refer only to the dearth o f poetry written in 
English by the literati, then this objection o f course relies on demonstrating 
that literary composition in Latin was far inferior to any in Gaelic and Scots. 
However, this restriction on the scope o f D aiches’ thesis doesn’t apply in the 
current context.
94T.C. Smout, ‘Perspectives on the Scottish Identity’, Scottish Affairs (1994), 
no. 6, pp. 101-13; ‘Problems of Nationalism, Identity and Improvement in 
later Eighteenth-Century Scotland’, in T.M. Devine (ed.), Improvement and  
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1989), pp. 1—21. Colin K idd’s
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According to Smout, an individual is to be considered as upholding sets o f 
allegiances, to family, kin, class, locality, nation, and so on. Each allegiance 
is understood as more or less strong, according to how close to their heart it 
is. A conflict o f loyalties will result in a show o f allegiance to that which is 
held more strongly, that which is closer to the heart. Identification with 
Scotland, on this model, will be stronger than identification with Britain; 
identification with one’s county within Scotland, stronger than that with 
Scotland.95 On Smout’s thesis, then, there is nothing anomalous about 
Beattie’s ‘The M instrel’ -  it simply arises from allegiances both to Britain 
and to Scotland; just as there’s nothing anomalous in Burns castigating the 
behaviour o f Scots land owners as being not ‘for Britain’s guid’ but ‘for her 
destruction! / Wi dissipation, feud an faction.’96
Smout’s approach accommodates seeming contradictions, by the idea not 
that the Scots were influenced by the English, but that they identified with 
both Scotland and Britain. However this merely describes a set o f attitudes, 
without providing either their explanation or their motivation. In 
consequence, it leaves two important questions unanswered: why did the 
literati opt for polished English prose and poetry, refined manners, and polite 
culture generally? And what understanding did Scots have o f Britain? Was 
it more than a political and economic expedient?
Smout follows Colley’s analysis o f the way a concept o f  British 
nationality was generated during the course o f the eighteenth century: Britain 
was identified with Protestantism initially, and imperial power after mid­
century, with British allegiance being forged as a result o f threats from 
elsewhere to both: from France until the end o f Seven Years War; and from
discussion o f mid-eighteenth century Britishness in his ‘North Britishness 
and the Nature o f Eighteenth Century Patriotisms (The Historical Journal, 39 
(1996), pp. 361-82), is placed within a larger historical context in his British 
Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic 
World 1600-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
95 Smout, ‘Perspectives’; Smout, ‘Problems o f Nationalism ’. The circles o f 
loyalties are shown in a figure in ‘Perspectives’, p. 103. Presumably there is 
no need to explain the gradations o f allegiance, as these are to be taken as 
grounded emotively -  non-rationally.
6 Robert Burns, ‘The Twa Dogs’ (1786), in The Poems and Songs o f  Robert 
Burns, ed. James Kinsley, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), no. 71, pp. 
137-45, 11. 169-70.
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the colonies during the American War o f Independence.97 According to 
Smout, antagonism towards England -  interpreted by some as nationalism -  
occurred in consequence o f the Scots being treated unfairly, or 
contemptuously: in ways that were seen to contravene the terms o f the 
Union.98
Although Smout’s model appears to rely on an intuitive understanding o f 
which allegiances are likely to be strong for an individual, it does allow that 
allegiances can wax and wane. Since Anglo-Scots relations vacillated 
between tolerance and hostility throughout the 30 years from 1750, a 
plausible account o f Scottish identity during the eighteenth century needs to 
be sensitive to these fluctuations. It is particularly relevant in connection 
with attempts to interpret the loyalties o f the literati. The social and political 
context changed dramatically between the 1750s and early 1760s, for 
example, and it is a misrepresentation to draw conclusions about the aims 
and intentions o f the literati during the latter period on the basis o f evidence 
drawn from the 1750s.
M ackenzie’s Man o f  Feeling was written during the long-term aftermath 
o f the Bute smear campaign. Antagonism broke out between the two 
countries in the early 1760s, as a result o f the rise in power and influence o f 
John Stuart, 3rd Earl o f Bute. Lord Bute was a close friend o f the King, a 
fact that was viewed with suspicion by his detractors. In 1761 he was made 
Secretary o f State and in 1762, became Prime Minister. English longstanding 
suspicion o f the Scots, which had initially been due to their belief in 
supposed unilateral Scottish support for Jacobitism refocussed on the K ing’s 
pronounced attachment to Bute.
Bute’s ministry negotiated the Peace o f Paris, in February 1763. Despite 
increasing Britain’s empire substantially, the treaty was widely unpopular. 
In addition, Scots virtually monopolised governorship in the newly
97 Smout, ‘Perspectives’, p. 105. As in most other references to Colley’s 
thesis, Smout’s fails to mention that Colley argues from evidence o f popular 
responses to British policy -  the exception to this general omission being 
Alexander Murdoch, ‘Scotland and the Idea o f Britain in the Eighteenth 
Century’, in T.M. Devine and J.R. Young (eds), Eighteenth Century Scotland: 
New Perspectives (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999), pp. 106-21.
98 Smout, ‘Problems of Nationalism’, pp. 6-7, 19.
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conquered territories. Bute’s detractors rekindled English antagonism further 
by arguing that Bute favoured his compatriots at home, suggesting this could 
be seen as a kind o f Jacobite invasion. (The absurdity o f allegations o f Scots 
Jacobite leanings to those deemed too intimate with the Hanoverian Crown 
appears to have been overlooked.)
Bute became a frequent target o f the North Briton, a journal launched by 
Wilkes in June 1762. The remit o f W ilkes’ journal was in direct opposition 
to that o f the Briton, which had been established by Smollet in February o f 
that year, and which was intended promote harmony between Scotland and 
England together." Wilkes appealed to the English fear o f everything Scots. 
For example, after Bute directed £4,000 for the construction o f a bridge over 
the Tweed, Wilkes played on English fear, not o f simply Scottish culture, but 
o f Scottish economic power:
I Cannot conceal the joy I feel as a North Britain, and I heartily congratulate 
my dear countrymen on our having at length accomplished the great, long 
fought, and universally national object o f all our wishes, the planting o f a 
Scotsman at the head o f the English treasury.100
The English fear o f the Scots extended even to their use o f the English 
language. Another anti-Scots attack in the North Briton by Wilkes read:
Though I am a NORTH BRITAIN, I will endeavour to write plain English, 
and to avoid the numerous Scotticisms the BRITON abounds with; and then, 
as the world is apt to mistake, he may be taken for an Englishman .101
Xenophobic attacks on Bute eventually led to his resignation in April 1763. 
The intensity o f popular hostility suffered by Scots generally in London is 
described in Boswell’s London Journal and Smollett’s Humphrey Clinker N 2
99 Smollett was commissioned by Bute to undertake the publication o f the 
Briton, a party periodical in defence o f his government.
100 Quoted in Davis, Acts o f  Union, p. 76
101 Quoted in ibid.
102 Bosw ell’s London Journal 1762-1763, ed. Frederick A. Pottle (London: 
Reprint Society, 1951), p. 79; Tobias Smollett, The Expedition o f  Humphry 
Clinker (1771), ed. Lewis Knapp, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
for example, a letter from Jery Melford describes the scene at St James 
during in which he describes the raillery o f the crowd towards ‘the 
Caledonian luminary’ (p. 97); in another letter, Jery relates conversation 
overheard at the Duke o f N ew castle]’s levee, which features rank anti- 
Catholicism, and the duke is represented as dismissing politicians as ‘a pack
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Prior to this, Scottish MPs had become disaffected as a result o f  changes 
in the structure o f English politics, which had led to increasing emphasis on 
party organisation and financial manipulation, and the loss o f more 
traditional modes o f representation and patronage. The dissatisfaction 
expressed by David Dairymple, the future Lord Hailes, was not untypical:
One would imagine, indeed, that those whose birth and rank in life entitles 
them to aspire to posts o f honour and pre-eminence in the state, should be 
above all sordid consideration o f gain. Their sentiments ought to be as 
elevated as their station; and to a mind so enlarged, the pleasure o f serving 
his country, and contributing to the happiness o f millions, is surely a 
sufficient reward.103
Many Scottish peers stopped attending Parliament between 1763 and 1775, 
and during the 1760s, a significant number of those who had been resident in 
London returned to Scotland.104
The return o f absentee peers to Scotland was not an unalloyed benefit to 
the country, as many embarked on improving their estates, often to the 
detriment o f the tenants who suffer the kinds o f consequences illustrated in 
Edwards’ tale.105 However their change o f focus from London to Scotland,
of rascals ... Tories, Jacobites, rebels’ (p. 113). The Duke o f Newcastle 
resigned from Bute’s ministry in 1762 in protest at the treaty arrangements 
for the Peace o f Paris the following year.
103 Caledonian Mercury, 14 September 1763; quoted in John Dwyer and 
Alexander Murdoch, ‘Paradigms and Politics: Manners, Morals and the Rise 
of Henry Dundas, 1770-84’, in John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander 
Murdoch (eds), New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture o f  Early 
Modern Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), pp. 210-48, p. 217.
104 Dwyer and Murdoch, ‘Paradigms and Politics’, p. 217.
105 Johnson was preoccupied by the relation between emigration, rent 
increase and the breakdown o f clanship throughout the Journey.
Johnson considers two different sets o f motives for emigration (ibid., p. 
85). He concludes that those for whom emigration is for positive reasons -  as 
a result o f wishing for ‘the pleasure o f happier clim es’ could not be 
dissuaded from their decision to leave. However, he believed that those 
whom he describes as being ‘driven from their native country by positive 
evils’, by which we are to understand rent increases, and imprudent 
improvement, should have been encouraged to stay by the removal o f 
whatever conditions were driving them away. And with regard to rent 
increases, Johnson states simply that landlords should reduce their rent, and 
be compensated for whatever losses result (ibid., p. 86).
It is plausible to explain Johnson’s acute interest in, and anxiety over, the 
effects o f rent increase, emigration and clan break-up, in terms other than
105
explains the upsurge in large-scale civic developments during the 1760s such 
as the construction o f the Forth-Clyde canal, and the development o f the 
New Town.
Although peers returned to Scotland, they were not resident on their 
estates, but retained their position as absentee landlords, spending a large part 
o f the year in Edinburgh. At the same time, the increased interest in land and 
the increase in land prices led to an influx in the counties o f the newly 
wealthy -  Glasgow tobacco merchants, government contractors and rich 
nabobs returning from the Indies -  who took their cue from the established 
landowning class, both in terms o f estate management and with regard to the 
ways in which they adapted their London lifestyle and values for the Scottish 
context.
It is now becoming evident that the prevailing social and political climate 
in Scotland at the time Mackenzie wrote The Man o f  Feeling, although 
sharing some of the characteristics o f that o f Britain as a whole, included 
conditions peculiar to Scotland, and it is plausible to consider the literati as 
attempting to negotiate a ‘new social order’ which would both accommodate 
the economic changes o f benefit to the country while curbing a value system 
based predominantly on increased personal wealth.106 They laid emphasis on 
reintroducing the values o f moral man into society by encouraging the 
nobility and landed gentry to reside on their estates and reintroduce the 
values o f a land-based aristocracy.
antiquarian concern for the preservation o f tradition. For example, taking his 
stadialist stance to be paramount suggests that the source o f Johnson’s 
concern might have been that the loss o f clan property would put clan society 
back a stage in the stadial schema. In other words, Johnson might have 
regarded the mass emigration o f tacksmen and associated tenants to be in 
danger o f taking the clan from the agricultural stage back to an earlier, 
nomadic, pastoral stage. Alternatively one might interpret Johnson’s concern 
to be primarily driven by moral considerations: in losing the paternalistic 
influence of a clan chief (which Johnson regarded as a detrimental 
consequence o f the abolition o f heritable jurisdictions), clan members also 
lose their source o f moral guidance.
106 Although to generalise over even just the thirty-year period from 1750 is 
misleading; for example, Dwyer and M urdoch argue convincingly that the 
Scottish literati in general, and Dundas in particular and most surprisingly, 
became decidedly less oriented towards England, after the Bute smear 
campaign; see Dwyer and Murdoch, ‘Manners, Morals and the Rise o f Henry 
Dundas, 1770-84’.
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That this line o f thought had been at least entertained by Mackenzie is 
evident from Edwards’ tale, which includes many o f the features which 
caused concern for the moral state o f the Scottish nation among the literati: 
Edwards falls foul of his landlord’s decision to restructure land use on his 
estate: he is forced to take on the lease for a larger farm and is seen to be
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under pressure to meet an annual rent o f  £300. Edwards is genuinely the 
victim o f unforeseeable circumstances, so one deserving the benevolence 
dictated by a developed sensibility -  as demonstrated by H arley’s reaction. 
There is a pay-off for the benefactor since doing one’s doing one’s duty is a 
pleasure. The author ends the episode leading to Edwards being 
accommodated on Harley’s estate with a statement o f just this point:
Father o f mercies! I also would like to thank thee! that not only has thou 
assigned eternal rewards to virtue, but that, even in this bad world, the lines 
o f our duty, and our happiness, are so frequently woven together. (M F , p. 
102)
Conclusion
The Man o f  Feeling is arguably far from being just the story o f a sentimental 
hero -  not the adventures of a quixotic youth. Mackenzie uses Harley’s tale, 
both to guide readers through the stages in the refinement o f sensibility; and 
as a set o f cautionary tales about the destructive effects to both the individual 
and the community, o f placing most emphasis on the acquisition and 
enjoyment o f increased personal wealth. But it is more than this too: it is a 
handbook o f practical morality for those in positions o f authority within a 
community -  and specifically for the aristocracy and nobility o f Scotland.
The book is also far from being a loose collection o f episodes. It is a 
carefully structured collection o f moral essays, which taken together guide a 
reader through the various stages of developing a refined sensibility from the 
natural sympathy Mackenzie believed intrinsic to man, and the seat o f m an’s
107
Land worth £200-£300 featured in the debate about the destruction o f 
entails, this being the value of the smallest economically viable farm unit, see 
Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, p. 42. It is also relevant here to note that the 
kind o f family tie Edwards claimed to have with his landlord, namely, their 
both having the same great great grandfather, is very much a clan-based 
notion rather than the English notion o f family tree.
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moral nature. Further, it uses the notion o f sensibility and the connected 
concept o f benevolence to propound a practical morality which is constructed 
to give new life to the traditional Scottish values o f land and land ownership. 
In short, it is, as Mackenzie described it, ‘as much as sermon as a history’, 
and in being so is quite different from a novel.
The notion o f sensibility is vague, however. This can be remedied by 
considering exactly how Smith’s philosophy influenced the literati’s 
approach to questions concerning social values. In so doing, the extent to 
which Smith’s moral philosophy underpins The M an o f  Feeling  is revealed to 
be surprisingly deep.
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I I  The Theory o f  Moral Sentiments
The outcome of the analysis o f the structure and content o f M ackenzie’s The 
Man o f  Feeling given in chapter I is that it was intended as an aid to the 
development o f sensibility. This raises the question o f why such a book 
might have been thought to have value in this regard; or o f what theory o f 
morality and o f moral development underpinned the notion that reading 
morality tales would enable an individual to develop his or her capacity to 
react appropriately to another’s situation. The argument in chapter I led to the 
conclusion that in The Man o f  Feeling, Harley, and so the reader, is 
confronted by a series o f situations o f increasing moral complexity, the 
response to each requiring concomitantly more sophisticated moral reasoning. 
Clearly the intention is not to prepare the reader specifically for the kinds o f 
encounters that Harley has, so the descriptions o f H arley’s experience o f card 
sharps, prostitutes and the insane must serve a different pedagogic purpose. 
Reading The Man o f  Feeling as instructing and guiding a reader by stages 
through a process o f moral maturation prompts the question o f what 
Mackenzie understood to constitute moral maturity.
Smith first published his Theory o f Moral Sentiments in 1759.1 The 
book was so well received that it merited the publication o f 6 editions 
between 1759 and 1790. We know that Mackenzie greatly admired Smith’s 
w ork,2 and the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that M ackenzie’s 
understanding o f moral development was derived from Adam Smith’s 
Theory o f  Moral Sentiments. However, this requires first, a demonstration 
that Smith’s Moral Sentiments does indeed comprise a theory, since, to the 
unprepared contemporary reader, it seems a bewildering muddle o f neonate 
psychology, prescriptive rules for mannered society, and philosophical 
dispute over abstruse issues in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Smith 
added an explanatory subtitle for the 4th edition (1774), which states that the
1 Adam Smith, The Theory o f  M oral Sentiments (1759, 6th edn 1790), ed. 
D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1984); 
hereafter references given by part, section, chapter and paragraph nos.
" In a letter to William Carmichael, written early in 1784, Mackenzie referred 
to Smith as ‘the first o f our writers, both in point o f Genius & Information’ 
(Letters 1766-1827, p. 124).
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book concerns ‘the Principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the 
Conduct and Character, first o f their Neighbours, and afterwards o f 
themselves’, but while this indicates the scope o f  Sm ith’s use o f the phrase 
‘moral sentiments’, it still fails to elucidate what kind o f book the M oral 
Sentiments is. Smith makes no concessions to the reader in his opening 
paragraphs. From the first part, section and chapter titles, we learn that a 
discussion of sympathy is to provide Sm ith’s route into the notion o f 
propriety, but Smith gives no obvious explanation for choosing this route, 
nor a description o f how his discussion is to proceed. He simply opens with 
an assertion about m an’s natural capacity for uncalculated interest in the 
welfare o f others. On first reading there seem to be good grounds for 
describing the book as ‘wandering like a river amidst luxuriant banks’.4
However, if the book is read as a contribution to what Berry has argued 
was a centra] concern of Scottish Enlightenment thought -  namely, to 
provide an empiricist account o f the nature and development o f society -  
and if weight is given to Campbell’s analysis o f the Newtonian influence on 
Smith’s moral theory, then Smith’s discussion, far from meandering, reveals 
itself as a tight, controlled argument for a specific model o f social interaction, 
while the seemingly lush landscape o f its discursive setting, is seen as 
providing descriptive evidence for the plausibility o f  each stage in Sm ith’s 
carefully constructed theory.5
There is intrinsic interest in reading the M oral Sentiments as a scientific 
discourse, blending, as it does, Hum e’s empiricism, Locke’s epistemology 
and Newton’s methodology. Furthermore, as a result o f  Sm ith’s unstinting 
use o f detailed examples and illustrations o f contemporary attitudes to social 
and political events and circumstances throughout, the book also merits a
3 ‘Howsoever selfish man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes o f others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure o f seeing i f  (I.i.1.1).
4 John McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy (London: M acmillan, 1875), p. 168; 
quoted in T.D. Campbell, Adam Sm ith ’s Science o f  M orals (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. 21.
5 Christopher Berry, Social Theory o f  the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1997); Campbell, Adam S m ith ’s Science o f  
Morals.
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subtextual study. Here, however, the remit is to show that in the Moral 
Sentiments, Smith presented a theory o f social interaction which conformed 
to the principles o f hypothetico-deductive discourse which he articulates 
elsewhere; and that Smith was not merely influenced by Hum e’s theory o f 
understanding, but adopted it and extended it to encompass the moral 
domain. Furthermore, in constructing this theory, Smith identified certain 
specific experiential parameters which have direct reference to an 
individual’s ability to make moral judgements; so while Smith may have 
intended to write no more than a scientifically objective account based on 
observation alone, o f the stages in the development o f m an’s ability to make 
moral judgements, his theory was taken to indicate a means by which an 
individual’s sensibility can be developed fully as a result o f  controlling 
certain experiential parameters. The plausibility o f this suggestion rests, in 
part, on showing what Smith’s theory o f moral sentiments is -  which is a 
controversial issue.
There is little agreement about how the M oral Sentiments is to be read. 
In consequence, the bulk o f this discussion focusses on establishing a 
particular interpretation; an interpretation which takes seriously Smith’s 
decision to describe his text as a theory.
The eighteenth-century Scots were concerned to answer the question 
‘How do I know what is morally the right action?’ Since they were 
empiricists, an adequate answer had to be founded in experience, without 
appeal to innate concepts o f right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjust, 
and so on. Moral knowledge was regarded as being on all fours with any 
other empirical knowledge, and so gained through our experience o f the 
world via the senses. As described in the introduction, this led Hutcheson 
and others to postulate a moral sense. By contrast, Hume and Smith rejected 
the suggestion o f a sixth, moral sense, and instead considered experience o f 
the moral to promote a feeling, that is, the rationale being that initially, 
moral knowledge o f the world comprises an unmediated response to some 
aspect o f the actions o f others. We can think o f this as analogous to the 
acquisition o f the concept o f heat, for example. We learn that heat is a 
property o f a flame from an unmediated feeling o f warmth induced by our
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proximity to the flame; similarly, moral action will produce an unmediated 
identifiable feeling in a witness to the act. In order to be adequate, that is, in 
order for it to accommodate all the kinds o f behaviour intuitively considered 
moral, the theory had to account for abstract moral concepts such as justice; 
and also provide an explanation o f  judgem ents o f  conscience -  moral 
judgements which appear to be made without a w itness’s approval, and so 
seemingly independent o f experience. Sm ith’s treatment o f  judgem ents o f 
conscience was intended to show that these judgements, like all other moral 
judgements, are based in experience o f others’ moral behaviour.
The eighteenth-century Scottish moralists believed that science generally 
would yield to Newtonian methodology. Since morality was considered an 
empirical subject, the expectation was that Newtonian principles o f theory 
construction would apply equally fruitfully to this domain. Newton had also 
subscribed to this view. As noted by Berry, Newton stated in the preface to 
his Optics (1704), that ‘the method o f natural philosophy or science when 
perfected would enlarge the bounds o f moral philosophy’.6 The claim here 
is that Smith’s Moral Sentiments is a theory o f morality which is constructed 
according to the principles o f Newtonian methodology. In fact, the claim is 
stronger than this: it is that Smith not only adopted Newtonian principles o f 
theory construction but also adapted N ew ton’s laws o f motion. As 
mentioned in the introduction, this reading o f the M oral Sentiments is highly 
revisionist.
Smith’s work on morality builds on that o f  Hume. Hume had rejected 
Hutcheson’s notion o f a distinct sense to explain the source o f the kinds o f 
experience that form the constituents o f moral knowledge, arguing instead 
that moral knowledge is founded in an unmediated sensation or feeling 
which he termed ‘sympathy’. Smith used this idea, but modified it. For 
Hume, sympathy is an individual’s reaction to another’s moral behaviour, 
but for Smith it is a relation between moral agent and spectator: an 
unmediated mutual response between agent and witness.
The fact that both Smith and Hume used the term ‘sympathy’, has misled 
some commentators to assume that the two uses are equivalent. Since the
6 Berry, Social Theory, p. 4.
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revisionist reading proposed here requires the distinction between the two 
uses to be made clear, and this is articulated below.
To make some progress towards validating the claim that Sm ith’s M oral 
Sentiments is a Newtonian account o f the nature o f moral knowledge, it is 
necessary to show that his theory exhibits the characteristics o f Newtonian 
methodology. Newton’s theory o f gravitation is constructed from three laws 
o f motion and a handful o f atomic concepts. In the following analysis, 
Smith’s theory is shown to be constructed from a small number o f principles 
based on lawlike regularities in the sympathetic response, together with a 
small number o f irreducible concepts.
Acknowledging that and why Smith had to work with irreducible moral 
concepts provides the motivation for a revisionist reading o f the opening 
sections o f the Moral Sentiments. However, it is not difficult appreciate why 
this aspect o f Smith’s text frequently has been misinterpreted. In these first 
sections o f the book, Smith introduces the basic building blocks o f the 
theory: irreducible concepts founded in unmediated responses to others’ 
behaviour. By definition these atomic concepts cannot be analysed or 
explicated -  to do so would imply that our notion o f morality is actually 
artificial, being a complex construction from other, non-moral concepts. 
Smith had to attempt something akin to an ostensive definition o f moral 
concepts, to equate the element o f an immediate response with the feeling 
that he identified as necessary for a reaction to another’s behaviour to 
comprise a moral response. His only means o f achieving this was to 
describe situations which he considered would elicit the feeling in the reader 
that he had argued is definitive o f a moral response. However, unless this 
context is understood fully and the examples are taken as having this 
illustrative role, they can appear to have a prescriptive function: that is, 
instead o f being read as describing scenarios intended to induce an 
intuitively recognisable reaction on the part o f the reader, Smith is seen as 
stipulating the appropriate moral response to the situations he described. In 
order to motivate the proposed revisionist reading it needs to be clearly
7 This is the essence o f Hume’s account o f justice;’ see above, pp. 36-7.
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established that, and why Smith’s examples have a merely illustrative role in 
his argument for the moral prim itivity o f sympathy.
Smith’s main contribution to eighteenth-century moral theory was a 
consistently empiricist account o f conscience, which he achieved by 
reference to his concept o f impartial spectatorship. This aspect o f  his theory 
still attracts great philosophical interest. It follows that Sm ith’s account o f 
judgements of conscience must be shown to remain central and intact under 
the revised reading.
Smith intended to construct an account o f the development o f our moral 
knowledge, and his discussion o f sympathy shows that an individual’s moral 
education begins with the identification o f his unmediated reaction to 
another’s situation. But Smith goes on to show that moral judgem ents are 
tempered according to the context in which that situation arises. The Man o f  
Feeling supplies examples of the kind o f contextual information that Smith 
describes. For example, Harley modifies his initially benevolent response to 
the beggar’s plight on learning that the m an’s destitution was due to a series 
o f misfortunes exacerbated by his persistent self-centredness; while he 
modifies his initial disapproval o f Miss Atkins, on learning that the series o f 
misfortunes that led to her plight were largely not her fault. However, Smith 
argues, it is often impracticable to anticipate full knowledge o f the 
background to a given situation. In these cases we can only reach a 
judgement by applying general rules o f conduct to the situation, that is, by 
subsuming the situation under one, or a set o f inductive generalisations 
about what is and what is not appropriate conduct under certain broadly 
specifiable conditions.
Rules o f conduct play a substantial part in Smith’s thought. With regard 
to an individual member o f a society, they enable him to make judgem ents 
about situations which lack adequate specific information, and in this role 
they provide a gauge against which to judge the conduct o f others. They can 
also provide a means o f charting an individual’s moral development since 
increasing competence can be defined as increasing familiarity with the rules 
o f conduct.
The idea o f rules o f conduct also has a wider role. Smith believed they
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derive from inductive generalisations over a society and as such they 
describe general behavioural trends within that society. It follows that a 
statement o f a society’s general rules o f conduct effectively describes that 
society’s social mores. This idea that it is possible to identify general 
behavioural trends in one’s own or another society forms the basis o f 
stadialism. As noted in the Introduction, stadial history depends on the 
possibility o f comparing the social mores o f  different societies, and 
identifying those which are common to, and so interpreted as indicative of, a 
specific developmental stage. General rules o f conduct were regarded as 
providing the data for this kind o f comparative study, in particular those 
rules which are comprise the legal system for that society.
Since, in Smith’s view, an individual’s ability to make moral judgem ents 
depends on his familiarity with the rules o f conduct for the society to which 
he belongs, it follows that any morally competent agent will have tacit or 
explicit knowledge o f the general trends in his own society. This line o f 
thinking provided the literati with a means o f implementing their ideas for 
halting and reversing what they saw as the moral deterioration o f their 
society. While general rules o f conduct can provide a description o f a 
society’s moral code, for an individual they have a prescriptive role. Since 
Smith’s theory explained how an individual acquires knowledge o f these 
rules, it follows that if the rules o f conduct can be identified, they can be 
taught to an individual.
Furthermore, according to stadialist theory, a society’s mores can change. 
Change can be a sign o f improvement, or o f deterioration. For completeness, 
Smith had to accommodate this capacity in his account o f the means by 
which knowledge o f general rules o f conduct is disseminated. His analysis 
also had to be compatible with his account o f  how individuals learn to 
regulate and improve their moral conduct, since, as mentioned above, rules 
of conduct are inductive generalisations over the behaviour o f  a society’s 
members. This is explicated by Smith in the course o f his discussion o f 
custom and fashion.
Smith’s theory o f social improvement can supply a structure and rationale 
for a system o f moral education. He gave an empirical analysis o f the
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elements o f moral judgement and an account o f  the conditions under which 
they can be acquired. He also explained the derivation o f abstract moral 
concepts and showed how these are formed by abstraction from less 
complex concepts. This dependency introduces an intrinsic ordering or 
hierarchy o f concepts from less to more complex, and for this reason, in 
theory, it can be used to structure the moral education o f an individual. 
There is good evidence that this underpinned the literati’s strategy for 
improving society morally, a point taken up again in chapter 3, and, as 
argued below, that Mackenzie used Smith’s theory o f the generation o f 
general rules and their role for an individual, to structure The Man o f  Feeling 
and so educate the reader in what he deemed the moral code considered 
appropriate for Scottish society.
In conclusion, Smith’s Moral Sentiments should be understood to be 
putting forward a theory, in which first the atomic building blocks o f the 
theory are identified and described, and then are used in the construction o f 
more complex concepts. Few commentators have taken this theoretical 
structure into account. Intuitive and, frequently, inaccurate interpretations 
have been given o f the concepts Smith uses, with little or no recognition o f 
the possibility of there being an overall purpose to Sm ith’s argumentation. 
A good example o f the confusion that can arise from this kind o f piecemeal 
approach is given by Dwyer’s discussions o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments. I 
have considered Dwyer’s account in detail, partly because his mistakes 
throw into the relief the explanatory advantages o f the revisionist reading, 
and partly because, since his account o f the concerns o f the eighteenth- 
century Scottish moralists is one o f the few that is sympathetic to the 
suggestion that the literati’s concern was to improve the moral fabric o f 
Scotland by preserving traditional mores, his overview o f the intended 
import o f the literati’s sentimental writing is useful. However, as is shown 
below, his analysis fails to recognise the coherence o f their approach, and its 
dependence on Smith’s theorising.
The structure o f the discussion o f the M oral Sentiments and its influence 
on Mackenzie’s The Man o f  Feeling is as follows. In section 1, I explain 
what it is about Smith’s theory o f moral sentiments that differentiates it from
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that o f Hume; and gesture towards the kind o f evidence we might expect to 
find o f the influence in Smith’s work o f his intellectual mentor, Newton. In 
section 2, I attempt to clarify the concepts basic to Sm ith’s moral theory. 
These concepts are both fundamental to the theory and, as mentioned above 
are all too often misread as constituting a normative ethics. I reconstruct 
Smith’s argument that propriety, that is, morally acceptable behaviour, is 
learned behaviour founded on sympathy; and that while sympathy is 
spontaneous, we have to learn when to modulation our responses to others’ 
behaviour.
Since Smith’s main contribution to eighteenth-century moral theory was 
a consistently empiricist explanation o f conscience, I discuss his use o f the 
notion o f impartial spectatorship reconstruction in Sm ith’s account o f 
conscience in section 3, and show how this accounts remains consistently 
empiricist.
Many have read the Moral Sentiments as essentially prescriptivist. In 
section 4, 1 argue that this is inappropriate by demonstrating the extent to 
which Smith incorporated Newtonian thought into his theory -  and hence 
ground the claim that Smith’s theory is not prescriptive, but a scientific 
account o f human conduct.
Smith relies on Lockean epistemology and its implied empiricist 
psychology for his account o f an individual’s concept development. In 
section 5, I describe how this feature o f Locke’s thought comprises the 
epistemic presuppositions for Smith’s theory, and in section 6, I use this to 
articulate Smith’s analysis o f change in social mores.
Central to Scottish Enlightenment thought is the idea that societies 
improve or progress -  become more civilised. This is a problem for an 
empiricist account o f social mores and one which Smith does not really 
solve. However, it is possible to reconstruct his analysis o f the dynamic o f 
social change from his account o f the corrosive effects o f wealth on societal 
values. This forms the content o f section 7. It leads to an explanation o f 
Smith’s emphasis on the middle rank as the custodians o f  acceptable social 
conduct, as explained in section 8. In this section I also demonstrate the 
advantages o f the Newtonian reading o f the M oral Sentiments by contrasting
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it with that of Dwyer’s reading o f the text as a normative ethics. In section 9,
I return to the question which initiated this discussion o f Smith’s theory; 
namely, that concerning the source o f M ackenzie’s idea o f a virtuous 
education, by first explaining how Smith’s theory o f moral sentiments lends 
itself to use in this way; and then by showing that his theory does indeed 
inform The Man o f  Feeling.
1 The Theory o f  Moral Sentiments: an overview
As mentioned above, the 4th edition o f the M oral Sentiments was given the 
subtitle: ‘the Principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the 
Conduct and Character, first o f their Neighbours, and afterwards o f 
themselves’. Superficially, the subtitle appears to be no more than a clear, 
if somewhat pedantic statement about the ordering o f  material in the book. 
Parts I and II do indeed treat o f judgements concerning the behaviour o f 
others -  the matter o f making judgements about one’s own conduct not
Q
being addressed until part III.
To anyone familiar with the kinds o f problems engendered by an 
empiricist account o f the meaning of terms denoting what may be called 
‘private objects’ -  pains, emotions, attitudinal states such as approval or 
expectation -  the specification o f the order ‘others; s e lf  in connection with 
the concept ‘character’ carries other connotations. It signifies a sensitivity to 
the problems created by the privacy o f experience.
Smith’s theory o f moral sentiments, essentially, is that men approve o f 
another’s conduct and character when, on imagining themselves to be in the 
same situation as that person, the imagined situation causes the same feeling 
to arise in them as that which they perceive to have motivated the behaviour 
under scrutiny. Another’s behaviour prompts disapproval, when the 
imagined situation fails to cause such feelings to occur (I.i.2.6). The 
accordance of feelings between agent and observer -  or, to use Sm ith’s term, 
spectator -  is referred to by Smith as the relation o f  sympathy.
o
‘In the two foregoing parts o f this discourse, I have chiefly considered the 
origin and foundation of our judgments concerning the sentiments and 
conduct o f others. I come now to consider more particularly the origin o f 
those concerning our own’ (III. 1.1).
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The sympathy relation is sensitive to various contingencies affecting the 
spectator’s ability to imagine the agent’s situation -  for example, 
inexperience (II.2.31, n., III.3.19); inattention (I.i.3.4); insufficient 
information about the agent’s situation (III.2.4, III.2.33); partiality (III.2.26, 
III.4.1). However, certain kinds o f conduct inherently affect the spectator’s 
sympathetic response, namely those which entail interaction between the 
agent and another -  what might be thought o f as ‘transitive acts’ such as 
beneficence on the part o f an agent with concomitant gratitude on the part o f 
the recipient; or anger on the part o f an agent and concomitant fear on the 
part o f the provocateur. In these cases a spectator’s response to an agent will 
be modulated by his response to the party to the agent’s behaviour. For 
example, a benefactor will garner approval only if  the spectator can 
sympathise with both parties -  in such instances, according to Smith’s 
theory, the spectator’s sympathy with the gratitude o f a beneficiary will 
enhance the spectator’s approval o f the benefactor (II.i.4.1-2). In the case o f 
anger, the spectator can sympathise wholly with only one o f the parties 
concerned, but which o f the two parties will depend on the spectator’s 
judgement as to whether the agent has reacted appropriately to the situation 
provoking his anger.9
Impartiality
Moral sentiments, then, are understood by Smith to be ultimately reducible 
to the reactions by a spectator towards an agent’s conduct or character. This 
approach to an explanation o f moral judgem ents does not originate with 
Smith. Hutcheson and later Hume both accounted for morality in terms o f 
the response o f spectators to events or states o f affairs. Hutcheson’s theory 
was innovative in being the first to insist on an account o f morality which 
depends on the idea o f disinterested moral judgem en ts.10 Hutcheson
9 In each case the spectator instinctively tends towards sympathy with the 
party to the agent’s action, so moral judgem ent about the agent’s conduct 
rests more overtly on the motivating circumstances (II. 1, chs 4, 5).
10 I.e. in addition to disinterested motives. Lord Shaftesbury and Bishop 
Butler had each argued against egoistic accounts o f morality, basing 
alternative accounts on disinterested motives, but neither managed to 
eradicate completely considerations o f self-interest. Both gave accounts o f
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developed the concept of a ‘moral sense’, which he describes as a 
disinterested feeling o f approval which naturally occurs when witness to an 
act o f benevolence arising from disinterested m otives.11 He compared 
disinterested moral reaction with aesthetic reactions (love or admiration) 
evoked by beauty. The point o f the comparison was not to draw parallels 
between the objects o f judgement for each kind o f  judgem ent -  benevolence 
in the case o f moral judgements; unity-in-variety in the case o f  aesthetic 
judgem ents -  but to stress the impartiality Hutcheson regarded as necessary 
for moral judgements; an impartiality which he argued had to be regarded as 
that o f a witness to acts of benevolence, rather than the reaction o f any o f 
those connected with the feelings o f either agent or beneficiary.
Hume endorsed and built on Hutcheson’s moral theory. He added an 
explanation o f the moral sense, or sentiment o f approval, describing it as a 
feeling o f pleasure or displeasure o f  a particular kind which arises in an 
impartial spectator as a result o f sympathy with the pain or pleasure o f the
1 9person affected by the action under consideration. He also widened the 
scope o f virtue beyond benevolence, arguing that a more complex account o f 
moral judgements was necessary. He developed the concept o f artificial 
virtues using the concept of utility, the most notable o f which virtues is 
justice. However, all such analyses were founded in sympathy and analysed
• 13from a spectator’s point o f view.
The originality in Smith’s use o f the concept o f an impartial spectator lies 
in his development of the concept in such a way as to enable an explanation 
o f judgements o f conscience made about one’s own conduct.14 According to 
Smith, moral judgements about one’s own behaviour are the result o f
morality based on the psychology o f the moral agent alone: the agent’s 
judgem ents about his own behaviour being the result o f  reflection on his 
motives. Smith argues against Hutcheson’s theory at III.4.5 and V II.iii.2 .9- 
VII.iii.3.17.
11 Disapproval is similarly a naturally occurring feeling, but evoked by action 
motivated by self-interest.
12 David Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature (1739—40), ed. E.C. M ossner 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), II.ii.2, pp. 522-4.
13 Ibid., l.ii.
14 See D.D. Raphael, ‘The Impartial Spectator’, in Andrew S. Skinner and 
Thomas Wilson (eds), Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), pp. 
83-99, p. 87.
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applying to oneself, decisions already made about similar behaviour in 
others.15
In effect, Smith equates a moral judgem ent with recognition o f the 
existence or otherwise o f a sympathetic relation between agent and spectator, 
while Hume grounds morality in the occurrence or otherwise o f a 
sympathetic contagion o f the spectator’s feelings by the agent. In Hum e’s 
theory, sympathy is a communicated passion (Treatise III.iii.1); by contrast, 
for Smith it is a relation o f accordance between passions caused by an actual 
situation on the part o f the agent, and passions caused by an imagined 
situation on the part o f the spectator (I.i.3.1). In other words, according to 
Hume, sympathy is a reaction by a spectator to an agent; while for Smith it 
is an interaction between agent and spectator.16
15 Smith wrote: ‘To be amiable and to be meritorious, that is, to deserve love 
and to deserve reward, are the great characters o f virtue ... but all these 
characters have an immediate reference to the sentiments o f others’ (III.i.6). 
Dugald Stewart glossed this as ‘The fundamental principle o f M r Sm ith’s 
theory is, that the primary objects o f our moral perceptions are the actions o f 
other men; and that our moral judgements with respect to our own conduct 
are only applications to ourselves o f decisions which we have already passed 
on the conduct o f our neighbour’ (Stewart, ‘Account o f the Life and Writings 
of Adam Smith, LL.D.’ (1793), repr. in Adam Smith, Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects with Dugald S tew art’s Account o f  Adam Smith (1795), 
ed. I.S. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 269-351, p. 280).
16 The connection between Hum e’s notion o f sympathy and that o f  Smith is 
often recognised but misrepresented. Mullan, for example, inverts the 
relation between sociability and sympathy, so representing Smith and Hume 
as relying on sociability as compensation for the effects o f competition and 
self-interest. This may be the pragmatic end result o f  Sm ith’s and Hum e’s 
theories, but it is inadequate as an explanation o f the role ascribed to 
sympathy in the theories o f each (see for example, I.i.3.1; Hume, Treatise, 
III.iii.1.1, ‘O f National Character’ (1748), in Essays, Moral, Political and  
Literary (1741-77), ed. E.F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), pp. 
197-215, p. 202). M ullan’s approach leads him to describe Hume as 
establishing the principle o f social relations by describing ‘our need for and 
behaviour in company’, and sympathy becomes the principle which is taken 
to make social transactions possible. This is a misconstrual: sympathy is not 
a response to social interaction, but in effect the cause o f it. M ullan’s 
misunderstanding o f the presuppositions behind Hum e’s and Sm ith’s 
accounts o f social interaction results in his describing Smith as forsaking ‘the 
ambition to imagine a sociability which could be a common habit, a shared 
possession’. Mullan continues: ‘In a sense, the ideally socialized individual 
has become, in [Smith’s] moral theory, the abstracted spectator’ (John 
Mullan, ‘The Language o f Sentiment: Hume, Smith and Henry M ackenzie’,
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Sm ith 's Newtonianism
The relational nature o f Smith’s concept o f sympathy and its role in society 
lends itself to comparison with the nature and role o f gravity in Newtonian 
astronomy. Smith’s theory o f interactions between any given person and the 
rest o f society can be modelled by an orrery.17 This is not as surprising as it 
might be, given Smith’s enthusiasm for N ew ton’s theory o f gravitation, both 
as an explanation o f planetary movement and as an example o f scientific 
discourse. Clearly he not only regarded Newtonian methodology to have 
application in any scientific domain but recommended that it be followed. It
is also evident from his other writings that Smith considered a theory o f
• • • 18morals to come within the remit o f ‘scientific theory’.
Taking Smith’s intention behind his account o f moral sentiments to be 
that o f presenting a structured scientific account o f morality which not only 
adheres to Newtonian principles o f scientific explanation, but also 
transposes Newton’s model o f gravitational force from the planetary to the 
social arena, has several favourable consequences. An immediate outcome
in Andrew Hook (ed.), The History o f  Scottish Literature, vol. II: 1660-1800  
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pp. 273-89; pp. 276, 286). 
This misinterpretation o f Smith’s concept o f impartial spectatorship is not 
unusual, as discussed in section 8, pp. 196-8, below.
17 This can be generalised to societies (III.3.42).
18 See Smith, ‘The Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries; 
Illustrated by the History o f Astronomy’ (1795), in Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects with Dugald Stew art’s Account o f  Adam Smith (1795), ed. I.S. Ross 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 31-105 (hereafter HA), IV .75; and 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762/3) (hereafter LRBL), ed. J.C. 
Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), ii. 133. Cam pbell’s study o f the 
M oral Sentiments seeks to establish the Newtonian influence on Smith’s 
moral philosophy: Campbell, Adam S m ith ’s Science o f  Morals, pp. 43—4; 
‘Scientific Explanation and Ethical Justification in the M oral Sentiments', in 
Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (eds), Essays on Adam Smith 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), pp. 68-82, p. 69. As Raphael and M acfie remark, 
the Newtonian aspect o f Smith’s theory was noted as innovative by his 
contemporaries; Raphael and Macfie quote from a letter from James Wodrow 
(written about 1808) in which Wodrow refers to Sm ith’s lectures on moral 
philosophy: ‘His Theory o f Moral sentiment founded on sympathy, a very 
ingenuous attempt to account for the principal phenomena in the moral world 
from this one general principle like that o f  gravity in the natural w orld’ 
(quoted in D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, ‘Introduction’ to Smith, The 
Theory o f  Moral Sentiments, pp. 1-52; p. 3).
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is that, as mentioned above, the M oral Sentiments loses its meandering 
quality and becomes, instead, a controlled, tightly constructed theory o f 
morality. Moreover, the theory is arguably more rigorously empiricist even 
than that o f Hume. Hume is content to allow that an individual’s sensory 
experiences remain essentially private, and his account o f morals relies on 
the idea that the kinds o f experiences which form the objects o f  moral 
judgements are in some sense transmitted between agent and observer. 
Smith, however, both acknowledges the essential privacy o f experience 
throughout both sensory and moral domains, and uses that privacy to drive 
his account o f self-approbation; to explain the root o f m an’s essential self- 
interest; and to explain conscience and duty in empiricist rather than (tacitly 
or overtly) rationalist concepts.19
A less immediate consequence o f a strongly Newtonian reading o f the 
Moral Sentiments is that, because Smith highlights and uses the role and 
scope o f experience in the formation and manipulation o f moral concepts, 
and furthermore, constructs complex and abstract moral concepts from 
simple concrete experiences, his theory can be used to form the basis for 
controlling and structuring moral development. According to Sm ith’s theory, 
an individual can be educated morally, in much the same way as he can be 
educated intellectually, and for the same reasons. In each case, the ability to 
reason -  to manipulate conceptual content -  is independent o f the objects o f
19 Hume argues for the concept o f artificial virtues on the grounds that since 
moral sentiment is an original quality and primary constituent, but the 
number o f duties is, in a manner o f speaking, infinite, it is impossible that 
original instincts should extend to each o f  these duties (Treatise, III.i.2, pp. 
525-6). Hume regards some virtues (e.g. justice) as yielding pleasure and 
approbation as a result o f ‘artifice or contrivance’, which artifice is a 
necessary response by mankind to social circumstances (ibid., III.ii.1, p. 529; 
III.ii.5, pp. 568-77). The pleasure such virtues generate results from 
intellectual appreciation o f the reason-based response to circumstances, 
rather than from a non-rational, sympathetic response. I suspect that M ullan’s 
confusion (see above, p. 121, n. 15) is a result o f  failing to appreciate 
Hum e’s distinction between natural and artificial virtue -  despite this being 
the crux o f Smith’s objection to Hum e’s account o f justice. It is true that 
Smith utilises a notion of contrived propriety, but this appears only in 
explanations o f moral approval founded in delusions about the nature o f 
virtue; and as justification for moral approval. See Smith on custom, below 
(pp. 188-9).
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reason, and o f the quality of experiences to which one is exposed. In an era 
in which economic and religious trends were changing rapidly, and in a 
country stripped o f its political identity, the promise o f a means o f 
preserving and propagating societal values will have had no little import.
2 The basic concepts
The framework for Smith’s theory o f moral sentiments is given in the 
opening section o f the book. By the end o f that section, Smith has indicated 
both his understanding o f the nature o f the subject matter o f his inquiry and 
the approach he intends to take in answering the two questions which he 
believes an adequate account o f morality should answer, namely ‘What is 
virtue?’ and ‘How do we recognise it?’ (V II.i.l). We learn that m an’s 
capacity for moral evaluation is natural: developing the ability to make 
moral judgements is part and parcel o f m an’s experience o f social interaction, 
and man is intrinsically social; so the subject matter for a theory o f  moral 
sentiments is the nature o f man. Moral facts then, are observable social facts; 
and because observable will yield to a consistently empiricist approach.
I have referred to Smith as ‘indicating’ the way in which he intends to 
carry out his inquiry because nowhere in the Moral Sentiments does he 
explain his approach. He opens the book with a statement o f fact which he 
describes as ‘too obvious to require any instances to prove it’ (I.i.1.1). But 
this description in itself is indicative o f the manner in which Smith proposes 
to conduct his inquiry. Where necessary, demonstration o f the plausibility 
of his theory is to be furnished by ‘instances’ -  by appeal to confirmation by 
readers’ experience; otherwise he will rely on statements o f fact too obvious 
to brook doubt.
The fact that Smith regards as being too obvious to require demonstration 
is ‘that we often derive sorrow from the sorrow o f others’ (I.i.1.1). Man is 
naturally disposed to pity or sympathise. This is an ‘original passion’, and 
as such it is universal and irreducible.20 While acknowledging that the term
20 Properties or characteristics o f mankind which Smith describes as natural, 
or ascribes to Nature, are atomic, hence universal and irreducible. A 
contemporary reader would have been alerted to the kind o f enquiry Smith
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‘sympathy’ is generally regarded as a generic term for a compassionate 
response to another’s emotional state (I.i.1.5), Smith uses it as a technical 
term. He treats pity and compassion as two o f a family o f  responses towards 
the feelings or emotional states o f another, a family which also includes joy, 
gratitude and resentment, and in fact any resonance with any emotional 
reaction in another: ‘Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in 
the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the 
thought o f his situation, in the breast o f every attentive spectator’ (I.i. 1.4). 
He refers to these analogous responses generically as ‘fellow feelings’ 
(ibid.), and he then defines ‘sympathy’ as the relationship o f concordance or 
harmony between the emotional responses o f any two people to the same 
kind o f cause: ‘Sympathy ... may ... without much impropriety, be made use 
o f to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever’ (I.i.1.5).
Empiricism and the problem o f  privileged access
9 1It takes two to sympathise. Since, for Smith, sympathetic reactions are the 
result o f original passions, it follows that man is naturally disposed to 
interact socially. Taken within an empiricist theory, this implies that social 
facts are understood to be facts o f nature, and hence irreducible. To put the
point another way, for an empiricist, m an’s societal existence cannot be
22regarded as fully explicable by reference to purely rational concepts. 
Social facts may be confirmed by observation, but cannot ultimately be
23proved by analytic reasoning.
had undertaken by the reference in the subtitle to principles by which men 
naturally judge.
21 It is true that Smith describes situations which, he acknowledges, involve 
only the spectator -  we sympathise with the dead, for example (I.i. 1.13,
II.i.2.5), but he argues subsequently that sympathy under these circumstances 
is dependent on an ability to sympathise with an actual agent.
22 Hence one cannot assume that Scottish Enlightenment writers fall into the 
‘Age o f Reason’ categorisation applied to the European Enlightenment 
generally, a point noted by Dwyer (The Age o f  Passions: An Interpretation o f  
Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment Culture (East Linton: Tuckwell 
Press, 1998), p. 1).
23 Smith states: ‘the reasonings o f philosophy ... though they may confound 
and perplex the understanding, can never break down the necessary 
connection which Nature has established between causes and their effects’ 
(VII.ii. 1.47).
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Smith indicates that he is working with an empiricist theory o f 
knowledge at the outset of the M oral Sentiments, albeit with characteristic 
lack o f fanfare. He writes:
As we have no immediate experience o f what other men feel, we can form 
no idea o f the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we 
ourselves should feel in the like situation. ... Neither can that faculty help 
us in any way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if  we 
were in [another’s] case. (I.i. 1.2)
Here, Smith is addressing the fact that emotions and feelings are essentially 
private experiences. We can know that A feels pain, for example, but not 
what it is for A to be in pain -  what A ’s experience o f pain is. The fact that 
Smith refers to the inaccessibility o f another’s experience does not provide 
sufficient grounds for ascribing to him an empiricist stance.24 What does 
supply the grounds for this ascription however, is the way in which he 
accommodates the privacy problem, namely, by recourse to an appeal to the 
imagination: Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves 
are at our ease, our senses will never inform us o f what he suffers. They 
never did, and they never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by 
imagination only that we can form any conception o f what are his 
sensations’ (ibid.). Smith’s approach to the privacy o f experience provides 
insight into his conception o f what might be referred to as the ‘m echanics’ 
o f the sympathy relation, and since, as Hume noted, sympathy forms ‘the 
Hinge o f [Smith’s] System’,25 it is important that the ideas underpinning 
Smith’s reliance, in this passage, on imagining the content o f another’s 
experience o f pain, are made explicit.
Smith seems to be stating that in order to understand what another is 
feeling, we have to do no more than imagine that we are in the same 
situation as that person. That is, it appears that, for Smith, an adequate 
account o f the content o f B ’s statement o f  an ascription o f pain to A, is
24 This is the crux o f debate in meaning theory, in the wake o f W ittgenstein’s 
anti-private-language argument in his Philosophical Investigations and 
elsewhere.
25 ‘Letter from David Hume, 28 July 1759’, in J. Reeder (ed.), On M oral 
Sentiments: Contemporary Responses to Adam Smith (Bristol: Thoemmes 
Press, 1997), pp. 3-12, p. 10.
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supplied by reference to the pain sensations B imagines he would have, were 
he in the same situation as A. However, throughout the first chapter, there 
are indications that Smith is working with a very specific idea o f  what it is 
to use one’s imagination in such cases. For example, one’s powers o f 
imagination are affected by one’s physical constitution: ‘persons o f delicate 
fibres and weak constitution’ are unable to help reacting adversely and 
physically to the sight o f ‘sores and ulcers exposed by beggars in the street’ 
(I .i.i.3); on occasions an emotional response to another’s emotional state is 
so instantaneous as to seem the result o f contagion (I.i.1.6);26 and as Smith 
mentions at the outset, the capacity to respond compassionately in the face 
o f another’s misery, is universal (I.i.1.1).
There is another idiosyncracy in Smith’s comments in Li. 1.2. The 
observer’s compassion in Smith’s example is the outcome not o f  vicarious 
pain, but o f vicarious sorrow: ‘For as to be in pain or distress o f any kind 
excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are 
in it, excites some degree o f the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity 
or dullness o f the conception.’ In other words, fellow feeling is not fellow 
feeling with the sufferer’s pain, but with his sorrow.
Smith’s remarks in I .i.i.2 have the general tenor o f a mere reminder to 
his readers o f what it is we understand when we recognise pain, or, indeed, 
any sensation, in another individual. The clue to the way in which Smith is 
using ‘imagination’, lies in his reference to the imagination copying 
impressions o f our senses, which reproduces Hum e’s terminology with 
regard to Hume’s description o f the imaginative faculty. On closer reading,
• 77it can be seen that Smith presupposed Hum e’s account o f  the passions. In 
order to understand fully Smith’s concept o f sympathy, the Moral 
Sentiments has to be read as propounding a theory developed from Humean 
empiricism.
26 Presumably Smith believed this phenomenon to have misled Hume.
27 Hume expounded his theory o f understanding in Treatise o f  Human Nature 
(1739-40), and in Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding 
(1748). Philosophical Essays was later renamed and subsequently known as 
the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.
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H um e’s concept o f  imagination
According to Hume, all conceptual content is derived ultimately from the 
effect o f stimulation of our senses, i.e. from what are now commonly 
referred to as ‘sense data’. Our knowledge o f an object existing 
independently in the external world is effectively treated as constructed 
from information we gather from our senses:28 a round, pink, sugar-coated 
pill feels solid, looks pink and tastes sweet. We experience solidity, 
pinkness and sweetness. In Hume’s terminology, we experience sensations 
o f solidity, pinkness and sweetness. Sensations give rise to ideas, in the 
following manner: when we are subject to a sensation, the mind ‘takes a 
copy’ o f that sensation, which we retain indefinitely, after the sensation has 
ceased. The copy is an idea. So for example, seeing a pink pill, we have a 
pink sensation; the mind copies the pinkness; and we acquire the idea 
‘pinkness’ (Treatise I.I.ii, p. 55).
Hume includes pleasure and pain among sensations (ibid.). However,
sensations are only a subcategory o f the possible initial causes o f ideas.
Other such causes are passions and emotions {Treatise I.I.i, p. 49). Hume
refers to passions, emotions and sensations generically as impressions. There
is a crucial distinction between sensations, and passions and emotions.
Although all impressions give rise to ideas, passions and emotions are
themselves derived, by a mental process which Hume calls ‘reflexion’, from
ideas that arise from sensations, namely the sensations o f pain and pleasure:
Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those o f SENSATION and those 
o f REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown 
causes. The second is derived in great measure from our ideas. ... [The] idea 
o f pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces new impressions 
o f desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called 
impressions o f reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied 
by the memory and imagination, and become ideas. ... So the impressions 
o f reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to 
those o f sensation and deriv’d from them. {Treatise I.I.ii, p. 55)
9 o
Hume remains agnostic about the way in which our senses work: cf: ‘As to 
those impressions which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is in my 
opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ‘twill always be 
impossible to decide with certainty whether they arise immediately from the 
object or are produc’d by the creative power o f the mind, or are derived from 
the author o f our being’ {Treatise, I.iii.v, p. 132).
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Arguably, Hume has managed to account only for memories, but he 
intends his distinction between memory and imagination, for all its 
philosophical opacity, to carry explanatory weight. Both memory and 
imagination act on the same kinds o f impressions, but memory ‘preserves the 
original form in which its objects were presented’, while ideas resulting from 
the action o f the imagination are not so constrained (Treatise I.I.iii, pp. 57,
56).
The difference between ideas copied by memory and those copied by 
imagination is crucial for Hum e’s account o f  understanding. Impressions 
furnish only simple ideas -  the content o f atomic concepts, such as pinkness; 
sweetness; solidity. However, our experience is o f compound ideas: a pill,
O A
for example. If his theory is to be both plausible and consistently empiricist, 
then Hume needs to be able to explain how we can entertain complex 
concepts without appeal to any notion o f innate ideas -  that is, by appeal only 
to ideas derived from sensation. More importantly, if  his account is to be 
plausible, he has to be able to explain how we understand complex concepts 
for which we have had no corresponding experience. As Hume points out, 
we can understand descriptions o f places w e’ve never visited, for example;
29 Hume is aware that he has given no means for a hard and fast demarcation 
between ideas resulting from the imagination and those o f memory. He 
mentions differentiation between the two kinds o f  ideas by way o f 
differences in their relative liveliness and vivacity. Impressions generally are 
the most vivacious (Treatise, I.I.i, p. 49); ideas have lost vivacity, and 
memories are ‘somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea’ 
{Treatise I.I.iii, p. 56). None o f these distinctions will serve to allow an 
individual to decide between an impression, a memory or idea, however, for 
the simple reason that the decision requires that one is able to make sense o f 
the notion o f comparing ideas. Later Hume appeals to the notion o f there 
being a difference in feeling between memories and ‘pure’ ideas, although 
this feeling is again something to do with relative strength and liveliness: ‘I 
believe every one will readily agree with me, that the ideas o f  the memory 
are more strong and lively than those o f fancy’ {Treatise I.III.v, p. 133; 
original emphasis).
30 Both Smith and Hume make explicit reference to the fact that qualities are 
essentially abstractions; that they are only ever experienced as qualities o f an 
object; see Hume, Treatise, I.i.7, pp. 64-5; Smith, Considerations 
Concerning the First Formation o f  Languages, and the Different Genius o f  
Original and Compounded Languages (1761), hereafter FFL  (in Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762/3), ed. J.C. Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983), pp. 201-26), 6).
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we can also understand ‘poems and rom ances’ which refer to fabulous 
creatures -  in which ‘Nature ... is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned 
but winged horses, fiery dragons and monstrous giants’ (Treatise I.I.iii, p.
57); and in the opening paragraph o f the Treatise he mentions that we 
understand abstract ideas.31 Hume’s response to each o f these issues relies 
on our atomic ideas being intrinsically independent o f each other, and the 
bulk o f Book 1 of the Treatise comprises Hum e’s solutions to problems 
created by combining the need for this independence with an explanation o f 
the predictability, or law-governed quality, o f our experiences without either 
confining mental activity to what has been actually experienced, or invoking
'X')innate ideas.
S m ith ’s concept o f  fellow feeling
The difficulty either o f ensuring that a Humean ontology melds with our 
intuitive metaphysics, or o f giving a plausible explanation o f  its failure to so 
meld is o f such significance, philosophically, as to have merited the exertions 
o f the some of the greatest thinkers from Kant onwards. However, in the 
M oral Sentiments, Smith’s argument with Hume is over the place o f utility 
in moral evaluation.33 Smith’s remarks about fellow feeling, the role o f the 
imagination in generating fellow feeling, and the nature o f the sympathetic
31 Hume refers to the ideas involved in reading the Treatise -  ‘the faint 
images ... in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the 
perceptions excited by the present discourse excepting only, those which 
arise from the sight and touch [i.e. from the physical book], and excepting 
the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion’ (Treatise I .i.l., p. 49).
32 Hume states: ‘As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, 
and may be united again in what form it pleases, nothing w ou’d be more 
unaccountable than the operation o f that faculty, were it not guided by some 
universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in 
all times and places’ (I.i.4, p. 57). A great deal o f  subsequent philosophical 
activity has been devoted to saving Humean methodology from the sceptical 
paradoxes it engenders, while also saving the phenomena it endeavours to 
explain.
33 See Smith’s comments on accounts o f virtue which are founded on utility 
at I.i.4.4; and IV.2.3-7; especially IV.2.3, which refers directly to Hume; and 
Hum e’s comment on Smith’s objections in a review o f the M oral Sentiments: 
‘Hum e’s Abstract o f  Adam Sm ith ’s Theory o f  M oral Sentiments' (May 1759), 
repr. in J. Reeder (ed.), On Moral Sentiments: Contemporary Responses to 
Adam Smith (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997), pp. 33-50, esp. pp. 45-6.
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relation become significantly less opaque when read in the light o f  Hum e’s 
description o f the origin of ideas. One may regard him as using Hum e’s 
ontology as a starting point in his theory o f moral sentiments, as a Humean 
reading o f Smith’s ‘rack’ example (I.i. 1.2) illustrates.
Smith wrote: ‘As we have no immediate experience o f what other men 
feel, we can form no idea o f the manner in which they are affected, but by 
conceiving what we ourselves would feel in the like situation. Though our 
brother is on the rack ... our senses will never inform us o f what he suffers’ 
(ibid.). Smith’s point here is that the immediate experience o f witnessing 
someone in pain, is restricted to what we experience through the five senses 
-  the ‘look and gestures’ (I.i.i.6) o f the person affected. An individual B can 
ascribe pain to another, A, on the basis o f A ’s behaviour.34
This raises a question as to what it is that is being ascribed to A; what 
content the concept -  or idea -  o f another’s pain can have, given that we 
experience only what we see, hear and so on. According to Hume, an 
individual’s idea o f pain can only derive from pain felt by that individual; in 
other words, when B ascribes pain to A, the content o f B ’s use o f the term 
‘pain’ can only have been supplied by B ’s past personal experiences o f pain. 
Using Hume’s terminology, B ’s idea o f pain is the copy by the imagination 
o f what B has felt in the past when in pain. Smith expresses the point 
generally: ‘It is the impressions o f our own senses only ... which our 
imaginations copy’ (I.i.l .2).
As mentioned above, Hum e’s account o f the origin o f ideas o f the 
passions, rests on the notion that physical pain gives rise to emotional 
reactions. Smith concludes the rack example with a statement which shows 
he accepts this notion: ‘For as to be in pain or distress o f any kind excites the
34 It may be argued that a person’s behaviour is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for an ascription o f pain, and that ‘being-in-pain behaviour’ is not a 
necessary condition for ascription o f pain and other essentially private states, 
plays a large part in Smith’s account o f self-control (I.iii.1.9); and the 
possibility o f feigned pain seems to undermine any claim that behaviour can 
give sufficient grounds for such an ascription (I.iii.1.2 mentions feigned 
sorrow). I understand Smith in this chapter to be focusing on ‘the norm ’ -  on 
‘average’ symptoms of pain. Justification for this can be drawn from 
Smith’s arguments against Stoic perfection (I.iii.2.9, n., pp. 58-60, III.3.14,
III.3.27), and his repeated references to a use o f plausible expectations o f 
another’s conduct in making moral judgem ents (e.g. I.i.3.4. III.3.26).
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most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to  imagine that we are in it, excites 
some degree o f the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dullness o f 
the conception’ (ibid.). But notice that Sm ith’s notion o f fellow feeling 
depends on the generation o f the emotional response itself to pain, and not on 
the idea o f that emotion. Hume says that emotions arise from, for example, 
pain and are copied by the imagination to yield ideas; Smith’s theory 
depends only on the first half o f this process: that imagining that we are pain 
is sufficient to cause actual sorrow.
It seems to me that Smith is working with an understanding o f the 
imagination o f pain according to which understanding the meaning o f the 
term ‘pain’ entails associating with it, past experiences o f  pain, and -  
perhaps even, therefore -  using the term meaningfully entails replicating, in 
some sense, the being-in-pain content.33 For Smith, we empathise with 
another’s painful situation, and as a result feel our own sorrow. Neither 
response is intellectual, and the response to recognition o f som eone’s 
physical situation is itself physical. One upshot o f  this is that the more an 
observer B understands o f A ’s pain-provoking position, the richer will be 
his response, and the closer his emotional reaction will be to A ’s both in 
kind and strength. Full sympathy in this case, depends on having the same 
kind o f emotional reaction, as far as possible in the same degree, to 
another’s situation; and that in turn requires as great a comprehension as 
possible o f that situation.
Smith’s choice o f pain to highlight the role personal experience plays in 
furnishing the content of concepts is both useful and misleading. It is useful, 
because the idea o f a separation between external, publicly observable cause 
and internal private effect is implicit in pain discourse, and hence familiar: 
for example, we are used to the notion that if we were to witness someone 
watching himself being injected in the thigh, his experience would have an
35 Jonathan Harrison construes the foundations o f  H um e’s epistemology 
similarly; see Hume's M oral Epistemology  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), esp. 
pp. 29-30.
This interpretative route seems to be confirmed by Sm ith’s description o f a 
crowd’s unconscious movements when watching a tightrope walker (I .i.l.3); 
and provides an explanation for Smith’s comments about physical sensitivity 
increasing the intensity o f a spectator’s reaction to another’s injuries (I.i. 1.3).
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aspect which is inaccessible to us, namely in addition to seeing all we can see 
(the needle denting, then entering his flesh, the syringe plunger being 
depressed and so on), the subject would also feel pain. Nevertheless, the 
idiosyncrasy o f pain discourse is misleading because, given Hum e’s account 
o f understanding, all conceptual content reduces ultimately to private 
experience. We acknowledge that the denotation o f ‘pain’ is an internal 
private experience, in our use o f the term. According to Hume, the 
conceptual content o f every term is reducible to an essentially private 
denotation -  for example, just as I can’t know what another’s pain feels like, 
so I can’t know what another’s perception o f pinkness looks like. However, 
we use the term ‘pink’ to refer, not to the experience o f pink, but to an 
external, independently existing source o f that experience, and effectively, 
abnormal circumstances aside, the experiential side o f colour concepts drops 
out o f colour discourse. Taking Smith to rely on the use made by Hume of 
experiential component in an account o f understanding has repercussions for 
Smith’s notions o f fellow feeling and sympathy -  and, more importantly, for 
his use o f both in his theory o f moral judgements. Sm ith’s account o f  both 
notions shows him to have been not just sensitive to this, but to have 
deployed it.
Sympathy
Fellow feeling is a natural reaction (I.i.4.7) -  Smith describes the emotional 
responses o f fellow feelings as ‘original passions’ (I.i.1.1). However, the 
ability to interact with another is dependent on experience. It is dependent 
on recognising the import o f another’s behaviour. Just as we are bom  with a 
linguistic capacity, but have to learn a language; so we are bom  with the 
capacity for fellow feeling but have to learn to use it.37 Since the content o f 
all concepts is founded ultimately in experience, and understanding concepts 
entails in some sense replicating the experiential content, it follows that a 
mutual understanding of any concept which generates a non-physical 
response has the potential for spawning fellow feeling. Because social 
interaction is dependent on communication between individuals, or on a
37 A new-born has no such concepts, according to Smith (I.i. 1.12); we have 
to learn ‘the looks and gestures’ which indicate grief or joy  (I.ii.1.6).
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degree o f mutual understanding, it follows that fellow feeling is a 
concomitant o f social interaction. Sympathy is, at bottom, no more than 
recognition o f this mutual understanding, so sympathy is also a concomitant 
o f social interaction.38
There is nothing intrinsically moral in m an’s capacity for fellow feeling; 
it is more akin to an autonomic response. Nevertheless, Smith makes it clear 
that there is a certain category o f response which is associated with a moral 
reaction. In order for sympathy to become the ‘hinge’ to his theory o f moral 
sentiments, then, he has to provide criteria for the distinction between moral 
and amoral responses.
Smith has another, more immediate task: namely, to give a plausible 
explanation o f why, when a sympathetic relation can involve simultaneous 
experiences o f such painful emotional responses as grief and sorrow, people 
are inclined to enter such a relation -  why they tend neither to avoid certain 
kinds o f interaction, nor to ignore those liable to induce painful emotional 
responses. This is particularly important, as he regards the motivation for 
communicating one’s grief and sorrow to another to be that o f alleviating 
the pain and discomfort o f these feelings (I.i.2.3); yet he also acknowledges 
that while people do enter sympathetic relations with those who are 
suffering emotionally, they do so only with reluctance (I.iii.1.9). If  the 
motivation for communicating one’s disagreeable passions is to subdue their 
painfulness, this implies that, according to Smith, m an’s actions are 
explicable, at least in part, by reference to a natural wish to reduce pain and 
increase pleasure. Given that pain is part and parcel o f sympathy with the 
afflicted, what is it that prevents another from attempting to avoid 
encounters which will generate painful or disagreeable fellow feelings? 
Smith’s answer is simple: we derive pleasure from sympathy: ‘As the person
38 In fact, it transpires that one may strengthen this last statement: sympathy 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for socially effective interaction. 
Smith constructs the concept o f justice from the idea o f spectatorial 
sympathy with the resentment o f one whose rights have been violated 
(II.ii.3 .6-7 -  here he presents the first o f several objections to Hum e’s idea 
that justice is founded in an appreciation o f utility); and he argues that 
society cannot subsist among those without a sense o f formal justice -  ‘those 
who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one another’ (II.ii.3.3); hence 
justice, and not benevolence, is necessary for a concept o f society (II.ii.3.3).
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who is principally interested in any event is pleased with our sympathy, and 
hurt by the want o f it, so we, too, seem to be pleased when we are able to 
sympathize with him, and to be hurt when we are unable to do so.’39 Since 
Smith is discussing a natural response or original passion, he does not 
attempt to reason his way to this conclusion, but instead appeals to his 
readers’ observations of their feelings and o f others’ behaviour.40
In Smith’s system, the pleasure and pain which derive from fellow 
feeling and the want o f it, are sufficiently strong as to provide the 
motivation for social conformity. Approval o f  another’s sentiments, 
generally, is based on ‘correspondence with our ow n’ (I.i.4.1), and Smith 
defines approval and disapproval o f another’s passions in terms o f sympathy 
or lack o f sympathy with the feelings which provoke that behaviour:
To approve o f the passions o f another, therefore, as suitable to their objects, 
is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and 
not to approve o f them as such, is the same thing as to observe that we do 
not entirely sympathize with them. (I.i.3.1)
In other words, to express the judgem ent that someone is reacting with 
appropriate emotion in a specific situation -  or behaving with ‘propriety’, to 
use Smith’s preferred term (I.i.3.6) -  is equivalent to stating that one entirely 
sympathises with that individual’s behaviour; that one responds in a similar 
way as that individual when one imagines oneself in that situation. Given a 
Humean gloss on the workings o f the imagination, this implies that one can 
use one’s past experience o f reactions to the kind o f case in point, to 
comprehend the other’s current experience o f that situation.
I.i.2.6. This points forms the crux o f Hum e’s objection to Smith’s use o f 
sympathy: ‘It is always thought a difficult Problem to account for the 
Pleasure, receivd from the Tears and G rief and Sympathy o f  Tragedy; which 
woud not be the Case if all Sympathy was agreeable. An Hospital woud be a 
more entertaining Place than a Ball. I am afraid that ... this Proposition has 
escapd you, or is rather interwove with your Reasonings ... You say 
expressly, it is painful to go along with G rief and we always enter into it with 
Reluctance. It will probably be requisite for you to modify or explain this 
Sentiment, and reconcile it to your System’ (‘Letter from David Hume, 28 
July 1759’, pp. 3-12, p. 10-11); Smith added a footnote to the 2nd edition o f 
the Moral Sentiments responding directly to Hum e’s objection (I.iii.1.9, fn.).
40 For example, he appeals to readers’ intuitions about their sympathetic 
responses to the mad or the dead ( I .i .l . 11, 13).
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Sm ith’s definition o f  propriety
Whenever Smith introduces a concept defined in terms o f ‘original passions’, 
he uses the properties o f equivalence inherent to a definition, to demonstrate 
the plausibility o f his definition. He cites examples which show that, when 
the definiens is inapplicable, so is the deflnendum; and vice versa; and so 
on.41 Furthermore, he uses examples to show that apparent counterexamples 
to his definition are explicable in ways which show them to be consistent 
with his definition. Accordingly, having defined approval in terms o f 
sympathy at I.i.3.1, he sketches situations which confirm his definition 
(I.i.i.3-13); and dissolves prima facie counterexamples by showing that 
they can be reduced to conditions which confirm the definitional 
equivalence together with independent conditions which override the 
sympathetic response. For example, while Smith claims that sharing 
another’s sense o f grief is equivalent to approving o f it (I.i.3.1), he also 
acknowledges that there are circumstances in which one may approve o f 
another’s grief without reacting emotionally to the circumstance that has 
caused it. He explains this apparent counterexample to his definition o f 
approval by reference to independent factors which temporarily override 
one’s capacity for engagement with the victim ’s plight, together with past 
experience o f one’s own reactions in similar situations:42
A stranger passes by us in the street with all the marks o f deepest affliction; 
and we are immediately told that he has just received the news o f the death 
o f his father. In it impossible that, in this case, we should not approve o f his 
grief. Yet it may often happen, without any defect o f humanity on our part, 
that, so far from entering into the violence o f his sorrow, we should scarce 
conceive the first movements o f concern upon his account. Both he and his
41 He relies on what are now known as ‘thought-experim ents’.
42 This is an instance o f what Smith refers to as ‘conditional sympathy’; 
describing circumstances under which one can approve o f another’s grief 
over his father’s death, without sympathising, Smith writes: ‘We have 
learned ... from experience , that such a misfortune naturally excites a degree 
o f sorrow, and we know that if we took time to consider his situation, fully 
and in all its parts, we should, without doubt, most sincerely sympathise with 
him. It is upon the consciousness o f this conditional sympathy, that our 
approbation o f his sorrow is founded, even in cases in which that sympathy 
does not actually take place’ (I.i.3.4). Conditional sympathy plays an 
important role in Smith’s account o f rules o f  conduct, which in turn is crucial 
to his account o f the origin o f a sense o f duty. See below, p. 146.
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father, perhaps, are entirely unknown to us, or we happen to be employed 
about other things, and do not take time to picture out in our imagination the 
different circumstances o f distress which must occur to him. (I.i.3.4)
Smith’s choice o f examples to illustrate the tenability o f his definition o f 
approval reveals several features o f this definition, not the least important o f 
which being the scope o f approval -  and, by fiat, the scope o f  what is 
understood by ‘acting with propriety’. He appeals both to circumstances in 
which a correspondence o f sentiments (cf. I.i.3.2) intuitively can be related 
to what we now consider the domain o f moral approval (e.g. approval o f 
another’s resentment or grief (I.i.3.1)); and to those which do not (e.g. 
approval o f another’s laughter, or admiration o f a poem, or picture (I.i.3.1), 
or opinions (I.i.3.2)).
Another feature o f his definition, which Smith later addresses explicitly
(I.i.5.5) is that an expression o f approval is not equivalent to a 
commendation; that is, to earn another’s approbation is not thereby to earn 
another’s praise, but merely implies conformity with the norm.43
A third outcome o f Smith’s definition is that, since it leaves room for 
disapproval -  and would obviously lack plausibility if  it did not -  
conformity to the norm is not something hardwired into man;44 it is possible 
to fail to meet the norm; and (unlike under the kind o f mitigating 
circumstances mentioned in connection with conditional sympathy) to do so 
for reasons which merit blame. Furthermore, it is also possible to exceed 
the norm: to act in ways which are commendable, ways which deserve 
praise (I.i.3.5-7).
The sympathy relation and the moral domain
I stated above, that while Smith equates approval o f another’s passions, with 
a sympathetic response to those passions, he exemplifies his definition o f 
approval using cases which extend beyond the moral domain. It transpires 
that, for Smith, propriety is dependent on the ‘cause or object which excites 
it’ alone (i.e. not on the effect o f the response) (I.i.3.6-7), and that whether
43 This idea forms part o f his criticism o f the conduct o f ‘men o f  rank’. See 
below, p. 189-94.
44 More importantly, most norms are not hardwired into man.
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judgements o f approbation/disapprobation are moral judgem ents is 
determined by the nature o f the cause or object o f another’s conduct. The 
moral realm comprises all and only those causes which are fundamentally 
subjective; events and states o f affairs which it does not make sense to 
regard as publicly accessible -  in Sm ith’s terms: ‘[objects which] are 
considered as peculiarly affecting one or other o f us’ (I.i.4.1; emphasis 
added), or ‘objects which affect in a peculiar manner either ourselves or the 
person whose sentiments we judge o f  (I.i.4.5; emphasis added). 
Furthermore, a judgement is defined as moral or not according to whether a 
correspondence of sentiments or reactions relies on a sympathetic relation -  
whether it demands ‘that imaginary change o f situations from which 
[sympathy] arises’ (I.i.4.2).
There is an inherent asymmetry in the sympathy relation. No matter how 
assiduously an observer imagines the situation o f the primary individual, his 
notion o f that individual’s situation draws on ideas furnished only by his 
imagination -  copies o f previous sensations -  and consequently the 
emotions which these ideas cause cannot be as acute as those that arise from 
the actual experience of the situation (I.i.4.7). Full correspondence o f 
sentiments is only possible where both parties can have the same perspective 
on a situation (I.i.4.2); and generally that can occur only when the object o f 
both parties’ attention is independent o f each.45 Smith writes:
My companion does not naturally look upon the misfortune that has befallen 
me, or the injury that has been done me, from the same point o f view in 
which I consider them. They affect me much more nearly. We do not view 
them from the same station, as we do a picture, or a poem, or a system o f 
philosophy, and are, therefore apt to be very differently affected by them.
(I.i.4.5)
45 ‘Generally’ because Smith evidently regards the achievement o f  perfect 
harmony to be possible, albeit only in connection with the extraordinarily 
virtuous, either in reacting to another’s situation (I.i.5.2), or in controlling his 
natural response to his own acutely distressing situation (I.iii.1.13). This 
coheres with Hume’s definition o f moral causes: ‘By moral causes, I mean 
all circumstances which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, 
and which render a peculiar set o f manners habitual to us’ ( ‘O f National 
Character’, in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, p. 198).
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Sympathy is a pleasurable experience, one which benefits both parties to 
the relation. In consequence, there is a natural propensity on the part o f an 
observer to attempt to achieve sympathetic harmony with another, and to do 
this he must ‘strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change o f 
situation upon which his sympathy is founded’ (I.i.4.6). However, since the 
imaginary quality of the observer’s response is by nature less intense than 
that of an actual experience, and since both parties benefit from the 
sympathetic relation, it implies that if the primary individual concerned can 
lessen his response, ‘flatten ... the sharpness o f its natural tone’ (I.i.4.7), it 
may become possible to attain concordance with an observer’s reaction. In 
fact, this possibility plays an important part in Sm ith’s theory:
In order to produce this [correspondence o f sentiments], as nature teaches 
the spectators to assume the circumstance o f the person principally 
concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those o f  the 
spectators. As they are continually placing themselves in his situation, and 
thence conceiving emotions similar to what he feels; so he is as constantly 
placing himself in theirs, and thence conceiving some degree o f that 
coolness about his own fortune, with which he is sensible they will view 
it ... and as the reflected  passion, which he thus conceives is much weaker 
than the original one, it necessarily abates the violence o f what he felt before 
he came into their presence, before he began to recollect in what manner 
they would be affected by it, and to view his situation in this candid and 
impartial light.46
The onus on the spectator to strive to replicate the agent’s reaction leads 
to Smith’s definition of amiable virtue, which is excellence in the degree to 
which another can appreciate an agent’s situation. The demand that 
sympathy makes on an agent to control an emotional response leads to the 
concept o f self-command, excellence in which constitutes ‘awful’ virtue. 
Virtue comprises excelling in both regards:
And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to 
restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the 
perfection o f human nature. (I.i.5.5)
46 I.i.4.8. Smith refers to the continual adoption by each party o f the other’s 
situation, because the imaginary change o f situation is not considered to be 
sustainable: ‘That imaginary change o f situation, upon which their sympathy 
is founded, is but momentary’ (I.i.4.7).
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Virtue can be seen to be a complex concept, on Sm ith’s account. Fellow 
feeling creates sympathy; sympathy is equivalent to moral approval; and 
excellence in propriety constitutes virtue.
3 The impartial spectator
The imbalance within the sympathy relationship, together with Smith’s 
general notion o f propriety as being correspondence o f sentiments, allows 
Smith to make use o f the concept o f'im partia l spectator’ as an indication o f 
societal norms. Within a set o f people, one o f whom is Sm ith’s ‘person 
principally concerned’ by a situation, where each observing member o f that 
set is engaged in a sympathetic relation with the principal, each may also 
regard any other observer’s sympathetic reaction without sympathy (i.e. 
with full objectivity), and hence make judgem ents about the appropriateness 
or otherwise o f that observer’s reaction by direct comparison with their own. 
The norm, then, can be defined as how most people would react, most o f the 
time, in any given situation -  or, how man in general (III.2, n., p. 129), or an 
impartial, or indifferent spectator would react to a given situation. Smith 
refers to this idea throughout the Moral Sentiments; for example he writes:
But these [gratitude and resentment], as well as all the other passions o f 
human nature, seem proper and are approved o f when the heart o f  every 
impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent 
by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them. (I.i.2.2; emphasis 
added)
Some of [other people’s] actions shock all our natural sentiments. We hear 
every body about us express the like detestation against them. ... It 
satisfies us that we view them in the proper light, when we see other people  
view them in the same light. (III.4.7, emphasis added)
It follows from this, that one’s past experience o f  sympathetic reactions 
comprises in part, perception o f concord between one’s reactions as an 
observer and those o f other observers.
The concept o f the impartial spectator is an abstract. It represents the 
judgements o f the average man when unswayed by personal interest, the
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man o f middling understanding, or a society’s norms.47 It has a crucial role 
in Smith’s theory, as it represents the standpoint from which moral 
judgements are made. Ultimately, according to Smith, moral sentiments are 
the sentiments o f a spectator: to understand spectatorial judgem ents is to 
understand the nature o f morality. However, for Sm ith’s theory o f  moral 
sentiments to have plausibility, it has to provide an explanation o f  how 
moral judgements acquire prescriptive value for an individual -  how they 
gain the authority to influence an individual’s perception o f  his own conduct. 
In other words, Smith’s theory needs to provide an account o f the relation 
between judgements made from a spectator’s point o f view, and self­
approbation.
Smith understands self-approbation, or the ability to make judgem ents 
about the propriety o f one’s own conduct, to be a natural development from 
the ability to engage sympathetically with a spectator. As explained above 
(pp. 138-40), the causes o f the emotional reactions o f agent and spectator in 
a sympathetic relation differ in kind. The agent is understood to be reacting 
to an actual experience, and the spectator is reacting to an imagined 
experience. As such, the strength o f the emotional response in each case 
differs according to the nature o f the experience -  the agent will respond 
more keenly than the spectator.
In order to achieve the kind o f concordance o f emotions necessary for the 
sympathetic relation to hold, the spectator has to work to heighten his 
comprehension o f the agent’s situation. However, the spectator’s 
involvement with the situation is by definition psychologically less 
immediate than that o f the agent, and in consequence his reaction will 
necessarily be less intense. For a sympathetic relation to become possible, 
then, the agent has to strive to control his response -  to decrease the 
intensity o f his reaction to a level approximating that o f the spectator. The 
ability to control natural responses in this way is what Smith regards to be 
the essence o f self-command (I.i.5.3, 6).
47 III.2.14; III.2.30, n. p. 130. ‘M iddling’ does not carry the connotation 
‘second-rate’, in Smith’s usage, but is used in the sense o f ‘average’ or ‘the 
norm’; see below, p. 189.
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Smith's account o f the way in which a sympathetic relation is achieved is 
presented very simply. However, a great deal is presupposed in the idea o f 
spectator and agent each striving to achieve concordance with the other’s 
reaction. To be a spectator, one has to have had enough experience to 
appreciate the effect o f the agent’s situation in such a way as to be able to 
imagine the emotional response it would elicit; i.e. a range o f experience 
broad and deep enough to give conceptual content to the agent’s situation in 
such a way as to elicit an emotional response from the spectator were he 
subject to the same conditions. To be an agent, one has to have had enough 
experience as a spectator to be able to appreciate the level o f emotional 
response plausibly expected from an independent observer. In other words, 
given Smith’s account o f the nature o f propriety, in order to become agent in 
a sympathetic relation, one has to be already qualified as a spectator.
The scene is set for Smith to invoke one more shift in imagination. The 
ability to judge one’s own conduct independent o f the presence o f an 
impartial spectator, is the ability to act as i f  there is a spectator with whom 
one is striving to achieve sympathy. Smith writes:
[W]e either approve or disapprove o f our own conduct, according as we feel 
that, when we place ourselves in the situation o f another man, and view it, 
as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot 
entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which 
influenced it. ... Whatever judgment we can form concerning [our own 
sentiments and motives], accordingly, must always bear some secret 
reference, either to what are, or to what, upon a certain occasion would be, 
or to what, we imagine, ought to he the judgm ent o f others. We endeavour 
to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial 
spectator would examine it. (III.1.2; emphasis added)
When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass 
sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all 
such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; ... the spectator, 
whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, 
by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear 
to me, when seen from that particular point o f v iew ... the agent, the person I 
properly call myself, and o f whose conduct, under the character o f a 
spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion.48
48 III.1.6; emphasis added. See also reference to the ‘supposed’ impartial 
spectator at III.2.32, 33.
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As Smith makes clear here, an ability to judge one’s own conduct tacitly 
relies on a spectator’s judgement.49 If Smith’s use o f H um e’s concept o f 
imagination is taken seriously, then the reason for this dependence becomes 
clear. Smith’s use o f ‘ought’ in this context is causal, not moral, i.e. it is 
intended to embrace cases in which actual spectators either have incomplete 
knowledge o f the agent’s situation or no knowledge at all (III.2.7, 9).
One important aspect o f Smith’s account o f  the origin and development 
o f conscience which, in the majority o f commentaries, is either missed, or 
passed over without comment, is that it is no more than an application o f the 
general theory o f understanding implicit in the M oral Sentiments, to the 
specific domain o f moral judgements. That is, that the general account o f 
understanding implied by the Moral Sentiments, when used to underpin an 
explanation o f concept-acquisition by an individual, will involve reference 
to the kind o f concept which Smith terms ‘impartial spectator’. This is part 
and parcel o f Hum e’s empiricist epistemology, because, given the 
empiricism, some explanation is required o f how an individual learns to 
differentiate and categorise his sensations and impressions in such a way as 
to accord with the differentiation and categorisation taken to be the norm by 
the society in which he is brought up. Humean empiricism precludes any 
appeal to innate ideas. Conceptual content is a consequence o f experience 
alone. However, only an individual has access to their own experiential 
content. Accordingly, one is able to show that one has acquired a particular 
concept only by responding appropriately -  linguistically or otherwise -  
under certain circumstances. Furthermore, one can only be considered to 
acquire a concept by being shown by others the appropriate response. For 
example, generally, a child’s reaction to his mother will differ from his 
reaction to any other female, from an early age. He may be described as 
showing an ability to identify his mother, by this reaction, but would not 
plausibly be considered to have acquired the concept mother until he is able 
to demonstrate, linguistically and otherwise, that he understands the 
meaning o f the term ‘mother’ both by his own use o f the term, and through
49 This is the import o f Smith’s use o f the phrase ‘secret reference’, in the 
preceding quotation from III. 1.2.
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his response to others’ use. He will learn the correct use o f  the term from 
those who already possess the concept -  from those already linguistically 
competent. Similarly, while a child may consistently show a preference for 
soft toys which are pink over those which are in every way the same but 
blue, the child will not be said to possess the concepts pink, blue or colour 
until he is able to use the terms in the correct way -  and again, he will learn 
their use from those who are already competent.
One problem for this kind of theory is that o f explaining what it is to 
become competent; what it is that marks o ff the novice from the competent, 
and it is in this regard that Smith’s notion o f an impartial spectator comes 
into play. If  we allow Smith the presupposition that when an individual 
possesses a concept, he associates certain sensations with the term denoting 
that concept; then according to Smith’s theory, a child will acquire that 
concept as a result o f guidance in the use o f the term, by an independent 
party; and a child will be considered to have acquired understanding o f  the 
concept when he behaves in a manner which is considered correct (or 
appropriate) by an observer.
The change from learner to competent language user is that from being 
subject to other people’s judgement about one’s use o f a term, to becoming 
qualified to judge others’ use o f the term -  that is, becoming qualified to act 
as an impartial spectator. Another change is that o f being able to judge, 
without recourse to, or even the possibility o f recourse to endorsement by 
others (cf. III.2.1), that one’s own use o f the concept is correct; an ability 
which Smith would describe as acting as an impartial spectator towards 
one’s own use.
It seems unnecessary to stress the impartiality o f judgem ent involved in 
educating and testing another in the use o f concepts concerning the external 
world -  concepts which under most circumstances are not obviously open to 
interpretation. As mentioned earlier, in such cases, the experiential content 
of such concepts drops out o f the picture. Royal Mail pillar boxes just are 
red; coal just is solid; and so on. It is assumed that those who educate a 
child in the meaning and use o f concepts in this domain are impartial (in fact, 
it is difficult to find a sane motive for bias for these kinds o f  cases).
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While the domain now o f what is, and what is not certain, is not 
isomorphic to that o f Smith’s era (Smith, for example, was able to regard 
mathematics as yielding certainty (II 1.2.20)), there are areas o f overlap 
between what we currently regard as open to interpretation, and the areas 
which Smith regarded as falling short o f truth and certainty (III.2.18-23). 
One o f these areas o f overlap is that o f interpretation o f  other people’s 
behaviour, as is amply testified by the plethora o f self-help books; agony 
aunt columns; and opportunities for counselling. It is in this area, now, as in 
Smith’s time, that impartial adjudication is not assumed inevitable. It is 
considered valuable enough to be actively sought after. Furthermore its 
value is formally acknowledged in the legal system, by the reliance on the 
decision o f an unprejudiced jury regarding the culpability o f a defendant.
Reliance on impartiality, and the opinions o f impartial observers or 
spectators, are not uncommon concepts in the domain o f  social mores. 
Smith’s notion o f the impartial spectator merely highlights the fact that 
social mores are ultimately dependent on the idea o f what is acceptable 
behaviour to an independent third party; and his account o f  conscience uses 
this implicit presupposition to explain how an individual acquires 
knowledge o f social mores -  an acquisition which differs from the 
acquisition o f any other knowledge only in its subject matter, and not in the 
method o f acquisition. Smith expresses this idea as follows:
Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges o f  the like 
faculty in another. I judge o f your sight by my sight, o f  your ear by my ear, 
o f your reason by my reason, o f your resentment by my resentment, o f your 
love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way o f judging 
about them. (I.i.3.10)
Rules o f  conduct
Raphael has objected that Smith’s account o f conscience is ‘too complicated 
when one works it out fully in terms o f his general theory o f  approval’; that 
a theory in which an agent has to imagine what he would feel were he 
witnessing his conduct, and then compare that imagined spectatorial
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position with his actual feelings, while not impossible, is ‘too complicated to 
be a common occurrence’.50
Raphael’s objection applies equally to an account o f  an individual’s 
knowledge o f colour concepts, yet few would dispute either that that 
knowledge is originally acquired from experience o f  what may be termed 
‘criterial’ occurrences o f specific colours together with guidance by another 
in the correct use o f the term; or that under normal circumstances, mature 
competence in colour recognition does not, or does not obviously, involve 
consciously the complicated mental processes involved in learning to 
recognise colour concepts.
However, Raphael’s objection is valid if Sm ith’s account is understood 
to be a description o f what is involved each time one acts in accordance with 
a sense o f duty -  Smith’s account would indeed lack plausibility if  this was 
his intention. However, Smith is not concerned to explain what happens on a 
day-to-day mundane level, but to explain the origin o f  conscience. Smith 
may be considered as explaining what is involved in consciously deciding 
what constitutes one’s duty -  in conscious decision-making procedures per 
se; or as describing the learning process involved in acquiring a sense o f 
duty. He gives examples o f both. But he accommodates the fact that on 
most occasions, we are not aware o f imagining a spectator’s judgem ent on 
our conduct when we act according to the dictates o f duty (III.5.1) in two 
ways: he acknowledges and explains the idea o f certain kinds o f behaviour 
becoming second nature; and he explains the origin and nature o f  rules o f 
conduct -  and the origin o f their apparent prescriptive nature. His 
explanations are perhaps not sound, philosophically considered, but this is 
irrelevant to the question o f the intended scope o f Sm ith’s account o f 
conscience. What is pertinent is that Smith was sensitive to a difference 
between an explanation o f the origin o f a concept, and a description o f the 
psychological deployment o f that concept.
Smith slips in the notion o f rules o f conduct very early in the M oral 
Sentiments. As noted above, in considering a potential counter-example to 
his definition o f approval o f another’s conduct as sympathetic harmony with
50 Raphael, ‘The Impartial Spectator’, p. 99.
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the feelings which motivated the behaviour, Smith concedes that ‘there are, 
indeed, some cases in which we seem to approve without any sympathy or 
corresponding sentiments’, that is, there are cases in which ‘the sentiment o f 
approbation would seem to be different from the perception o f this 
coincidence’. 51 Smith’s example here is the instance o f  conditional 
sympathy cited above (pp. 86-7) in which a stranger’s display o f grief gains 
approval by an observer, when that observer learns that is it occasioned by 
the death o f the stranger’s father. In other words, the stranger’s conduct is 
sanctioned as a consequence o f the spectator’s knowledge o f its cause, and 
not as a result o f fellow feeling with his g rief Smith’s analysis o f  this 
apparent counter-example leads him to conclude that the sanction is a 
consequence o f the stranger's behaviour according with ‘general rules 
derived from our preceding experience o f what our sentiments would 
commonly correspond with'. In other words, conditional sympathy occurs 
when an agent behaves in a manner which accords with that derived 
inductively by spectatorial experience o f similar situations. According to 
Smith such rules can ‘correct upon many occasions, the impropriety o f our 
present em otion’ (I.i.3.4). In this context Smith is referring to the correction 
o f a spectator’s emotions; but such rules can also be relied on by an agent to 
correct, or check a tendency towards inappropriate emotions. In fact, such 
rules not only can be so used; Smith’s opinion is that ‘the bulk o f m ankind’ 
are incapable o f ‘directing their actions’ (i.e. acting as moral agents) by any 
other means.52
Smith is aware o f the difficulty o f adopting an impartial stance towards 
one’s own conduct: man is naturally self-interested (III.6.6-7); the ability to 
judge oneself impartially has to be learnt (III.3.3); and even when mastered
51 I.i.3.2; rules o f duty are also anticipated in Smith’s account o f remorse in 
part II (II.ii.2.3), as noted by Stewart (‘Account o f the Life and Writings o f 
Adam Smith, LL.D.’, p. 285).
32 III.5.1. This is because the bulk o f mankind are unable to attain the degree 
o f impartiality and self-control required to work from ‘first principles’: 
‘None but those o f the happiest mould are capable o f  suiting, with exact 
justness, their sentiments and behaviour to the smallest difference o f situation, 
and o f acting upon all occasions with the most delicate and accurate 
propriety’ (ibid.). That Smith regards such a person as exhibiting moral 
excellence is evident from his account o f the amiable virtues (I.i.5.2; I.i.5.6).
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is liable to be overridden by the strength o f emotions motivating certain 
behaviour (III.4.3), and blurred after the event by a tendency to justify one’s 
reactions (III.4.4). In fine, Smith writes: ‘so partial are the views o f 
mankind with regard to the propriety o f their own conduct both at the time 
o f action and after it; and so difficult it is for them to view it in the light in 
which any indifferent spectator would consider i f  (III.4.5). This weakness 
is corrected by falling back on general rules drawn from our experience as 
spectators concerning the fitness or otherwise o f certain kinds o f  conduct:
Nature, however, has not left this weakness [partiality] which is o f  so much 
importance, altogether without a remedy ... Our continual observations 
upon the conduct o f others, insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain 
general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be 
avoided. (III.4.7)
Smith repeatedly refers to the empirical nature o f general rules o f 
morality. For example, he wrote: ‘[the general rules o f morality] are 
ultimately founded upon experience o f what, in particular instances, our 
moral faculties, our natural sense o f merit and propriety, approve or 
disapprove o f  (III.4.8); that they are ‘formed, by finding from experience, 
that all actions o f a certain kind, or circumstances in a certain manner are 
approved or disapproved o f  (ibid.). General rules o f  morality are 
fundamentally no different from any other laws o f nature -  a point to which 
Smith alludes at III.5.6:
All general rules are commonly denominated laws: thus the general rules 
which bodies observe in the communication o f motion, are called laws o f 
motion. But those general rules which our moral faculties observe in 
approving or condemning whatever sentiment or action is subjected to their 
examination, may much more justly be denominated such.
As with laws o f nature, general moral rules can function either 
descriptively or predictively. However, since moral rules are inductive 
generalisations about the free actions o f men, and as such can influence such 
actions, they have prescriptive value (III.5.6), although the prescriptive
n  #
Smith switches between these two uses continually -  see for example his 
account o f savages’ codes o f conduct at III.6.7. Campbell discusses the fact 
that Smith does not pass from causal explanation to moral judgem ent but 
combines the two enterprises: ‘Explanation and Ethical Justification’, pp. 
68ff.
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content is founded ultimately in m an’s natural (and hence irreducible and 
God-given) propensity for sympathy.
Two aspects o f Smith’s notion o f general rules o f  morality are o f 
particular importance. First, Smith regards it to be a natural human 
tendency to formulate such generalisations. It is not something learnt, nor 
does it appear to be executed consciously: Smith refers to ‘our continual 
observation upon the conduct o f others, insensibly lead[ing] us to form ... 
certain general rules’ (III.4.7; emphasis added). It is apparent from Sm ith’s 
other writings that he regarded generalising, categorising and abstracting 
from experience to be part and parcel o f the human condition. In fact, it 
would appear from Smith’s comments in the ‘History o f  Astronom y’ that 
mankind is constitutionally bound to manipulate and order the data o f 
experience -  to rein in experience to the domain o f the familiar. To be 
unable to do so results in wonder or surprise, both o f which states appear to 
be exceedingly uncomfortable:
When something quite new and singular is presented ... [t]he memory 
cannot from all its stores, cast upon any image that nearly resembles this 
strange appearance ... it stands alone and by itself in the imagination, and 
refuses to be grouped or confounded with any set o f objects whatever. The 
imagination and the memory exert themselves to no purpose, and in vain 
look around all their classes o f ideas in order to find one under which it 
might be arranged. They fluctuate to no purpose from thought to thought, 
and we remain still uncertain and undetermined where to place it, or what to 
think o f it. It is this fluctuation and vain recollection, together with the 
emotion or movement o f the spirits that they excite, which constitute the 
sentiment properly called Wonder, and which occasion that staring, and 
sometimes that rolling o f the eyes, that suspense o f breath, and that swelling 
of the heart ... which are the natural symptoms o f uncertain and 
undetermined thought. (HA III.3; emphasis in the original)
Wonder and sometimes surprise also result from confrontation with a 
lawless succession o f objects (ibid., II.5). Surprise may be violent enough 
to cause death or lunacy, and ‘almost always occasions a momentary loss o f 
reason, or o f that attention to other things which our situation or our duty
? 54requires .
54 HA 1.2. Surprise is rendered more graphically in Lectures on Rhetoric and  
Belles-Lettres', there it is described as causing a person ‘to start back, his 
hands stretched out and his eyes staring’(LRBL, Lecture 13, para. 164).
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Secondly, since the general rules o f morality are derived from 
spectatorial experience, they encapsulate the norms o f whatever society or 
social grouping the spectator belongs to -  alternatively they can be regarded 
as describing the codes o f conduct o f the majority o f the people most o f  the 
time. The lack o f precision in the rules themselves is important for several 
reasons. It provides enough leeway for an explanation o f the differences in 
behaviour between groups within a society -  such groups as are determined 
by rank or profession or age (V.2.4); and it also allows for differences 
between civilisations and nationalities (V.2.7). Perhaps more importantly 
for the Scottish literati, the flexibility concomitant with inductive 
generalisations across behaviour is compatible with the idea o f  social 
progress, or improvement. If  one can identify and isolate the catalysts for 
change in societal norms, then one can in theory calibrate ‘progress’ across 
societies; and, theoretically at least, one has the means for influencing the 
norm in any given society.
4 A Newtonian theory of social interaction
Interpreting the role o f the impartial spectator to be that o f representing the 
social mores o f a society is not uncontroversial. As Raphael and Campbell 
have each shown, alternative interpretations have been proposed according 
to which the impartial spectator is, in some sense, an idealisation o f  moral 
norms.55 This family o f interpretations leaves Smith’s theory wide open 
either to inconsistency or to incoherence. However, as both Raphael and 
Campbell have argued, the source o f error in these accounts o f  the nature 
and role o f Smith’s impartial spectator is a misconstrual o f  Sm ith’s intention 
in constructing the concept. Smith’s primary intention is bipartite: to give 
an account o f the origin and development o f an individual’s ability to make 
moral judgements, and to provide an explanation o f the origin and workings 
o f conscience.56 The impartial spectator underwrites Sm ith’s account o f 
conscience.
55 Raphael, ‘The Impartial Spectator’; Campbell, Adam S m ith ’s Science o f  
Morals and ‘Explanation and Ethical Justification’.
56 Campbell, ‘Explanation and Ethical Justification’, pp. 68, 73-4; Raphael, 
‘The Impartial Spectator’, pp. 91-4.
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The problem for Smith is that an account o f judgem ents o f conscience in 
terms o f internalisation o f a society’s rules o f conduct lacks plausibility, as it 
appears to fail to accommodate instances in which an individual’s 
judgement o f conscience goes against the judgem ents o f society in general. 
As Smith acknowledges, there are two general sets o f circumstances under 
which this situation can (and does) occur. An individual can differ in 
judgements from the majority either in judging that his conduct is morally 
correct when received opinion believes otherwise; or in judging that his 
conduct is incorrect (i.e. when the agent feels remorse), when received 
opinion believes otherwise (II.ii.2 .3-4). Smith not only has to be able to 
explain such divergences generally, but also to allow for the possibility that 
in each case the individual’s judgem ent is correct. Smith’s explanation o f 
the divergence in each case is in terms o f one or other party lacking 
impartiality. The problem then becomes that o f explaining how an 
individual’s opinion can override that o f the majority; that is, how an 
individual can make a judgem ent about his own conduct which can 
coherently be deemed more impartial than that o f society generally. What 
commentators have failed to appreciate is that if Smith is unable to give a 
plausible account o f how an individual may differ in judgem ent about his 
own (or another’s) conduct from the majority, whilst nevertheless being 
correct, then he is also unable to give an account o f how society’s mores as 
a whole may change.57 The possibility o f a causal explanation o f the 
conditions under which the moral code o f a society may change, is 
important both for Smith’s project in the M oral Sentiments and for his 
overall perspective on societies’ development: he requires an account o f 
social change which will take in both the stadial nature o f societal 
development and the possibility o f social corruption.58
Smith’s impartial spectator has been interpreted variously as a vehicle for 
Smith’s preferred normative ethics; as an ideal observer; and as a device o f
57 More accurately, Smith will be unable to give a causal account o f  change 
in the moral code o f a society.
58 Stadial history is discussed above, pp. 9-21.
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utilitarian theory.59 The alternative is to show that Sm ith’s concept is 
compatible with reading the M oral Sentiments as an empiricist theory o f 
morality, and that within this context Smith has left him self enough 
conceptual room for a coherent notion o f divergence between the moral 
judgements o f an individual and o f society at large, where the individual’s 
judgement can be seen to be the more correct, even according to the lights o f 
the society in question. This is the tack independently taken by Raphael and 
by Campbell, although each has argued to the conclusion from very 
different kinds o f evidence.
Raphael bases his argument on textual evidence o f  Sm ith’s intention to 
construct an empiricist account o f morality, which differed from, and 
improved on, those o f Hume and Hutcheson because, unlike that o f 
Hutcheson, it does not depend on postulating an additional, and specifically 
moral, sense; and unlike that o f Hume, it is able to account for the 
development o f conscience, using the concept o f the impartial spectator. 
Raphael’s tactic is to trace the additions and alterations which Smith made 
in the second and subsequent editions o f the M oral Sentiments, in response 
to critics’ comments on just these aspects o f his theory.60
59 For example, a normative interpretation is foundational to Dwyer’s reading 
o f the Moral Sentiments in his Age o f  Passions (see esp. chs 1-2); the ideal 
observer theory has been propounded by Roderick Firth in ‘Ethical 
Absolutism and the Ideal Observer’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research , 12 (1952), pp. 317-45, and its failings as an exposition o f  Sm ith’s 
concept clearly demonstrated by Campbell, in A dam S m ith ’s Science o f  
Morals, pp. 128-34. The use o f the concept o f an impartial spectator in a 
utilitarian ethics is found in Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, although, despite 
R aw ls’ description o f his account as ‘reminiscent’ o f both Hume and Smith, 
given Smith’s severe criticisms o f utilitarian ethics (part IV), it cannot be 
regarded as particularly illuminating with regard to Sm ith’s position -  a point 
also made by Raphael ( ‘The Impartial Spectator’, pp. 94-6).
60 Raphael, ‘The Impartial Spectator’, pp. 87-94. The objection most 
pertinent to the current context appears to have been that o f  Gilbert Elliot. 
Although Elliot’s letter to Smith is not extant, it is possible to reconstruct his 
objection to Smith’s theory from Smith’s reply to Elliot (10 October 1759), 
in which he asks for Elliot’s opinion on emendations to the text in response 
to Elliot’s remarks about the 1st edition: ‘You will observe that [the 
emendation (III.2.6-7)] is intended both to confirm my Doctrine that our 
judgements concerning our own conduct have always a reference to the 
sentiments o f some other being, and then shew that, notwithstanding this, 
real magnanimity and conscious virtue can support itself under the
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Campbell argues that Smith’s remarks about the nature and role o f the 
impartial spectator are context-sensitive; effectively, his argument is that the 
use/mention distinction has to be honoured with respect to Smith’s 
comments on the concept o f the impartial spectator, and that apparent 
inconsistencies within Smith’s theory arising from the properties accorded 
by Smith to the concept impartial spectator are the outcome o f failure to 
differentiate between contexts in which Smith is constructing the concept 
and those in which he is using it.61
Campbell’s overall position is adopted here: the M oral Sentiments is a 
scientific study o f morality in which Smith applied Newtonian methods o f 
theory construction and presentation which, he argued in the ‘History o f 
Astronomy’, are optimal.62 Campbell’s reasons for regarding the impartial 
spectator as a construct within a scientific account o f  moral knowledge 
acquisition are strengthened if one considers the structure o f the M oral 
Sentiments in the light o f Smith’s remarks on scientific discourse in LRBL -  
a text on which Campbell relies only very slightly as support for his 
interpretation o f the M oral Sentiments. However, Cam pbell’s understanding 
o f those aspects o f New ton’s theory which Smith adapts for a study o f a
disapprobation o f all m ankind’ (‘Letter from Adam Smith to Gilbert Elliot, 
10 October 1759’, repr. in J. Reeder (ed.), On M oral Sentiments: 
Contemporary Responses to Adam Smith (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997), 
pp. 18-29, p. 19).
1 Nevertheless, Campbell seems to regard Smith as using the concept to 
promote a specific normative ethics despite taking the M oral Sentiments to 
be primarily a scientific endeavour; see, in particular, his comments on 
impartial spectatorship in ‘Explanation and Ethical Justification’, pp. 79-82.
62 Campbell, ibid. p. 68. Campbell here describes the M oral Sentiments as a 
‘pioneering venture’ in the scientific study o f morality, apparently ignoring 
the fact that Hume intended the same, as attested by the subtitle to his 
Treatise: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental M ethod o f  Reason 
into MORAL SUBJECTS. Interestingly, Hume compares the contemporary moral 
philosophy with pre-Copernican astronomy: ‘moral philosophy is in the 
same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the time o f 
Copernicus' (Treatise, II.i.3, p. 334) -  the comparison being on the grounds 
that moral philosophies displayed the same kind o f complexity found in 
ancient astronomy, and so were implausible because they failed to reflect the 
economy o f Nature.
Smith advocates what is now referred to as the hypothetico-deductive 
method o f theory construction (see below, pp. 166-77; Campbell, ibid., pp. 
31-2).
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morality, is incomplete. Campbell claims that Smith adopted only N ew ton’s 
principles o f theory construction and presentation. However, as argued 
below (pp. 158-66), there is textual evidence that Smith assigned to 
sympathy the same role and the same kinds o f properties in his theory o f 
morality as that which gravitational force has in N ew ton’s theory o f 
planetary motion; and that he also worked with ideas akin to those o f
New ton’s laws o f motion, in his account o f the modulation o f passions
required for fellow feeling.
Although Campbell addresses the problem created for Smith by the need 
to explain how an individual can override the moral judgem ents o f the 
majority, he seems to take the problem to issue from a tacit requirement that 
Sm ith’s theory has plausibility only with regard to the moral judgem ents o f 
an individual within a given society. He does not consider the fact that 
Smith needs to be able to accommodate this possibility in order to be able to 
explain the society-wide changes in moral code intrinsic to his stadialist 
perspective on history.63 A further element o f Sm ith’s theory which 
Campbell -  and most other commentators -  fail to discuss, is his equation o f
happiness with tranquillity. Taking a strong Newtonian line on Sm ith’s
63 Stadial history views societal progress in terms o f four stages: hunter- 
gatherer; pastoral, agricultural and commercial, as discussed above (pp. 9 -  
21). That Campbell underestimates the importance to Smith o f evidence o f 
societal trends across ages is indicated by his remark that ‘Smith, no doubt, 
relied too much on second-hand accounts and tales from classical literature’ 
(ibid., p. 54). Smith, like all Scottish Enlightenment historians regarded 
classical literature and travellers’ tales as providing either observations which 
needed to be accommodated by a stadial and causal theory o f  m an’s societal 
development, or confirmation o f such a theory. In the M oral Sentiments, 
Smith’s description o f the differences between polished and barbarian society 
(V .2.8-9), and his reference to the prompts to increased sophistication in 
judicial concepts (II.ii.2.2) presuppose a stadial approach to history; as does 
his reliance, throughout the text, on examples drawn from Ancient Greek and 
Roman sources (see for example his comment on sources o f  confirmation at
III.3.31). He refers specifically to stages o f societal development in HA, III. 
Stadialism underpins his discussion o f the evolution o f astronomy in HA, and 
his use o f examples drawn from ‘ancient Physics’ to illustrate his argument 
about the origin and development o f philosophical/scientific inquiry in 
‘History o f Ancient Physics’ and ‘History o f Ancient Logics and 
M etaphysics’ (both in Essays on Philosophical Subjects with Dugald  
Stew art’s Account o f  Adam Smith (1795), ed. I.S. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980)).
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theory yields an explanation o f this definition (see pp. 161-6). This is 
important, as Smith’s concept o f happiness is pertinent to his account o f 
luxury induced social corruption and instrumental in his proposal for its 
prevention (pp. 196-7).
S m ith ’s transposition o f  N ew ton ’s theory o f  gravitation  
The excitement and admiration which N ew ton’s gravitational theory caused 
is evident even in Smith’s measured prose. In the ‘History o f  Astronom y’, 
Sm ith’s reference to the way in which Newtonian mechanics enables the 
computation o f the mass and density o f the planets conveys something o f 
the astonishing quality o f this achievement:
But o f all the attempts o f Newtonian Philosophy, that which would appear to 
be the most above the reach o f human reason and experience, is the attempt 
to compute the weight and density o f the Sun and o f the Several Planets.64
Sm ith’s enchantment with the nuts and bolts o f N ew ton’s theory is similarly 
evident, and similarly understandable. Smith pinpointed the most 
unexpected aspect o f Newton’s theory, namely, that the mass and velocity o f 
the planets are calculable in exactly the same way as the same properties o f 
mundane objects o f human experience.
Using the concept o f gravity, together with a handful o f simple laws, 
Newton constructed a theory which analyses such everyday phenomena as 
falling apples, collisions between people on a crowded street, and carts 
increasing in speed when moving downhill; yet which also explains the 
movement o f the planets. According to Smith, N ew ton’s theory is ‘the 
greatest discovery ever made by m an’ (HA IV.76), revealing ‘an immense 
chain o f the most important and sublime truths, all closely connected
64 HA IV.75. Even now the idea o f calculating the weight o f  the Sun seems 
audacious, so it is small wonder that New ton’s achievements captured the 
attention o f so many. It is one o f the relatively few achievements o f 
European world mentioned in M ontesquieu’s Persian Letters which not only 
do not come under attack, but merit praise {Persian Letters (1721; revised 
edn 1758), trans. John Davidson (London: Routledge, 1891), Letter 98). 
John MacQueen discusses the Scottish Newtonian poets, citing work by 
Ramsay, Fergusson and Thomson {The Enlightenment and Scottish 
Literature, vol. I Progress and Poetry (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 
1982) pp. 55-60).
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together by one central fact, o f the reality o f which we have daily 
experience’ (ibid.). Newton’s theory was the acme o f scientific explanation: 
it satisfied the aesthetic criteria o f a good scientific account -  simplicity, 
comprehensiveness and familiarity (HA 11.12); and it was open to 
confirmation by experience.63
C am pbell’s interpretation o f  Sm ith ’s Newtonianism
Campbell believes that most commentators on the M oral Sentiments have 
failed to appreciate the extent to which Smith saw him self as applying 
Newtonian theory to m orals.66 He argues convincingly that Smith’s 
intention was to achieve in moral science, or philosophy, the same breadth 
and depth o f explanation as that o f New ton’s theory, and in the same 
manner. That is, according to Campbell, Smith followed N ew ton’s 
methodology in using a familiar concept and a few simple laws, to construct 
a theory in which a multitude o f law-governed, predictable effects could be 
derived from a single cause. Sm ith’s moral causal counterpart to N ew ton’s 
single cause -  gravity -  is sympathy.67
Campbell understands the foundational concept in Smith’s theory to be 
spectatorial imagination; and Sm ith’s intention to be to reduce operations o f 
the imagination to empirical laws with human application. He isolates 
several such laws in the Moral Sentiments; that is, he finds textual evidence 
o f generalisations which relate the efficiency o f spectatorial imagination to 
the kind o f circumstances imagined. For example, that men can imagine 
some states more easily than others; pleasure more easily than pain; 
common rather than uncommon circumstances; and mental states rather than 
physical ones .68 Campbell refers to these generalisation as Taws o f 
sympathy’, and shows that Smith uses these laws in explanation o f such 
moral facts as that men approve o f expressions o f love more readily than 
those o f less pleasant emotions such as anger; that the expression o f physical
65 HA IV.72. Smith highlights the simplicity o f his theory in the M oral 
Sentiments, commenting that it accords with New ton’s demonstration that 
Nature ‘acts with the strictest oeconomy’ (VII.iii.3.3).
66 Campbell, ‘Explanation and Ethical Justification’, p. 69.
67 Campbell, Adam Sm ith ’s Science o f  Morals, pp. 43—4.
68 This reduction is effectively a precis o f I.ii.
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pain causes more disapproval than the expression o f  mental anguish, as does 
that o f the idiosyncratic by contrast with that o f the more usual.69
According to Campbell, the laws o f imagination, together with the 
assumption o f the universality o f m ankind’s make-up, allow Smith to 
account for basic similarities between societies and for detailed differences 
in moral codes. Campbell further argues that the role o f the impartial 
spectator in determining moral norms, is explicable by reference to two 
postulates: (i) what is desired for harmony (i.e. agreement o f  sentiments) is 
irreducible and universal; and (ii) that only by adopting the perspective o f an 
impartial spectator can man hope to achieve the coincidence o f sentiments 
which he desires.70
While Campbell’s explication o f Smith’s remarks on the relationship 
between approval and spectatorial imagination is accurate, he misinterprets 
its role in Smith’s theory. He has extracted not laws o f sympathy, but (some 
o f the) laws o f imagination. He justifies his decision to refer to the laws as 
those o f  sympathy, on the grounds that a spectator’s sympathy with an agent
71is dependent on his ability to imagine himself in the agent’s situation.
It is true that, according to Smith, sympathy is only possible if  a spectator 
can imagine the agent’s situation, but Campbell’s laws do not describe 
generalisations about the sympathy relation per se. In short, laws o f 
imagination are not same as laws o f sympathy -  at least, not if Smith is 
understood to be using ‘imagination’ in Hume’s sense o f  ‘concepts drawn 
from sense experience’, for then the scope o f imagination becomes far wider 
than that o f spectatorial imagination. For Campbell to have equated 
‘conditions affecting m an’s imaginative faculty’ with ‘conditions affecting 
m an’s spectatorial ability’ means he has either underplayed, or failed to note 
the possibility that Smith was not using ‘imagination’ in the sense o f 
‘fabrication’.
While the details o f Cam pbell’s interpretation o f  Sm ith’s theory are 
disputable, his general position seems sound -  the M oral Sentiments should 
be read as a theoretic discourse. Campbell justifies this interpretation by
69 Campbell, Adam Sm ith’s Science o f  Morals, pp. 98-102.
70 Campbell, ‘Explanation and Ethical Justification’, p. 71.
71 Ibid., p. 98.
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appeal to Smith’s analysis o f the development o f scientific method in the 
‘History o f Astronomy’, and to his explanation o f those features o f 
New ton’s theory which constitute the acme o f  scientific explanation (e.g. 
HA IV.67). Somewhat ironically, the inaccuracies in Cam pbell’s discussion 
stem from exactly that failing which he criticises in ‘norm ative’ 
interpretations; it fails to acknowledge the extent to which Smith saw 
him self as applying Newtonian principles o f scientific explanation to moral 
theory.
Campbell blurred the distinction between imagination and spectatorial 
imagination by failing to recognise that spectatorial imagination is a kind o f 
imagination, and identifiable as such by its subject matter. Furthermore, it is 
independent of, and prior to, sympathy, as is evident from the fact that a 
spectator’s ability to imagine him self in another’s situation does not always 
lead to sympathy. In fact it cannot always lead to sympathy, since, if  it did, 
Smith would be unable to account for disapproval, which he explains as the 
failure o f a sympathy relation between a spectator and an agent, due to a 
spectator, on imagining the agent’s situation, failing to respond emotionally 
in the same way as the agent (e.g. I.i.l .6).
Campbell seems to have overlooked the import o f sympathy being a 
relation between individuals’ reactions to each other’s situation, and not 
between an individual and a set o f circumstances. The moral crux o f the 
matter is not whether a spectator can imagine what it will be like in 
another’s circumstances, but whether what he imagines evokes the same 
kind o f  emotional response as that displayed by the agent. Sympathy is a 
function o f two individuals -  a relation; while on Cam pbell’s account it 
appears to be a function o f one individual and a set o f  circumstances -  a 
predicate.
Newtonian Laws o f  Sympathy
It is a pity that Campbell fudged the distinction between sympathy and 
imagination, as his suggestion that Smith worked with laws o f sympathy is 
confirmed within the Moral Sentiments. When these laws are teased out o f 
the text, they strengthen Campbell’s claim that Smith intended the M oral
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Sentiments to be an application of Newtonian theory to morals, because, not 
only do the properties o f sympathy bear a striking resemblance to those o f 
gravity; but Smith’s remarks on the interactions o f emotions or passions 
suggest that he believed they operated according to laws resembling 
New ton’s laws o f motion.
Newton’s law of gravitation states that every particle o f  matter attracts 
every other with a force proportional to the product o f the particles’ mass 
and inversely proportional to the square o f the distance between them. 
Smith comments:
The law [of gravitational force] ... by which gravity is supposed to diminish 
as it recedes from its centre is the same which takes place in all other 
qualities which are propagated as rays from a centre, in light, and in 
everything else o f the same kind. (HA IV.76)
The imagery and metaphors associated with Smith’s description o f the 
sympathy relation, suggest that he thought o f sympathy as a kind o f force 
which is ‘propagated as rays from a centre’. In fact, his description o f  social 
interaction suggests that sympathy relations can be modelled as an orrery, 
with the agent, or object o f moral judgem ent at the centre; and that this 
model applies whether the object is an individual, a group within a society, 
or a nation.72 Mankind becomes bound together by sympathy, just as the 
solar system is bound together by gravitational force.
A feature o f Smith’s account o f propriety which tends to go largely 
unmentioned, is that the degree o f an agent’s self-control which is requisite 
for a spectator’s approval, is dependent on the kind o f spectator in question. 
Evidently, the standard o f approval for any given set o f circumstances varies 
with the social milieu. The requisite level o f  self-command for propriety 
turns out to vary according to the social distance between agent and 
spectator:
72 ‘M odel’ here is used in the formal sense o f  ‘interpretation o f a formal 
system, or set o f axioms’. Each individual becomes the sun in his own solar 
system; although, from any other individual’s perspective, he is just another 
planet. That nations are subject to sympathetic interrelations is indicated, for 
example, by Smith’s statement at III.3.42: ‘O f the conduct o f  one 
independent nation towards another, neutral nations are the only indifferent 
and impartial spectators.’
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We expect less sympathy from a common acquaintance than from a 
friend ... we assume, therefore, more tranquillity before him, and endeavour 
to fix our thoughts upon those general outlines o f our situation which he is 
willing to consider. We expect still less sympathy from an assembly o f 
strangers, (l.i.4.9)
The need to modulate one’s emotional response to a situation, according to 
one’s company, is iterated throughout the M oral Sentiments. For example, 
Smith states that ‘modern good manners’ permit only near relations and 
intimate friends to visit a family undergoing great distress, because the 
grief-stricken ‘have reason to expect more indulgent sympathy’ from those 
to whom they are closer socially (III.3.24); he refers to being able to expect 
a more ‘indulgent sympathy’ from a friend than from strangers (V.2.10); and 
states that those ‘whom we can neither serve, nor hurt’ should expect no 
sympathy from us at all (III.3.9).
In a nutshell, sympathetic indulgence, like gravitational force, decreases 
over distance. The explanation for this turns on the notion o f common 
experience. At 1II.2.24, Smith gives a partial explanation: ‘the sufferers can 
more easily accommodate themselves to the feelings o f those, from whom 
they have reason to expect a more indulgent sympathy’. By contrast, no 
sympathy will be forthcoming from strangers who ‘know nothing, or care 
nothing’ about their misfortune (III.3.39).
Sympathy is more easily achieved when the agent and spectator are 
familiar to each other. Under these circumstances, it seems plausible to 
regard both agent and spectator as knowing how to expect the other to react. 
Furthermore, it is also plausible to regard the spectator as having more 
detailed knowledge o f the agent’s situation than would be expected o f an 
acquaintance. Given the way in which Smith regards the imagination to 
function, it follows that a consequence of familiarity is that the spectator can 
be expected to imagine the agent’s situation with more accuracy, and so 
achieve fellow feeling with more ease. In other words, the explanation for 
‘sympathetic indulgence’ lies in the fact that a common emotional response 
is dependent on common experience.7j
73 See V.2.5; I.ii.2.5. In HA, Smith describes the imagination as ‘gliding 
easily’ along events to which it has become accustomed (II.8). Presumably 
the sympathy relation is more easily attained the less difficulty each
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It appears that sympathy varies with the depth and breadth o f  experience 
common to agent and spectator: the richer the common ground, the more 
easily the participants will achieve sympathy. Considered in this form, 
sympathy once again appears to have properties markedly resembling 
New ton’s gravitational law, which states that the gravitational force between 
two objects is proportional to the product o f their masses.
Newtonian emotions
It may seem fanciful to regard Smith to have applied Newtonian science to 
moral theory to the extent of appropriating and modifying the nature and 
properties o f gravitational force. After all, Smith is surely doing no more 
than making statements o f mundane fact about the way people just do feel 
more comfortable and less inhibited with those with whom they are familiar. 
But objections along these lines miss the point o f Smith’s project, which is 
to provide an explanation for everyday features o f social interaction. 
Furthermore, since he refers frequently to agents expecting  (e.g. I.i.4.9, 
quoted above), or having reason (111.3.24) to expect to forge a sympathetic 
relation easily with those whom they know well, it would appear that he 
regarded the explanation to be accessible to any who are familiar with the 
experience of sympathy.
The conclusion from this is that it is possible to make empirical 
generalisations about the sympathy relation, which resemble those about 
gravitational force. Campbell has shown that imagination similarly can be 
encapsulated in empirical laws. The case for the extent o f Newtonian 
influence on Smith’s moral theory becomes stronger still in the light o f 
Sm ith’s comments on the interaction between emotions, as it transpires that 
emotional flux is both predictable and strongly Newtonian.
Newton’s three laws o f motion are:
participant has in imaging the response o f the other, which in turn is 
dependent on the imagination ‘covering trammelled ground’ on each side. 
Sm ith’s use o f ‘indulgent’ in this context, is consistent with his notion that 
impartial spectatorship is difficult to achieve between family members or 
close friends -  that such individuals will naturally favour the agent’s 
response (III.3.41). He writes: ‘my imagination is more ductile [than the 
body] and more readily assumes, if I may say so, the shape and configuration 
o f  the imagination o f those with whom I am fam iliar’ (I.ii.1.6).
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1. Every body continues in a state o f rest or uniform motion in a straight 
line unless it is acted upon by an external force.
2. The rate o f change o f momentum o f a body is proportional to the 
applied force and in the same direction.
3. For every applied force, or action, there is an equal and opposite 
reaction.
Together these laws are sufficient to explain why, in Newtonian space, the 
planets orbit the Sun as they do, and more importantly, why ceteris paribus 
the solar system is stable and will remain so.
Prima facie the suggestion that Smith considered m an’s emotions to 
conform to laws akin to, or perhaps adapted from, N ew ton’s laws o f motion 
seems just too neat, or too far fetched. None the less there is evidence that 
this is indeed what he did, and furthermore, the suggestion casts light on 
Sm ith’s extraordinary statement about m an’s natural state and happiness -  
that is, on his reason for believing the majority o f mankind man to be happy 
(I.iii.1.5; see also III.3.30) -  and the role this idea plays in his account o f 
virtue.
One o f the more marked features o f Sm ith’s comments on emotion is the 
frequency with which the relation between emotional response and propriety 
is described as proportional. For example:
If we consider the different passions o f human nature, we shall find that they 
are regarded as decent, or indecent, just in proportion as mankind are more 
or less disposed to sympathize with them. (I.iii.intro.l)
Elsewhere he states that the extent to which we attain approval is ‘exactly 
proportional’ to the ‘vivacity and force’ with which we can replicate the 
feelings o f a spectator (III.3.34); that this proportional relationship holds 
even in the case o f self-approbation (III.3.26); and that our reliance on 
others’ judgem ent about our behaviour is ‘in exact proportion’ to our 
uncertainty about our own ability to judge (III.2.10). Although not an 
exactitude, there is a precision in the relation between the rewards o f 
sympathy and the combined efforts o f spectator and agent in achieving 
fellow feeling, a relation to which Smith explicitly refers in the case o f  an 
agent at III.3.26:
162
The reward which Nature bestows upon good behaviour under misfortune, 
is ... exactly proportional to the degree o f that good behaviour ... In 
proportion to the degree o f self-command which is necessary in order to 
conquer our natural sensibilities, the pleasure and pride o f  the conquest are 
so much the greater.74
In other words, the harder one works to overcome one’s emotions, the 
greater the ensuing pleasure. The pain o f effort is rewarded by the pleasure 
o f sympathy: the idea evokes New ton’s third law.
The strongest evidence that Smith worked with ideas resembling those 
formulated by Newton’s first and second laws is given in the opening 
sections o f the ‘History o f Astronom y’, in which he describes the effect o f 
novelty and surprise on the emotional constitution, which he regards as a 
partial explanation o f m an’s inherent tendency towards scientific inquiry. 
Although the ‘History o f Astronomy’ is often read as a discourse on 
scientific method, by way o f a critical account o f  the development o f 
astronomy, Smith described his agenda quite differently:75
It is the design o f this Essay to consider particularly the nature and causes 
o f each o f [the] sentiments [of wonder, surprise and admiration], whose 
influence is o f far wider extent than we should be apt upon a careless view 
to imagine. (HA Intro.7)
In the ‘History o f Astronom y’ Smith details his idea that m an’s natural 
state is one o f tranquillity -  more specifically, m an’s natural state is one in 
which the imagination is tranquil and composed (HA 11.12); Smith describes 
this state as ‘both agreeable in itself and most suited to [the m ind’s] nature’ 
(HA 11.12). Once certain basics o f life are guaranteed -  namely, those 
necessary for the preservation and continuance o f the species (HA III. 1), 
man can turn his attention to maintaining mental composure (HA III.3). 
Mental composure is disrupted by the unexpected -  by encounters for which
74 Although this is a reference to the rewards o f  self-command on the part o f 
the agent, since the spectator has to work towards attaining fellow feeling, 
and the sympathy relation is rewarding to both parties, presumably the 
spectator’s efforts will be similarly proportionately rewarded.
7 This point is made in Raphael and Skinner’s ‘General Introduction’, to 
Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects with D ugald S tew art’s 
Account o f  Adam Smith (1795), ed. I.S. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980), pp. 1-2, p. 4\ and in J. Ralph Lindgren ‘Adam Sm ith’s Theory o f 
Inquiry’, Journal o f  Political Economy, 77 (1969), pp. 897-915.
163
the mind is unprepared. Man instinctively endeavours to pre-empt such 
encounters by anticipating the future, by observing and identifying trends 
and regularities in his experience, and so introducing order into ‘[the] chaos 
o f jarring and discordant appearances’ (HA 11.12). Such predictions ‘allay 
the imagination’, and restore it to its natural ‘tone’ o f composure (HA 11.12). 
The task o f science -  or philosophy, in Smith’s parlance -  is to identify 
regularities.77
When the mind is prepared, it can accommodate change: the emotions or 
passions which the change excites ‘glide gradually and easily into the heart, 
without violence, pain or difficulty’ (HA 1.1; cf. Hume, Treatise I.i.4, p. 58). 
By contrast, the mind has to work hard to accommodate unexpected change. 
Regardless o f whether the change is ultimately welcome, experience o f the
76 The mental effects o f the unexpected are acute: it can cause lunacy and 
distraction (HA 11.10).
77 Cf. Hume’s distinction between cause and chance: ‘the distinguishing 
between chance and causes must depend on every particular m an’s sagacity, 
in considering every particular incident. But i f !  were to assign any general 
rule to helping applying this distinction, it would be the following. What 
depends on a few  persons is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or 
secret, or unknown causes: What arises from  a great number, may often be 
accounted fo r  by determinate and known causes’ (David Hume, ‘O f the Rise 
and Progress o f the Arts and Sciences’ (1742), in Essays Moral, Political, 
and Literary, pp. 110-37, p. 112; emphasis in the original). It is worth 
noting that Smith’s account o f the origin o f curiosity presupposes uniformity 
in m an’s make-up. ‘Barbarians and savages’ are precluded from this kind o f 
intellectual endeavour only because their society has yet to evolve to a stage 
at which provision for survival can be assumed. Life in an undeveloped 
society entails constantly reacting to the environment -  an idea which Smith 
also uses to explain the form taken by ‘prim itive’ religions. See for example, 
HA III.2; Christopher J. Berry, ‘Rude Religion: The Psychology o f 
Polytheism in the Scottish Enlightenment’, in Paul Wood (ed.), The Scottish 
Enlightenment: Essays in Reinterpretation  (Rochester, NY: University o f 
Rochester Press, 2000), pp. 315-34; and Jerry Evensky, ‘Adam Smith’s 
Moral Philosophy: The Role o f Religion and its Relationship to Philosophy 
and Ethics in the Evolution o f Society’, History o f  Political Economy, 30 
(1998), pp. 17-42. It is also worth noting that Smith regarded m an’s need for 
predictability to be strong enough not only to engender reliance on 
connections created by the imagination, but also induce him to regard these 
as holding objectively (HA IV.76; see also HA 11.12). Part o f the splendour 
o f N ew ton’s theory is that its explanatory scope is so wide that it appears to 
be more objectively based than theories founded in connections by the 
imagination: Smith describes Newton as having gone beyond the laws o f 
conjecture to unravelling ‘the real chains o f N ature’ (HA IV.76).
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unexpected is, at best uncomfortable, and often unpleasant. Smith takes 
‘surprise’ to denote the emotional effect o f an unexpected cause. The 
greatest surprise results from a cause which induces a change from an 
emotional state to that which is its opposite: from grief to joy, for example.78
According to Smith’s analysis, surprise varies according to both the 
degree o f change produced, and the rate at which it causes one emotional
7 0
state to give way to another. Emotions are subject to a law not dissimilar 
to N ew ton’s second law o f motion, which states that the rate o f change o f 
momentum is proportionate to the applied force and in the same direction.
In the ‘History o f Astronom y’, Smith claims that m an’s natural state is 
one o f tranquillity, and throughout the M oral Sentiments he cites examples 
which cohere with and endorse this idea. For example, he states that distress 
is a temporary state (III.3.28) and that once it has passed, the mind returns to 
‘ordinary tranquillity’ (III.3.29); furthermore, man unfailingly
!
accommodates a permanent change in his situation (III.3.30).
! The ‘ordinary’ state o f tranquillity is the median state, which SmithI
| equates with happiness:
I Happiness consists in tranquillity and enjoyment. Without tranquillity there
! can be no enjoyment, and where there is perfect tranquillity there is scarce
anything which is not capable o f amusing. But in every permanent situation,
78 HA 1.6. Unanticipated joy is veritably dangerous, according to Smith, who 
describes the effect o f which in graphic detail. G rief dampens and oppresses 
the heart. Because joy is a welcome passion, which the mind is keen to 
embrace, unlike grief, which ‘comes on slowly and gradually’ (ibid.), joy 
‘comes rushing upon us all at once like a torrent’ and expands and elates the 
heart. Its effect is intense and violent, and never more so than when a ‘tide 
o f gladness’ unexpectedly relieves grief. Then according to Smith, the heart 
‘extends’ and ‘heaves up ’ violently, and irresistibly, causing ‘pangs o f all 
others most exquisite’, which ‘almost always occasion faintings, deliriums, 
and sometimes instant death’ (ibid.). ‘Most m en’, Smith comments, soberly, 
‘who can take the trouble to recollect, will find that they have heard o f  more 
people who have died or become distracted with sudden joy, than with 
sudden g rie f  (ibid.). Apparently, Harley’s fate is not as extraordinary as it 
seems.
79 A fact Smith takes to be attested to by the fact that one prepares a friend 
for news o f an ‘extraordinary calamity’ (HA 1.6).
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where there is no expectation o f change, the mind o f every man, in a longer 
or shorter time, returns to its natural and usual state o f tranquillity.80
In other words, there is a median state to which the mind or imagination 
generally returns after a disturbance. The intended import o f  this statement
is not normative, but factual. It is also not implausible: one cannot live
81constantly in a state o f shock or surprise. Sm ith’s analysis o f surprise can 
be seen to rest on an assumption about emotional change and what might be 
termed m an’s ‘resting emotional state’ which is reminiscent o f the concept 
conveyed by Newton’s first law o f motion, namely homoeostasis. In the 
absence o f an external force, the emotions maintain a state o f equilibrium.
S m ith ’s analysis o f  hypothetico-deduction
As it stands, the justification for interpreting the M oral Sentiments as a 
scientific account o f the origin and nature o f morality and, more specifically, 
for taking the impartial spectator to be a theoretical construct within such an 
account, is vulnerable to just the objections levelled by Campbell and 
Raphael at normative readings. The claim made above that Smith’s analysis 
o f moral concepts is strongly Newtonian in both form and content is 
justified by appeal to remarks drawn from throughout the M oral Sentiments 
without reference to their context. If  it is acceded that these do supply 
evidence, at least, o f a scientific slant to Sm ith’s account, then the M oral 
Sentiments stands in danger o f seeming even more o f a confusion than that 
perceived on the normative reading. Without additional evidence o f the 
Newtonian influence o f Smith’s thought, the M oral Sentiments threatens to 
appear no more than a ragbag o f prescription gilded with Newtonian 
mechanics.82 What is needed to avoid this unpalatable outcome is evidence
80 III.3.30. Cf. Locke’s comments on the relationship between unease and 
the motive for change, John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1689), ed. A.D. Woozley (London & Glasgow: Collins, 
1964), Il.xxi-xxii.
81 Smith believes that it would not be possible to live in the state o f 
heightened awareness he terms surprise, because repetition o f an experience 
deadens the associated emotional reaction (HA 1.9).
82 This perspective might be the cause o f Dw yer’s cavalier attitude towards 
the suggestion that the M oral Sentiments is a scientific discourse. See Age o f  
Passions, p. 1, and below, pp. 199-202.
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o f  linearity in the argument o f the M oral Sentiments; that is, that Smith 
constructs moral concepts o f increasing complexity and abstraction.
Campbell argues that the Newtonian influence is evident in both the 
content and the form o f the M oral Sentiments', that is he argues that there is 
evidence o f those features o f Newton’s method o f theory construction which 
Smith highlights in the ‘History o f Astronom y’ as paradigmatic o f 
excellence in scientific discourse. He points out that in addition to 
appreciating the simplicity and economy o f the content o f N ew ton’s theory, 
Smith is enthusiastic about the way in which Newton presents his theory.83
Smith’s remarks in the ‘History o f Astronom y’ show him to have been 
intellectually impressed and aesthetically pleased by what is now known as 
hypothetico-deduction, that is, creating a scientific theory by making a 
hypothesis or set o f hypotheses from which results already obtained could 
have been deduced and which also entails new experimental predictions 
which can be verified or refuted.84 Part o f Cam pbell’s intention in Adam  
Sm ith ’s Science o f  Morals is to show that this method is replicated in the 
M oral Sentiments -  an intention which is not quite fulfilled, in part because 
he blurred the distinction between sympathy and imagination; and in part 
because, charitably interpreted, his reading o f the M oral Sentiments can be 
seen as underplaying the importance to this method, o f demonstrating that it 
will ‘save the phenomena’ , i.e. account for phenomena which are intuitively
Campbell, Adam Sm ith ’s Science o f  Morals, p. 31.
84 Smith comments that ‘the observations o f Astronomers at Lapland and 
Peru have fully confirmed Sir Isaac’s system and have not only demonstrated, 
that the figure o f the Earth is, in general, as he supposed it; but that the 
proportion o f its axis to the diameter is almost precisely such as he had 
computed it. And o f all the proofs that have ever been adduced o f the diurnal 
revolution o f the Earth, this perhaps is the most solid and satisfactory’ (HA,
IV.72). The hypothetico-deductive method is clearly explained in 
Ferguson’s Institutes o f  M oral Philosophy: ‘M ethod in science is o f two 
kinds; analytic and synthetic. Analytic method is that by which we proceed 
from observations o f fact, to establish general rules. Synthetic method, is 
that by which we proceed from general rules to the particular application. 
The first is the method o f investigation. The second o f communication, or o f 
the enlargement o f science’ (Adam Ferguson, Institutes o f  M oral Philosophy 
(1769) (London, Bristol: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1994), pp. 3-4).
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associated with concepts undergoing analysis, in a principled w a y .85 
Campbell focuses on the elements o f Smith’s theory construction almost to 
the exclusion o f considering the way Smith structures his argument. It is not 
possible here to carry out the kind o f textual analysis required to show that 
Smith put as much effort into demonstrating that his theory was confirmed 
by intuitively recognised facts about the approval o f conduct as he did into 
constructing complex concepts from atomic moral facts. This would entail 
showing that for each moral concept he constructs, he provides an 
illustration o f its application which functions as a thought-experiment for 
the reader. Limitations o f space also preclude a demonstration that Smith 
tackled the predictive aspect o f Newtonian theory construction -  it is 
possible only to gesture in the direction which such a demonstration might 
take by suggesting that this might have been his intention in arguing that 
wealth can result in moral deterioration.
What it is possible to establish, with requisite brevity, is that there is a 
degree o f support for the suggestion that Smith used the full barrage o f 
Newtonian methodology; that is, that he not only endorsed the principles o f 
the hypothetico-deductive method, but applied them. In consequence, a 
detailed textual study from this perspective would reveal the intended 
import o f the Moral Sentiments.
Evidence for this line o f thought comes from a source rarely utilised fully 
in connection with the M oral Sentiments, namely Sm ith’s Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. This book merits study in its own right. 
Together with Blair’s text o f the same title (1783), it introduces a new 
categorisation o f prose. Smith’s Lectures articulates principles o f
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composition for scientific, didactic, historical and oratorical discourse.
85 Smith’s objection to Hume’s reliance on utility to explain justice and duty 
is effectively that he fails to save the phenomenon o f conscience (part IV).
86 Arguably it is more accurate to suggest that this might have been Smith’s 
original intention for discussing the luxury issue; that his addition o f material 
in the 6th edition o f the Moral Sentiments was a response to trends beginning 
to confirm his predictions. See below, pp. 197-204.
87 Jill Marie Bradbury agues that Smith gives a unique, philosophically 
motivated analysis o f prose forms which maps out the fields o f relations 
between eighteenth-century discursive forms. She also points out that Smith
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As argued below there is evidence o f Smith’s influence on Mackenzie 
and other late eighteenth-century prose writers considered meritworthy by 
their contemporaries. M ackenzie’s depiction o f characters’ emotions follow 
Smith’s guidelines, for example, and it is arguable that Sm ith’s comments 
on the purpose o f history influenced M ackenzie’s choice o f structure for The 
Man o f  Feeling ,88
Smith explains the criteria for ‘good prose’ for each category according 
to the efficiency with which it attains its intended end, whether that is to
O Q
educate, analyse, persuade or stimulate emotionally. The innovation o f 
Smith’s approach merits attention, but more interesting are the tacit 
assumptions which underpin it, as these indicate that Sm ith’s perspective on 
stylistics is consonant with his general theory o f the development o f  m an’s 
mental and emotional faculties.90 ‘Good prose’ is not a literary attribute but 
a psychological one.91
was the first to treat prose and poetry as different media: ‘New Science and 
the New Species o f W riting’, Eighteenth-Century Life, 27 (2003), pp. 28-51.
88 Evidence o f Smith’s influence on Mackenzie is discussed on pp. 222-34; 
that o f his influence on Macpherson, on pp. 280-7. Charlotte Lennox’s 
satirical The Female Quixote constitutes further argument for Sm ith’s 
analysis o f style, content and authorial intention appropriate to history {The 
Female Quixote, or the Adventures o f  Arabella  (1783), ed. M argaret Dalziel 
(London: Oxford University Press) esp. Bk IX, ch. XI).
89 See LRBL ii. 12; and Lecture 17 in which Smith describes different kinds o f 
discourse.
90 See ibid., Lecture 19 in which Smith gives a history o f historians and 
makes the association between poetic content, and superstition and credulity 
(ii.46-7).
91 This is overlooked by almost all who have discussed the literary 
predilections the Scottish literati -  see for example, Simpson on Hum e’s 
criteria o f literary quality (Kenneth Simpson, The Protean Scot: The Crisis o f  
Identity in Eighteenth Century Scottish Literature (Aberdeen: Aberdeen 
University Press, 1988), ch. 3); Trumpener on the literati’s response to the 
Poems o f  Ossian {Bardic Nationalism: The Romantic Novel and the British 
Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), ch. 2); and 
probably every single discussion which mentions M ackenzie’s advice to 
Bums to write in English. This is not to suggest that the literati are immune 
to criticism on this question; but that the objections made to their criteria for 
quality writing fail to take into account that the literati were working with a 
teleological notion o f ‘quality’. Campbell nods in this direction -  he 
mentions that Smith’s Essays on Philosophical Subjects shows the extent to 
which Smith regarded empirical science as a distinct species o f  didactic 
discourse {Adam Sm ith ’s Science o f  Morals, p. 31). An example o f the kind
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Sm ith’s enthusiasm for N ew ton’s achievement is as obvious in LRBL  as 
in the ‘History o f Astronomy’.
The Newtonian method is undoubtedly the most Philosophical, and in every 
scien<c>e w<he>ther o f Moral! or Nat<urall> phil<osophy> etc., is vastly 
more ingenious and for that reason more engaging than the other [i.e. the 
scientific method Smith attributes to Aristotle].9
We are left in no doubt about the importance Smith placed on the 
presentation o f a theory. According to Smith the intellectual appeal o f the 
deductive method is so strong that, on first encountering it in Descartes’ 
theory o f astronomy, ‘all the Learned in Europe’ were beguiled into 
accepting as fact what was later shown to be ‘one o f the most entertaining 
Romances that has ever been w rote’ (LRBL ii.l 34).
Smith regarded ‘Newtonian m ethod’ to be the most suitable prose style 
for theory construction, which he refers to as ‘didactical writing containing 
an account o f some system’ (ibid.). It is axiomatic -  a discursive form of 
the kind o f theory construction which would have been familiar from 
Euclidean geometry:
[In using the Newtonian method] we lay down certain principles known or 
proved in the beginning, from when we account for the severall phenomena, 
connecting all together by the same Chain. (Ibid.)
Here Smith uses terms which had, or which swiftly acquired, specific use in 
this kind o f scientific context. ‘Principle’ for example, is defined by 
Ferguson as ‘a general rule, when applied to explain or regulate particulars’,
o f psychological criteria Smith invokes is given by his comment that in 
didactic discourse, ‘It is proper to begin with laying down the proposition, as 
the argument advanced will by that means make a greater impact on the 
mind’; and with regard to the number o f propositions presented at any one 
time, he writes: ‘The Rule is in this matter the same as in architecture; the 
mind can not there comprehend a number at sight and without counting 
above 9 or 10’ (LRBL, ii.126, 127).
Stylistics for Smith seems to have been a literary equivalent o f method 
acting; and from his comments in the M oral Sentiments it is plain that he 
regarded his principles to be no more than guidelines (III.6.9-11) -  if  the 
parallel he draws between style and morals is solid, then one may also 
assume that the rules may be countermanded by those who excel (as Bach’s 
genius is revealed by his decision to break the rules o f Baroque composition).
2 LRBL  i i . l33; angled brackets indicate editorial additions.
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and ‘phenomena’ as the particulars to be explained.93 Sm ith’s use o f ‘chain’ 
refers to ‘a chain o f metaphysicall arguments one deduced from another’ 
{LRBL i i . l31). So, if Smith adopted the Newtonian method in the Moral 
Sentiments we can expect the text to be arranged to form a single chain o f 
argument, or alternatively, chains o f argumentation which all stem from the 
same set o f premises. Whichever form the text takes, there will be evidence 
o f a direction in conceptual content from less to more complex -  in other 
words, evidence that Smith has used the conclusions from one stage as 
assumptions for the next, so moral concepts considered in the later parts o f 
the book will be both theoretically more complex than, and explanatorily 
dependent on, those found in the earlier. Furthermore given Smith’s 
reference to ‘metaphysical argum ents’, the analysis will be causal -  in 
Humean terms this means Sm ith’s theory will be constructed according to 
general rules drawn from experience o f constant conjunctions between 
phenomena. Finally, we can expect Smith to work to establish propositions 
already accepted.
Smith’s discussion o f didactic discourse also indicates what we should 
not expect to find -  namely the second o f the two possible forms o f 
presentation he identifies as suitable for the presentation o f scientific theory. 
In his explanation o f the methodology for this discarded method, Smith 
relies heavily on its use in Virgil’s Georgies {LRBL i i . l32-3). Sm ith’s 
description makes it plain that the method is iterative. One analyses a 
concept by listing instances, grouped intuitively, and then generalising over 
kinds o f instance,94 No attempt is made to order the kinds, i.e. to put them 
in a relation with one another. So, in Sm ith’s example, the concept o f 
‘husbandry’ is explicated by listing different kinds o f husbandry -  from bees 
to trees -  and generalising only over instances within each category, not 
across categories. Smith describes it as ‘go[ing] over the Different branches 
[of a subject] in the order which they happen to cast up to us, giving a
93 Ferguson, Institutes, p. 3. Ferguson goes on to point out that a theory (or 
system) ‘must rest on ultimate facts’ -  that is on facts which cannot be 
analysed or reduced (ibid., pp. 8-9).
94 These are now known as ‘natural kinds’ in contemporary philosophy. We 
can identify instances o f colour, for example, without knowing the physics o f 
light.
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principle, commonly a new one, for every phenomena’ {LRBL i i . l33). As 
Smith points out, an attempt to present systematically the results o f this kind 
o f  iterative account o f a concept, alters the presentation from iterative to the 
Newtonian (ibid.).
Smith details the architecture o f the Newtonian method, pointing out that 
his comments refer equally to both the proof o f either a proposition or a set 
o f  propositions; and to the presentation o f theory, ‘where the Design is to 
Deliver a System of any Scien<c> e.g. Natural 1 Philosophy’ {LRBL i i . l30). 
The overriding consideration is to make it as easy as possible to keep track 
o f  the connection between premises and conclusion -  o f the steps in 
argumentation. For example, Smith states that each deductive argument 
should begin with the statement o f the proposition to be proved; and when a 
conclusion is dependent on the proof o f several subcomponents this too 
should be stated at the outset. Both are obvious points but perhaps their 
obviousness indicates only that the nuts and bolts o f discursive deduction 
are now familiar.95 Smith also details a specific internal structure for 
scientific composition, again on the grounds that the mind responds better to 
some arrangements o f textual material than to others. Here, though, he 
relies on a blend o f ideas drawn from both his analysis o f  the Newtonian 
method and from time-honoured mnemonics.96 Smith’s blend o f ancient 
and modern in this way would not have been novel. Yates discusses 
evidence o f reliance on classical memory systems in the developing sciences 
o f  the seventeenth century.97 From Smith’s discussion, it is evident that he 
thought o f the way in which material is clustered for optimum clarity, by 
breaking dense argumentation into its subcomponents, as being determined 
by considerations regarding both memory and reason. For example, he 
states that each propositional cluster should comprise no more than three or 
five propositions -  and justifies his choice by appeal to both the ease with
95 LRBL ii. 125-6. It is impossible to determine the extent to which Smith’s 
emphasis is due to the fact that LRBL comprises teaching material, rather 
than R&D.
96 Smith relies on a relatively simple mnemonics relying on architectural 
metaphor. See Frances A. Yates, The A rt o f  M emory (1966) (London: Ark, 
1984).
97 Yates, ibid., ch. 17.
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which a small number o f steps can be remembered, and, by using an odd 
rather than even number, the ease with which reason, or the mind, can 
recollect the deductive connections between propositions because odd 
numbers provide a central pivot from which one may work to construct the 
more complex or synthetic proposition, or deconstruct via analysis to its
QO
conceptually simpler components.
Even a fairly superficial reading o f the Moral Sentiments reveals that 
Smith followed the principles o f clarity he laid down for didactic discourse 
in the Lectures on Rhetoric. Each part o f the M oral Sentiments deals with a 
different moral concept. The connection between parts is not strictly linear, 
however. The content o f part II, ‘O f merit and dem erit’ depends on the 
arguments in part I for Smith’s notion o f propriety and subsequently virtue. 
Merit and demerit -  or reward and punishment -  are (re)constructed on the 
basis o f these concepts, but Smith also constructs the concept o f justice 
equating it with the notion o f avoidance o f punishment -  a more complex 
concept than punishment simpliciter. Part III, in which Smith constructs 
‘conscience’ and from this, the concept o f duty, is dependent on arguments 
in part II. Conscience is derived from praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness, which are in turn are derived from praise and blame -  
concepts discussed in part II, but justice per se is not a component o f 
conscience. It is therefore possible to order deductively the moral concepts 
which feature centrally in parts I to III, but part II contains a ‘conceptual 
outcrop’ which is related to the matter within that part but not foundational 
to subsequent parts.
Parts IV and V are similarly dependent on Sm ith’s conclusions in 
foregoing chapters, but the derivational elements are not quite as 
straightforward as in parts I to III. Hume argues that justice and related 
concepts which he associates with the notion o f ‘government’ are founded in 
considerations o f u tility ." In part IV Smith objects to this on the grounds
98 LRBL  i i .l26-30. The associated imagery is highly reminiscent o f that o f 
Ferguson’s description o f the hypothetico-deduction, quoted above n. 84.
99 Treatise II.i; in his abstract o f the M oral Sentiments, Hume wrote: ‘Our 
author subjoins many irrefragable arguments, by which he refutes the 
sentiments o f Mr. Hume, who founded a great part o f his moral system on 
the consideration o f public utility’ ( ‘Hume’s A bstract p. 45).
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that Hume’s arguments constitute post hoc justification for social practices 
which his theory explains more adequately by reference to fellow feeling 
and the sympathy relation. And in part V Smith tackles the difficult issue o f 
diverging practices across societies -  using the idea o f ‘created propriety’ 
(see below, p. 188). In each o f these parts, Sm ith’s aim is to show that the 
moral concepts are based on a tacit assumption o f propriety -  that they are 
logically complex. Part VII cannot be considered a contribution to Sm ith’s 
theory. It is more akin to the form o f discourse Smith refers to as 
‘deliberative’ {LRBL i i .l35-6). His intention in part VII is to show that ‘ the 
most celebrated and remarkable’ o f moral theories given to explain the 
nature and origin o f moral sentiments are only partially correct, and that in 
each case, the partial nature o f the account is due to the theory relying on 
some but not all o f the concepts foundational in Sm ith’s theory; in other 
words that an analysis or deconstruction o f other theories will reveal them to 
be based on concepts which are identical with only some o f those 
foundational in Smith’s theory. The net result, he concludes, is that either 
the theory tacitly imports concepts which need explanation -  i.e. is only a 
partial explanation; or, like Hume’s and Hutcheson’s have limited scope, i.e. 
are only a partial explanation o f the concept o f morality per se.100
The concepts foundational in each part become increasingly complex as 
the book progresses. Part I depends on the concept o f fellow feeling -  the 
concordance o f irreducible passions and emotions. Fellow feeling is then 
used in Smith’s reconstruction o f the sympathy relation, by which he defines 
propriety. Propriety in part I is discussed only with regard to spectatorial 
judgem ent on one other person’s conduct -  which Smith remarks upon:
The effects o f grief and joy terminate in the person who feels those emotions, 
o f which the expressions do not, like those o f resentment, suggest to us the 
idea o f any other person or whom we are concerned, and whose interests are 
opposite to his. (Li. 1.8)
In part II, Smith uses propriety and sympathy in an analysis o f  moral 
judgements o f greater complexity because it involves the interaction o f two
100 Smith’s objections to Hutcheson’s theory are given at V II.3.7-16; and he 
argues against Hume in part IV.
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(or more) individuals -  which I have referred to above as transitive acts.101 
In such cases, a moral judgem ent on the interaction is dependent on the 
spectator’s reaction to each o f those involved. One cannot condone a m an’s 
fury if one condones the victim ’s resentment o f this anger, for example; and 
one cannot condone the generosity o f a benefactor unless one also condones 
the gratitude o f the recipient (II.i.5.2; II.i.5.5). Smith then uses the 
compound nature o f such judgem ents in an analysis o f praise and blame, 
which he in turn uses in an explication o f reward and punishment. From 
punishment he derives the morally highly complex concept o f justice.
The content o f part III is dependent on the conclusion o f part I 
concerning the role o f the spectator’s perspective in moral judgem ents; and 
on the notion o f remorse which is derived from blame in part II. Smith 
builds on these conclusions, to construct the concepts o f self-approbation 
and o f conscience, which are the most complex moral concepts in the theory.
So, the theory construction in the M oral Sentiments arguably follows that 
which Smith outlines in LRBL ; five parts centring on part III. Arguably part 
VI also fits into the schema, as it can be read as a summation o f  the 
conclusions drawn in parts I to V. This can only be left as conjecture here.
This is more than merely an exercise in pattern-recognition. If  Smith 
followed his principles for the presentation o f scientific theory, in this 
regard, it is not unreasonable to look for evidence that he followed them 
generally, in which case, we should find that he begins each part, and each 
logical subcomponent o f a part with a statement the proposition he intends 
to prove, followed by argument for that proposition. We should also find he 
differentiates between descriptions o f events and states o f  affairs which 
illustrate the points made; and descriptions intended to generate in the reader 
emotional responses o f the kind he regards as foundational.102 This would
101 Smith refers to such cases in part I, but does not analyse them.
102 The difference between these two uses o f examples being that Smith 
would be intent in the first cases, on describing a situation to demonstrate 
that certain concepts apply; and in the second on showing that certain 
responses occur spontaneously. Both cases rely ultimately on spontaneous 
emotional reactions, but concept-formation entails the use o f  reason to 
compare and contrast reactions and so form generalisations, which are then 
used to formulate predictions -  hypothetical conditionals o f  the form ‘if  x 
then y ’. Logically the ordering relation is ‘more complex than’. ‘To do x is
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constitute a very strong case against a normative interpretation o f the Moral 
Sentiments, not to mention gloss Sm ith’s choice o f subtitle for the book.
This brief outline o f the content and structure o f the M oral Sentiments 
indicates that there is justification for reading the M oral Sentiments as a 
scientific theory o f morality, which is presented in hypothetico-deductive 
form, and in which elements o f New ton’s theory have been transposed from 
the gravitational to the social.
This is an important conclusion. It provides good reason for confining 
the question o f the normative content o f the M oral Sentiments to the 
subtextual; and it provides a general philosophical context for Sm ith’s 
comments on individual and societal development. Furthermore, regarding 
the M oral Sentiments to be the result o f Smith’s application o f an empirical 
epistemology to the moral domain, gives Smith’s corpus an overall 
coherence. His thoughts on language, economics, history and jurisprudence 
all yield to the same kind o f epistemic interpretation and show Sm ith’s work 
to be stunning in scope and intellectually appealing in its rigour and 
consistency.
For present purposes, however, the fact that the M oral Sentiments can be 
interpreted within a specific empiricist account o f understanding provides a 
foundation for the suggestion that the later eighteenth-century moralists
1 fttworked with the idea that morality is both learnable and ‘scrutable’; and 
because moral development is observable and founded in experience, an 
individual’s moral development can be guided and refined by controlling the 
kinds o f  experiences to which he is exposed.
The fact that an individual’s moral development is ‘accessible’ to, and 
dependent on, spectators also provides a means by which the mores o f a 
society generally may be changed.
wrong’ is construed as ‘when I have done x in the past, I have gained 
disapproval; so doing x causes disapproval; therefore, if I do x now, I shall 
gain disapproval’. This together with an analysis o f disapproval in terms o f 
lack o f  sympathy as necessary and sufficient for avoiding doing x, yields the 
requisite moral generalisation.
103 To borrow Donald Davidson’s happy phrase.
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5 The psychology of morality: moral change and Sm ith’s moral 
stadialism
For Smith, a sense o f duty comprises a regard for the general rules o f 
morality (II 1.5.1). These rules are inductive generalisations drawn from 
sympathetic spectatorial experiences, and once identified, may then be used 
to predict and prescribe, both for others and for oneself, the conduct 
appropriate for certain familiar circumstances (III.4.8).
The capacity for fellow feeling, which lies at the root o f Smith’s 
understanding of the sympathetic relation, is inherent. It follows from 
Sm ith’s definition o f propriety, that the capacity for moral approbation and 
disapprobation is also inherent.104 Given this, what is learned from 
experience are the appropriate responses to certain circumstances; more 
accurately, given that Smith holds that a certain basic moral rectitude is 
inherent and uniform (V.2.1), experience teaches the approved manner o f 
responding, or the approved modulation o f response, to certain 
circumstances. This varies not only across societies and nations (V.2.7, 8), 
but also within a society in accordance with the kind o f interaction between 
the members o f a group.105
In effect, Smith regards the general rules o f morality to be the set o f 
social habits for any given group. The notion o f habitual mental processes 
played a central role in eighteenth-century epistemology. Hum e’s 
explanation o f the source o f certainty in causal explanation is that it consists 
in a ‘habit o f the m ind’ resulting from the constant conjunction o f cause and
104 V.2.1, see also III.3.3.
105 V.2.4, cf. Hume: ‘A soldier and a priest are different characters in all 
nations, and all ages; and this difference is founded on circumstances whose 
operation is eternal and unalterable’ ( ‘O f National Characters’, p. 198; not 
that Hume liked priests see fn. 3). Smith makes the same point: ‘We cannot 
expect the same sensibility to the gay pleasures and amusements o f  life in a 
clergyman, which we lay our account with in an officer. The man whose 
peculiar occupation it is to keep the world in mind o f that awful futurity 
which awaits them, who is to announce what may be the fatal consequences 
o f every deviation from the rules o f duty, and who is him self to set the 
example o f the most exact conformity, seems to be the messenger o f tidings, 
which cannot, in propriety be delivered either with levity or indifference. 
His mind is supposed to be continually occupied with what is too grand and 
solemn, to leave any room for the impressions o f those frivolous objects, 
which fill up the attention o f the dissipated and the gay’ (V.2.5).
177
effect; the mind is ‘determined by custom to pass from any cause to its 
effect ... upon the appearance o f the one, ‘tis almost impossible for it not to 
form an idea o f the other’ (Treatise, I.ii.10, p, 179). Smith adopts the same 
kind o f explanation: ‘when two objects have frequently been seen together, 
the imagination acquires a habit o f passing easily from one to the other’.106
In addition to forging mental links between phenomena, Smith regards 
repetition o f experience to alter one’s disposition: ‘custom and the frequent 
repetition o f any object comes at last to form and bend the mind or organ to 
that habitual mood and disposition which fits them, to receive its impression, 
without undergoing any violent change’ (HA 1.10, p. 37). Bearing in mind 
that Smith believed that the moral sentiments cannot be erased from a 
person’s make-up (V.2.1), it follows from this, that although repeated 
exposure to certain social states o f affairs cannot eradicate the possibility o f 
a sympathetic response, it will modulate that response. Smith also states 
that experience which ‘concides with the natural principles o f right and 
w rong’, will reinforce that sympathetic response, and lead to the 
development o f heightened sensibility (V.2.2).
The idea that the general rules o f morality describe what are effectively a 
set o f social habits, gives morality the kind o f flexibility that Smith needs 
for his account to be plausible. For his empiricism to work, he has to 
assume a uniformity o f nature across mankind -  the differences between 
societal norms becoming completely determinable by reference to 
differences between asocial factors affecting members o f each society. 
‘Society’ is to be understood in the broadest sense -  in order to cover a 
discussion o f the codes o f conduct o f nations and historical periods; as well 
as discussion o f the codes o f conduct for such groups within any given 
society as are created by professions or trades, and familial and more 
informal social sets.
106 V.1.2. Smith uses ‘object’ to refer both to external objects and to mental 
events and states: ‘internal [objects] ... pass within the mind itself and are the 
object o f none o f our senses. The causes o f these internail facts, or objects 
are ... either internal! or externall. The internail ones are such dispositions o f 
the minds as fit one for that certain passion or affection o f  the mind and the 
externall are such objects as produce these effects on a mind so disposed’ 
{LRBL, i.l 62).
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Smith’s theory might appear to engender a form o f moral relativism; that 
is, it might seem to be a theory according to which there are no hard social 
facts: societal norms are no more than the codes o f conduct approved o f and 
upheld by the majority o f people in any given social grouping. However, a 
thoroughgoing moral relativism bars any comparison between societies. If 
what is moral is simply what is approved o f  within any society, then 
differences between societies may be described, and perhaps explained, but 
neither condoned nor condemned -  judgem ents o f approval or disapproval 
o f  the moral conduct o f a social group may only be made relative to the 
norms and practices o f the society which the group comprises or to which it 
belongs.107
Although Smith rarely condemns the practices o f other societies,108 he 
works with an implicit notion o f ‘moral progress’. Civilised, polished 
societies are an improvement on the societies o f  the barbaric and savage 
(V.2.10); they are morally more developed than the savage and barbaric 
(V .2.11). Given the ways in which Smith considers moral developments to
107 The question whether Smith’s theory engenders moral relativism is 
addressed by Dwyer -  and dismissed by a comment which reveals his failure 
to grasp the import o f the assumption, found throughout Scottish 
Enlightenment writing, that the nature o f mankind is uniform across nations 
and through ages. Dwyer comments: ‘Adam Sm ith’s treatment o f the ways 
in which the social group defined propriety without recourse to some eternal 
standard might seem to make him a moral relativist. But although he did 
believe that the circumstances o f social groups differed and could be affected 
by historical circumstances and customs, he thought that the basic features o f 
sympathy and morality are remarkably uniform ’ (Age o f  Passions, p. 38). 
This is inaccurate: Smith assumed the propensity for sympathy to be uniform, 
and, certain moral values to hold uniformly. Given the equation o f propriety 
with the existence o f a sympathy relation between agent and spectator, the 
uniformity of fundamental moral judgem ents becomes inevitable.
108 In concluding his explanation o f the influence o f  custom (part V), Smith 
writes: ‘In general, the style o f manners which takes place in any nation, may 
commonly upon the whole be said to be that which is most suitable to its 
situation. Hardiness is the character most suitable to the circumstances o f a 
savage; sensibility to those o f one who lives in a very civilized society. Even 
here, therefore, we cannot complain that the moral sentiments o f  men are 
very grossly perverted’ (V.2.13). Reading Dwyer, however, one is left with 
the impression that Smith is highly critical o f alternative societies (Age o f  
Passions, pp. 38-9). However Dwyer appears to have mistaken Sm ith’s 
comments on religious fanaticism as general criticism o f  alternative codes o f 
conduct.
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occur -  the kinds o f catalysts which provoke improvement in the codes o f 
conduct for any given society -  it follows that members o f the less 
developed societies have to be regarded as literally being unable to conceive 
o f ways in which to better conduct until the conditions which spawn such 
improvements prevail, because concept-formation is dependent on 
experience. Smith’s comments entail the belief that he is well placed to 
comment on the moral development o f societies; and hence entail the belief 
that Smith’s perspective (and that o f his readers) is that from the most 
developed societal norms.
For Smith, the epitome of moral development is exemplified by an 
individual who excels in both the amiable and the awful virtues (III.3.35); 
that is, someone ‘whose sympathetic heart seems to re-echo all the 
sentiments o f those with whom he converses, who grieves for their 
calamities, who resents their injuries, and who rejoices at their good fortune’ 
(I.i.5.2), while exercising over his own passions ‘that degree o f self- 
command which astonishes by its amazing superiority over the most 
ungovernable passions o f human nature’ (I.i.5.6). Both kinds o f virtue 
demand practice (III.3.36, II1.3.42). However, according to Smith, there are 
certain societal conditions which inhibit the development o f one or the other 
aspect o f m an’s moral character. For example, the lifestyle o f the ‘savage’ 
as a matter o f course exposes him to ‘continual danger’ and to ‘the greatest 
extremities o f hunger’. In short, savages are habitually inured to ‘every sort 
o f distress’ (V.2 9). Since it is not possible to generate fellow feeling for 
others unless we are ourselves at ease, members o f savage communities 
cannot expect sympathy from their fellows; consequently they underrate the 
amiable virtues; consider it to be a sign o f weakness to display distress; and 
therefore extol self-command (V .2.8-10). The demands o f day-to-day life 
are physically less demanding in more civilised societies and their members 
are more inclined to sympathy as a result. But, on Sm ith’s analysis, these 
less aggressive conditions are not such as to engender self-command: ‘the 
man o f the most exquisite humanity is naturally the most capable o f 
acquiring the highest degree o f self-command. He may not, however, 
always have acquired it; and it very frequently happens that he has not’
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(III.3.36), because ‘In the mild sunshine o f undisturbed tranquillity, in the 
calm retirement o f undissipated and philosophical leisure ... the greatest and 
noblest exertions of self-command have little exercise’ (III.3.37).
The fact that savage society fails to allow the development o f humanity, 
while civilised society fails to encourage the development o f self-command 
threatens to undermine Smith’s tacit assumption that the latter is the more 
morally developed. But it appears, there is an intrinsic difference between 
the lack o f kinds o f virtues in each kind o f society. In the savage society, 
conditions are such that it is not possible to develop the amiable virtues; 
while in the civilised society, while the conditions do not encourage the 
development o f self-command, they do not render its development 
impossible, for several reasons. First, exposure to the dangerous conditions 
savage deals with as a matter o f course is not eradicated entirely from 
civilised society. The onus merely devolves onto a specific segment o f 
society -  namely the armed forces, whom Smith describes as being expected 
to display the same kind o f fortitude in the face o f danger as the savage.109 
Second, Smith regards the development o f a degree o f self-command to be 
part and parcel o f the human condition: a child begins the practice at a very 
early stage in his development, namely, as soon as he is old enough to mix 
with his peers (III.3.22). Third, the concept o f self-command is not only 
possible in all societies but fundamental to societal existence; by contrast the 
concept o f humanity can only evolve once a society has achieved a level o f 
stability (V.2.9). Virtuous conduct is what exceeds the societal norm. If, as 
in the savage society, there is no such norm for humanity, the concept o f 
amiable virtues is empty.
The demands o f a group’s lifestyle, therefore, can provide barriers to the 
development o f certain societal norms. This accords with Smith’s 
stadialism, and enables him to draw broad conclusions about the kinds o f 
social norms to be expected at certain stages o f social development. But this
109 III.3.37. The devolution o f a citizen’s responsibility for self-preservation 
to a standing army is one o f the marks o f civilisation. Cf. Hume: ‘The force 
which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly 
political and derived from authority, the effect o f an established government’ 
( ‘O f the Original Contract’ (1742), in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary , 
pp. 465-87, p. 468).
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kind o f analysis will not explain the moral differences between societies (or 
nations) at the same level o f development, or indeed those between groups, 
ranks, or factions within a given society.110
6 Custom and Corruption
According to Scottish Enlightenment thought, it is in the nature o f social 
mores to change. The engine for this kind o f societal change is an inherent 
aspect o f m an’s make up -  what is referred to as ‘self-interest’, ‘selfishness’ 
or ‘self love’. During the eighteenth century, these terms did not carry the 
pejorative connotation o f current use. The terms were used instead to 
denote a species-driven propensity in man to preserve him self and his 
offspring, a propensity referred to explicitly by Smith in this regard:
|
i
| Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his
; own care, and as he is fitter to take care o f him self than o f  any other person,
| it is right and fit that it should be so. (II.ii.2.1)
i Nature, for the wisest purposes, has rendered, in most men, perhaps in all
j  men, parental tenderness a much stronger affection than filial piety. The
| continuance and propagation o f the species depend altogether upon the
| former, and not upon the latter. (111.3.13)
i
| According to Smith, ‘bettering our condition’ is ‘the great purpose o f
human life’ (I.ii.2.1).111
Eighteenth-century Scottish thinkers regarded self-love as requiring 
moderation or control, but not eradication. Indeed, the sole function o f
110 It is here that Smith reveals his hopes and fears for eighteenth-century 
Scottish society -  it would be interesting to compare his remarks in the 5th 
edition with those o f the additions for the 6th edition.
111 It is possible that population increase was taken as a criterion o f  social 
progress. Hume’s essay ‘O f the Populousness o f Ancient N ations’ (1754) 
directly addresses and refutes M ontesquieu’s claim in The Persian Letters 
that ‘there are on the earth hardly one-fiftieth part o f the people there were in 
ancient tim es’ (Letter 112; this appears as Letter 113 in revised editions after 
1758, and revisions include a partial retraction o f M ontesquieu’s claim -  
‘one-fiftieth’ is reduced to ‘one-tenth’) (Hume, ‘O f the Populousness o f 
Ancient Nations’ in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, pp. 377—464; pp. 
380ff; Montesquieu, The Persian Letters, p. 252. M ontesquieu’s argument 
spans Letters 113-33)). It is also possible that Hume regarded a decrease in 
population to be a indication o f a corrupt society -  for example, veneral 
disease is referred to as the ‘new plague’ and Hume believes it had as 
devastating effect on the population as ‘the three great scourges o f mankind, 
war, pestilence, and famine’ (Hume, ibid., pp. 380-1).
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Smith’s impartial spectator is to govern or rein in self-interest (II.ii.2.2). 
However, a degree o f self-interest is healthy and, on occasion, laudable
(II.ii.2.1); and there are circumstances in which failing to act in one’s own 
interest is contemptible; Smith’s examples include failure to demonstrate a 
degree o f self-respect in the face o f insult (I.ii.3; II.ii.2.2); a private 
gentleman’s failure to pursue an estate or office {vide Harley); an M P’s 
indifference towards his election; and a merchant’s indifference towards his 
business (III.6.7). In short, ‘self-interest’ did not have the aggressive 
grasping connotation it has now. Bryson, in the course o f an astute 
characterisation o f the general Scottish Enlightenment approach to the study 
o f man, deftly explicates the eighteenth-century concept as ‘the belief that it 
was natural for man to make an order o f life different from that in which the 
| race was nurtured earlier, that it was in the nature o f his equipment that it
| should react intelligently and creatively to the situations in which he found
himself, however new and different and difficult they might be’.112 
| However, in the Moral Sentiments, the relation between self-interest,
| impartial spectatorship and societal change threatens to create an impasse.
[
| If social mores change as a result o f man acting in his own self-interest, but
j  self-interested conduct is under the jurisdiction o f the guardian o f social
112 Gladys Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry o f  the Eighteenth 
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 173-4). Bryson’s 
characterisation o f eighteenth-century thinkers’ understanding o f the nature 
o f man precises that o f Hume: ‘[Man is] a creature, whose thoughts are not 
limited by any narrow bounds, either o f place or time; who carries researches 
into the most distant regions o f this globe, and beyond this globe, to the 
planets and heavenly bodies; looks backward to consider the first origin, at 
least, the history o f the human race; casts his eye forwards to see the 
influence o f his actions upon posterity, and the judgm ents which will be 
formed o f his character a thousand years hence; a creature who traces causes 
and effects to a great length and intricacy; extracts general principles from 
particular appearances; improves upon his discoveries; corrects his mistakes; 
and makes his very errors profitable’ (‘O f the Dignity or M eanness o f 
Human Nature’, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, pp. 80-6; p. 82). 
Simpson relies more overtly on Hume for a statement o f the ‘definitive 
formulation o f the thinking characteristic o f the Scottish Enlightenment’, 
quoting from Hume’s Essays Literary, Moral and Political: ‘industry, 
knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an indissoluble chain, and 
are found from experience as well as reason, to be peculiar to the more 
polished, and, what are commonly denominated, the more luxurious ages’ 
(quoted in his The Protean Scot, p. 72).
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mores, then, prima facie, it appears, there is no opportunity for any kind o f 
innovation -  or at least no opportunity for any kind o f predictable, hence 
causally explicable, innovation. In other words, considering man as 
regulating his behaviour in a manner satisfactory to an impartial spectator, 
appears to annul the possibility o f all but accidental social change. Smith 
avoids this deadlock by relying on what is effectively a stipulation o f  the 
end or purpose o f human life: being aware o f ‘being beloved’ (III.5.1), 
where ‘to be beloved’ is, ‘[t]o be observed, to be attended to, to be taken 
notice o f with sympathy, complacency and approbation’ (I.ii.2.1).113 This 
definition leaves room for the idea that social mores might and do change, 
when a deviation from the norm is recognised, generally, as promoting this 
end more efficiently for each member o f society. Smith relies on the 
assumption that man is naturally endowed with the capacity to recognise and 
adopt changes in conduct which will enhance the quality o f life: ‘the love 
and admiration which we naturally conceive for those whose character and 
conduct we approve o f necessarily disposes us to desire to become ourselves 
the object of the like agreeable sentiments’ (III.2.2). Since such changes 
(necessarily) appeal to all, they (necessarily) receive the blessings o f the 
impartial spectator.
This position will not yet accommodate the kinds o f change in moral 
conventions and social values for which there is evidence from observation 
and from historical accounts.114 Reliance on a natural ability to judge 
whether novel conduct is meritorious allows only for society to become 
increasingly more virtuous, while, to be plausible, Smith needs an account 
which will accommodate change which is morally neither more nor less an 
improvement on the status quo; or, more pertinently, morally a change for 
the worse, given the downfall o f the Roman Empire, for example. Smith 
therefore has to be able to answer the question ‘How can a society become 
corrupt?’
] 13 Dwyer points out that even in an economic context, Sm ith’s use o f 
‘bettering one’s condition’ is essentially non-aggressive (The Age o f  Passions, 
p. 36).
14 For example, Smith refers to the ‘Luzury [sic] o f the Romans and their 
depraved morals’, and to Greek sedition’ as described by Thucydides {LRBL, 
ii.59).
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Smith refers to two kinds o f corrosive influence: faction and fanaticism; 
and custom and fashion:
Faction and fanaticism have always been the greatest corruptors o f moral 
sentiments. (III.3.43)
[Custom and fashion] are the chief causes o f the many irregular and 
discordant opinions which prevail in different ages and nations concerning 
what is blameable or praiseworthy. (V. 1.1)
Smith describes the distorting effect o f faction and fanaticism on a society’s 
moral code in the same way. In each case, the affected group loses 
impartiality; attitudes towards any from the opposing camp are essentially 
partisan.115 However, neither o f these kinds o f cases can function in an 
explanation o f the kind o f predictable deterioration Smith needs for his 
account o f societal development. For this, he needs to consider phenomena 
which yield to a causal analysis. That is, Smith needs to be able to explain 
the causal aetiology o f moral deterioration on a society-wide scale. This 
explanation is provided by his analysis o f custom and fashion.
This interpretation o f the intention behind Sm ith’s discussion o f  custom 
and fashion is diametrically opposed to the interpretation given by Dwyer 
who takes Smith’s remarks on religion to have more weight than is given 
here, to the extent o f dismissing Sm ith’s discussion o f  custom and 
fashion.116 In keeping with his reading o f the M oral Sentiments as an 
economist’s critique o f contemporary Scotland, Dwyer understands Smith’s 
comments on the corrosive effects o f religious fanaticism to relate to his 
views on the contemporary battle for precedence within the Church o f
115 In a discussion o f the distorting effects o f religion, Smith refers to the 
damage being the outcome o f religion claiming the authority to dictate the 
rules o f duty (III.6.12), which if taken together with Sm ith’s comments in 
part III, ch. 3, indicate the relation between the concept o f impartial spectator 
and the rules o f duty. Presumably Smith regards religious fanaticism to be 
the greater o f the two evils because, although war induces an inability to 
judge members o f the opposing faction with any degree o f  sympathy -  to 
refuse to acknowledge a shared humanity -  its effects are not all lacking in 
virtue: it promotes the development o f self-command in those who are 
fighting for example (III.3.37). By contrast, religious fanaticism appears to 
Smith to have nothing whatsoever to recommend it. Arguably, Scott 
explores the differences between fanaticism/faction and patriotism, 
sentimentally construed, in Old Mortality.
116 Dwyer, The Age o f  Passions, pp. 47f.
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117Scotland between the Moderates and the High Flyers. This reading places 
Smith firmly on the side o f the Moderates, and the M oral Sentiments then 
becomes Moderate proselytising -  which flies in the face o f  the claim that 
Smith was attempting to produce an objective account o f the nature o f man 
and society.
According to Dwyer, the M oral Sentiments propounds a social ethics 
‘well tailored to a society organized in terms o f independent proprietors and 
capitalist production’. In partial justification o f this remark Dwyer states: 
‘[Smith] paid relatively little attention ... to the role o f  custom and fashion 
in the creation o f social values’.118 This is an odd conclusion to draw, given 
that Smith devoted an entire part o f The M oral Sentiments (part V), to the 
discussion o f the influence o f custom and fashion on social mores. O ne’s 
confidence in Dwyer’s reading dwindles in the light o f the quotation from 
the M oral Sentiments with which he chose to justify his preferred reading. 
Dwyer would have us believe that Smith wrote, o f custom and fashion: ‘All 
these effects o f custom and fashion upon the moral sentiments o f mankind 
are inconsiderable’ but what Smith actually wrote was:
All these effects o f custom and fashion, however, upon the moral sentiments 
o f mankind, are inconsiderable, in comparison o f those which they give 
occasion to in some other cases; and it is not concerning the general style o f 
character and behaviour, that those principles produce the greatest 
perversion o f judgment, but concerning the propriety or impropriety o f 
particular usages. (V .2.12)
So, contrary to the conclusion invited by Dwyer’s doctored quotation, Smith 
is not here dismissing the idea that custom and fashion affect social mores; 
he is stating that custom and fashion give rise in some instances to gross 
perversions o f judgement -  his example being the A thenians’ practice o f 
infanticide (V .2.15). His point is that while custom and fashion can affect 
(and corrupt) a society’s moral code, they cannot in general go so far as to 
alter m an’s fundamental understanding o f right and wrong; although in 
particular instances they are capable o f shocking ‘the plainest principles o f 
right and wrong’ (V .2 .14) -  Smith gives as example the Athenians practice
117 Ibid., pp. 38-9.
118 Ibid. p. 47.
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o f infanticide long after their circumstances provided anything verging on a 
justification for this kind o f practice, simply because it had become 
custom ary.1,9 Infanticide breaches what Smith has earlier described as the 
foundational sacred law, namely that protecting ‘life and person’ (II.ii.2.2). 
Such a practice cannot become condoned generally -  cannot be considered a 
part o f potentially universalisable trend -  because it is antithetical to the 
concept o f society (V .2.16; c f II.ii.3.3). Somewhat ironically, Dwyer has 
chosen to quote from a context in which Smith both acknowledges that 
custom and fashion affect social mores, and relies on the properties o f 
inductive generalisation to dismiss (only) those customs which cannot be 
considered relevant to his theory because by definition they are too 
fundamentally idiosyncratic to count as evidence contributing to a general 
account o f mankind.120
Smith’s discussion o f custom and, especially, fashion, works the 
impartial spectator very hard indeed. In fact, it threatens to spell disaster for 
Sm ith’s attempt to construct a philosophically consistent moral empiricism. 
Since his compatriots seemed not to object to his theory on this score, the 
question whether the internal consistency o f the M oral Sentiments can be 
salvaged, may be left unexplored, here. However, the threat posed by the 
fashion issue, has interesting, highly relevant repercussions.
From Smith’s discussion o f custom and fashion (part V), there appears to 
be no bars as to what may become customary or fashionable, because 
custom, by linking together two objects or ideas, creates propriety. 
Customary connections are powerful -  even to the extent o f rendering
119 V .2 .15. This was apparently treated as a test case for a moral theory.
Athenian practice o f infanticide is also discussed by Hume, for example. Its 
problematic nature stems from the fact that the practice continued long after 
Athenian society became civilised. The issue became that o f  explaining how 
such a barbaric custom could be sustained within a morally civilised people, 
given that it contravened a basic moral principle.
20 Dw yer’s Age o f  Passions is rife with evidence o f shoddy scholarship: 
inaccurate citations; typographic errors; and in the opening pages, a glaring 
mistake in the form o f a reference to the final paragraph o f  the M oral
Sentiments followed by a quotation from the first paragraph. However,
Dwyer is most culpable in regard to his misuse o f  textual quotation: 
repeatedly he fails to honour the context-sensitivity o f Sm ith’s comments, 
and the worst case is this partial quotation from a discussion which gives the 
lie to the claim for which Dwyer intended the quote as justification.
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acceptable, or at least diminishing disapproval of, ‘improper’ conjunctions 
(V.1.2). Smith’s thought seems to be that what is customary creates 
propriety (i.e. approval founded in a familiar conjunction which is not found 
universally) because it appears to display the same kind o f sustained 
conjunction between two objects or ideas, as those constant conjunctions 
which do occur naturally, or as that which is ‘naturally’ causal.121 What is 
customary apes natural conjunctions to such an extent that it can appear to 
sanction ‘a violation o f hum anity’, although, as discussed above, Smith 
regards such harmful customs as aberrations on the grounds that a general 
acceptance o f inhumanity within any given society would destroy that 
society (V .2.16).
‘Custom’ refers to a society’s practices which have become habitual 
through some idiosyncrasy o f its members. ‘Fashion’ has a more restricted 
application. Smith describes it as ‘a particular species o f  custom ’ (V.1.3), 
although his account of how and why the fashionable has influence, 
suggests that while fashion resembles custom in creating propriety, the 
relation between custom and fashion is more akin to that o f host and parasite 
than that between genus and species. Fashions can be significantly more 
ephemeral than customs, which, because habitual associations, are by 
definition o f long duration. Fashions are also more prone to being 
wrongheaded than custom, and so more likely to be morally corrosive.
Although Smith nowhere explicitly describes the origin o f fashion and 
the source o f its influence, his thinking on both can be gleaned from his 
comments on ambition and wealth. Admittedly these comments appear to 
fuel arguments for a prescriptive interpretation o f Sm ith’s intended import 
o f the book.122 Certainly Smith’s remarks on avarice and wealth indicate an 
anxiety about the effect on morality of contemporary economic 
developments, but taking this anxiety seriously does not entail the
1 91 HA 11.11; see above, pp. 163-5. Although it seems that the propriety is 
most evident by its absence.
1 99 For example Dwyer, Age o f  Passions, esp. ch. 2, o f  which Dwyer writes: 
‘Its underlying assumption is that Smith’s work cannot be fully understood in 
terms o f  its supposed scientific or abstract philosophical character but needs 
to be related to a specific environment and a particular social constituency’ 
(p. 35).
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conclusion that Smith intended the M oral Sentiments to be read as a 
handbook of morality; nor does it undermine the claim that his intention was 
to give an objective and scientific empiricist account o f morality. The fact 
that his thoughts on ambition and wealth have to be constructed from 
comments scattered throughout the book, suggest that they were used either 
as illustration for his discussion or to demonstrate the adequacy -  the 
explanatory scope -  o f his theory. Furthermore, the idea that his comments 
on wealth, if illustrative, are incidental to the main purpose o f  the book, 
invites the suggestion that rather than drawing attention to those aspects o f 
contemporary society which he believed should be eradicated -  a suggestion 
which is concomitant with the normative reading o f the M oral Sentiments -  
Sm ith’s intention was to choose issues which at the time were generally held 
to be cause for concern in order to display the plausibility o f his theory.
Regardless o f whether Smith is understood to have been putting forward 
his own ideas on corruption within eighteenth-century Scottish society, or 
drawing on received opinion on this matter, his remarks on ambition and 
avarice do indicate where he laid the blame for societal corruption, and, as a 
corollary, in whom he placed the responsibility for a society’s moral health: 
moral corrosion begins in the uppermost rank o f society, the rank which 
ought to set the standard o f conduct for society; and the saviours o f a 
society’s moral standards, in lieu o f the men o f rank, come from the ‘inferior 
rank’; in eighteenth-century Scotland, the men o f rank were the aristocracy 
and landowners; while the ‘inferior rank’ included those like Dundas and 
Mackenzie who could aspire to the upper echelons o f government 
administration.
1231.ii.2.5. It would appear that Smith considered mid-eighteenth-century 
Scottish society to comprise three strata: men o f rank (aristocracy and 
landowners); inferior ranks (including those who received university 
education); and ‘the m ob’. Smith’s discussion o f wealth, in the M oral 
Sentiments, leads one to conclude that, mid-century, the social placement o f 
(successful) merchants was highly problematic -  that Smith regarded them as 
essentially (and so, morally) belonging to the mob but economically part o f 
the upper echelons o f society. I have referred explicitly to the mid­
eighteenth century, as the structure o f Scottish society changed during the 30 
years after the publication o f the 2nd (revised) edition o f the M oral 
Sentiments, and this, together with factors affecting the internal political 
relations between Scotland and England, altered the tenor o f issues
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7 Sm ith’s analysis of social corrosion
Sm ith’s explanation of the way fashion ‘works’ -  the way the preferences o f 
the minority comprising the highest rank in a society influence the cultural 
and moral values of society as a whole, is misleadingly simple. Trends set 
by ‘men o f rank and distinction’ are ‘connected in our imaginations with the 
idea o f  something that is genteel and magnificent’ (V.1.3). By dint o f this 
connection, the substance o f the trends is regarded as itself possessing 
gentility and magnificence (ibid.). However, these admirable qualities 
pertain to a trend only as long as it is upheld by members o f the highest rank 
(ibid.). When that association breaks, the qualitative association also breaks. 
Smith merely indicates the extent o f this rank’s influence in the course o f 
describing the change in the perception (and reception) o f  any given trend 
once it no longer informs the codes o f the highest rank. As soon as a 
preference is dropped by men o f rank, Smith states that it not only loses its 
connotation o f grace and gentility -  which loss would render it once again 
culturally neutral; but it acquires the ‘meanness and awkwardness’ 
associated by our imaginations with ‘the m ob’ (V.1.3; I.iii.2.1). That is, 
trends set by the few men of rank influence, and are adopted by society as a 
whole.
In some spheres -  matters o f taste, for example -  the influence over a 
society by those with the highest social profile seems unlimited (V.2.1). By 
contrast, their effect on the moral codes o f a society is constrained by m an’s 
natural sense o f  right and wrong. Trends which accord with these moral 
principles enhance a society’s sense o f propriety -  increasing sensibility; but 
those which run counter to such principles will warp a society’s notions o f 
vice and virtue -  deadening a society’s response generally to vice, and so 
lowering its moral standards (ibid.). Nevertheless it appears that fashion can 
turn the notion o f morally approved conduct on its head, albeit only 
temporarily; the prevailing codes o f conduct during the reign o f Charles II
preoccupying the literati (see above, pp. 104-8) -  a fact which is reflected in 
the substantial revisions made for the 6th edition (1790) and, particularly, the 
additional part (VI). Tellingly, the text for the 5th edition (1781) differs only 
minimally from that o f the 2nd edition (1761).
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provide Smith with a case in point. At that time, ‘a degree o f 
licentiousness ... was connected ... with generosity, sincerity, magnanimity 
[i.e. self command], loyalty, and proved the person who acted in this manner 
was a gentleman’; meanwhile any behaviour or practice associated with 
Puritanism -  for example, severity o f  manner and regularity o f conduct -  
left the perpetrator open to accusations o f  ;cant, cunning, hypocrisy and low
, 124manners .
Fashion, then, trades on a temporally prior association between rank and 
gentility and other similarly laudable qualities. This prior connection must 
itself be a product o f custom, given the connection does not hold necessarily. 
According to Smith’s account, the association between rank and all that is 
good and worth striving after is strong: ‘Even when the order o f  society 
seems to require that we should oppose [the inclinations o f our superiors], 
we can hardly bring ourselves to do it ... even when the people have been 
brought to [punish or depose their superiors], they ... easily relapse into 
their habitual state o f deference to those whom they have been accustomed 
to look upon as their natural superiors’ (I.iii.2.3). In fine, deference to one’s 
superiors is so ingrained a habit as to seem natural -  it is literally ‘second 
nature’.125
Smith traces the origin o f  deference to one’s social superiors to m an’s 
natural proclivity to better his condition, which he understands as a 
proclivity on the part o f each man, to increase his happiness. The 
explanation o f this is somewhat convoluted. According to Smith, the man 
o f rank in any given society, appears to his social inferiors to have attained
124 V .2.3. Attitudes towards Puritanism were still disdainful during the 
eighteenth century. In Smollett’s, Humphry Clinker (1771), Matthew 
Bramble is described as ‘ashamed of  his name Matthew, because it is 
puritanical’ {The Expedition o f  Humphry Clinker, ed. Lewis M. Knapp 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 191).
125 Sm ith’s views on the extent to which deference becomes ingrained are 
similar to those o f Hume: ‘Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar, that 
most men never make any enquiry about its origins or cause’ (Hume, ‘O f the 
Original Contract’ (1742), p. 470). Later in the M oral Sentiments Smith 
concludes: ‘Few men ... are willing to allow, that custom or fashion have 
much influence upon their judgments concerning what is beautiful or 
otherwise, in [the arts]; but imagine, that all the rules, which they think ought 
to be observed in each o f them, are founded upon reason and nature, not 
upon habit and prejudice’ (V. 1.4).
perfect happiness (I.iii.2.2). By dint o f his position alone, he commands not 
only the attention o f those beneath him, but their sympathy (I.iii.2.1). This 
is because he appears to have pursued with success what Smith describes as 
‘the impossible and absurd project o f gaining the good will and approbation 
o f every body’, a project to which all men are naturally drawn as a result o f 
their inherent desire to please: ‘the chief part o f happiness’ according to 
Smith’s account o f sympathy ‘arises from the consciousness o f  being 
beloved’ (I.ii.5.1), and as mentioned earlier (p. 184), one is beloved when in 
sympathy with -  or pleasing -  one’s fellow men.
The man of rank, of course, has not attained perfect happiness for reasons 
delineated in Smith’s appraisal o f his situation (I.iii.2.1). Smith argues that 
society at large is deluded into the bel ief that he has, because they fail to go 
beyond appearances. The sympathetic response to a man o f rank is the 
result o f failing to comprehend what it would be like to experience that 
situation, and o f responding instead to the trappings o f rank and wealth
(I.iii.2.2).126
In effect, the approval and admiration o f the majority o f society for their 
superiors is based on an inaccurate notion of what it would be to experience 
superior status. Hence they fail to judge that rank impartially. As already 
mentioned above, Smith regarded the judgement o f a partial and indulgent 
spectator to result in the corruption o f moral sentiments (pp. 148, 158-61). 
Smith evidently believes that impartiality on the part o f  a spectator is 
possible when there is temporal distance between the spectator and the 
society under judgement: his examples of corruption engendered by 
indulgent spectatorship on the part o f the hoi polloi are all drawn from 
history: the prevailing mores during the reign o f Charles II (V.2.3) or Louis 
XIV (III.2.5); and Plutarch’s account o f the sympathetic reception by the 
crowd o f the Macedonian king after his defeat by Rome (I.iii.2.6).
126 Actually, although the members o f the higher ranks in society are the 
focus o f attention for the majority o f the remainder, for whom they are 
objects o f sympathy, the actual relation between the strata is something other 
than a sympathy relation, as according to Smith, the upper ranks interact 
socially (and so presumably sympathetically) only within their own stratum
(I.iii.2.5).
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It is possible to reconstruct Sm ith’s train o f thought concerning how the 
rich and powerful have carte blanche to set moral trends for a society. Such 
men command a high profile, socially, as a result o f vaunting their wealth. 
The rest o f society are attracted by displays o f wealth and consequently 
direct their sympathy towards the wealthy. Since what is socially acceptable 
is by definition what gains the approval o f the average spectator, wealth 
becomes emblematic o f propriety. However, since virtue consists in 
exceeding the approved norm (I.i.5.9), and members o f the highest order o f 
a society are by definition also in the wealthiest bracket, wealth becomes 
emblematic not merely of propriety but of virtue; those who are wealthy are 
thereby deemed also virtuous; and thereby provide the standards for moral 
excellence -  standards which people strive to emulate. In short, wealth 
appears to bestow the moral high ground on those who possess it; so the 
conduct o f this economic bracket o f society is allowed to define the moral 
norm for society as a whole. This it seems, is what prompted Smith to such 
comments as:
[A palace] may serve to promote luxury and set the example o f the 
dissolution o f manners, (l.ii.3.4)
It is from our disposition to admire and consequently to imitate, the rich and 
the great, that they are enabled to set. or to lead, what is called the 
fashion ... even their views and follies are fashionable, and the greater part 
o f men are proud to imitate and resemble them in the very qualities which 
dishonour and degrade them. (I.iii.3.7)
The hoi polloi are misled by their imagination into equating wealthiness 
with happiness, and rank with virtue.127 The delusion is self-perpetuating 
and -  worse -  in a commercial society it is self-propagating: initially wealth
127 The men o f rank are also deluded albeit in a different way. They believe 
they are being admired for themselves, but in fact are being admired for what 
they own. This analysis reappears in M arx’s writings, albeit for a different 
end: ‘Everything that the political economist takes from you in life and in 
humanity, he replaces for you in money and in wealth; and all the things that 
you cannot do, your money can do. It can eat and drink, go to the dance hall 
and the theatre; it can travel, it can appropriate art, learning, the treasures o f 
the past, political power -  all this it can appropriate for you -  it can buy all 
this for you: it is the true endowment. Yet being all this, it is inclined  to do 
nothing but create itself ... All passions and all activity must therefore be 
submerged in greed’ (quoted in Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl 
M arx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 139).
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is equated with rank and rank with virtue. This equation transmutes into one 
o f  wealth with rank and hence, o f wealth with virtue (I.ii.l). Those with 
wealth then set the moral standard for society a whole, and the acquisition o f 
wealth becomes a virtue -  a state all would wish to attain. In a commercial 
society, wealth is no longer restricted to men o f  rank; merchants also 
become wealthy. In fine, the moral standards for society are open to 
influence by those who value wealth over virtue, and the scene is set for the 
general deterioration o f moral sentiments.
A society in the most advanced stage o f developed is in a precarious 
position on Smith’s analysis. Although moral corruption is not inevitable, it 
is highly probable. For Smith and his contemporaries, this conclusion 
tallied with evidence from history.128 Unlike social changes brought about 
by faction, wealth-induced corruption is predictable, because brought about 
by changes in society which are themselves predictable. Most important for 
Sm ith’s theory, the cause o f the corrosive influence wealth reduces to, or is 
explicable in terms o f universal natural characteristics o f m an’s make up, 
namely self-interest; the capacity for fellow-feeling; and the pursuit o f 
happiness.
However, although Smith did not seem aware o f  it, the ‘fashion issue’ 
threatens his empiricism because his analysis o f the way in which corrupt 
fashions or trends o f any kind permeate society, and o f how and why the 
preferences o f a few can influence society as a whole, depend on the idea 
that at any given time, a morally incorrect view can be held by the majority
128 Smollett expresses this concern through Lismahago, the Scot and D evil’s 
Advocate in Humphry Clinker. “ ‘Woe be to that nation, where the multitude 
is at liberty to follow their own inclinations! Commerce is undoubtedly a 
blessing, while restrained within its proper channels; but a glut o f  wealth 
brings along with it a glut o f evils: it brings false taste, false appetite, false 
wants, profusion, venality, contempt o f order, engendering a spirit o f 
licentiousness, insolence, and faction, that keeps communities in continual 
ferment, and in time destroys all the distinctions o f civil society; so that 
universal anarchy and uproar, must ensue. Will any sensible man affirm, that 
the national advantages o f opulence are to be sought on these terms?” “No, 
sure; but I am one of those who think, that, by proper regulations, commerce 
may produce every national benefit, without the allay o f such concomitant 
evils’” (p. 280; quoted in M.A. Goldberg, Smollett and the Scottish School: 
Studies in Eighteenth-Century Thought (Albuquerque: University o f  New 
Mexico Press, 1959), p. 168).
194
o f society; that is, that the majority o f society and so, it would appear, by 
Sm ith’s definition, the impartial spectator, can be morally deluded. If 
Sm ith’s theory is to avoid importing idealism, then the judgem ents ascribed 
to an impartial spectator o f any level o f abstraction, have to be either 
generalisations drawn from experience, or, at least, supervenient on such 
generalisations. The concept o f impartial spectator has its origin in the 
concept o f ‘a moral judgement o f the majority’, and proceeds via the more 
generalised concept o f ‘the judgem ent o f “the average m an’” to that o f a 
highly abstract ‘man within’, who can, at times, countermand the moral 
conclusions o f those o f a fairly immediate social circle.129 I f  Sm ith’s theory 
is to remain empiricist, then the judgem ents o f  ‘the man w ithin’ can never 
float entirely free o f those o f the society on which the abstraction depends or 
supervenes, as Smith acknowledges.130 However, if Sm ith’s account o f 
fashion is to allow for the possibility o f society-wide moral corruption, 
recognisable as such either by a member o f the society under scrutiny, or by 
a member o f a different society, the recognition o f moral corruption has to 
be regarded as the result o f a judgem ent made according to standards o f 
right and wrong which are immune to, or supersede those maintained by the 
majority o f that society. It appears that Smith could assume that such a 
judgem ent with moral content can be made only by a member o f a different 
society, only on pain o f contradicting the foundational assumption that the 
nature o f mankind is universal. However, given the examples he uses in the 
M oral Sentiments, it is apparent that he presupposes such judgem ents can be 
made by his readers about contemporary developments within Scotland, 
which presupposition threatens his empiricism.
129 This is broached by Campbell ( ‘Explanation and Ethical Justification’, pp. 
73-4).
130 ‘[When all our brethren appear loudly to condemn us] The supposed 
impartial spectator o f our conduct seems to give his opinion in our favour 
with fear and hesitation; when that o f all the real spectators, when that o f  all 
those with whose eyes and from whose station he endeavours to consider it, 
is unanimously and violently against us. In such cases, this demigod within 
the breast appears, like the demigods o f the poets, though partly o f immortal, 
yet partly too o f mortal extraction ... when he suffers him self to be 
astonished and confounded by the judgments o f ignorant and weak man, he 
discovers his connexion with mortality, and appears to act suitably, rather to 
the human, than to the divine part o f his origin’ (III.2.32).
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8 The social role of the middle rank
Smith does not want to eradicate wealth; nor can he consistently advocate 
the eradication o f ambition, given that that is a natural concomitant o f m an’s 
tendency for betterment. His argument is against neither wealth nor 
ambition, but against the equation o f wealth with virtue, and the perception 
o f wealth as a worthy goal. Given Sm ith’s demonstration that this equation 
is the result o f a causally explicable mistake about the existence o f a relation 
between wealth and virtue, it follows that Smith may argue that if  a society 
can avoid making the erroneous connection or, having made it, realign its 
focus on a genuine source o f happiness, then economic improvement will
1 T 1not engender moral deterioration.
The social group Smith regards as the most suitable custodians o f a 
society’s mores is the middle rank. In this he follows Hume, and for the 
same kinds o f reasons. Hume argues that ‘all Discourses o f  Morality ought 
to be principally addressed [to the middle station]’ because ‘they form the 
most numerous Rank of Men that can be suppos’d susceptible by 
Philosophy’. 132 According to Hume, the middle rank is best placed to 
appreciate moral reasoning because their social position affords the most 
balanced view of society, being midway between the extremes o f  poverty 
and wealth, and equally importantly, its members have ‘the leisure’ to 
observe social interaction, unlike the wealthy who are too absorbed in 
pleasure, and the poor who are ‘too much occupy’d in providing the 
Necessities o f Life’.133
Smith identified two social groups which are immune to the lure o f social 
distinction: those whose behaviour greatly exceeds the ‘ordinary standard o f
131 This is an important connection for Smith to have made, given the general 
concern among the literati about the potential detrimental effect o f Scotland’s 
improved economy. It informs M ackenzie’s view on wealth and corruption, 
described above, pp. 90-1.
132 David Hume, ‘O f the Middle Station o f L ife’ (1742), in Essays, Moral, 
Political and Literary, pp. 545-51; p. 547.
133 Ibid., pp. 546-8. It is interesting to note that the poor are precluded from 
philosophical pursuits for the same kinds o f reasons as barbarians: they are 
able only to react to situations, the demands o f day-to-day life being too great 
to allow contemplation (V .2.8-9); see above pp. 180-1.
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human behaviour’, i.e. the virtuous; and those who have lost the wish to 
better themselves, and succumbing to ‘slothful and sottish indifference’ 
sunk too far below ‘the ordinary standard’ for redemption (I.iii.2.7). The 
immunity o f the former group is a result o f  their being less concerned about 
the attitudes o f their fellow man, than about acting according to the dictates 
o f conscience.134 This characterisation excludes men o f  rank, for whom 
‘glory’ consists in no more than ‘the propriety o f ordinary behaviour’
(I.iii.2.5). Men of rank regard themselves as unconstrained by the rules o f 
decorum, not because they discount the views o f their inferiors, but because 
they fail to acknowledge the existence o f other ranks (ibid.). Since Smith 
also describes this group as ‘inaccessible to reason and dispute’ by all but 
their peers, given their failure to acknowledge society at large, ‘reason and 
dispute’ are unlikely to produce the kind o f impartial moral judgem ents 
which are constitutive o f the virtuous character.135
The poor do not feature large in the M oral Sentiments, unless they are 
afflicted by the desire for wealth.136 Smith laments the status o f nonentity 
which poverty confers, and argues that this is wrongheaded on two counts: 
poverty is castigated as a vice in consequence o f a delusion about the 
virtuous nature o f wealth (I.iii.2.1); and poverty does not o f  itself result in,
134 Smith associates this attitude with a ‘well-formed m ind’ (III.2.7). Virtue 
is equated with behaviour beyond ‘the ordinary’ at I.i.5.6.
135 I.iii.2.3. Given that the implication o f Sm ith’s argument against the 
pursuit o f wealth is that the rich, being pleased with ‘groundless applause’, 
have demonstrated ‘the most superficial levity and w eakness’ (III.2.5) not to 
mention his dismissal o f their acquisition as ‘mere trinkets o f  frivolous folly’ 
(IV. 1.7), we can assume Smith regarded his readership to be only the
convertible.1 E.g. Smith refers to the poor m an’s son who admires the condition o f the 
rich as one whom ‘heaven in its anger has visited with am bition’ (IV. 1.7) 
because, Smith claims, a lifetime devoted to the pursuit o f  wealth will reveal 
that riches are just ‘mere trinkets o f frivolous utility’ (ibid.). One is left with 
the distinct impression that Smith enjoyed writing this chapter. It is full o f  
deft caricatures o f the more idiosyncratic ‘collectors’: men with pockets 
bulging with what would now be referred to as ‘designer tweezers’ for 
example. Cf. Harley’s predilection for a pair o f brass sleeve buttons (MF, p. 
47; mentioned on p. 64 above); and his return from London as if  from a 
Grand Tour, replete with half a dozen snuffboxes with invisible hinges (MF, 
p. 100, quoted above, p. 52-3, n. 15).
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or cause, unhappiness.137 Apart from this the poor tend to be subsumed 
under the general rubric ‘the m ob’, o f whom Smith seems to have little
expectation o f displaying refined reasoning and who generally represent the
118lowest common denominator socially.
D w yer’s normative reading o f  The Theory of M oral Sentim ents
Sm ith’s conclusion that the middle station is most likely to spawn men o f 
virtue has been taken by many, not as the outcome o f an analysis o f the 
causes o f social corruption by increased wealth, but as the starting point for
137 IV .1.11. Smith also argues that disdain causes distress for the poor 
because it has a concomitant lack o f sympathy and causes the poor to feel 
intrinsically unworthy o f sympathy, ‘for though to be overlooked, and to be 
disapproved of, are things entirely different, ... to feel that we are taken no 
notice of, necessarily dampens the most agreeable hope, and disappoints the 
most ardent desire o f human nature’ (I.iii.2,1).
138 E.g. II.ii.3,8. Smith’s reasoning here may well have been justified 
pragmatically at the time. It is hard to imagine how the majority o f society 
would have gained access to the material he regarded as essential for the 
development o f the kind o f refined reasoning skills needed to follow his 
arguments, despite the breadth o f catchment o f education in Scotland (see 
George Elder Davie, The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her Universities 
in the Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1961); Henry 
Grey Graham, The Social Life o f  Scotland in the Eighteenth Century (London: 
Adam and Charles and Black, 1906), chs 10-12). Then -  as now -  few 
would have had the time or motivation to study texts at the cutting edge o f 
philosophy, science and history. Most people were reliant on the pulpit for 
the dissemination o f new ideas. Smith was aware o f  the limitations o f 
oratory: ‘The arguments that are to be used before a people cannot be very 
intricate; the Proposition generally requires no proof at all and when it does 
the arguments are o f themselves so evident as not to require any elaborate 
explanation. There must be in this case no nicety nor refinement, no 
metaphysical 1 arguments, these would be altogether superfluous in the 
circumstances an orator is generally in and can very selldom be in any shape 
applicable’ (LRBL ii. 138). This is not to slight the intelligence o f  an 
audience or congregation; it just is difficult to follow complex reasoning 
aurally -  as any attending philosophy conferences will fully appreciate. 
Sm ith’s argument against the pursuit o f  wealth is indeed complex: it rests 
ultimately on his definition o f propriety, and o f virtue as excellence in this 
domain. It is also dependent on his analysis o f custom, and as Smith points 
out, few will acknowledge the transience o f custom (V.1.4). The concept o f 
the impartial spectator is also in play.
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a normative ethics.139 One such reading is found in the several discussions 
o f  the M oral Sentiments by Dwyer.140 Dwyer states that Sm ith’s intention in 
the M oral Sentiments was ‘to provide the “middling ranks” o f an emerging 
capitalist society with a framework for social behaviour’. 141 While he 
acknowledges that there are grounds for treating the M oral Sentiments as a 
scientific discourse, he believes that such an approach obscures ‘a major 
insight’ in Enlightenment thought, namely that emotions played a primary 
role in individual motivation and social organisation.142 It appears that the 
possibility that this insight might form the starting point for a principled 
empiricist analysis o f the role that human emotions play in human 
motivation and social organisation for Smith (or Hume) has passed Dwyer 
by. It is valuable to consider Dwyer’s discussions o f the M oral Sentiments 
in detail because it highlights the confusion resulting from a piecemeal 
approach to the text, which appears viable on a normative reading o f the 
M oral Sentiments. According to Dwyer, Sm ith’s M oral Sentiments is 
riddled with inconsistencies. The Newtonian reading, by contrast, shows 
Smith to have been rigorously consistent both in his empiricism and with 
regard to his views on the importance o f a structured argument from first 
principles found elsewhere in his writings. Dw yer’s reading does have a 
redeeming feature however. His discussion emphasises the value o f a 
subtextual study o f part VI o f the M oral Sentiments. This was a later 
addition to the text, written for the 6th edition. This edition was published 
1790, at the end o f a decade which had seen the end o f the American War o f 
Independence (1775-83) and the French Revolution (1789-90). The issues
139 This kind o f approach not only is tantamount to dismissing the bulk o f  the 
M oral Sentiments, but also ignores the fact that Sm ith’s concern to give a 
causal explanation o f social corruption reflects a general concern o f  the 
Scottish literati. Smith also believed that the delusion o f the mob by the 
aristocracy was advantageous for society -  this being the origin o f ranks 
(I.iii.2.3).
140 John Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late 
Eighteenth-Century Scotland  (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), ch. 7; 
‘Enlightened Spectators and Classical Moralists: Sympathetic Relations in 
Eighteenth-Century Scotland’, in John Dwyer and Richard Sher (eds), 
Sociability and Society in Enlightenment Scotland , Eighteenth-Century Life, 
15 (1991), nos 1-2, pp. 96-118; and Age o f  Passions.
141 Age o f  Passions, p. 35.
142 Ibid., p. 1.
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which Smith chooses to discuss in this part cast light on the concerns o f the 
late eighteenth century -  namely the potentially damaging effects o f an 
improved economy.
Juxtaposing Dwyer’s justification o f his normative interpretation o f the 
M oral Sentiments with approaches which take seriously Sm ith’s attempt to 
apply the hypothetico-deductive method, for the use o f which he lauded 
Newton frequently, is an exercise in chiaroscuro. What, on the ‘structured 
theory’ reading, feature as illustrative examples, are taken by Dwyer to be 
the backbone o f the book -  and as such to be read prescriptively; Smith’s 
construction from first principles o f complex abstract moral concepts is 
ignored or glossed over; and since no attempt is made to elucidate Sm ith’s 
use o f such terms as ‘sympathy’, ‘imagination’ or ‘propriety’, Dwyer 
understands Smith’s usage intuitively, which at times yields only 
obfuscation -  a prime example o f which being Dwyer’s statement that 
‘sentim ent’ (the use o f which he nowhere explains) ‘had the sole purpose o f 
transforming the patriotic citizen into a creature o f peace, friendship and 
love’. 143 The kinds o f differences between the ‘theory’ reading, and the 
normative reading championed by Dwyer, are exemplified by such 
comments on Dwyer’s part as that propriety ‘often’ dictated ‘a certain 
mediocrity o f feeling and behaviour’, as opposed to the interpretation given 
above which takes seriously Smith’s definition o f propriety as ‘actions the 
greater part o f men commonly arrive a t’ (I.i.5.9), which, since it is a
143 Ibid., p. 154. This is a curious statement, to say the least; Smith barely 
address the notion o f patriotism in the M oral Sentiments, and when he does 
consider the concept, it is in the context o f discussing the single-minded, and 
therefore reprehensible, bias towards one’s own country engendered by war 
(III.3.42). Furthermore, Smith does not consider there to be a single 
sentiment. The whole problem for him is the reconciliation o f  motives 
resulting from the several sentiments natural to man, to explain the fact o f 
social harmony.
Dwyer uses a similarly opaque connection between passion and patriotism 
in ibid., ch. 6 -  concerning the Ossian poems -  which he describes as a 
discussion o f  ‘the contribution which the new analysis o f the passions made 
to a burgeoning European nationalism’ (ibid., p. 11). D w yer’s views on 
Ossian are discussed below (pp. 281-5); I ’ll mention here only that they 
failed to cast light on what he understands to be the eighteenth-century 
concept o f ‘European nationalism’.
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definition, means propriety cannot but dictate ‘a certain mediocrity’. 144 
Sympathy, propriety, and impartiality, concepts and relations which are 
foundational to Smith’s reasoning according to the ‘theory’ reading, for 
Dwyer warrant mention only in a footnote, where they are billed as ‘other 
features o f Smith’s approach’. 145 The relationship between virtue and 
conscience, generally regarded even on most normative readings as worthy 
o f attention, and which on the ‘theory’ reading is seen to be the end for 
which Smith worked hardest, for Dwyer, merits only a glancing reference as 
‘com plex’ in the course o f comments in support o f his (dubious) claim, 
contra not only Smith but Hume, Elliott and Stew art,146 that the central 
concept in the Moral Sentiments is self-control.147 And he understands 
‘secondary passions’ to mean weaker, less important passions, missing 
entirely the philosophical import o f Smith’s use o f the term ‘secondary’, to 
refer to passions deriving from passions as opposed to passions arising from 
(physical) sensation. This misreading on D w yer’s part leads him to a deeper 
misinterpretation regarding Sm ith’s views o f love and marriage (see below 
pp. 282-4) -  a mistake which effectively undermines the main thesis o f  Age 
o f  Passions which is based on the premise that Smith did not believe that 
love played, or should ever play, a dominant role in human motivation; and 
that in consequence, he was less influential on later writers such as 
Mackenzie than Millar and M acpherson.148 Given that ‘the chief part o f 
happiness’ according to Smith’s account o f sympathy ‘arises from the
144 Ibid. p. 38.
145 Ibid., n. 17, p. 51.
146 Hume, ‘Letter from David Hume, 28 July 1759’; E lliot’s objection can be 
reconstructed from Smith, ‘Letter from Adam Smith to Gilbert Elliot, 10 
October 1759’, and from the footnote added in the 2nd edn o f the M oral 
Sentiments, I.ii.1.9, n.; Stewart, ‘Account o f the Life and W ritings o f  Adam 
Smith, LL.D .’, p. 281.
147 Ibid., p. 19.1
Ibid., p. 84; p. 11. An interpretation o f Sm ith’s views on love which is 
diametrically opposed to that o f Dwyer, is given in Douglas J. Den Uyl and 
Charles Griswold, ‘Adam Smith on Friendship and Love’, Review o f  
Metaphysics, 49 (1996), pp. 609-37. Far from considering Smith to have 
marginalised love, Den Uyl and Griswold regard it as pivotal in Smith’s 
thought.
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consciousness o f being beloved’ (I.ii.5.1), Dwyer’s interpretation requires 
no little justification. None is forthcoming, however.
There are additional sources o f irritation with Dwyer’s approach which 
countermand its viability. Dwyer rarely argues for his position. For 
example, he makes unsupported generic claims such as ‘Smith believed that 
the achievement o f a state o f sympathetic harmony with one’s fellows could 
never be based in reason’ -  which is correct, but wrongly suggests that 
Smith himself supplied no reasons; and he makes claims which he supports 
by misquotations: for example, Dwyer states ‘Smith refers to [those who 
were responsive to public opinion and capable o f virtue] as “by far the 
greater part o f mankind’” and equates ‘the greater part o f  m ankind’ with the 
middle station, which if nothing else is an oxym oron.149 The text Dwyer 
quotes actually states that ‘the greater part o f  m ankind’ respects the law; and 
depends for success on the ‘favour and good opinion’ o f their neighbours 
and peers (I.iii.3.5), a situation which, had Dwyer taken into consideration 
Smith’s analysis o f the nature and role o f  sympathy in all societies and 
groups within society, would have been seen to apply to all but those in the 
‘superior’ stations o f life. Smith’s point, here, as he makes explicit in the 
immediately following text (I.iii.3.6), is not that imputed to him by Dwyer,
i.e. that the middle station is likely to preserve a society’s morality through 
sheer force o f numbers; but that the conditions conducive to the promotion 
o f virtue do not prevail in the highest rank o f  society.
Dwyer’s is the more recent o f a long line o f  woolly-minded commentary 
on the influence o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments on eighteenth-century Scottish 
literature. Goldberg, for example, argues for the general thesis that 
Smollett’s heroes are grappling with the issues o f  the Scottish 
Enlightenment -  that Roderick Random  for example, centres on a tussle to 
reconcile the opposition between passion and reason; and that the relevant 
issues are reflected in the overarching internal structure o f  each book. 
Somewhat surprisingly however, Goldberg manages to discuss 
Enlightenment thought without a single reference to Hume. In opposition to 
the view o f Peregrine Pickle as pure and unmitigated farce, Goldberg argues
149 Ib id ., p 63.
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that it is less ludicrous than satiric and relies on wit rather than farce, on the 
ground that eighteenth-century wit has to be understood in the context o f  the 
relation then assumed between wit and imagination. 150 Goldberg’s 
conclusions are interesting, but his reasoning is badly adrift, ascribing to 
Smith the view that the imagination is a source o f  judgem ent, when Smith, 
following Hume, takes imagination to supply the subject matter for 
judgements which, because comparative, are the provenance o f the separate 
mental faculty o f reason, or the m in d .151 His discussion becomes less 
convincing still when he glides seamlessly from the moral theory o f  Adam 
Smith to that o f David Fordyce in the course o f  arguing that there is an 
internal progressive structure to Roderick Random. The dynamic o f this 
progression, he argues, is provided not by a plot, but by the hero’s
152development o f a moral sense. Goldberg, here, appears to equate Sm ith’s 
understanding o f moral development with that o f Fordyce, despite the latter 
following Hutcheson in holding that the moral sense is a separate faculty 
(albeit differing from Hutcheson in regarding it to be ‘m idw ay’ between 
passion and reason, as if  arbitrating between the two); and more importantly, 
despite Smith arguing quite specifically against Hutcheson’s postulation o f a 
separate moral sense.153 Goldberg argues that Sir Launcelot Greaves is a 
study in self- and social love.154 In the course o f describing the importance
150 Goldberg, Smollett and the Scottish School, p. 54.
151 Ibid. See also pp. 28-9. Cf. Hum e’s argument that reason is ‘perfectly 
inert’ never producing o f itself a motive for action, or the content o f a 
concept or judgement (Treatise, II.iii.3, pp. 460-5).
152 The kind o f movement to which Goldberg is referring to is akin to that 
which structures The Man o f  Feeling. There are several parallels between 
Roderick Random  and The Man o f  Feeling.
153 VILii.3.4-19; VII.ii.2.9-VII.iii.3.16; Goldberg, Smollett and the Scottish 
School, pp. 46-7. A further difference between Fordyce and Smith, which 
Goldberg fails to mention, is that Fordyce holds that passions act without 
regard for others, that they essentially concern only oneself, while Smith 
regards resentment and gratitude as passions, each o f which is rooted in 
sympathetic responses to others. In fact the innovation o f  Hutcheson, Hume 
and Smith lies in recognition o f the need for impartiality in moral judgem ents; 
see above pp. 119-21. His understanding o f resentment is central to his 
analysis o f justice as grounded in sympathy, and hence, contra Hume 
{Treatise, III.ii.1, III.iii.6), a natural virtue. Goldberg’s m uddled attempt to 
describe Smith’s theory appears on pp. 28-9.
154 Ibid., ch. 5.
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ascribed to this antipathy in Scottish Enlightenment moral theory, Goldberg 
describes Hutcheson as advocating a practical and utilitarian view to 
mediate self- and social love -  a view less applicable to Hutcheson than to 
Hume; and slips from Hutcheson’s moral theory to that o f  Ferguson without 
taking into account that like Smith but unlike Hutcheson, Ferguson did not 
regard m an’s selfishness to need eradication.155 In fact, Goldberg regards 
Ferguson as representative o f Scots moral thought, which view is liable to 
encourage a normative reading o f Sm ith’s the M oral Sentiments, if  for no 
other reason than that Ferguson states categorically that moral philosophy is 
essentially prescriptive -  ‘is knowledge o f what ought to be, or the 
application o f rules that ought to determine the choice o f voluntary 
agents’.156 By contrast, both Hume and Smith regard moral philosophy to 
be a prescriptively neutral, causal analysis o f social facts.
Even Simpson, who argues that evidence o f conflict within the work o f 
individual Scottish writers o f eighteenth-century literature points to a crisis 
o f identity in the century following the Union, and whose claims are 
generally well substantiated, goes astray with regard to Sm ith.157 In the 
course o f an attempt to establish that the Scottish literati worked to replace 
the essentially Scottish features o f their culture with those which accorded 
with English standards o f  taste, he cites in evidence from both Sm ith’s 
writings on language -  Lectures on Rhetoric and First Formation o f  
Languages -  and the M oral Sentiments,158 Simpson quotes from Sm ith’s
155 Ibid., pp. 112-13.
156 Ibid., p. 184; Ferguson, Institutes, p. 9.
157 Simpson, The Protean Scot. Simpson’s conclusions on Smollett are 
diametrically opposed to those o f Goldberg. Where Goldberg finds evidence 
o f preoccupation with philosophical issues characteristic o f Enlightenment 
endeavours in the architecture o f Smollett’s novels, Simpson sees only ‘rage 
and pace and concomitant lack o f depth’, a firmly external point o f  view, and 
little beyond a physical response by characters to their situations (p. 14).
158 Simpson, ibid., pp. 71-81; Simpson draws on the M oral Sentiments for 
evidence o f the divided nature o f the Scottish personality, citing, somewhat 
crassly, Smith’s use o f the idea o f a division o f the self to explain the way in 
which conscience works (p. 12), which indicates a clumsy reading o f  the 
Moral Sentiments. His interpretation o f Hume to the same end is similarly 
heavy-handed; for example failing to follow Hum e’s reasoning about why 
customary constant conjunction in matters o f  taste takes on the authority o f
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argument against the notion o f objective standards o f  excellence, founded 
independently o f experience, in moral conduct (I.i.5.6), during the course o f 
which Smith likens the foundations o f judgem ents o f moral excellence to 
those o f taste. Smith uses the simile, because unlike morality, the standards 
for which then, had until recently had been presented as having the authority 
from some extra-societal source (via revealed religion, for example), matters 
o f taste are more overtly rooted in the opinions o f  a society. Simpson, 
however, fails to appreciate the purpose o f Smith’s comparison, taking the 
fact that Smith ‘mentions taste and sensibility in the same breath’ as 
evidence that, according to Simpson, Smith, like the literati generally, 
overrated the importance o f taste, and (somewhat surprisingly given 
Simpson supplies no grounds for this move), in particular the importance o f 
cultivating English taste. 159 In fact, Smith goes to some length to 
demonstrate that the difference between moral standards and standards o f 
taste is that while a disagreement over the latter will have no bearing on 
one’s attitude towards the person holding the differing opinion, evidence o f 
a difference in moral judgem ent will affect one’s attitude towards the other 
person (I.i.4.5), which implies that, according to Smith, English opinions on 
matters o f taste have no intrinsic social weight.
Despite a plethora o f drawbacks to Dwyer’s exegesis, it has the edge 
over these and many other attempts at normative readings o f Sm ith’s 
thought in addressing the M oral Sentiments directly rather than assimilating 
it in a congenial amble through the full gamut o f Scottish Enlightenment 
critical writing. However, given the vapid quality o f D w yer’s engagement 
with the text, this not enough to redeem it as a reliable commentary on 
Smith’s thought per se.
In Virtuous Discourse Dwyer considers the substantial changes that 
Smith made to the M oral Sentiments for the sixth edition (1790). His thesis 
is that the additional text -  namely chapter 3 o f the third section in part I; 
and part VI -  indicates that Smith had become increasingly concerned that 
economic improvement together with changes in social priorities in the
natural conjunctions. Simpson reads Hum e’s remarks as indicative o f 
conservatism (ibid., p. 81).
159 Simpson, The Protean Scot, pp. 78-9.
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higher ranks o f society resultant from increased contact with London society, 
were threatening to change the nature o f Scottish social mores. He cites as 
evidence for this interpretation the fact that the additional chapter in part I 
deals with the corrosion o f a society’s morals which can be wrought by 
society-wide increase in wealth; and he argues that in part VI, ‘O f the 
Character o f Virtue’, Smith changes the nature o f the impartial spectator 
from that o f embodying generalisations about a society’s moral code to that 
o f an autonomous morality relying more heavily on the notion o f  self- 
command than in former editions, again as a result o f  Sm ith’s observations 
on the effects o f wealth-oriented ambition.160
Dwyer’s preoccupation with Smith’s arguments for the value o f self- 
command becomes more evident in his later paper ‘Enlightened Spectators 
and Classical M oralists’. This is a condensed version o f  the material in Age 
o f  Passions, the rehydration o f which takes the form o f a long and somewhat 
unwieldy attempt on Dwyer’s part, to trace the self-interested capitalist he 
finds in Wealth o f  Nations to the more stoic version o f  the virtuous man he 
claims comes into the existence in the sixth edition o f the M oral Sentiments.
Dwyer’s remarks in his later discussion o f the M oral Sentiments, like that 
in Virtuous Discourse, centre on the content o f part VI. Unlike the 
discussion in Virtuous Discourse, however, Dwyer does not state this to be 
the case. If  the ‘theory’ interpretation o f the M oral Sentiments is given any 
credence, Dwyer’s interpretation is just a red herring. The aetiology o f  his 
reading is evident. Assuming I.iii.3 and part VI add to, rather than clarify, 
Smith’s position in the M oral Sentiments, Dwyer takes Smith both to have 
dropped the relationship between impartial spectatorship and general 
notions o f propriety, replacing it by an autonomous abstract concept o f  
correct conduct; and to have introduced a concern about the deleterious 
effects o f increased wealth on a society’s moral code.161 The change in 
impartial spectatorship, Dwyer claims, is the result o f  Smith coming to 
regard self-command as o f more importance than humanity, in the light o f
160 Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, pp. 169-76. Mullan also understands Smith 
ultimately to divorce judgements o f the impartial spectator from those o f  
actual spectators (Mullan, ‘The Language o f Sentiment’, pp. 286-7).
161 See, e.g., Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, p. 14.
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1 f\*ycontemporary developments in Scotland’s economy. Dwyer then argues 
from this, in both his later publications, to the conclusion that Sm ith’s moral 
theory is Stoic, and so, classical in essence. The discussion o f  Wealth o f  
Nations in Age o f  Passions, is based on what Dwyer sees as a connection 
between the newly introduced emphasis on Stoicism in the M oral 
Sentiments, and ‘[the] controlled and “dispassionate desire” for self- 
advancement, particularly on the part o f small-scale agricultural capitalists’ 
which is extolled in Wealth o f  Nations .164
It is easy to pick holes in Dw yer’s interpretation. For every quotation 
Dwyer chooses from part VI to confirm his reading o f it as indicating a new 
direction in Smith’s notion o f impartial spectatorship, there are several 
equivalent statements to be found in the text o f the earlier editions, which 
suggests that part VI does not introduce new material but forms a concise 
summation o f the conclusion drawn in parts I to V. It is true that Smith 
emphasises the need for self-command in the pursuit o f  virtue, or moral 
excellence, but it is equally true that self-command is essential to an ability 
to act in accordance with the dictates o f one’s conscience as opposed to 
acting only to meet the approval o f  actual impartial spectators -  the 
argument o f part III (second and subsequent editions). Since the kind o f 
reasoning required to make sense o f the notion o f autonomous conscience 
derived from generalisations o f actual experience, proved difficult for 
Smith’s critics (then, and it would seem, also now), it is not unreasonable to 
regard Smith as attempting to clarify this, which arguably is the point o f  part 
V I.'65
162 Dwyer, Age o f  Passions, pp. 19, 38; this is another point at which Dwyer 
cites text which fails to provide the requisite confirmation. He states ‘In the 
final edition o f The Theory o f  M oral Sentiments, ... Smith used the concept 
o f the “impartial spectator” to refer more exclusively and abstractly to 
conscience or the “man inside the breast’” , and citing Vl.iii.concl. in 
evidence (ibid. and n. 16, p. 50). The reference is to text in which Smith 
states only that it is impossible to tread the virtuous path without being able 
to do so with a clear conscience.
163 Dwyer, ‘Enlightened Spectators and Classical M oralists’, pp. 102—4; Age 
o f  Passions, pp. 8, 20-2.
164 Age o f  Passions, p. 14.
165 Criterial justification which is what Smith relies on in his argument to the 
notion o f autonomy o f conscience -  o f the ‘abstract’ impartial spectator -  is
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Dwyer’s claim that Smith ‘consistently lauded the stoic emphasis on self- 
control’ is an exaggeration. The need for self-control is a concomitant o f 
Sm ith’s empiricist presupposition that man is a social animal. Smith 
condones the emphasis on self-control found in Stoicism as being along the 
right lines for the construction o f  a system o f morals, but criticises it for 
being essentially unworkable because premised on moral perfection, rather 
than moral excellence. Since moral perfection is an unattainable ideal, Stoic 
concepts o f morality are not founded in experience, and therefore cannot 
provide an explanation o f the origin and source o f concepts o f  virtue 
(I.iii.2.9, n., pp. 58-60). Stoicism is lauded only as much as any other 
system o f moral philosophy aside from his own -  as being partially correct:
From some one or other o f those principles which I have been endeavouring 
to unfold, every system of morality that ever had any reputation in the world 
has, perhaps ultimately, been derived. As they are all o f  them in this respect, 
founded upon natural principles, they are all o f them in some measure in the 
right. But as many o f them are derived from a partial and imperfect view o f 
nature, there are many o f them too in some respects wrong. (VII I .i.l; see 
also Vll.ii. 1.26-7)
D w yer’s attempt to solve what has become known as ‘Das Adam Smith 
problem ’, i.e. the alleged incompatibility between Sm ith’s account o f the 
nature o f man in the Moral Sentiments and that in Wealth o f  Nations, fails, 
but none the less has a salvageable elem ent.166 Dwyer’s proposed solution
used by Wittgenstein to explain language meaning (e.g, Philosophical 
Investigations). That this is a difficult form o f reasoning to grasp is evident 
from the havoc it has wrought for meaning theory in philosophy (e.g. Hilary 
Putnam has produced no less than five different accounts o f  meaning, each o f 
which he bills as Wittgensteinian); and the nonsense its misinterpretation has 
spawned in other disciplines, not least o f which being post-modernist literary 
theory.
166 I confess I have not entirely understood the issue, as it seems unnervingly 
evident that there is no incompatibility between the interaction o f merchants 
depicted in Wealth o f  Nations and the dynamics o f social interaction in the 
M oral Sentiments -  a perspective endorsed by J. Cropsey, ‘Adam Smith and 
Political Philosophy’ in Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (eds), 
Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), pp. 132-53). At II.ii.3.3 
Smith refers to the social dynamic between merchants as being upheld by the 
‘mercenary exchange o f good offices according to an agreed valuation’ as 
opposed to that o f a less formal nature which is comprised o f ‘mutual love or 
affection’ and ‘obligation and gratitude’. Later Smith refers to strangers ‘who 
know nothing or care nothing’ about one’s private life (III.3.39). The
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seems to be that the Moral Sentiments is a normative ethics for ‘the middle 
station’, an identifiable social sector, typically comprising not merchants, 
manufacturers or tradesmen, but ‘the gentry, the upper yeomanry, civil 
servants and the members o f  the learned professions’.167 In other words, 
Dwyer takes Smith to be addressing a different social group in the M oral 
Sentiments from that in the Wealth o f  Nations, and writing ad hominem. 
There is nothing inherent to this solution precluding its viability, but for it to 
hold water, Dwyer needs to establish that Smith’s primary intention was to 
address a specific group in the M oral Sentiments rather than address a 
specific conceptual issue, which has as a conclusion a moral role for that 
group, and this he fails to do.
The redeeming feature o f Dw yer’s discussion is that it draws attention to 
the chapter written for the sixth edition o f the M oral Sentiments, in which 
Smith describes the potentially detrimental effects, morally, o f an improved 
economy (I.iii.3). In this chapter, Smith argues that the promise o f meteoric 
elevation, socially, which appears to be an adjunct o f increased personal 
wealth, is ephemeral (I.iii.3.4); and that the social distinction which wealth 
appears to confer can be achieved reliably, and more importantly, without 
moral compromise, by consistent application within ‘the real and solid’ 
professions (I.iii.3.5). There are good grounds for the claim that in this
difference between interaction based on commerce and that based less 
formally is that the former is not dependent on sympathy -  does not depend 
on emotional harmony. There seems nothing intrinsically contradictory in 
Smith’s presupposition that decorum is relative to context; and it is 
consonant with his analysis o f  an individual’s social experience being made 
up o f different kinds o f interactions (see above, pp. 159-61). His concern in 
the Moral Sentiments is to show that moral codes o f  conduct yield virtue -  
not that business takes place in accordance with such rules. That Smith 
regarded the realms o f business and o f social intercourse to operate according 
to different dynamics is confirmed by his discussion elsewhere o f  the 
different conceptual domains o f  poetry and o f  prose. He states, ‘Prose is 
naturally the Language o f Business; as Poetry is o f  pleasure and am usem ent’, 
and observes laconically, ‘No one ever made a Bargain in verse’ (LRBL,
ii.l 15-16).
167 Dwyer, Age o f  Passions, p 35. Dwyer’s reference to ‘yeom anry’ is 
strictly inaccurate; during the eighteenth century, England, but not Scotland, 
had a yeomanry. Dwyer also fails consistently to acknowledge an additional 
and socially important infrastructural difference between England and 
Scotland during the eighteenth century, namely that between the respective 
educational systems in the two countries.
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chapter, Smith is writing prescriptively for an identifiably specific 
contemporary readership. However, the interest o f this chapter stems not so 
much from its normative content per se, but from the questions it raises 
about the reasons for Smith’s decision to deviate from the general tenor o f 
the Moral Sentiments, not least because in this chapter, Smith presents, 
prescriptively, conclusions he argues for elsewhere in the M oral Sentiments, 
and so conclusions to be found in earlier editions o f the M oral Sentiments -  
as argued above (pp. 173-6) in the chapter preceding this late addition to the 
text (i.e. I.iii.2). There are good grounds for arguing that events and 
developments during the interim between the initial publication o f the M oral 
Sentiments and the sixth edition altered the nature o f the luxury debate, the 
repercussions o f which would have been worrying enough to prompt Smith 
to respond directly. Despite this, it is obviously unreasonable to suggest that 
the addition o f a single chapter can change the character o f  the M oral 
Sentiments, and since Dwyer fails to establish other reasons for reading the 
M oral Sentiments normatively, his interpretation lacks conviction.
However, Dwyer’s approach suggests an endeavour which would have 
great value, namely a subtextual study o f the M oral Sentiments. His 
interpretation o f the M oral Sentiments is confused because he relies too 
heavily on Smith’s examples, which at times almost merit the status o f  case 
studies. However, had Dwyer made clear the difference between what he 
takes to be the structure o f  Smith’s ethics -  or presuppositions -  and its 
content, and subjected the details o f the latter to scrutiny, he would have 
produced a convincing case for what the M oral Sentiments reveals about the 
concerns o f the period -  particularly those which came on the back o f  the 
change in Scotland’s political and economic status during the eighteenth 
century.168
9 The Theory o f  M oral Sentiments and The Man o f  Feeling
The claim was made in Chapter I, that M ackenzie’s The M an o f  Feeling  is a 
manual o f morality, constructed in accordance with principles o f  moral
168 It is almost a hallmark o f  Dw yer’s studies that their value lies in the lines 
o f  inquiry suggested by the objections they provoke -  an instance o f what 
Smith would regard as the work o f an invisible hand.
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development derived from Smith’s Theory o f  M oral Sentiments. Given the 
perspective on the nature o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments developed in this 
chapter, this claim can now be substantiated. First I shall outline how 
Sm ith’s theory gives rise to an account o f  the actual course o f child’s moral 
development; and then present evidence that Sm ith’s theory informs The 
M an o f  Feeling.
The virtuous education
Sm ith’s man of virtue has achieved excellence in regard both to self- 
command and to humanity. That is, he is one for whom ‘the view o f  the 
impartial spectator’ is ‘so perfectly habitual’ that he adopts an impartial 
view on his own conduct as a matter o f course (III.3.29); and he is also able 
to ‘adopt the whole case o f his companion, with all its minutest incidents; 
and strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change o f situation 
upon which sympathy is founded’ (I.i.4.6):
The man o f the most perfect virtue, the man whom we naturally love and 
revere the most, is he who joins, to the most perfect command o f his own 
original and selfish feelings, the most exquisite sensibility both to the 
original and sympathetic feelings o f others. (III.3.35)
The virtuous man is the ideal spectator -  both o f  others’ conduct and o f 
his own. However, since Smith takes seriously the notion that ‘ought 
implies can’, ‘ideal’, here, does not refer to unattainable perfection, but 
achievable excellence.169 Our understanding o f virtue derives, in the first 
instance, from comparison; in consequence, the notion o f moral perfection 
can only be extrapolation from ideas drawn from experience, and hence the 
work o f reason acting on experience, and not the outcome o f an innate 
idea.170
1691.i.5.9. Smith objects to Stoicism on the grounds that it implies perfection, 
and since no one can achieve perfection, and hence no one will gain such an 
idea from experience, ‘moral perfection’ is an abstract concept generated by 
reason (I.3.2.9, n., pp. 58-60, esp. p. 60).
170 Smith follows Hume: ‘That there is a natural difference between merit 
and demerit, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, no reasonable man will deny. 
Yet it is evident, that in affixing the terms, which denote either our 
approbation or blame, we are commonly more influenced by comparison 
than by any fixed unalterable standard in the nature o f things ... the
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Since man is inherently social, and predisposed to morality, it follows 
that, for Smith, amorality is a state not just contingently, but logically prior 
to any social experience. A newborn, strictly, is amoral, because able only 
to react to its immediate sensations -  it cannot draw on past experience in 
order to conceive o f possible consequences o f its sensations:
‘The [sick] infant ... feels only the uneasiness o f  the present instant, which 
can never be great. With regard to the future, it is perfectly secure, and in its 
thoughtlessness and want o f foresight, possesses an antidote against fear and 
anxiety, the great tormentors o f the human breast, from which reason and 
philosophy will, in vain, attempt to defend it, when it grows up to be a man. 
(I.i.1.12)
Otherwise, amorality is only a theoretical possibility:
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some 
solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could 
no more think o f his own character, or the propriety or demerit o f  his own 
sentiments and conduct, or the beauty or deformity o f his own mind, than o f 
the beauty or deformity o f his own face ... To a man who from birth was a 
stranger to society, the objects o f his passions, the external bodies which 
either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole attention. The passions 
themselves, the desires or aversions, the joys or sorrows, which those 
objects excited, though o f all things the most immediately present to him,
• • 171could scarce ever be the objects o f his thoughts.
The newborn is amoral because literally without thoughts or ideas; the 
solitary man would be amoral because, since he would obviously live 
without the kind o f interaction that prompts sympathy, his experience could
honourable appellations o f wise and virtuous are not annexed to any 
particular degree o f these qualities o f  wisdom  and virtue; but arise altogether 
from the comparison we make between one man and another’ (Hume, ‘O f the 
Dignity or Meanness o f Human N ature’ (1741), pp. 81-3; emphasis in the 
original). The comparative nature o f Smith’s concept o f  virtue is an outcome 
o f his empiricism, and is fundamental to his notion o f societal improvement. 
Because the notion o f virtue is derived comparatively, it follows that only a 
minority o f any given society can be deemed virtuous by that society. A 
society cannot therefore be regarded as virtuous per se; but it may be 
regarded as more or less virtuous than another society. Smith states 
explicitly that virtue is defined contextually: ‘Every age and country look 
upon that degree o f each quality, which is commonly to be met with in those 
who are esteemed among themselves, as the golden mean o f that particular 
talent or virtue’ (V.2.7).
171 III. 1.3; cf. Smith’s description o f the savage as one ‘whose notions are 
guided altogether by wild nature and passion, waits for no other proof that a 
thing is the proper object o f any sentiment than that it excites it’ (HA III.2).
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not supply any motive to please, and he could not have a concept o f 
another’s approval -  whatever seemed right to him would be right.
One upshot o f this is that propriety is learnt behaviour. The feelings in 
which it is founded are spontaneous; so what is learned is the modulation o f
1 79expressions o f feeling. The drive to learn to express one’s emotions in an 
acceptable manner is inherent: ‘Nature, when she formed man for society, 
endowed him with an original desire to please.’173 A second outcome is that 
all men are have the potential for virtue. The determining factors as to the 
kind o f character an individual develops are the social milieu to which he is 
exposed as a child, and that which he chooses as an adult. O f paramount 
importance to an individual’s moral education are initial experiences o f 
social interaction he had as a child. Reconstructing Sm ith’s reasoning in 
this regard, we can see that Smith relied heavily on empiricist psychology to 
justify the application o f his theory o f moral sentiments in this manner.
Smith wrote o f the virtuously educated:
Those who have been educated in what is really good company, not in what 
is commonly called such, who have been accustomed to see nothing in the 
persons whom they esteemed and lived with, but justice, modesty, humanity, 
and good order; are more shocked with whatever seems to be inconsistent 
with the rules which those virtues prescribe. (V.2.2)
By contrast:
Those, ... who have had the misfortune to be brought up amidst violence, 
licentiousness, falsehood, and injustice; lose, though not all sense o f  the 
impropriety o f such conduct, yet all sense o f its dreadful enormity, or o f  the 
vengeance and punishment due to it. They have been familiarized with it 
from their infancy, custom has rendered it habitual to them, and they are 
very apt to regard it as what is called, the way o f the world. (Ibid.)
So the attitudes o f those by whom a child is brought up affect his capacity 
for virtue as a mature individual. The kind o f experience to which a child is 
exposed will heighten or deaden natural reactions to vice and virtue (ibid.); 
and since the virtuous man acts in accordance with the dictates o f  his
172 This is an important distinction within Smith’s thought, especially with 
regard to his concept o f social improvement.
173 III.2.6. According to Smith, Nature also endowed man with an inherent 
desire ‘o f being what ought to be approved o f  (III.2.7), an idea crucial to his 
account o f the development o f  conscience.
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conscience; and Smith explains the development o f conscience as the result 
o f applying to oneself the judgements one makes on others’ conduct, which 
judgements are, in turn, learnt from witnessing others acting as impartial 
spectators; it follows that both the kind o f behavioural responses which a 
child’s behaviour evokes, and those which he observes are evoked by 
others’ behaviour, will colour his capacity for virtuous conduct in later life.
Smith’s comments on the learning process and on rule-formation indicate 
that he regards the formative effect o f a child’s initial experiences to have 
paramount importance because he believes they will have greater impact, 
psychologically, than most o f those o f later life. For example, he refers 
explicitly to ‘the lively impressions that interesting objects are apt to make 
upon the tender and unpractised senses’ o f the young (V.2.4); and since it is 
evident that Smith believed even the jaded senses o f the more mature react 
acutely to the novel or unexpected (I.ii.1.9), and that, for the newborn, all 
sense experience will be novel, it follows that a child’s impressions (i.e. 
mental responses and resultant ideas) will be particularly well defined. 
Similarly, mental habits formed when young will be more ingrained than 
those developed in later years; and prove more difficult to overturn.174 This 
applies not only to responses to encounters with events or (internal or 
external) objects,175 but to successions o f objects, or events, from which, as 
noted above the mind naturally or inherently derives predictive trends.176 It 
follows from this that the social and moral attitudes a child encounters at
174 LRBL 1.1-2; see also the discussion o f rules o f  conduct above, pp. 146-50; 
For example, on the effect o f attempts to create new mental habits later in life, 
Smith wrote: ‘... too severe an application to study sometimes brings on 
lunacy and frenzy, in those especially who are somewhat advanced in life, 
but whose imaginations, from being too late in applying, have not got into 
those habits which disposes them to follow easily the reasonings in the 
abstract sciences’ because the imagination ‘feels a real difficulty in passing 
along two events which follow one another in uncommon order’ (LRBL ii.10).
175 Smith refers to internal and external facts or objects in LRB L : ‘the cause 
o f ... intemall facts, or objects are ... either internail or externall. The 
intemall are such dispositions o f the mind as fit one for that certain passion 
or affection o f the mind; and the externall are such objects as produce these 
effects on the mind so disposed’ (LRBL i. 162).
176 HA 11.11 and pp. 149. Although Smith does not refer explicitly to John 
Locke, the epistemic model strongly resembles that in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, esp. I.ii.5.
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home will form a backdrop to subsequent experience, and, as such, have 
paramount importance.
Principles o f  the virtuous education
Smith’s psychology o f learning together with his theory o f  moral sentiments 
provide the means for educating someone for virtue. Sm ith’s account o f 
virtue is constructed from concepts derived from experience. So, if  a child 
is educated socially in an environment which replicates the kinds o f 
experiences which Smith regards as constitutive o f virtue, then that child 
will be equipped with habits and concepts necessary for right conduct, and 
all that is necessary to develop a standard o f  conduct which exceeds the 
norm -  that o f a man o f virtue -  which is the end to which such an education 
is intended to lead. Smith expresses some thoughts on the basics o f  a 
virtuous upbringing:
There is scarce any man ... who by discipline, education, and example, may 
not be so impressed with a regard to general rules as to act upon almost 
every occasion, with tolerable decency, and through the whole o f his life 
avoid any considerable degree o f blame. (III.5.1)
A virtuous education can even compensate for a naturally cool temperament:
The man who has received great benefits from another person may, by the 
natural coldness o f his temper, feel a very small degree o f sentiment o f 
gratitude. If  he has been virtuously educated ... [t]hough his heart is not 
warmed with any grateful affections, he will strive to act as if  it was. (Ibid.)
Another way o f looking at the notion o f virtuous education is to regard it 
as an education in ideal spectatorship. As Campbell has noted, the ideal 
spectator exhibits all the characteristics o f a good scientist. 177 His 
judgements are impartial, well informed and accurate (I.iii.2.5); his 
humanity is generous and comprehensive, but based in a realistic assessment 
o f  the situation (III.4); and he is guided by enlightened reason -  that is, he 
makes judgements which accord with inductive generalisations which 
reflection reveals yield to causal analysis (II.ii.3.5). There is an additional 
aspect o f spectatorship which Campbell, and most other commentators, at 
best radically underplay and in the main fail to mention at all; namely, that
177 Campbell, ‘Explanation and Ethical Justification’ p. 81.
spectatorship requires self-control. Many have picked up on the effort 
involved in achieving a sympathy relation as a result o f  the inherent 
disparity between the intensity o f the agent’s responses to experiencing his 
situation, and the relatively tepid nature o f  a spectator’s response to 
experience o f an imagined situation. However, Smith also takes pains to 
explain that, and why, once achieved, the relation is difficult for a spectator 
to maintain. Smith comments: ‘the imaginary change o f situation upon 
which sympathy is founded, is but momentary’. The intermittent nature o f 
spectators’ engagement is due to a natural tendency on their part, to turn 
their attention to their own situation -  ‘to thought o f their own safety, the 
thought that they themselves are not really the sufferers’ (I.i.4.7). In other 
words, self-absorption on the part o f either agent or spectator causes the 
sympathy relation to fail, so self-discipline is required on the part o f both 
parties. Smith is explicit about this:
Our sensibility to the feelings o f others, so far from being inconsistent with 
the manhood o f self-command is the very principle on which that manhood 
is founded. ... The man who feels the most for the joys and sorrows o f 
others is best fitted for acquiring the most complete control o f his own joys 
and sorrows. The man o f the most exquisite humanity, is naturally the most 
capable o f acquiring the highest degree o f self-command.178
In each case, self-discipline is required to quell a natural, instinctive 
tendency for concern for oneself. It is true that the outcome o f  this self- 
discipline differs in each case -  the agent is working to decrease the emotion 
which the spectator is working to heighten. For this reason, although self- 
discipline is necessary to achieve impartiality on the part o f the agent and 
the spectator, mastery o f either role does not entail mastery in the other 
(III.3.26).
So the intention behind a virtuous education can be understood as 
providing conditions under which an individual develops the concepts o f 
right and wrong, and the habits o f an impartial spectator, with regard to both
178 III.3.34, 36. Given that self-command is required for both the awful and 
the amiable virtues, it is small wonder that references to it appear throughout 
the Moral Sentiments.
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his own and others’ conduct. Experience is essential to each.179 To see 
why, requires consideration o f the constraints which Smith’s adoption o f 
Hume’s empiricism places on his account o f knowledge acquisition.
A new-born possesses no concepts. It is motivated by an instinct for self- 
preservation and for pleasing others (III.2.31, n., p. 129). Self-preservation 
infially depends on an ability to express one’s needs pre-verbally, and this 
is achieved by emotional reactions to sensory experiences. It includes an 
ability to anticipate events, which ability requires reasoning skills. A child 
is equipped with the capacity for reasoning, but reasoning is understood by 
Smith to be the manipulation o f concepts, so until a child acquires ideas 
with conceptual content, the reasoning skills remain dormant; also dormant 
is an inherent desire for self-approval.180
Initially the child learns how to behave in a way that pleases those to
whom we would now refer as his primary carers. However the restrictions
family members place on the child’s conduct are minimal: enough to
preserve a child’s safety, and the parents’ ease, and focussing mostly on
1 81controlling the child’s anger. While the family environment might be 
relied on to ensure that a child’s natural aversion to vice is not deadened, it 
cannot provide the kind o f environment for the development o f  self- 
command, because the parents are not able to view their children’s
179 It may seem that Smith’s comments on the possibility o f  living a blame- 
free life by following rules o f conduct without engaging in a sympathy 
relation (III.5.1) allow for the possibility o f  moral conduct as a result only o f 
learning to follow rules. However, knowledge o f when specific rules apply 
can only be gained from observation; o f the virtuously educated, but 
emotionally lacking, individual Smith says he will respond appropriately to 
generosity as a result o f having been ‘made to observe how odious those 
actions appear which denote a want o f the sentiment o f  gratitude’ (ibid.). 
Given Smith’s empiricism, one may assume that Smith’s use o f ‘observe’ 
here is not being used in the sense o f ‘intellectually taking note’.
180 III.2.5. The upshot o f Smith’s comments is effectively that the child is 
completely dependent on his parents for all knowledge and experience, 
initially. Smith expresses this as follows: ‘Nature seems to have judged it 
necessary for their [i.e. children’s] preservation that they should, for some 
time at least, put implicit confidence in those to whom the care o f  their 
childhood, and o f the earliest and most necessary parts o f their education, is 
intrusted’ (VII.4.23).
181 III.2.31, n., p. 129. It is interesting that Smith refers to use o f  noise and 
fright to discipline the child -  which seem a far cry from the more aggressive 
practices in Victorian childrearing.
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behaviour impartially. According to Smith’s theory, this will not be a moral 
defect per se on the part o f parents, but an inevitable outcome o f biology and 
psychology. Parental indulgence -  or lack o f  impartiality -  is an instinctive 
reaction: ‘Nature has rendered in most men ... parental tenderness a much 
stronger affection than filial pity. The continuation and propagation o f the 
species depend on it’ (III.3.13). Smith obviously does not regard this to be 
an easy option: ‘We blame the excessive fondness and anxiety o f  a parent as 
something which may in the end prove hurtful for the child, and which in 
the meantime is excessively inconvenient to the parent’ (III.3.14). Certainly 
a mother’s concern for a very young child is almost as irrational as concern 
for the wellbeing o f the dead -  and as impossible to eradicate (I.i. 1.12-13).
The psychological bar to impartiality has been explained above in 
connection with Smith’s ideas that social proximity increases the ease with 
which the sympathy relation can be established, because it is easier for each 
party to imagine the situation o f the other as a result o f  their common 
experience (see above, pp. 160-1). The difficulty in achieving impartiality 
with close friends and family members is consequently second only to that 
with which we achieve impartiality towards ourselves:
Those private misfortunes, for which our feelings are apt to go beyond the 
bounds o f propriety, are o f two different kinds, they are either such as affect 
us only indirectly, by affecting in the first place, some other persons who are 
particularly dear to us; such as our parents, our children, our brothers and 
sisters, our intimate friends; or they are such as affect ourselves immediately 
and directly. (III.3.12)
W ithout a counter to the indulgence occurring naturally in the family setting, 
a child will fail to develop the strength o f character required to achieve the 
sympathy relation as an agent when adult; in consequence, under duress he 
is likely to behave Tike a child that has not yet gone to school’ and attempt 
to gain sympathy by ‘importunately’ calling on the compassion o f  others 
(III.3.23). Smith also points out that in the restricted environment o f  the 
family, a child will gain the impression that he is able to please everyone 
(III.2.31, n., p. 129), so in addition to a skewed notion o f  acceptable 
behaviour, he will also develop a skewed set o f expectations about how 
others will respond to him. Furthermore, without his expectations being
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challenged in anyway, there will be no cause for him to exercise his 
reasoning skills, which lack will hinder his ability to make judgem ents on 
others and subsequently his own behaviour (cf. III.3.20). Given this ability 
is intrinsic to Smith’s concept o f virtue, Smith is bound to advocate that a 
ch id spend at least some o f his time in a non-familial environment (III.2.31, 
n.,p. 129; III.3.22).
Initially a child is educated morally with a view to imbuing him with a 
concept o f sociability. Effectively it comprises refining a child’s innate 
emotional responses, with the most urgent task being to teach a child to 
control anger and revenge (III.4.42). However the point o f  virtuous 
education, ultimately, is to enable an individual to pass judgem ent on his 
and others’ behaviour independently o f others’ opinions even to the extent 
o f  overturning others’ decisions. Since virtue is a comparative notion, it 
follows from Smith’s epistemological stance, that the richer and more 
diverse appropriate behaviour an individual experiences, the more numerous 
and richer the ideas he’ll develop. Not only will he then be able to imagine 
another’s situation with more accuracy and in more detail, and so be more 
adept at sympathy for another; but he will also be able to make more 
accurate generalisations -  and so develop a more refined concept o f duty. 
By comparing and contrasting ideas and groups o f ideas, an individual
should be able to reconstruct those rules o f conduct he has been taught, and
182generate more from his own experience. As with any inductive 
generalisation, the greater the breadth o f domain over which the induction is 
made and the greater the number o f instances in the domain, the more likely 
the induction is to be correct. A concomitant advantage o f a broad-based 
experience is that it reduces the chance o f surprise, and novelty, which, as 
discussed above (pp. 163-6), renders the possibility o f  a measured and 
impartial reaction almost impossible.
Another way o f expressing the same idea is to think o f  the child as 
needing to amass concrete ideas about his own emotional reactions -  in 
order to be able to then learn to associate the behaviour o f  others with
182 Rules o f conduct being inherently vague, it appears that everyone has to 
refine them to some degree in order to apply them to any given situation 
(III.6.8).
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feelings he himself has experienced. The child then has to learn to 
recognise modifications o f these descriptions -  that is, has to learn how to 
identify behaviour in others not just as expressive o f  anger but o f 
appropriate anger or inappropriate anger. At this stage the child is not 
deemed by Smith to control his behaviour in accordance with a moral 
imperative, but in order to gain approval. Once amongst his peers the child 
begins to learn why some behaviour is approved -  the foundation o f  others’ 
encouragement and prohibitions on his behaviour: he starts to experience the 
emotional effect on himself o f others’ behaviour; and begins to experience 
the sympathy relation with others, as a spectator. It is only once a child has 
acquired a degree o f experience o f  what he recognises as appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour and the relation between this differentiation and his 
reaction to other’s behaviour that he can be regarded as equipped to draw 
general conclusions about the nature o f propriety in certain circumstances, 
and hence have acquired moral concepts. Formally, Smith regards the 
child’s experience to yield first, concrete ideas about his feelings and 
behaviour; then concrete ideas about the distinction between appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour -  that is he learns that it is appropriate to exhibit 
grief under certain specific conditions; the loss o f a parent, for example. 
Only at this stage will there be the kind o f ideas on which reason can work 
inductively to yield abstract notions such as propriety, right, correct, and so 
forth.
There’s a problem with this experiential account o f moral development 
however; namely how to educate a child to recognise and disapprove o f  vice 
without putting the child at risk. Given Smith’s psychology o f learning, this 
proves a very delicate issue indeed, given that, according to this account, 
repeated exposure to any kind o f experience deadens any emotional 
response. On the other hand, an understanding o f punishable behaviour is 
required for an understanding o f remorse, an acquaintance with which is 
fundamental in the development o f conscience. According to Smith, being 
able to foresee that certain actions will bring remorse in their wake, and 
knowing that remorse is not an emotion anyone would willingly embrace, is 
fundamental to the development o f  the restraining element o f  conscience:
The man who has broke through all those measures o f conduct, which can 
alone render him agreeable to mankind, though he should have the most 
perfect assurance that what he had done was for ever to be concealed from 
every human eye, it is all to no purpose. When he looks back upon it, and 
views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he finds 
that he can enter into none o f the motives which influenced it. He is 
abashed and confounded at the thoughts o f it, and necessarily feels a very 
high degree o f that shame which he would be exposed to, if  his actions 
should ever come to be generally known. (III.2.8)
The experience o f remorse without forgiveness or punishment is considered 
by Smith to be unbearable enough to force those who experience it to seek 
out witnesses to their confession:
In such cases [when a crime is unlikely to be discovered] the horror o f 
blame-worthiness seems, even in persons who cannot be suspected o f  any 
extraordinary delicacy or sensibility o f character, completely to conquer the 
dread of blame. In order to allay that horror, in order to pacify, in some 
degree, the remorse o f their own consciences, they voluntarily submitted 
themselves both to the reproach and to the punishment which they knew 
were due to their crimes, but which, at the same time, they might easily have 
avoided. (III.2.10).
The notion o f blame and o f blame-worthiness is o f  paramount importance 
in Smith’s theory. It is foundational both to the concept o f  justice, and to his 
account o f conscience. However, it is not only important for an individual 
to learn to recognise which o f his actions are blameable; it is equally 
important to recognise accurately when someone is blameworthy because 
inaccurately apportioning blame will adversely affect even those who, in 
other respects, are virtuous enough to eschew the opinions o f the majority in 
other respects (II.iii.3.5). That an empiricist account o f the development o f 
the notion o f justice is flawed because o f  the difficulty o f making 
judgements about a person’s motives from his conduct and appearance alone, 
is testified by the fact that Smith devotes an entire section to just this issue 
(part II, section iii).
The only means o f correctly assessing the blameworthiness o f an action 
is to judge whether, under the circumstances, a person has acted 
inappropriately as a result o f  morally reprehensible motives; and the only 
means o f doing this is to make an assessment o f the causal history o f the 
situation. So, in order to be able to asses whether an individual should be
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punished or blamed, the aetiology -  the history -  o f the situation needs to be 
assessed.
Mackenzie and the virtuous education
The Man o f  Feeling  provides experience, albeit vicarious experience o f
situations to which a reader is not witness first hand. They are open to causal
explanation, and the reader, if  guided by H arley’s (eventual) judgem ents,
will be guided towards the response appropriate to an impartial spectator.
This approach to moral education would have had Smith’s seal o f  approval,
as he too regarded reading as a suitable means o f  being prompted to
sympathy: ‘We can sympathise with the distress which excessive hunger
occasions when we read the description o f it in the journal o f a siege, or o f  a 
181sea voyage.’
Throughout The Man o f  Feeling, Harley is confronted by situations in 
which an individual’s presenting situation belies their circumstances. Prior 
to the episode with Miss Atkins, poor Harley’s inability to go beyond 
appearances and discriminate between those who are worthy o f sympathy, 
and those who are not, makes life very difficult for him. Until H arley’s 
encounter with Miss Atkins, Harley’s moral learning curve is vertical. 
M ackenzie flags Harley’s sudden moral growth when, on receiving Miss 
A tkins’ sincere gratitude for his concern, and expressing remorse at her 
situation, Harley responds with ‘there is virtue in these tears; let the fruit o f
183 I.ii.1.1; see also III.4.9. Smith may not have approved o f the reading 
matter being fiction however; ‘A well contrived Story may be as interesting 
and entertaining as any real one: the causes which brought about the several 
incidents that are narrated may all be very ingeniously contrived and well 
adapted to their severall ends, but still as the facts are not such as have realy 
[sic] existed, the end proposed by the history will not be answered. The facts 
must be real, otherwise they will not assist us in our future conduct by 
pointing out the means to avoid or produce any event’ (LRBL , ii. 17). This 
perhaps is the reason for M ackenzie stating his book is not a history. Sm ith’s 
remark about journals, and the prevailing view o f the moral value o f  reading 
true accounts, may also be what prompted B um s’ wry comment in the 
preface o f his Common-place Book: ‘it may be o f some entertainment to a 
curious observer o f human-nature to see how a plough-boy thinks, and feels, 
under the pressure o f Love, Ambition, Anxiety, Grief, with the like cares and 
passions, which, however, diversified by the Modes and M anners o f  Life, 
operate pretty much alike, I believe, in all the Species’ (quoted by Simpson, 
The Protean Scot, p. 1).
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them be virtue’ (MF, p. 50). Harley has recognised remorse, and for once 
judged the situation correctly, as he, and the reader subsequently learn, on 
hearing the history -  that is, the causes -  o f Miss Atkins’ destitution.
The parallel between Smith’s and M ackenzie’s emphasis on the 
importance o f causes and motives in making moral judgem ents, together 
with evidence o f Harley’s growing ability to deal with moral situations o f 
increasing complexity while relying less on his own experiences in reaching 
such judgements, are good reasons for taking seriously the suggestion that 
Mackenzie has written an aid to the kind o f virtuous education promoted by 
Smith’s theory. Further, less theoretical, reasons to assume a connection 
between Mackenzie’s The Man o f  Feeling  and Smith’s M oral Sentiments is 
provided by considering the characters in The Man o f  Feeling, many o f 
whom express views o f  which Smith overtly disapproves. For example, the 
philosophy o f the beggar Harley meets en route for London (outlined above, 
p. 58), epitomises attitudes that Smith associates with those who ‘have had 
the misfortune to be brought up amidst violence, licentiousness, falsehood, 
and injustice’, and who, in consequence, ‘lose, though not all sense o f  the 
impropriety o f such conduct, yet all sense o f its dreadful enormity, or o f  the 
vengeance and punishment due to it’ (V.2.2). Furthermore, M ackenzie’s 
beggar very obviously fails to regard his lot as being in any way a 
consequence o f his attitude: the disasters that befell him ‘forced’ him to beg; 
and he was surprised to find that telling his story honestly failed to induce 
people to give him alms. He illustrates what Smith describes as the belief 
that ‘the way o f the w orld’ is ‘something which either may, or must be 
practised, to hinder us from being dupes o f our own integrity’ (ibid.). 
Mackenzie’s misanthropist (see above, pp. 62-3) exemplifies the 
conclusions Smith reaches as a result o f considering the sociable nature o f 
sympathy about the result o f  solitary brooding on one’s disappointments: ‘In 
solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves: we are 
apt to over-rate the good offices we may have done, and the injuries we may 
have suffered: we are apt to be too much elated by our own good, and too 
much dejected by our own bad fortune’ (III.3.28).
M ackenzie’s excise man (p. 60 above) could substitute for Sm ith’s
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‘coxcomb’ or liar:
The foolish liar, who endeavours to excite the admiration o f  the company by 
the relation o f adventures which never had any existence; the important 
coxcomb, who gives him self airs o f  rank and distinction which he well 
knows he has no just pretensions to; are both o f them, no doubt, pleased with 
the applause which they fancy they meet with. But their vanity arises from 
so gross an illusion o f  the imagination that it is difficult to conceive how any 
rational creature should be imposed upon it.184
There are few references to women in the M oral Sentiments but none the 
less, Miss Walton (see above, pp. 56-7) matches Smith’s description o f a 
virtuous woman: ‘[the company o f women] should inspire us with more 
gaiety, more pleasantry, and more attention; and an intire insensibility to the 
fair sex, renders a man contemptible in some measure even to m en.’ 185 
Where Smith wrote:
Humanity is the virtue o f a woman, generosity o f a man. Humanity consists 
merely in the exquisite fellow-feeling which the spectator entertains with the 
sentiments o f the persons principally concerned, so as to grieve for their 
sufferings, to reset their injuries, and to rejoice at their good fortune. The 
most humane actions require no self-denial, no self-command, no great 
exertion o f the sense o f propriety. They consist in doing what this exquisite 
sympathy would o f its own accord prompt up to do. But it is otherwise with 
generosity. (IV.2.10)
Mackenzie states o f Miss Walton: ‘Her beneficence was unbounded; indeed 
the natural tenderness o f  her heart might have been argued by the frigidity o f 
a casuist, as detracting from her virtue in this respect, for her humanity was a 
feeling, not a principle’ (M F , p. 16).
Most importantly, Harley and Edwards are also two o f  Sm ith’s characters. 
Smith may as well have been describing Harley when he wrote:
184 III.2.4, although given Smith’s analysis, Harley doesn’t come out o f  this 
well, since he was thoroughly credulous throughout the excisem an’s 
extraordinary performance during lunch.
185 This remark is made in the context o f  the impropriety o f  expressions o f 
lust -  Smith’s point is not that the calibre o f conversation should be lowered 
in the presence o f women, but that while they should not be treated as ‘sex 
objects’, women nevertheless demand respect on account o f  their gender. 
Dwyer, however, has suggested that this comment supplies evidence o f 
Smith’s demeaning attitude to women; as, given his contrast between 
Fordyce’s and Smith’s attitudes towards women, he also apparently 
interprets Smith’s comment on women and humanity (Dwyer, Age o f  
Passions, pp. 81-3; 126-8).
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There is a helplessness in the character o f extreme humanity which more 
than anything interests our pity ... We only regret that it is unfit for the 
world, because the world is unworthy o f  it, and because it must expose the 
person who is endowed with it as a prey to the perfidy and ingratitude o f 
insinuating falsehood, and to a thousand pains and uneasinesse, which o f  all 
men, he the least deserves to feel, and which generally too he is, o f  all men, 
the least capable o f supporting. (I.ii.4.3)
Edwards as the benevolent, family-oriented warrior fits perfectly Sm ith’s 
idea o f the man o f virtue (see above, p. 138-9). For example, his self- 
command is such that while his description o f events leading to his 
conscription make Harley weep so much his face was bathed in tears, he 
himself ‘dropped one tear and no m ore’ (M F, p. 89), yet despite his great 
self-command, he was able to grieve for others -  for his dead son and his 
fatherless grandchildren, for example (M F , p. 100). He matches Smith’s 
description o f the man o f virture as capable o f both great self-command and 
sincere benevolence:
When we meet, in common life, with any example o f such heroic 
magnanimity, we are always extremely affected ... the sympathetic grief o f 
the spectator appears to go beyond the original passion o f  the person 
principally concerned. (I.iii.1.4)
In addition to peopling The Man o f  Feeling  with Sm ith’s stereotypes, 
Mackenzie replicates some o f the situations Smith uses as illustrative 
examples in the M oral Sentiments. For example, Smith regarded madness, to 
be the worst conceivable affliction: ‘O f all the calamities to which the 
condition o f mortality exposes mankind, the loss o f  reason appears, to those 
who have the last spark o f humanity, by far the most dreadful, and they 
behold that last stage o f  human wretchedness with deeper commiseration 
than any other’ (I.i. 1.11). This sentiment is echoed in The M an o f  Feeling: 
‘Harley objected to [a visit to Bedlam] , “because,” said he, “I think it an 
inhuman practice to expose the greatest misery with which our nature is 
afflicted’” (M F, p. 29). And just as Smith argued that in the case o f  madness, 
it is possible to feel sympathy because one cannot help imagining oneself in 
the circumstances o f the afflicted, regardless o f whether they are themselves 
aware o f their condition, so Harley reacts acutely to the bereaved lover’s 
situation, although she herself is unable to do so (M F, pp. 33-5).
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Smith argued that it is impossible to feel sympathy with a lover’s feelings 
for his beloved, because it is impossible to imagine yourself in their position 
-  that is, it is impossible to imagine falling in love with someone with whom 
you are not romantically involved:
The passion appears to every body, but the man who feels it, entirely 
disproportionate to the value o f the object; and love, though it is pardoned in 
a certain age because we know it is natural, is always laughed at, because 
we cannot enter into it. All serious and strong expressions o f  it appear 
ridiculous to a third person, and although a lover may be good company to 
his mistress, ... he endeavours to treat his own passions with raillery and 
ridicule. (I.ii.2.1)
Harley’s inadequacy as a swain prior to his visit to London is highly 
illustrative o f Smith’s remarks about the impossibility o f spectatorial 
sympathy with a lover’s feelings. Miss Walton obviously has hidden allure, 
for example:
The effect [that Miss W alton’s voice] had on Harley, him self used to paint 
ridiculously enough; and ascribed to it powers, which few believed, and 
nobody cared for. ... there were certain seasons when his ideas were flushed 
to a degree much above their common complexion. In times not credulous 
o f inspiration, we should account for this from some common cause; but we 
do not mean to account for it at all; it were sufficient to describe its effects; 
but they were sometimes so ludicrous as might derogate from the dignity o f 
the sensations which produced them. (MF, pp. 16-17)
Harley didn’t even escape as well as Sm ith’s besotted man, as it is evident 
that, at this stage, he w asn’t even good company for his mistress, being 
rendered tongue-tied in her presence.
Smith’s influence on The M an o f  Feeling  is pronounced with regard to 
M ackenzie’s treatment o f wealth and social corrosion. The London 
sequences are almost entirely related to the ill-effect o f  avarice and ambition. 
On the reading o f Smith’s analysis o f the cause o f the wealth-induced social 
deterioration, given here, the relation between M ackenzie’s The M an o f  
Feeling  and Smith’s Theory o f  M oral Sentiments seems indisputable. Smith 
argues that valuing wealth above virtue is the result o f  m isperceiving the 
condition o f the wealthy -  taking the trappings o f wealth to indicate 
something o f the worth o f  the person (pp. 190-4 above). Throughout 
Harley’s sojourn in London, he is repeatedly confronted by the discrepancy
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between appearance and reality, and in almost all cases, the illusion concerns 
wealth or poverty. The excise man appears to be o f  a certain rank because o f 
the way he dresses; yet the topsy-turvy effect o f the appearance o f  wealth is 
emphasised by the fact that W rightson and Mundy look shabby in inverse 
proportion to their financial situation (MF, pp. 26, 28). Throughout, the 
message is that o f Smith: that wealth not only blurs the distinctions between 
social ranks but more importantly, it blurs that between the virtuous and the 
non-virtuous. Given the importance, according to Smith’s theory, o f  the 
need to develop ideas engendering virtue through experience o f appropriate 
sympathy relations, The Man o f  Feeling  can be seen as a series o f  exercises 
in sensibility focusing on the difficult business o f  becoming discerning 
enough to see beyond the trappings o f status.
Throughout The Man o f  Feeling , Harley encounters evidence o f  a society 
in which wealth takes precedence over virtue. The beggar, the excise man, 
the mad woman, Miss Atkins and Edwards, in different ways, are all 
products o f a corroded set o f social values. The beggar sought out the 
company o f felons, because he appreciated their feckless, self-centred 
lifestyle, and, as a result o f  habitual contact with such people, adopted their 
values. The woman in the asylum was victim to her father’s overriding desire 
for a wealthy son-in-law. W inbrooke’s refusal to countenance marriage to 
Miss Atkins was largely due to his anxiety that such a move would threaten 
his inheritance; while Edwards’ woes began when his landlord implemented 
changes on his estate to increase its revenue. In each case, virtue has been 
superceded by baser, money-oriented values. In conversation with Ben 
Silton, when travelling home from London, Harley explains the reasons why 
an improved economy will court society-wide moral deterioration. The 
populace have been dazzled by the trappings o f increased personal wealth, 
into believing there is more reward in achieving riches than in virtue: ‘The 
immense riches acquired by individuals have erected a standard o f  ambition, 
destructive o f private morals, and o f  public virtue’ (MF, p. 82). Harley then 
refers specifically to an issue o f  great concern to the literati: ‘The Frivolous 
and the Interested ... are characteristical features o f  our age; they are visible 
even in the essays o f our philosophers’ (ibid.). The Frivolous and the
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Interested reject the value system o f their predecessors, replacing it with one 
which values appearances. Harley concludes: ‘This I hold to be an alarming 
crisis in the corruption o f  the state; when not only is value declined and vice 
prevailing, but when the praises o f virtue are forgotten, and the infamy o f 
vice unfelt’ (MF, pp. 82-3). Again Mackenzie is following Smith. Since 
Smith argued that virtue is learned, it follows that, in a society in which vice 
and virtue go unrecognised can only deteriorate further.
Perhaps the most important evidence o f the centrality o f Sm ith’s M oral 
Sentiments to The Man o f  Feeling  lies in the way sympathy ‘w orks’ in The 
Man o f  Feeling. As mentioned above, whether a person’s conduct merits 
approval is signalled by Harley’s response to their history -  the account o f 
the circumstances which caused the situation in which Harley finds them. 
Tears from Harley signal that moral approval is appropriate, because he 
regards the person’s attitude and conduct to be those he would adopt under 
the same circumstances. It follows that if  a reader responds to the characters’ 
histories in the same way as Harley, she can be assumed to have understood 
their moral import, and, equally importantly, when Harley withholds 
approval, to have understood why he has done so.
An example o f the case in point is given by the variation in Harley’s 
reactions during his encounter with Miss Atkins. He did not weep at Miss 
Atkins’ initial display o f remorse (MF, p. 50), although he wept when, the 
following day, she recounted the events that led to her becoming a prostitute 
(MF, p. 66). Indeed, at this juncture, his tears threatened to cause her to 
weep:
[Harley] beckoned her with his hand: he would have stopped the mention o f 
his favours; but he could not speak, had it been to beg a diadem.
She saw his tears; her fortitude began to fail at the sight, when the voice 
o f some stranger on the stairs awakened her attention. (MF, p. 66)
Since the reader is expected to weep when Harley weeps, and withhold her 
tears when Harley does, here she needs to understand the difference between 
the two situations. During the initial exchange between Harley and Miss 
Atkins, Miss Atkins demonstrates the potential for a reversal o f  her slide into 
depravity in her response to Harley’s offer o f a financial help: ‘She burst into
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tears! “Your generosity, Sir, is abused; to bestow it on me is to take it from 
the virtuous: I have no title but misery to plead; misery o f my own 
procuring’” {MF, p. 50). Harley acknowledges this, but he has no 
information about why she is in her current situation so is unable to draw any 
conclusions about how genuine her remorse is. Having heard her story, 
however, he is able to judge her morally, and his tears indicate that her 
attitude towards her history and her situation, and the fact that, unlike the 
beggar, she acknowledges her part in her downfall, have his approval. The 
reader is expected to respond similarly: to weep only when there is sufficient 
cause for sympathy.
Miss Atkins’ tale introduces an additional element o f complexity for the 
reader. Understanding the difference described above between Harley’s 
responses during his first and second encounters with Miss Atkins requires 
appreciating the conditions under which it is possible to reach a conclusion 
about another person’s moral conduct. However, Mackenzie also describes 
Harley’s response the following morning, to his memory o f  his first meeting 
with Miss Atkins. He remembers that she wept in gratitude for his 
assistance: ‘he wept at the recollection o f her tears. “Though I am the vilest 
o f beings, I have not forgotten every virtue; gratitude, I hope, I shall still 
have left’” {MF, p. 53). It is difficult to explain what a reader is to 
understand by Harley’s tears at this juncture, unless Smith’s notion o f 
impartial spectatorship is brought into play. According to Sm ith’s theory, 
gratitude implies a benefactor, so moral approval o f Miss A tkins’ gratitude 
implies moral approval o f the conduct o f  the benefactor. Curiously, Harley 
has to be regarded, here, as expressing moral approval o f his own actions. 
Smith’s theory provides the reason for this unexpected development: it 
moves the reader to a different, more complex, and so more sophisticated set 
o f moral judgements -  ones for which the reader needs to consider a moral 
dyad. The reader can only appreciate Harley’s tears, if  she has approved 
both Miss Atkins’ response to Harley’s intervention and H arley’s 
intervention itself. This incident marks the start o f  a series o f  situations in 
which Harley reactions guide the reader towards specific reactions, rather 
than demonstrate what her reactions ought to be. The education process
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ends with Harley’s death scene, which effectively leaves the reader without 
instruction:
He sighed, and fell back on his seat. -  Miss Walton screamed at the sight -  
His aunt and the servants rushed into the room -  They found them lying 
motionless together. -  His physician happened to call at that instant -  Every 
art was tried to recover them -  With Miss Walton they succeeded -  But 
Harley was gone for ever! (MF, pp. 130-1)
There is no mention o f tears in this scene, yet undoubtedly the reader is 
expected to weep. An analysis o f an impartial spectator’s sympathetic 
response in this situation shows it to be another moral dyad, complicated by 
the fact that Miss W alton’s anticipated sorrow is understood to be the result 
o f  the complex business o f imagining what she would feel were she in 
Harley’s situation. Smith describes the cause o f our sympathy with the dead 
as the effect o f concern with ‘those circumstances which strike our senses, 
but can have no influence upon their happiness’:
It is miserable, we think, to be deprived o f the light o f the sun; to be shut out 
from life and conversation; to be laid in a cold grave, a prey to corruption 
and the reptiles o f the earth; to be no more thought o f in this world, but to be 
obliterated, in a little time from the affections, and almost from the memory, 
o f  their dearest friends and relations’ (I.i. 1.13).
When the reader can respond appropriately to Harley’s death, she has 
accommodated all this together with the knowledge that Harley has the 
happiness o f knowing his love for Miss Walton was reciprocated. For the 
reader to feel sorrow she will need to have both a sympathetic reaction to an 
imagined situation -  Harley’s grief at his death -  and an appreciation that 
M iss W alton’s sense o f grief and loss relies on what she imagines Harley to 
feel. Taking Smith’s theory as central to The Man o f  Feeling , this becomes 
the most testing o f scenarios, a fitting end to a course o f education in virtue.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Smith’s M oral Sentiments is intended to be read first and 
foremost as a scientific theory o f morality. Following Newton, Smith uses 
the hypothetico-deductive methodology o f  theory construction. He 
decomposes moral judgements into atomic constituents manipulated
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according to inductive generalisations about acceptable conduct; 
demonstrates the plausibility o f his theory by showing how intuitively 
understood, simple moral concepts such as propriety and gratitude can be 
reconstructed from the moral primitives in combination with the inductive 
generalisations or general laws, and then shows the completeness o f  his 
theory by using these simple concepts to constructing complex abstract moral 
concepts such as justice to recreate the full domain o f moral discourse.
Smith identifies sympathy as the moral primitive. Sympathy is a relation 
between moral agent or agents and impartial spectator. A sympathetic 
relation arises between two people when they recognise that agent’s 
emotional response to a situation accords with or is very similar to that which 
the spectator imagines such a situation would cause him to feel. A moral 
judgem ent involves the spectator recognising that nature o f the relation -  the 
degree o f convergence -  between his imagined reaction, and that o f  the agent, 
and condoning or condemning the agent’s behaviour according to whether or 
not there is enough convergence for the relation to be sympathetic. The 
ability to sympathise is unlearned; however, agents have to first learn to 
recognise their feelings as sympathetic, and then to modulate their response 
to accord with the general rules o f conduct. The theory is consistently 
empiricist. Moral conduct is learnt through experience initially through the 
guidance o f mentors.
It has also been argued that Smith used more than just Newtonian 
methodology. Sympathy is the convergence o f  two or more people’s 
emotional reactions. Smith suggests that an individual’s emotions wax and 
wane in a predictable manner. Smith’s general statements about fluctuations 
in emotions, which he regarded as derivable by inductive generalisation from 
experience, bear a marked resemblance to New ton’s three laws o f motion. 
Full sympathy is an ideal only. Since one element o f  the sympathy relation is 
the spectator’s imagined response to the circumstances in which he 
understands the agent to be situated, and since, according to both Hume and 
Smith, a reaction to imagined circumstances will always be less intense than 
a response to actual circumstances, the spectator’s response cannot match 
that o f an agent. However agent and spectator attempt to achieve full
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sympathy by modulating their responses to match each other’s. Smith argues 
that this involves knowledge by each o f the other’s circumstances in order to 
gauge what their emotional reaction might be. The greater the knowledge o f 
the other’s circumstances, the nearer they can get to achieving full sympathy. 
It follows that the closer agent and spectator are socially, the more common 
ground they will have, and the easier it will be for them to approach full 
sympathy. This can be expressed generally as a Newtonian-type law: 
sympathy is inversely proportionate to social distance -  analgous to 
New ton’s law that gravity is inversely proportional to distance. According to 
Smith’s theory, since sympathy relations describe the ways in which 
mankind interact, sympathy can be regarded as binding a society in a manner 
analogous to that in which gravity binds the elements o f  the universe.
Smith and Hume both adopted Locke’s theory o f concept-formation. 
Smith built on Hum e’s account o f the way information received through the 
senses is subsumed under identifiable concepts, to explain how experience 
affects moral concept-formation. Because on Sm ith’s theory, all conceptual 
knowledge is ultimately derivable from experience, it follows that the wider 
and more comprehensive one’s experience o f virtuous behaviour, the richer 
one’s corresponding concept o f  virtue. This account also motivates Smith’s 
explanation o f the derivation o f  general rules o f  conduct -  these are derived 
by induction from experience. Smith is then able to explain development o f 
conscience in terms o f internalising these rules, and developing sufficient 
self-discipline to act in accordance with them regardless o f whether subject 
to the moral judgements o f others.
The inductive nature o f general rules o f conduct makes Sm ith’s theory 
comprehensive enough to accommodate predictable social change. This is 
required for the theory to be plausible: since it is intended to encompass the 
moral codes o f any societies, it has to accommodate and explain the 
evolution and change o f a society’s value system -  whether progressive or 
regressive, as in the case o f the Roman Empire, for example. The theory’s 
comprehensiveness enables Smith to give a causal analysis o f  wealth-induced 
social deterioration, drawing on evidence in history. Because his analysis 
indicates the kinds o f  factors which precipitate social change, it also provides
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the framework for a means o f preventing or reversing social deterioration, 
arguably without eschewing commerce and an improved national economics.
Although Smith’s concept o f general rules is such that they can be used 
prescriptively in the moral education o f an individual, they can function 
descriptively in the characterisation o f  a society’s moral code. As such, they 
are intrinsic to the stadial view o f social development, foundational to the 
eighteenth-century concept o f improvement or societal progress.
Reading Smith’s intention in the M oral Sentiments to be that o f  providing 
an objective, scientific account o f moral concept-formation has been shown 
to give a unity and consistency to the text which is missing from a normative 
reading. In addition the M oral Sentiments becomes recognisably related to 
Smith’s work in other disciplines, and as such imparts a unity to Sm ith’s 
corpus as a whole.
If  The Man o f  Feeling  is read in conjunction with the revisionist 
interpretation o f the Moral Sentiments, the didactic aspects o f the novel come 
to the fore. There are enough parallels with the M oral Sentiments, for The 
Man o f  Feeling to be described as an illustration o f  Sm ith’s theory. 
Throughout the M oral Sentiments Smith exemplifies points o f his argument 
with detailed descriptions o f specific kinds o f social interaction. These 
examples, together with the character sketches Smith gave to illustrate the 
relation between a person’s behaviour and his level o f moral knowledge 
appear throughout The Man o f  Feeling.
In addition, Mackenzie guides the reader through a series moral puzzles, 
in which Harley acts first as role model, and then as mentor. Using Sm ith’s 
analysis o f moral concepts, the puzzles can be seen to increase in moral 
complexity, where moral complexity is determined by the complexity o f  the 
sympathetic relation between the reader and characters which needs to arise 
for a reader to be able to make a correct moral judgem ent about the 
characters’ conduct. The reader can only respond correctly if  she is first able 
to imagine the feelings o f the characters involved in interaction, and then 
judge from the given causal history for each character whether their reaction 
to their circumstances is appropriate. In conclusion, it can now be seen that 
the account o f The Man o f  Feeling  given in chapter I is incomplete:
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M ackenzie’s novel is not merely a manual o f  morality, but an aid to a 
reader’s education in the theory o f  moral sentiments as propounded by Smith.
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I l l  T h e  Fragments
I have argued that Smith used the hypothetico-deductive method to construct 
a theory o f moral sentiments; that his theory provided a structure and 
rationale for a principled approach to moral education; and that there is 
strong evidence o f Smith’s influence in this regard in M ackenzie’s The Man 
o f  Feeling.
There is another source o f evidence for the claim that the literati 
developed an education for virtue from Smith’s theory; namely Hugh Blair’s 
writings -  his Sermons (1777-1801) and Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres (1783). To establish this satisfactorily requires a detailed discussion 
o f  B lair’s Sermons and Lectures, an inquiry which is not possible here.
However, much o f the content o f  Blair’s Lectures appears in a condensed 
form in his Critical Dissertation the Poems o f  Ossian} B lair’s response to 
the Ossian poems reveals enough o f  his debt to Smith to bolster the claim 
that Smith’s theory was foundational in the literati’s approach to the 
promotion o f virtue. Considering Blair’s discussion o f the Ossian poems has 
the added advantage o f dovetailing with the discussion o f the nature o f 
M ackenzie’s The Man o f  Feeling , which several have pointed out exhibits 
markedly Ossianic qualities.2 The link between Ossian and The M an o f  
Feeling  is not controversial; the link between Blair’s response to Ossian, The 
Man o f  Feeling and Smith’s Theory o f  M oral Sentiments, is. For example, it 
has been argued that the response to Ossian shows a distinct break with 
Smith’s position on the role o f the family in the promulgation o f  virtue -  a
1 A Critical Dissertation on the Poems o f  Ossian (1763; revised edn 1765), 
repr. in James Macpherson, The Poems o f  Ossian and Related Works (1760- 
73), ed. H. Gaskill (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. 345- 
99. The relation between Blair’s Lectures and his Critical Dissertation is 
described in Fiona Stafford, ‘Hugh Blair’s Ossian, Romanticism and the 
Teaching o f Literature’, in Robert Crawford (ed.), The Scottish Invention o f  
English Literature, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 6 8 -  
88; pp. 77-9.
2 See, for example, Susan M anning, ‘Henry Mackenzie and Ossian or, the 
emotional value o f asterisks’, in Fiona Stafford and Howard Gaskill (eds), 
From Gaelic to Romantic: Ossianic Translations (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998, 
pp. 136-52). However Manning considers Mackenzie to have applied Reid’s 
philosophy rather than Smith’s, see. pp. 137-9.
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break regarded as evident also in M ackenzie’s novels; and that this break is 
concomitant with a general shift away from the Stoicism seen as 
underpinning Smith’s moral theory.3 However, few, in discussing Blair’s 
Dissertation, mention that Blair attended Sm ith’s lectures on rhetoric and 
belles-lettres, delivered in Edinburgh from 1749; that Blair later borrowed 
part o f Smith’s manuscript for his own use; or that Mackenzie, familiar with 
Smith’s work, commented on the lack o f originality in B lair’s published 
Lectures,4 In addition to these points, there are more interesting reasons for 
countering claims against Sm ith’s influence on the literati’s approach to 
issues o f morality -  reasons which come to light by considering Blair’s 
critical approach to the Ossian poems and to ‘ancient poetry’ generally.
The Ossian poems have been discussed from many quite different angles. 
More accurately, the reception o f the poems has been approached in different
John Dwyer, The Age o f  Passions: An Interpretation o f  Adam Smith and  the 
Scottish Enlightenment Culture (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1998), pp. 4 -5; 
and ‘The Melancholy Savage: Text and Context in the Poems o f  O ssian \ in 
Howard Gaskill (ed.), Ossian Revisited  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1991), pp. 164-206; pp. 166-7.
4 The connection between Smith and Blair is acknowledged by Stafford in 
‘Hugh Blair’s Ossian’, p. 71. Sm ith’s Edinburgh lectures on rhetoric and 
belles-lettres are mentioned in Dugald Stewart, ‘Account o f the Life and 
Writings o f Adam Smith, LL.D .’ (1793), repr. in Adam Smith, Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects with Dugald S tew art’s Account o f  Adam Smith (1795), 
ed. I.S. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 269-351, p. 272; Berry 
refers to a note in Blair’s Lectures acknowledging his debt to Smith 
(Christopher Berry, ‘Adam Sm ith’s Considerations on Language’, Journal o f  
the History o f  Ideas, 35 (1974), pp. 130-8; p. 131). In a letter written in 
1784 to William Carmichael, his former class mate and then American 
Charge d ’Affaires in Spain, Mackenzie commented ‘D r Blair has at least 
published his Lectures on Rhetoric & Belles Lettres, which I think very good, 
both in point o f Criticism & Taste, tho’ perhaps not so original or deep as the 
metaphysical enquiring turn o f this age, might have required.’ In the same 
letter he refers to Smith as ‘the first o f  our Writers, both in point o f  Genius & 
Information’ and o f Smith’s projected publication o f his Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, they will ‘nowise derogate from his former 
Reputation as an Author’ {Letters 1766-1827, p. 124; emphasis original). 
An example o f a discussion o f  B lair’s Dissertation  which appears to work 
from the assumption that Blair’s critique o f Ossian is entirely original is that 
o f John Valdimir Price, ‘Ossian and the Canon in the Scottish 
Enlightenment’, in Howard Gaskill (ed.), Ossian Revisited  (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1991), pp. 109-28; see especially pp. 110-11, 
where Price comments that Karnes’ comments on Ossian in his Sketches o f  
the History o f  Man (1774), can be traced back to Blair.
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ways. The authenticity o f the poems has been a perennial preoccupation o f 
commentators; however, in the first half o f the last century, the Ossian poems 
formed the basis o f  discussion o f  eighteenth-century Scottish primitivism.5 
More recently the poems and the debate over their authenticity have been 
requisitioned by the various camps in the ‘Scottish identity’ debate. The 
poem s’ reception has been taken as evidence o f the literati’s renewed interest 
in Scottish culture in the wake o f the ’45.6 The success o f the poems has 
been read as connected with the m ilitia issues o f the 1750s;7 and with the 
Bute smear campaign o f the early 1760s.8 Then again it has been argued as 
evidence o f an essentially Anglo-Scottish move on the part o f  the literati;9 
and also an anti-Anglo-Scottish move on their part.10
Here, however, the Ossian poems raise a more local concern. Hugh Blair 
responded enthusiastically to the very first o f  M acpherson’s translations o f 
Gaelic poetry; and on the strength o f this worked hard to coax M acpherson 
out o f  his reluctance to provide further translations.11 Blair’s efforts led to the
5 See for example, Roy Pearce, ‘The Eighteenth-Century Primitivists: Some 
Reconsiderations’, ELH, 12 (1945), pp. 203-20.
6Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837  (London: Vintage, 
1992), p. 92.
7 See for example, Dwyer, Age o f  Passions, pp. 8-9.
8 Leith Davis, Acts o f  Union: Scotland and the Literary Negotiation o f  the 
British Nation, 1707-1830  (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
pp. 75-6.
See Kenneth Simpson, The Protean Scot: The Crisis o f  Identity in 
Eighteenth Century Scottish Literature (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University 
Press, 1988), pp. 43^1.
10 Katie Trumpener, Bardic Nationalism: The Romantic Novel and the British  
Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), ch. 2.
11 Blair refers to M acpherson’s initial reluctance to translate the poems in the 
‘Appendix’ to his Critical Dissertation  citing M acpherson’s reason as that he 
was ‘afraid o f not doing justice to the poem s’ (‘Appendix’ to A Critical 
Dissertation on the Poems o f  Ossian (2nd edn, 1765), repr. in James 
Macpherson, The Poems o f  Ossian and Related Works (1760-73), ed. H. 
Gaskill (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. 401-12; p. 401). 
In a letter written to Henry Mackenzie in 1797, Blair wrote that having seen 
M acpherson’s initial translation -  the poem o f the death o f  Oscur (Fragment
VII), ‘I urged, him to translate the other pieces which he had ... he was 
extremely reluctant and averse to comply with my request, saying, that no 
translation o f his could do justice to the spirit and force o f  the original ... It 
was not till after much and repeated importunity on my part, and representing 
the injustice he would do to his native country by keeping concealed those 
hidden treasures, which, I assured him, if  brought forth, would serve to
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publication o f The Fragments (1760), for which he wrote a preface, 
anonymously.12 Although the preface mentions ‘a greater w ork’ o f  which 
the Fragments are remains, and which ‘might be recovered and translated’, it 
is reasonable to assume that Blair was responding to more than just the 
promise o f an extant epic -  that he responded to the poems themselves, to 
what he refers to in the preface as the ‘spirit and strain’ o f the poems which 
he regarded as demonstrating their authenticity.13 This suggests that there 
are elements o f the Fragments which Blair associated with ‘remote antiquity’. 
Since the poems were unique and novel, B lair’s response could not have 
been one o f straightforward recognition, so his reaction will have been, in 
part, to the ways in which the poems confirmed a preconceived notion o f  the 
nature o f poetry composed during ‘an aera o f the most remote antiquity’.14 
The question then, is ‘What provoked Blair’s interest in the Ossian poem s?’; 
and the answer to this is given in the Critical Dissertation. More pertinently,
enrich the whole learned world, that I at length prevailed on him to translate, 
and bring to me the several poetical pieces which he had in his possession’ 
{Letters 1766-1827, ed. H.W. Drescher (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter 
Lang, 1989), p. 197). Fiona Stafford quotes an account given by John Home 
for the Highland Society’s inquiry into the authenticity o f the Ossian poems, 
concerning his initial exchange with Macpherson about the possibility o f 
Macpherson providing a translation o f some o f the Gaelic poetry, to enable 
Home, not a Gaelic speaker, to understand the reasons for M acpherson’s 
enthusiasm. Here too, reference is made to M acpherson’s reluctance 
resulting from concern that he would be unable to do the poems justice: ‘Mr 
Macpherson declined the task [of translating a piece o f Gaelic poetry], saying, 
that his translation would give a very imperfect idea o f the original’ ( ‘A Note 
from John Home’, in Henry Mackenzie, Report o f  the Committee o f  the 
Highland Society o f  Scotland, appointed to Inquire into the Nature and  
Authenticity o f  the Poems o f  Ossian (Edinburgh 1805), quoted in Fiona 
Stafford, The Sublime Savage: James Macpherson and the Poems o f  Ossian 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), pp. 77-8).
12 ‘Preface’ (1760) to James Macpherson, Fragments o f  Ancient Poetry, repr. 
in The Poems o f  Ossian and Related Works (1760-73), ed. H. Gaskill 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. 5-6. Blair explained that 
he contributed the preface, in a letter to Henry M ackenzie {Letters 1766- 
1827, p. 197).
13 Blair, ‘Preface’, p. 5. This is not to discount the lure o f  a Scots epic -  a lure 
which would have been in evidence from the first, as M acpherson’s initial 
translation was the fragment describing the death o f  Oscur, in which it is 
evident that Ossian is the narrator. The fragment opens with a reference by 
the narrator to Oscur as his son; and a little later, Oscur is addressed as ‘son 
o f Oscian’.
14 Ibid.
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this answer also shows the extent to which Blair’s thought was dependent on 
that o f Smith.
I describe the Ossianic corpus in section 1, and describe B lair’s stadial 
approach to a comparative study o f ancient poetry in section 2. The import 
o f  stadial history for language and literature studies in the eighteenth century 
has been underestimated, and when acknowledged is frequently 
misrepresented. Misconceptions about the principles o f  stadialism, with 
regard to history and language have been shown in the introduction (pp. 10- 
20), however, stadialism informs Blair’s grammatical analysis o f  the Ossian 
poems, as is shown in section 4, and this leads to an analysis in section 5, o f 
the origin o f the anomaly posed for Blair by the character o f  Ossian. B lair’s 
reliance on Smith’s stadial theory o f language development is discussed in 
section 6, and in section 7 Blair’s Ossian problem is revisited by way o f  a 
discussion o f Smith’s account o f love in the Theory o f  M oral Sentiments. 
Finally, in section 8, I show that Mackenzie reveals a link between The Man 
o f  Feeling, The Fragments, and The Theory o f  M oral Sentiments in the 
course o f Edwards’ tale.
1 T he Ossian corpus
The Ossian poems originally appeared in three volumes: Fragments o f  
Ancient Poetry (1760), Fingal, an Ancient Epic Poem in Six Books (1760-1) 
and Temora, an Epic Poem in Eight Books (1763). They were presented as 
English translations o f authentic Gaelic poetry, gathered in the Scots 
Highlands by James Macpherson, a Gaelic-speaking Highlander. The 
Fragments comprises 15 segments o f poetry (16 in the second edition 
(1760)), which introduced the English-speaking world to a formerly lost 
Caledonia o f the third century AD. Fingal and Temora are epics. Fingal 
describes the defence o f Ireland by the Gaels from an assault by the 
Scandinavian king, Swaran. The saga centres on Fingal the leader o f  the 
Scots Gaels; Ossian, his son, warrior and poet; Ossian’s son Oscur; the Irish 
prince Cuchullin; the Dane, Swaran and through stories his father Stamo; and 
is augmented by a number o f  incidental sorrowful episodes involving bards, 
warriors and maidens. The Fingal publication includes a poem which was 
later republished as the first book o f Temora. Temora relates the end o f
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Fingal’s reign, and the involvement o f the Scots Gaels in what was
effectively civil war in Ireland.15
Even today the Ossian poems make strange reading. For an eighteenth-
century readership, used to the rule-governed elegance o f  neo-classicism,
they would have appeared like a bolt from the blue -  which Macpherson
anticipated would preclude a suitably appreciative reception o f  the poem s.16
That Blair shared M acpherson’s concern is indicated by the fact that in his
preface for the Fragments he concentrates on the antiquity o f  the poems -  on
their value as artefacts -  almost to the exclusion o f mention o f  them as
literature; and overtly leaves judgem ent o f their literary merit to the public.17
By contrast, 95 per cent o f  the Critical Dissertation is devoted to comments
on the literary nature o f ancient poetry generally and to a critical study o f  the
18 • •Ossian poems as poetry. The shift in emphasis reflects the extent to which 
anxiety that the poems would be received coolly or, worse, with disbelief,
15 Blair gives a fuller synopsis in his Critical Dissertation o f each o f Fingal 
(p. 361), and Temora (p. 370).
16 According to Blair, M acpherson’s initial reluctance to translate further 
poems in addition to that on the death o f  Oscur, which he had translated 
originally for John Home, was in part through fear o f  ‘injuring them by 
translation’ and in part because ‘he apprehended they would be very ill 
relished by the public as so very different from the strain o f  modern ideas, 
and o f modem, connected, and polished poetry’ (Hugh Blair to Henry 
Mackenzie, 20 December 1797, in Mackenzie, Letters 1766-1827, p. 197).
17 ‘O f the poetical merit o f  these fragments nothing shall here be said. Let 
the public judge and pronounce’ (Blair, ‘Preface’, p. 6).
18 Rizza gives exact figures for the discussions in the Critical Dissertation, o f  
antiquity and o f more literary issues: ‘O f some one hundred and thirty pages 
o f  octavo text in the Dissertation proper only seven are devoted directly to 
the matter o f the poetry’s authenticity’ (Steve Rizza, ‘A Bulky and Foolish 
Treatise? Hugh Blair’s Critical Dissertation  Reconsidered’, in Howard 
Gaskill (ed.), Ossian Revisited  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1991), pp. 129^16; p. 130). It is true that Blair added an appendix giving 
testimonies o f the authenticity o f the poems to the second edition o f the 
Critical Dissertation, but this appears to have been prompted by Hume, who 
regarded Blair’s arguments for their authenticity based on the poems 
themselves, to require augmentation by credible external evidence. Hume 
persuaded Blair to postpone publication o f  the second edition until such 
evidence could be could be included (Blair, ‘Appendix’); Hum e’s 
intervention is discussed in Rizza, ‘A Bulky and Foolish Treatise?’, p. 131; 
and more fully in David Raynor, ‘Ossian and Hume’, in Howard Gaskill (ed.), 
Ossian Revisited (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), pp. 147-63. 
Raynor quotes the letter to Blair, in which Hume exhorts him to authenticate 
the poems (ibid., pp. 148-50).
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proved unfounded. The Fragments was published in Edinburgh in June 1760, 
and was successful enough to warrant the publication o f a second edition just 
4 months later.19
Little o f  the Fragments would have been familiar to the majority o f  
readers. It is written in prose, the structure o f which is very simple -  short 
phrases often comprising monosyllables, and, proper names apart, rarely 
exceeding the disyllabic:
My love is a son o f the hill. He pursues the flying deer. His gray dogs are 
panting around him; his bow string sounds in the wind. (Fragment I)
Son o f the noble Fingal, Oscian, Prince o f men! what tears run down the 
cheeks o f age? what shades thy mighty soul? (Fragment VI)
The cadence and rhythm o f the prose is redolent o f Old Testament text.20 
The fragments, either singly or in pairs, tell a complete story in just a few 
short paragraphs, the motifs o f which are repeated with little variation, not 
only in this collection, but throughout the Ossianic corpus.
The first two o f the fragments contain most o f the elements making up 
‘the Ossianic’; what is missing from the Fragments is the overarching 
presence o f  the bard, Ossian. He overtly narrates only three o f  the fragments 
(VI, VII, VIII), although this is sufficient to establish the relationship 
between Fingal, Ossian and Oscur, and hence Ossian’s bardic-historian 
pedigree. In the majority o f the fragments, however, the narrator is 
unidentifiable. The fragmentation is replicated in the epics by the 
introduction o f incidental tales o f the kind making up the Fragments which
19 Stafford, The Sublime Savage, p. 96.
20 This point is made in Blair, Critical Dissertation, p. 391, although with 
respect to the use o f simile rather in respect o f pace and cadence. The text is 
often described as reminiscent o f the Song o f Solomon; or o f  the Psalms 
(Dafydd Moore, ‘Heroic Incoherence in James M acpherson’s The Poems o f  
O ssian’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 34 (2000), pp. 43-59; p. 46; Simpson, 
The Protean Scot, pp. 58-9; Stafford, The Sublime Savage, p. 102); the 
cadence and rhythm is also very similar to the Latin form o f  Catholic 
invocatory prayers.
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have the effect o f stilling the overall pace o f the longer poems by introducing
21what is, in effect, a meditation in sorrow.
Fragments I and II are largely exchanges between Shilric, one o f  Fingal’s 
warriors, and his love, Vinvela, although peculiarly in neither fragment are 
both parties physically present in the exchange. In the first, Vinvela 
describes Shilric, and anticipates secretly watching him, only to discover, 
from Shilric himself, that he is already far from familiar territory, en route to 
fight for Fingal. In the second it is Shilric who anticipates watching Vinvela 
unseen, and whose expectations are thwarted; for, when Vinvela eventually 
appears, she explains that, having heard he had been killed in battle, she has 
died from grief.
Romantic love thwarted by death is recurrent throughout the poems. As 
Stafford notes, Ossianic lovers only sleep together in the grave.22 In fact 
Ossianic heroes, for all their valour in the field, tend to have disastrous 
personal lives. Crimora, unwilling to be parted from her love, Connal, 
follows him to war ‘bright in the armour o f m an’, and in an attempt to 
prevent his death in hand-to-hand fighting with the mighty enemy, Dargo, 
draws her bow against Dargo, misses, mortally wounds Connal instead, and 
is herself killed by grief (Fragments IV, V).
Ossian’s son, Oscur, also dies at the hand o f his love, the enemy D argo’s 
daughter, albeit this time the death is willed, Oscur having killed friend and 
twin soul, Dermid, for somewhat complicated reasons. After a victorious 
battle in which they killed Dargo, Dermid, in love with D argo’s daughter, yet 
aware that she is in love with Oscur, and that that love is reciprocated, 
concedes any claim to her, to Oscur. However, Dermid is unable to 
countenance life without her, and asks Oscur to kill him to ensure that he can 
at least have the satisfaction o f  an honourable death. Oscur refuses to kill 
him outright, agrees reluctantly to fight him instead, and wins. However, 
Oscur is too grief-stricken by Derm id’s death, to countenance life without 
him, and tricks Dargo’s daughter into killing him. The sorry tale does not
21 This is noted by Blair: ‘In most o f our author’s poems, the horrors o f  war 
are softened by the intermixed scenes o f love and friendship. In Fingal ... 
these are introduced as episodes’ (Critical Dissertation, p. 371).
22 Stafford, The Sublime Savage, p. 105.
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end there however; Dargo’s daughter, although markedly unaffected by her 
father’s death, is too distraught at the loss o f Oscur to countenance life 
without him, and commits suicide (Fragment VII).
Death is also the recourse o f another Ossianic maiden Rivine. In 
Fragment IX, Rivine buries herself with her brother, Connan, and his friend 
and her love, Ronnan. Ronnan has killed Connan as a result o f  their being 
duped into fighting each other by the enemy Durstan, who wished to possess 
Rivine. On discovering whom he had slain, Ronnan sought out Durstan; 
they fought so long and hard that both expired from exhaustion. Connan 
does not come out o f this at all well, given he had promised Ronnan to 
protect his sister from Durstan’s advances while Ronnan was in Norway for a 
year or so. Duping by an enemy intent on absconding with a maiden who is 
already spoken for, also brings about the deaths o f brother, sister and sister’s 
beloved in Fragment XI; while in Fragment VI, three more Ossianic warriors 
overreach themselves in matters chivalric -  warriors whom one feels ought to 
have fared better given their progeniture: they are Fingal’s sons Carry 1, Fillan 
and Fergus, who, in their attempt to uphold their promise to Prince Crem or’s 
daughter o f protecting her from Ullin, a Danish invader, hellbent on 
ravishing her, put up such an inadequate fight that they are described as 
yielding at Ullin’s hands as easily as a crop falls at the hands o f a reaper.
Ullin continues to wreak havoc among Gaelic lovers. The final fragment 
tells o f the discovery by Lamderg that Ullin captured his love, Gealchossa, 
while Lamderg was away at the wars. Ullin magnanimously had given 
Lamderg three days in which to fight to reclaim the maiden before taking 
possession o f her. It is not evident whether Lamderg returns in time to meet 
U llin’s ultimatum; none the less, as soon as he has been apprised o f the 
situation, he sets out to challenge Ullin. Although the fragment ends just as 
Ullin learns o f Lamderg’s pursuit, given the preceding litany o f  disasters, the 
reader has no good reason to conjecture a successful and happy outcome for 
Lamderg.
The first two fragments have other motifs common to the poems generally. 
Shilric and Vinvela appear to communicate telepathically in Fragment I, and 
in the second fragment, Shilric has a conversation with Vinvela’s ghost. 
Robust hill-walking maidens, like Vinvela, or warrior maidens like Crimona,
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generally tend to wilt dramatically, terminally and with remarkable rapidity, 
in grief. Furthermore, as in Fragment I, the (subsequent) ghosts in the Ossian 
poems are highly ephemeral but with a definite presence, although, one is 
never quite sure whether the characters have actually communed with spirits 
or have believed or wanted to believe they have to the extent o f 
misconstruing the sound o f wind, or water, or o f being beguiled by a trick o f 
the light. For example, when on his way to war, Shilric describes hearing 
Vinvela’s voice which is like ‘the summer-wind’; and when Vinvela’s ghost 
appears to him she is like a beam o f light -  albeit as remarkable a beam as 
that o f the harvest moon, or sunlight during a summer storm (Fragment II). 
Again when she disappears she is described as sailing away ‘as grey mist 
before the wind!’ It’s hardly quiet on the hilltop: Shilric is sitting ‘by a 
mossy fountain’, at the top o f  a hill, which is so gusty as to have become 
known as ‘the hill o f  winds’, under a tree rustling in a wind stiff enough to 
cause ‘dark waves’ to ‘roll over the heath’ and to disturb the surface o f a lake 
below him enough for him to notice. Though he might well have the acute 
senses o f a hunter, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that he might have 
mistaken wind or water or rustling leaves for the voice o f  his beloved. The 
same kind o f explanation is equally plausible for the ghost in Fragment III: 
Carryl is waiting, with increasing hopelessness, for the return by boat, o f 
Malcolm. Carryl’s suspicion that Malcolm has come to grief at sea is 
confirmed when he hears a voice and sees M alcolm ’s ghost which is green, 
insubstantial and riding on a ‘meteor o f fire’. But again, Carryl’s conditions 
are far from optimal. He’s old; it’s dusk; it’s freezing cold, blowing a gale 
and either sleeting or snowing; and within earshot a river is flowing fast and 
full enough to howl. Furthermore, Carryl is sitting in a wood, under ferns 
which are described as ‘dry’ and which will veritably rattle in these weather 
conditions. Matters won’t have been helped by the fact that he’s also sitting 
by a hollow rock which is liable to boom or rumble with the wind:
Evening is grey on the hills. The north wind resounds through the woods. 
White clouds rise on the wind: the thin-wavering snow descends. The river 
howls afar, along its winding course. Sad, by a hollow rock, the grey-hair’d 
Carryl sat. Dry fern waves over his head; his seat is an aged birch. 
(Fragment III)
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Who can tell what Carryl really heard and saw ‘through the trees’?
This pattern o f ghosts being sighted under extreme meteorological 
conditions is repeated throughout: ghosts in Fragment X are seen at night, at 
a distance, from the ‘hill o f  storm s’ in teeming rain and high wind; and in 
Fragment XI they are seen from the seashore, as the moon is setting, during a 
storm which raises booming surf and so, presumably, also spume and heavy 
sea spray.23
Considered in this way, the poems appear ludicrous, but they are so well 
crafted that it requires effort to step back enough to hear the creak o f  their 
parts. Repeated use o f the same kind o f plot renders the failed chivalry o f 
warriors unremarkable; and the frequency o f  the appearance o f  ghosts makes 
their presence begin to seem quite natural. Repetition also creates limitations
-  a boundedness -  for the Ossianic world, in terms o f both time and space. 
The past is dependent on, and so limited by, human memory; and 
individuals’ expressed expectations o f the future are in the main similarly 
overtly dependent on remaining alive in others’ memory. Warriors exact 
promises from loved ones to remember them should, or rather when, they die 
in battle -  Shilric asks this o f  Vinvela (Fragment I), and Connal o f  Crimora 
(Fragment IV). Fear-comhraic’s grave is to be marked by a cairn (XIII); and 
one is promised for Shilric, and for Connal, while Duchommar seems to 
regard the promise o f a monument to his victim and rival in love for M oma, 
Cadmor, enough to induce M oma to turn her affection for her lover, whom 
he has just murdered for the purpose, towards him self (Fragment XV):
[Duchommar, son o f Mugruch, to M oma, daughter o f Cormac-Carbre]: His 
[Cadmor’s] blood is on my sword. I met him by the mossy stone, by the oak 
o f  the noisy stream. He fought; but I slew him; his blood is on my sword. 
High on the hill will I raise his tomb, daughter o f Cormac-Carbre. But love 
thou the son o f Mugruch; his arm is strong as a storm. (Fragment XV)
The fact that commemoration o f  the dead is ensured by memory alone is 
emphasised in Fragment IX, which is framed as an answer to a question
23 Macpherson himself gives a naturalistic explanation o f the Ossianic ghosts
-  specifically that Ossian’s voice o f  the dead, which he explains might have 
been ‘no more than a shriller whistle o f the winds in an old tree, or in the 
chinks o f a neighbouring rock’ (quoted in Rizza, ‘A Bulky and Foolish 
Treatise?’, p. 141).
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about to whom certain tombs belong: ‘Thou askest, fair daughter o f  the isles! 
Whose memory is preserved in these tom bs?’ It also underpins Shilric’s 
prediction that his grave located far away at the scene o f the wars, will be 
recognised only as that o f  a warrior (Fragment I); while Malcolm (Fragment 
III), Shalgar and his beloved’s brother (Fragment X), Daura, Arindel her 
brother, and Armor her beloved (Fragment XI) for whom there are no graves, 
are wholly reliant for posterity on others’ laments. An appreciation o f  the fact 
that the urgency o f promises to preserve another’s memory is undermined by 
the subsequent alleged or actual transcription o f these orally transmitted tales, 
requires a little thought.
Repetition also places constraints on the imagined location o f the Ossian 
poems. In this case, the boundary is created by repetition o f form rather than 
o f content, and has the curiously contradictory effect o f  at once creating an 
intimacy between the reader and the narrator, but ensuring that the setting o f 
the tales is impossible to locate.
One o f the most striking aspects o f the Fragments is the description o f 
location. For example, Fragment I opens with the line ‘My love is a son o f 
the hill.’ The phrase is ‘a son o f the hill’ seems an archaic and metaphorical 
description, summoning up connotations o f someone’s familiarity with the 
mountains, or the region, or perhaps self-sufficiency in the wilderness. 
However it quickly becomes apparent that ‘the hill’, while it might have this 
kind o f  metaphoric sense, also has denotational import. Shilric’s response to 
Vinvela’s expectations o f  his whereabouts also uses ‘the hill’ in this hybrid 
manner: ‘Afar, Vinvela, afar I go to the wars o f Fingal. My dogs attend me 
no more. No more I tread the h ill’, but in Vinvela’s reception o f this news 
from Shilric the use o f the phrase shifts towards the denotational: ‘I am alone 
on the hill. The deer are seen on the brow’, and in the last o f  V invela’s 
speech, the denotational sense is highlighted by Vinvela’s contrastive general 
reference to the area: ‘Through these hills I will go at noon.’ The implication 
that those who hear and, now, read the poem will know which hill and which 
heath are being referred to, generates a false intimacy through the tacit 
assumption that those who act as audience to the exchanges between the 
lovers will be familiar with the location. In Fragment V, the phrase occurs in 
a description o f the location o f Connal’s grave: ‘A tree stands alone on the
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hill, and marks the grave o f  Connal.’ A specific and identifiable tree 
indicates the grave, but this landmark is useless, because, obviously, it can 
only denote the relevant tree, if  one knows on which hill to start looking.
The references to ‘the hill o f  winds’ (Fragment II), and ‘the hill o f  storm s’ 
(Fragment X), have the same inclusive effect on the reader as ‘the hill’; so do 
references to such locations as ‘on the hill, beneath the aged trees’ (Fragment
VIII); ‘by the brook o f the hill’ (Fragment VII); ‘by the wall; by the tree o f 
the rustling leaf (XIV): while by contrast, although a rock near the seashore, 
with a tree laden with red fruit, visibly growing out the side, is a more 
distinctive feature than a brook or hill, the description in Fragment XI makes 
it less so, because the indefinite article suggests the location is unfamiliar 
both to Daura, who is to look for it, and to an ‘audience’: ‘a rock not distant 
in the sea, bears a tree on its side; red shines the fruit afar’. Repeated use o f 
the same form for reference to landmarks leaves the reader with an 
impression o f knowledge o f  the area in which the poems are set.24
A similarly false intimacy or familiarity is created in a similar fashion by 
the descriptions o f the characters in the poems. None o f  the descriptions o f 
protagonists’ physical characteristics enables one to differentiate between 
maidens or between warriors. With few exceptions, the women are fair, with 
snowy breasts; several have blue eyes, and two -  Rivine (Fragment IX) and 
Annir (Fragment XI) -  are the fairest o f maids. The warriors tend to be 
described in terms o f physical prowess rather than appearance, although most 
are tall: Connal is tall, like ‘a rock on the plain’ (Fragment V), Moran is ‘tall 
as a rock o f ice’ (Fragment XIV), and Gaul is singled out as ‘the tallest o f 
m en’ (Fragment VIII). Warriors generally are noted for the loudness o f their 
voices and for the strength in their arms.25 Much as the lovers lost in the
24 The intimacy created by the poems lends credibility to those commentators 
who explain the meteoric success o f the Ossian poems in terms o f  their 
ability to induce a vicarious Romantic Highland experience in the eighteenth- 
century reader. See, e.g. Davis, Acts o f  Union, ch. 3; H.W. Thompson, A 
Scottish Man o f  Feeling: Some Account o f  Henry Mackenzie, Esq. o f  
Edinburgh and o f  the Golden Age o f  Burns and Scott (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1931), pp. 285, 295ff.
25 Blair comments on the import o f praise for a warrior’s loud voice: ‘They 
had no expedient for giving military alarms but striking a shield, or raising a
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wood in Shakespeare’s M idsummer N ig h t’s Dream, the individuals matter 
less than the ins and outs o f  each amorous entanglement, and yet the reader is 
beguiled into a feeling o f acquaintance with those involved, by virtue o f  the 
presupposition that naming the fathers o f  the characters is enough to identify 
the individuals. The Caledonia described in the Fragments is small enough 
with a population limited enough for a person’s immediate family 
connections to be an adequate means o f identification.
The well-craftedness o f the poems is evident also when they are 
considered singly. In Fragment I, for example, the haunting quality o f the 
exchange between Shilric and Vinvela is in part created by the use o f  vowel 
harmony -  more specifically, long-vowel harmony. Vinvela’s opening 
speech includes a sentence containing long i and a diphthong: thee, me, 
unperceived, see, thee followed by the diphthong in approach, oak. and 
Branno and these are echoed in Shilric’s response:
V: When the rushes are nodding with the wind, and the mist is flying over 
thee, let me approach my love unperceived, and see him from the rock. 
Lovely I saw thee first by the aged oak o f Branno.
S: No more from on high I see thee, fair-moving by the stream o f  the plain; 
bright as the bow o f heaven.
The plaintive nature o f the exchange is enhanced by the repetition o f  phrases 
such as afar and no more, the vowel sounds themselves adding to the feeling 
o f  increasing distance between them:
S: No more I tread the hill. No more from on high I see th ee ...
V: No more they dread the wind, no more the rustle o f  the tree ...
In this way the orality o f the poems seems to have been preserved in some 
way.
The repetition o f tokens creates a focus. For example, in Fragment I, 
repetition afar and no more draws attention to the intractable separation o f 
the lovers, while in Fragment IV the repetition o f  shield  focuses attention on 
combat:
loud cry. And hence the loud and terrible voice o f Fingal is often mentioned, 
as a necessary qualification for a great general’ {Critical Dissertation, p. 354).
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Connal: Bring me thy father’s shield; the iron shield o f  Rinval; that shield 
like the full moon when it is darkened in the sky.
Crimora: That shield I bring, O Connal ...
Macpherson also used onomatopoeic alliteration. The relentless and ominous 
approach o f Ullin, for example, in Fragment VI, appears in sound as well as 
by description, with the more muted thumping m giving way to d  as Ullin 
draws nearer -  the effect is o f the sound o f an approaching thunderstorm:
The mountains trembled as he moved. The hills shook at his steps. Dire 
rattled his armour around him. Death and destruction were in his eyes.
Macpherson combined syllabicity, alliteration and repetition to superb effect 
to reproduce the sounds o f an increasingly more heated hand-to-hand battle 
between Fear-comhraic and Muirnin, in Fragment XIII:
Swords sound on helmets, sound on shields; brass clashes, clatters, rings. 
Sparkles buzz; shivers fly; death bounds from mail to mail. As leaps a stone 
from rock to rock, so blow succeeds to blow. Their eyes dart fire; their 
nostrils blow: they leap, they thrust, they wound.
Whatever the truth behind these poems, whether they were composed or 
translated by Macpherson, they are the work o f a master o f  language use.
2 Blair’s critique of the Ossian poems
It is evident from the outset that Blair’s discussion o f  ancient poetry in 
general and the Ossian poems in particular, is conducted on the assumption 
o f  a specific theory o f social development. According to Blair, ‘ancient 
poems’ ‘yield knowledge o f the history o f the human imagination and 
passions’; they allow an acquaintance with ‘notions and feelings’; the values 
and pleasures o f those who lived in a materially simple and socially
uncultivated milieu, prior to those refinements o f  society ‘which enlarge, ...
• 26and diversify the transactions, but disguise the manners o f  m ankind’. 
Ancient poetry provides useful information for those ‘philosophical 
observers’ o f human nature’ (ibid.). But while proving a source o f 
information about attitudes and reactions o f ancient peoples, such poetry also 
has a strong aesthetic appeal, promising ‘some o f the highest beauties o f
26 Blair, Critical Dissertation, p. 345.
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poetical writing’ (ibid.). Underpinning Blair’s approach to the Ossian poems 
are two presuppositions which have great importance within Scottish 
Enlightenment thought generally, both o f  which are already familiar from the 
discussion o f Smith’s Theory o f  M oral Sentiments’, that societies progress -  
become more sophisticated, in a discernible and predictable fashion; and that 
concomitant with this is a change in ‘m anners’ although the fundamental 
nature o f man remains unchanged throughout. M an’s essential nature is 
unaltered, but becomes more disciplined or modulated by the prevailing 
conditions o f the society in which he is brought up, or educated. The former 
presupposition informs Blair’s seemingly bland statement that ancient poetry 
acquaints us with the emotions and values o f those before ‘the refinem ents’ 
o f society have occurred; and the latter is implicit in his choice o f reference 
to manners o f mankind being disguised  by societal refinements. It is also a 
requisite assumption in an explanation o f the way ‘ancient poetry’ has 
contemporary aesthetic value -  o f why contemporary readers appreciate the 
poems as examples o f ‘the highest beauties o f poetical writing’. The poems 
do not so much introduce readers to primitive emotional reactions as remind 
them o f such reactions.27
While it is not surprising that archaic poetry was understood to provide 
evidence o f the kinds o f preoccupations o f the society from which they 
spawned, Blair’s statement that such poetry can achieve poetic excellence is 
unexpected -  particularly given the contemporary preference for mannered 
Augustan poetry. It transpires that the poetic comprises ‘compositions in 
which the imagination has the chief hand’, 28 and that Blair regards the 
prevailing conditions in barbaric societies to encourage the ‘high exertions o f 
fancy and passion’.29 While metre and tonal modulation tend to be used in 
the composition o f poetry, what is essential is the kind o f  content: the poetic
27 Hume wrote: ‘Stature and force o f the body, length o f life, even courage 
and extent o f genius, seem hitherto to have been naturally, in all ages, pretty 
much the same’ (Of the Populousnes o f Ancient Nations’ (1754), in Essays 
Moral, Political and Literary, pp. 377-464, p. 378).
28 Blair, Critical Dissertation, p. 346.
29 Ibid., p. 346; cf. Smith’s reference to savages as those ‘whose notions are 
guided altogether by wild nature and passion’ (HA III.2), and above p. 212, n. 
170.
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conveys feelings and impressions.30 Blair was not alone in regarding the 
definitive characteristic o f poetry to be given by its content. Smith goes so 
far as to categorise prose writers as poets, if  their subject matter concerns the 
fantastic, regardless o f the intended import o f  the text. In his ‘History o f 
Historians’ he wrote:
The next Species o f Historians were Poets in every respect except the form o f 
the Language. Their language was prose, but their Subject altogether 
Poeticall -  Furies, Harpys, Animalls half men and half Bird, Snake, centaurs, 
and others half fish and half men that were bread in Tartarus and Swam 
about in the Sea; ... The intercourse o f Gods and Women, and Goddesses 
with men, and the Heroes that Sprung from them ... the Creatures o f  an 
imagination engendered by terror and Superstitious fear which is always 
found in the ruder state o f Mankind. (LRBL II 46-7)
Ancient poetry displays an excellence unlikely to be found in the more 
mannered compositions o f refined society, because it trades in the norms o f 
ruder societies. Poetic genius cannot occur in a social vacuum .31 Blair 
regarded poets to promote social progress, as is evident from his discussion 
o f the improving influence o f Ossian.32 So, a society which promotes, or at 
least fails to modulate, emotional reactions, is more likely to produce 
compositions o f poetic value than those societies which value more refined, 
more modulated manners.
Blair also makes plain that the conditions which promote poetic 
compositions are concomitant with a less developed society. They are 
conditions which he overtly equates which the ‘infancy o f  societies’, in 
which life is riddled with insecurities, and lawlessness, so man is constantly 
presented with the novel and the strange, and consequently, constantly in a
30 Ibid.
31 A thought which Hume also expresses: ‘it is impossible but a share o f  the 
same spirit and genius must be antecedently diffused throughout the people 
among whom [the few who cause progress in arts and sciences] arise, in 
order to produce, form, and cultivate, from their earliest infancy, the taste 
and judgment o f those eminent writers’ (‘On the Rise and Progress o f the 
Arts and Sciences’ (1742), in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, pp. 110— 
37; p. 114).
32 Critical Dissertation, p. 351. B lair’s explanation o f  the manner in which 
bards might be considered to have had an improving effect on their society is 
an application o f Smith’s general explanation o f the mechanisms o f  change 
in social mores; see above p. 184.
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state o f wonder and surprise. Stafford has understood Blair to be 
expressing the belief that members o f ruder societies live in a state o f 
childlike innocence and delight.34 However, the list o f  subjects likely to be 
found in ancient poetry suggests otherwise: praises o f their gods, or o f  their 
ancestors, commemorations o f their own warlike exploits, or lamentations 
over their misfortunes. Such topics ‘naturally’ assume the tone o f  poetry, 
that is they naturally induce the reactions o f the order o f the sublime. As 
such they suggest less the innocent delight o f children, than the discomfort 
Smith associates with wonder and surprise (see above, pp. 149-50). Smith is 
equally unenthusiastic about novelty: novelty does not o f itself engender 
pleasure. ‘New objects are never agreeable in description merely from being 
new. There must be something else in them than mere novelty before they 
can please us much’ (LRBL , ii 156-7).
According to Blair, the life o f the barbarian is primarily reactive: 
conditions preclude the possibility o f reflecting on experience, and so 
disallow anticipation and prediction o f events and developments. M embers 
o f  barbaric societies are continually assailed by the new and strange, and so
• 35 • •are continually in emotional extremis o f one kind o f another. This line o f 
thought is familiar from the M oral Sentiments (see, for example, above pp. 
180-2).
B lair’s discussion o f the Ossian poems rests on further assumptions about 
the nature o f societal development. Concomitant with an ability to subject 
experience to causal analysis is the tendency o f man ‘to correct and refine 
one another’, pruning human nature ‘according to method and rule’. Both 
causality and the modulation o f behaviour are linked with the gradual 
precedence o f understanding over imagination, again a model familiar from 
Sm ith’s Moral Sentiments. 36 Blair relies heavily on a further theoretical 
construct initially developed by Smith -  the idea that societal development is
33 Cf. Hume: ‘from law arises security, from security curiosity, and from 
curiosity knowledge’ (Hume, History o f  England, quoted in Simpson, The 
Protean Scot, p. 71). Cf. also Smith on savages’ experience, and novelty 
mentioned above (p. 181).
34 Stafford, The Sublime Savage, p. 172.
35 Blair, Critical Dissertation, p. 345.
36 Ibid., p. 346
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stadial. This is what prompts him to claim that it is probable that an 
extensive search would ‘discover certain degrees o f  resemblance among most 
ancient poetical productions, from whatever country they have proceeded’;37 
that ‘in a similar state o f  manners, similar objects and passions operating 
upon the imaginations o f men, will stamp their productions with the same 
general character’ (ibid.). It is this assumption which is worked hardest by 
Blair in the course o f establishing the antiquity o f the Ossian poems from 
internal evidence alone. Poetry, and especially ancient poetry, is 
characteristic first and foremost o f an age, and not a country o f origin (ibid.). 
Diversity between ancient poetry is taken to be the result o f  climate and 
genius. This assumption legitimates comparison between Ossian and Homer:
As Homer is o f all the great poets, the one whose manner, and whose times 
come nearest to Ossian’s, we are naturally led to run a parallel in some 
instances between the Greek and the Celtic bard. For though Homer lived 
more than a thousand years before Ossian, it is not from the age o f  the world, 
but from the state o f society, that we are to judge o f resembling times. (Ibid., 
p. 353)
However, Blair’s position on this is stronger than implied by his reference to 
‘some parallels’ being drawn between societies at similar stages o f 
development. Blair adopts a stadial theory o f societal development (ibid.):
There are four great stages through which men successively pass in the 
progress o f any society. The first and earliest is the life o f hunters; pasturage 
succeeds this, as the ideas o f property begin to take root; next agriculture, 
and lastly commerce.
The Ossianic poems are firmly placed by Blair in the first, hunter-gatherer, 
stage o f  society, and the bulk o f  the Critical Dissertation analyses the poems 
by reference to the kinds o f considerations which this categorisation 
generates, and which Blair uses to establish both the antiquity o f the poems 
and their remarkable qualities (see below, pp. 265-72).
3 B lair’s stadialist account o f language development 
Stadialism pervades much o f Scottish Enlightenment thought about men and 
society. It has been shown to have been a concomitant o f the theory o f  moral 
concept-development put forward by Smith in M oral Sentiments and to have
37 Ibid., p. 347.
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influenced the structure and content o f  The M an o f  Feeling. It also takes the 
brunt o f the weight o f  B lair’s discussion o f the Ossian poems.
As explained in the Introduction (pp. 10-11), Smith used the stadial 
account o f society to explain the development o f property law.38 In the first 
stage o f society, people have little or no property, for they consume, rather 
than accumulate what they acquire; in the second stage, because less mobile 
than the first, there is an opportunity for the accumulation o f  wealth as 
shepherds may increase the sizes o f their flocks or herds. Accumulation o f 
wealth and inequality o f wealth have noticeable social impact at the third 
stage, when farmers live in permanent housing, and there are more 
opportunities to acquire property. And at the fourth stage, acquisition o f 
wealth and the laws governing property become increasingly more complex.
As mentioned above, Smith’s formulation o f  the four-stage theory o f 
societal development was developed in the course o f  lectures on 
jurisprudence (p. 10, above). The lectures were delivered in 1762/3, but the 
doctrine possibly occurred in lectures he gave in Edinburgh as early as 
1750.39 Smith refers to the four-stage theory o f societal progress in the 
course o f discussing the property rights o f occupation. A possession is 
something perceivable; property is a relation between a person and an object; 
and since occupancy is the most immediate relation between a person and a 
thing, Smith starts his discussion o f property rights with this relationship.40
It is important to bear in mind that Sm ith’s four-stage model o f  societal 
progress is merely an investigative tool. The Enlightenment perception o f 
the role and explanatory dynamic o f history combines several important, 
distinctively eighteenth-century ideas o f the nature o f the historian’s 
inquiry 41 Scottish historians believed that by observation o f different kinds
38 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael and 
P.G. Stein (Oxford: 1978), pp. 13-23; repr. in Alexander Broadie (ed.), The 
Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology (Edinburgh: Canongate Classics, 
1997), pp. 478-87; p. 479.
39 Christopher Berry, The Social Theory o f  the Scottish Enlightenment 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 93.
40 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, in Broadie, Anthology, p. 479.
41 David Allan has argued differently. According to his thesis, there is a 
continuum o f stadialist approaches to historical inquiry which ranges from 
those like Hume whom he takes to be motivated by Calvinist considerations,
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o f societies and through contemporary descriptions o f past civilisations they 
could discern law-like patterns in human behaviour which they interpreted as 
descriptive (and not prescriptive) o f human nature in general. In order to be 
able to make these inductions, they had to assume that all men are equal: that 
under the same environmental, social and psychological conditions, any 
person would behave in the same way as any other. But given the scope o f 
the variable parameters in these explanations -  the variety o f  kinds, and o f 
combinations o f kinds, o f environmental and social conditions in which man 
might find himself -  it made sense to observe as many different kinds o f 
social groupings as possible. Only in this way could they be sure o f 
identifying the true regularities in m an’s behaviour, that is, o f  being able to 
differentiate between actual law-like patterns o f behaviour and the 
coincidental or contingent or accidental convergence o f kinds o f  behaviour.
A society’s property laws are dependent on what its members understand 
to constitute property. As this changes, the concept o f property will become 
increasingly abstract. Justice in a society is ensured by a set o f laws which 
prohibit those actions which the society regards as punishable. Since the 
protection o f an individual’s property rights will come under the jurisdiction 
o f a legal system, the property laws o f a society will become more abstract as 
a result o f the society’s concept o f  property becoming more complex. Given 
Smith’s empiricist account o f concept-formation, it follows that a society’s 
property laws can only become increasingly more abstract when its members 
experience property rights as ranging over correspondingly increasingly 
more abstract possessions. Sm ith’s four stages provide a way o f  categorising 
this kind o f evidence o f societal change. If  a hunter-gatherer has no 
experience o f possession then he will have no concept o f possession, and 
consequently no recognition o f his right to possession being violated, so 
there will be no call for laws reflecting concern with possessions. Stadial 
theory encapsulates the empiricist credo that concept-formation is dependent 
on experience.
through scholarly antiquarianism to cultural collectors. See David Allan, 
Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideas o f  Scholarship in 
Early Modern History (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), ch. 3.
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In the preface to the Fragments Blair alludes to a larger work o f  Scottish 
poetry: ‘It is believed, that, by careful enquiry, many more remains o f  ancient 
genius, no less valuable that those now given to the world, might be found in 
the same country where these have been collected. In particular there is 
reason to hope that one work o f considerable length, and which deserves to 
be styled an heroic poem might be recovered and translated, if 
encouragement were given to such an undertaking.’42 M acpherson was 
encouraged to pursue the ‘remains o f ancient genius’ which Blair intimated 
in the preface gave hope o f a ‘work o f considerable length, and which 
deserves to be styled an heroic poem might be recovered and translated’. He 
was encouraged most notably by Hugh Blair, who responded enthusiastically 
on being shown examples o f M acpherson’s translations o f  Gaelic verse 43
Blair took up the newly created chair o f Rhetoric and Belles Lettres at 
Edinburgh University in 1760 and in 1783 published Lectures on Rhetoric 
and Belles Lettres. Fiona Stafford has argued that study o f  the Lectures and 
B lair’s sermons reveals the reasons why, from its inauguration as an 
academic subject, Blair was confident o f the need for the development o f 
literary criticism.44 Blair considered the study o f literature to be an integral 
part o f a much larger Enlightenment programme. It was encompassed by the 
stadialist account o f societal development, and so related to the development 
o f sensibility. As such, the study o f literature was justified by a moral 
imperative.
Briefly, the moral imperative that underpins Blair’s justification for the 
study o f  rhetoric and literature, arises from the essential need for sociability -  
communication with others -  in the development o f sensibility. Because, 
following Smith, Blair believed that sensibility can only mature as a result o f  
interaction with others -  the idea underpinning M ackenzie’s history o f 
Harley’s moral development -  and because we are morally bound to develop 
sensibility, it follows that we are also morally obliged to develop our ability
42 ‘Preface’, p. 5.
43 Quoted in Davis, Acts o f  Union, p. 80.
44 Fiona Stafford, ‘Hugh Blair’s Ossian’.
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to interact with others, and hence to develop both oral and writing skills. 
According to Blair, studying literature promotes both.45
As discussed above, Enlightenment historians believed that the study o f 
societal progress, understood in stadialist terms, revealed truths about m an’s 
capacity for virtue and the conditions under which this capacity flourished or 
floundered (pp. 20-1). Since interaction and communication are necessary 
for the development o f virtue -  and sensibility; and since too, according to a 
stadialist account, a society is more or less developed according to the 
development o f its members; it follows that a society’s level o f sophistication 
depends on the level o f sophistication o f its m em bers’ means o f 
communication. This means that languages can also be categorised in 
stadialist terms (see below, pp. 273-80).
Progress in the development o f sensibility was considered to be evident in 
terms o f  degree o f emotional control and interaction. And this idea too 
applies in language: the more developed a society, the more refined -  the 
more rational -  its language. This means that the less developed a society, 
the more emotional its language. As Stafford points out, the progress o f 
language in Blair’s account was not conducive to the composition o f  poetry, 
which he associated with the expression o f  feelings rather than reason:
Language is become, in modern times, more correct, indeed, and accurate; 
but, however, less striking and animated: In its ancient state, more favourable 
to poetry and oratory; in its present, to reason and philosophy.46
Macpherson in The Introduction to the History o f  Great Britain and Ireland  
(1771) expresses similar ideas about the development o f  language. Language 
is integral to a nation’s identity:
Nations are not so tenacious o f  their customs and manners as they are o f  their 
aboriginal tongues. The first gradually vanish in the growing improvements 
o f civil life; the latter can only be buried in the grave with the people 
themselves ...
45 Stafford, ‘Hugh Blair’s Ossian’, pp. 69-71.
46 Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres , 2 vols (London and 
Edinburgh, 983), vol. I, pp. 124-5; quoted in Stafford, ‘Hugh Blair’s Ossian’, 
p. 74.
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But, he continues, language also loses its integrity, as result o f  conquest, or 
corruption by commerce -  where commerce is possible only in the most 
developed society according to a stadialist theory. Macpherson depicts a 
language as changing until its ur-form remains only in place names:
Conquest may confine the bounds o f  a language; commerce may corrupt it; 
change in the mode o f thinking may alter idiom: but ... [language] retires 
from invasion into rocks and desarts; it subsists with the remains o f the 
people; even mountains and rivers in part retain it when the people are no
47more.
M acpherson obviously subscribed to B lair’s idea that stadial development o f 
language occurs in tandem with the development o f a society. It is hardly 
surprising then that Blair was enthusiastic about M acpherson’s first 
translations; nor that he encouraged Macpherson to pursue the ‘heroic poem ’ 
o f  substantial length which he hinted at in the preface to the Fragments. 
M acpherson’s finds promised to substantiate B lair’s theory o f language 
development. Taking a cynical view o f the patronage and funding, it also 
seems hardly surprising that Macpherson found the poem he was looking for. 
Nor that he went on  to find another.
The authenticity o f the poems was called into question almost 
immediately on their publication in the early 1760s, and the debate continued 
throughout the remainder o f the century. Eventually, in 1805, 9 years after 
M acpherson’s death, the Highland Society was appointed to inquire formally 
into the ‘nature and authenticity’ o f the poems. However, the concerns o f  the 
sceptics were far outweighed by the popular reception o f the Ossianic corpus.
The poems very obviously had appeal for a diversity o f  interests. 
Highlanders were enthusiastic about the poems -  Donald M ’N icol’s 
vituperative response to Johnson’s overtly sceptical remarks in his Journey 
being a case in point.48 The following is only a mere sample:
[the book systematically discredits] the Poems o f Ossian -  the whole Gallic 
language, -  our seminaries o f  learning, -  the Reformation -  and the veracity 
o f all Scotch, and particularly Highland narration. The utter extinction o f the
47 Quoted in Davis, Acts o f  Union, p. 86. Beattie’s remarks (quoted above, pp. 
99-100) about the corruption o f language are in a similar vein.
48 Johnson, Journey, pp. 101-5.
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two former seems to have been the principle motive o f TJohnson’sl journey 
to the North.49
The poems also appealed to Lowlanders, and to the English; and were 
endorsed by the Edinburgh literati to such an extent that, as Katie Trumpener 
points out, Macpherson was almost commissioned to produce the second and 
third volumes o f poetry.50
It is not surprising that Highlanders embraced the poems. O ssian’s poems 
describe three generations o f Highland bards and warriors, and since 
Macpherson felt the Highlanders were like the Greeks, the poems present the 
Highlanders as Homeric, militaristic and, because Celtic, mysterious.51
The appeal to the English might be explained to some extent by 
Thompson’s description o f  the Ossianic heroes: ‘I f  you took M acpherson’s 
own word for it, the Ossianic poems ... were genuine translations o f  old 
Celtic fragments and epics, proving that in the fourth century Scotland had 
been inhabited by Men o f Feeling as full o f  pity and tenderness as 
M ackenzie’s Harley.’52 So while they were heroic, the Highlanders were also 
tame. This would have been influential. The poems were published during 
the Seven Years War at which time the Scots were outraged by English 
reluctance to extend the militia system to Scotland. The British Army was 
able to recruit from the Highlands which was supposed by the Scots to 
present the country in a more favourable light to the English, the reputation 
o f  Scotland still suffering the consequences o f the ’45 Jacobite Uprising. 
However, as mentioned earlier (pp. 104-5) renewed antagonism broke out 
between the two countries in the early 1760s, as a result o f  the rise in power 
and influence o f John Stuart, 3rd Earl o f Bute.
49 Quoted with approval by Trumpener {Bardic Nationalism, p. 68).
50 Trumpener, Bardic Nationalism , p. 75. The poems were also translated 
into 26 languages. The literati funded M acpherson’s subsequent tours 
through the Highlands in pursuit o f  further material; see Stafford, The 
Sublime Savage, ch. 7.
51 Trumpener, Bardic Nationalism, p. 74; Bruce P. Lenman, ‘From the Union 
o f 1707 to the Franchise Reform o f 1832’, in R.A. Houston and W.W.J. 
Knox (eds), The New Penguin History o f  Scotland: From the Earliest Times 
to the Present Day (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 276-354, p. 334; Murray 
G.H. Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain: Cultural Identities in Britain 
and Ireland, 1685-1789 (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 154.
52 Thompson, Henry Mackenzie, p. 285.
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M acpherson’s sentimental, heroic and, above all, temporally distant 
Highlanders acted as a balm for the English in the midst o f this fear-induced 
outbreak o f acute xenophobia. This English reaction also explains part o f 
the appeal o f the poems to the Lowlanders. From attempting to distance 
themselves from any connection with the Highlands and its associated 
Jacobite disloyalty, it now became prudent for Lowlanders to encourage 
English confusion about the demography o f Scotland and acquiesce to 
Highland and hence Ossianic ancestry.
The question now arises as to what it was about the poems themselves 
that captured people’s attention. It has been argued that it was their bardic 
quality; and that in effect Macpherson became the bardic voice for 
Scotland.54 However, it is difficult to understand how M acpherson can be 
regarded as the Scottish bardic voice, for the simple reason that the Ossianic 
poems are written, are allegedly in translation, and are translated in such a 
way as to massage the images and characteristics o f what M acpherson 
presented as a Homeric and hence primitive society into something 
comfortingly pastoral.
We might assume that in constructing the Ossian poems, M acpherson was 
responding solely to his feelings and reactions towards the Highlands and 
w hatever o f its oral-based history he knew. In which case, it could be argued 
from the fact that the poems had widespread appeal in Scotland to features o f 
a bardic culture by considering the nature o f  the poem s’ content; then, by 
emphasising the backwards-looking, primitive, elements o f the poem, argue 
that these expressed people’s disaffection with the increasingly more 
commercial, more fiscal ambitions towards which Scottish society was seen 
to be tending. However this tack lacks plausibility, for at the time the 
Ossianic poems were launched and ancient Highland ancestry embraced 
across the whole o f Scotland, concerted efforts were being made not only to 
keep in force the governmental tactics to quell what was understood 
(erroneously) to be the rebellious Jacobite Gaeltachd, but to anglicise the
53 Macpherson dedicated The Works o f  Ossian (1765) to Bute. Bute’s 
patronage o f Macpherson, provided yet more ammunition against Bute for 
W ilkes after the publication o f Fingal (Davis, Acts o f  Union, p. 81).
54 Trumpener, Bardic Nationalismt pp. 74-82.
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area in the interests o f presbyterianism; while clan chiefs were improving the 
returns on their land by introducing agricultural measures which hastened the 
break-up o f their clans, the heart o f Highland society.
Davis has argued that M acpherson’s intention was to promote Scottish 
influence in Britain and to boost the morale o f the Scots nation, and to 
achieve both without inciting English fears o f  Scottish dominance. Davis 
then demonstrates that he achieved these ends by depicting an imagined 
community, situated far enough in the past to pose no contemporary threat, in 
such as way as would appeal to both Scots and English classically educated 
readers. Davis sums up M acpherson’s intention as being to emphasise 
cultural homogeneity.55
But equally plausibly, we might assume that Macpherson took advantage 
o f the primitivist movement, and ‘worked the system’ -  very well. That he 
was in fact motivated less by any kind o f  patriotism, than by self-interest.
Johnson doubted the authenticity o f the Ossian poems. He devotes four 
pages o f the Journey to ju st this point (pp. 101-5). In fact, he holds a 
stronger opinion than this. He doesn’t merely doubt the truth o f the claim 
that the Ossian poems are translations from an authentic third-century Gaelic 
epic; he believes that this claim is completely false:
I believe [the poems o f Ossian] never existed in any other form than that 
which we have seen. {Journey, p. 104)
The Ossian poems had by this time been in print for ten years, the Fragments 
having been published in 1760, and Fingal, an Ancient Epic Poem in Six 
Books and Temora in 1762 and 1763 respectively.
Johnson’s objections to M acpherson’s claims to the poem s’ authenticity 
are pertinent. Although he finds it ‘insolent’ and ‘audacious’ that 
Macpherson should claim to have original manuscripts yet refuse to produce 
th em ,56 Johnson’s incredulity focuses on the sheer length o f the poems, and 
Macpherson’s claims for their oral nature. ‘Few have the opportunities o f 
hearing a long composition often enough to learn it, or have inclination to
55 Davis, Acts o f  Union, p. 70.
56 Journey, p. 104. This refusal does indeed seem to be unexpected behaviour 
on the part o f an antiquarian or scholar.
repeat it so often as necessary to retain it; and what is once forgotten is lost 
for ever’ {Journey, p. 103). Johnson’s objection is not to the orality o f the 
poems, per se. He valued oral history. For example, commenting on being 
told the story behind a melody he was listening to on bagpipes, he wrote:
Narrations like this, however uncertain, deserve the notice o f the traveller, 
because they are the only records o f a nation that has no historians, and 
afford the most genuine representation o f the life and character o f  the ancient 
Highlanders. {Journey, p. 43)
Johnson’s objection is to M acpherson’s claim that such a large body o f 
narrative has survived oral transmission from generation to generation intact, 
because he finds it implausible to assume conditions under which such a feat 
o f memory should occur in any one generation, and because once any part o f 
an oral history is forgotten it can never be retrieved (or as he more eloquently 
expresses it earlier in the book: ‘Tradition is but a meteor, which, if  once it 
falls, cannot be rekindled’ {Journey, p. 98)).
Johnson’s dismissal o f the whole o f the Ossian corpus as fabrication may 
well be a case o f throwing the baby out with the bathwater, but, on the other 
hand, from the point o f view o f historical inquiry the text as a whole is 
worthless: knowledge that parts o f the text are genuine is only useful in this 
kind o f situation if  one knows which parts, or has some independent means 
or criteria for winnowing out the original text.57 And as Johnson pointed out 
in no uncertain terms, neither Macpherson nor anyone else would, or more 
probably could, supply this kind o f knowledge {Journey, pp. 104-5).
The veracity o f the poems’ content, and so o f the sincerity o f  intent, or 
otherwise, o f the poems’ author/translator/editor is important. The value o f 
the Ossian poems depended and still depends — perhaps only partially, but 
nevertheless crucially -  on adopting a specific and sympathetic stance over 
the nebulous issue o f  M acpherson’s intentions. Regardless o f how difficult it
57 It’s interesting to note that Johnson also isn’t objecting to antiquarian 
pursuits: he describes the difficulty o f having to rely utterly on the candour o f 
indigenous informants -  and admittedly comments on this in a way which 
seems very uncomplimentary about the indigenous Highlanders’ regard for 
truth {Journey, p. 103). In mentioning this it seems Johnson would have 
been prepared to ‘excuse’ the Ossian poems as a product o f M acpherson’s 
gullibility, had there not been mention by Macpherson o f  manuscripts.
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is to explain or describe the difference between reading something as fiction 
and reading the same thing as fact, Hume was right: truth adds a certain 
dimension to a text.58 It is not that truth is necessary for a text to gain status 
as historical evidence: for example, Burns’s ‘Address o f Beelzebub’, and the 
uncharacteristically whimsical ghost story which appears at the end o f 
Pennant’s Tour can each now contribute to a historical account o f  the effects 
o f rackrents and the breakdown in clanship.59 The problem with the Ossianic 
corpus is that Macpherson presented the poems as translations from an 
original archaic source, and for all the reasons Johnson gives, because the 
source is an allegedly oral culture which died away, as such the poems lack 
evidential veracity.
Johnson’s less than amenable interpretation o f M acpherson’s intentions 
seems to merit serious consideration for other reasons. These concern 
M acpherson’s connection with Hugh Blair and the Edinburgh literati. The 
outcome o f this consideration is that Trumpener’s reference to the Ossian 
poems being ‘almost commissioned’ by the literati contains more truth than
! Trumpener realised.
The finding o f the Highland Society’s investigation into the authenticity 
o f the poems was that Macpherson wove either small fragments from an
I original Gaelic source into his own composition or into a composite o f his
|
| own poetry with fragments he collected from various sources (and eras); or
!
! that he wove merely bridging sequences into a collage o f stories and poems
j from the oral Gaelic corpus o f  the time.
The Committee can with confidence state that its opinion that such [ancient] 
poetry [known by the denomination o f Ossianic] did exist, that it was 
common, general, and in great abundance; ...
The Committee is possessed o f  no documents, to shew how much o f his 
collection Mr. Macpherson obtained in the form in which he has given it to 
the world ...
58 See above p. 19.
59 Bums, ‘Address o f Beelzebub’, in The Poems and Songs o f  Robert Burns, 
ed. James Kinsley, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), vol. I. no. 108, 
pp. 254-5; Thomas Pennant, A Tour in Scotland and Voyage to the Hebrides 
1772 (1774, 1776), ed. Andrew Simmons (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 1998), pp. 
365-9. Pennant’s tale is overtly inspired by the Ossian poems, p. 364.
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[The] Committee has not been able to obtain any one poem the same in title 
and tenor with the poems published by [Macpherson] ... .60
However, the Committee also reported:
[Macpherson] was in use to supply chasms and to give connection, by 
inserting passages which he did not find, and to add what he conceived to be 
dignity and delicacy to the original composition, by striking out passages by 
softening incidents, by refining the language, in short by changing what he 
considered as too simple or too rude for a modem ear and elevating what in 
his opinion was below the standard o f good poetry.61
Taking seriously Blair’s linguistic moral imperative casts an interesting light 
on the Highland Society’s findings in their investigation, after M acpherson’s 
death, into the authenticity o f the poems. The inquiry resulted in a seemingly 
non-committal verdict, however, given Blair’s stadial view o f  language, 
Macpherson will have been regarded by the literati to have acted fraudulently 
with regard to the poems regardless o f the issue o f the authenticity o f  their 
source. By ‘changing what he considered as too simple or too rude’, and 
‘elevating what was in his opinion below the standard o f  good poetry’, he 
will have been seen as altering a fundamental feature o f  the language o f  the 
society in which these poems were supposed to have had their origin. And by 
elevating it from the ‘too sim ple’ and ‘too rude’, he also by fiat elevated the 
society itself from one stage to the next. In short, M acpherson’s evidence o f 
an instantiation o f Blair’s linguistic stadialism was a forgery whether 
Macpherson constructed the poems by translation or by composition.
4 Blair’s stadial critique o f the Ossian poems
In his Critical Dissertation, Blair follows his discussion o f the parallels 
between Ossian and other poets deemed to be from comparable societies,
60 Highland and Agricultural Society o f Scotland, Report o f  the Committee o f  
the H.S. o f  S. appointed to inquire into the nature and authenticity o f  the 
poem s o f  Ossian. Drawn up, according to the directions o f  the committee by 
Henry Mackenzie, Esq., its convener or chairman, Edinburgh 1805; quoted 
in Davis, Acts o f  Union, p. 89; and Thompson, A Scottish M an o f  Feeling, pp. 
298-9. These are, I think, interesting for the cagey nature o f  the 
Committee’s report reasons. M acpherson’s change o f linguistic register has 
moral implications.
61 Highland Society o f Scotland, Report; quoted in Davis, Acts o f  Union, p. 
89.
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stadially considered, with an analysis o f  the differences between Ossian and 
other comparable poetry. It is at this stage that his comment that poetry 
allows a history o f the imagination takes on a full-blooded sense. It is also 
here that the extent o f Blair’s debt to Smith becomes most apparent.
Blair’s discussion o f the literary credentials o f the Ossian poems is 
comprehensive. Having explained the stadialist rational for cross-cultural 
comparison o f the poetic output o f different countries, he compares and 
contrasts the Ossian poems, first with Gothic (Old Norse) poetry, and then 
with Homer; and briefly and contrastively with Virgil.
The Old Norse poem he chose for his comparison is a funeral song by 
Regnor Lodbrog. Lodbrog was an eighth-century Danish king, and the poem 
is a translation o f his funeral song. Lodbrog’s song is taken as paradigmatic 
o f barbaric poetry -  according to Blair, it is ‘as we might expect from a 
barbarous nation’; it is ferocious and bloodthirsty, animated and strong, hard 
and irregular, and has the stylistic marks o f antiquity, being rich in metaphor, 
with many grammatical inversions.62 Ossian’s poems exhibit some o f  these 
features: they too are highly figurative, with the same marked grammar, and 
strong animation found in Lodbrog’s song. However, where Lodbrog’s song 
is brimming with graphically and aggressively described military encounters, 
in Ossian’s poems, the overall mood is gentler; the composition is also more 
regular.
Ossian’s poems, particularly the Fragments, certainly appear decorous by 
comparison with Lodbrog’s song. In the extract quoted by Blair, Lodbrog 
dwells repeatedly on the copious amounts o f blood they caused to pour out o f 
the enemy: ‘we made torrents o f blood flow ... the whole ocean was one 
wound -  the crow waded in the blood o f  the slain ... the warm streams o f 
wounds ran into the ocean’.63 Blood spilt in the Fragments, when it runs at 
all, runs with significantly less verve: when Crimora wounds Connal we 
learn that ‘he bleeds’ (Fragment V); when Crem or’s daughter died at the 
hand o f Ullin ‘her soul came forth in blood’ (Fragment VI); and when Oscur 
felled Ullin, although having plunged his sword into her heart, there was no 
blood at all. More often than not, warrior exploits are adverted to by
62 Blair, Critical Dissertation, p. 349.
63 Ibid., p. 348.
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reference to blood stains on their swords; and hand-to-hand struggles tend to 
be described aurally rather than visually.64
Lodbrog’s song ends with an expression o f contempt for death which 
includes the declaration: ‘He only regrets this life who has never known 
distress.’65 By contrast, while warriors in the Fragments not only anticipate 
death in combat, but regard it as an honour, they tend to more lugubrious 
expressions o f this expectation, largely because they are usually talking about 
death in action when taking leave o f  their loved ones (for example, Shilric in 
Fragment I, and Connal in Fragment IV). Ossian’s warriors seem less to 
welcome the chance o f honour than to regret having to leave at all, an 
impression created by, for example, Shilric’s list o f  all he has left behind: his 
dogs, his homeland and his woman. Furthermore, as mentioned above, most 
o f  the warriors in the Fragments, when seen in action, are fighting for love 
rather than for more patriotic reasons.
The warrior mentality is in evidence in the Fragments, albeit more subtly 
than in Lodbrog’s song. Ossianic warriors and some warrior maidens tend to 
be men and women o f  action rather than reflection -  although perhaps ‘very 
impulsive’ would be a more accurate description. Duchomar, lusting after 
Cadm or’s beloved, Morna, does not attempt to woo her away from Cadmor; 
instead he gets rid o f the opposition by murdering him. Shilric leaves for the 
wars so abruptly he is unable to let Vinvela know he is going; Euran’s plan to 
trick Connan and Ronnan into fighting each other, leaving Rivine vulnerable 
to exploitation by Durstan was guaranteed to work because Connan and 
Ronnan could be counted on to hurry away to fight at the slightest chilvaric 
provocation (Fragment IX). In short, Ossianic warriors demonstrate the truth 
o f  ‘Act in haste, repent at leisure’. The fact that the same scenarios are 
repeated time after time in the Fragments shows that Ossian’s characters fail 
to learn from experience, their own or that o f  others -  which is a splendid 
attitude when away at war, but apparently, not quite as successful when 
applied to the domestic front.
64 For example, the fight between Gaul and Fingal (Fragment VIII); and that 
between Fear-comhraic and M uiman quoted above (p. 249).
65 Blair, Critical Dissertation , p. 348.
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Blair nowhere explains the theory behind his critique o f the Ossian and 
other poems; he merely describes the stadial framework without giving any 
theoretical account o f it. Ossian is presented as proof o f conjectural 
history;66 and throughout there are indications that B lair’s critique is couched 
in a theoretical frame concerning m an’s development: ‘The progress o f the 
world resembles ... the progress o f age in m an’ with regard to the gradual 
increase in the influence o f understanding over that o f the imagination with a 
concomitant refinement in manners and language.67 However, Blair shows 
evidence o f  having adopted specifically Smith’s theoretical framework.
5 Blair’s Ossianic puzzle
One o f  the marks o f antiquity in poetic writing on which Blair dwells for 
some time, and to which he draws specific attention, is the ‘figurative cast’ o f 
the language; that is, the high incidence o f concrete metaphors and similes 
which, together with the dearth o f  general terms, abstract nouns and 
specifically the lack of anthropomorphisation o f abstracts, he regards as 
demanding ‘particular notice’, because ‘one o f  the most genuine and decisive 
characters o f antiquity’.68 Blair also remarks on Ossian’s tendency to use 
definite descriptions as opposed to proper nouns, to specify location: ‘Even a 
mountain, a sea, or a lake, which he has occasion to mention, though only in 
a simile, are for the most part particularized.’69 On this point, Blair makes a 
curious comment:
The ideas o f men, at first were all particular. They had not the words to 
express general conceptions. These were the consequence o f more profound 
reflection, and longer acquaintance with the arts o f thought and o f  speech.70
Two points are relevant here both to Blair’s critique o f the Ossian poems, 
and to his reference earlier in the text to the stadial model o f  societal progress 
inaugurated by Smith. First, identification o f orders, or grammatical classes,
66 Ibid., p. 347.
67 Ibid., p. 346.
68 Blair, Critical Dissertation, p. 354; Blair discusses similes and metaphors 
found in the Ossian poems on pp. 384-92.
69 Ibid., pp. 354-5; see above, pp. 246-7.
70 Ibid., p. 354.
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o f  nouns used in a text is regarded, at least by Blair, as an analytic tool for 
dating the text, not chronologically, but by reference to the progressive stage 
o f the society to which the composer belongs; that is, language development 
is assumed to progress in tandem with the stadial development o f a society. 
Second, the analysis reveals not merely the stage o f linguistic development 
o f the society but the stage o f conceptual development that society has 
reached -  Blair’s explanation o f the use o f definite description and o f 
concrete as opposed to abstract nouns is that Ossian’s ideas were particular. 
Together these points reveal something o f the theoretical underpinnings o f 
B lair’s critique.
The puzzle prompting this diversion into the Ossian poems is that o f 
identifying what it was about the first o f M acpherson’s translations that 
caught Blair’s attention. Although much o f the Critical Dissertation draws 
on, and is a discussion of, primarily Fingal but to some extent Temora, 
B lair’s remarks about the reliance on metaphor, the lack o f abstract concepts, 
and the use o f definite descriptions and o f inversions applies equally to the 
poems first published. The proliferation o f definite descriptions used to 
identify location is discussed above (pp. 246-7). Inversions abound from the 
very beginning o f the Fragments:
Fragment I:
W hether by the fount o f the rock, or by the stream thou liest; ... Lovely I saw 
thee first by the aged oak o f Branno.
Remember me, Vinvela, when low on earth I lie!
Fragment III:
Sad on the sea-beat shore thy spouse looketh for thy return.
Fragment IV:
... sad is his darkened brow. Live the mighty race o f  Fingal? Or what 
disturbs my Connal?
Fragment VIII:
Fair with her locks o f gold, her smooth neck, and her breasts o f  snow, fair as 
the spirits o f the hill when at silent noon they glide along the heath, fair as 
the rain-bow o f heaven; came Minvane the maid.
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Similarly, reliance on metaphor and simile is very evident in the Fragments'.
Fragment I:
My love is a son o f the hill
... thou were returning tall from the chace
. . . th e  hunter is far removed, he is in the field o f graves.
... sons o f the waves!
Fragment II:
... she sails away
... the wings o f the gale ...
And the poem recounting the death o f Oscur (Fragment VII), the first o f  
Macpherson’s translations, is particularly rich in similes, tropes and 
synecdoche:
He fell as the moon in a storm, as the sun from the midst o f his course ...
I, like an ancient oak on Morven, moulder alone in my place. The blast has 
lopped my branches away; and I tremble at the wings o f  the north.
Her eyes like two stars in a shower; her breath the gale o f  spring; her breasts 
as the new-fallen snow floating on the moving heath. The warriors saw her, 
and loved; their souls were fixed on the maid. She forgot the blood o f her 
father and loved the hand that slew him.
Often on their green earthen tombs the branchy sons o f the mountain feed, 
when mid-day is all in flames, and silence is over all the hills.
Given Blair’s faith in the reliability o f noun-type for dating text, the reason 
for his enthusiasm for the first o f Macpherson’s translations becomes a little 
clearer.
There are at least two other facets o f Blair’s critique which depend for 
their sense on a stadialist theory o f societal development, namely his 
characterisation o f the tenderness o f the Ossian poems as anomalous, or at 
least unexpected; and his discussion o f the supernatural elements in the 
poems. These two aspects become interrelated as a result o f  Blair’s 
extraordinarily contorted description, and strained justification, for what he 
regards as Ossian’s remarkable refinement when considered by reference to
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comparably archaic northern poetry -  specifically Lodbrog’s funeral song, 
mentioned above.71
Blair highlights the similarities and differences between Lodbrog’s 
funeral song and Ossian’s poems. Both texts depend heavily on inversions, 
metaphors and similes; both are emotionally energetic; but where Lodbrog’s 
poem is ‘wild, harsh and irregular’, Ossian’s are artful and regular, 
expressing tender and delicate sentiment.72 In short, by comparison with 
Lodbrog, Ossian is veritably cultivated. Blair responds to this with: ‘How is 
this to be accounted for? Or by what means to be reconciled with the remote 
antiquity attributed to these poems? This is a curious point; and requires to 
be illustrated.’ And illustrate it he does, with a description o f  Ossian’s 
refinement by reference to a complex bardic and Druidic heritage in which 
religion flares and dies, and according to which the Celts, unlike members o f 
societies at a similar stage o f economic development, have progressed 
beyond the kind o f rude heroism expressed in Lodbrog’s song by such 
sentiments as: ‘What is more certain to the brave man than death, though 
amidst the storm o f swords, he stand always ready to oppose it? He only 
regrets life who hath never known distress’; and have also progressed beyond 
Lodbrog’s idea o f the afterlife as companionable male drunkenness in 
Valhalla.74 Again, those aspects o f Ossian’s poems which Blair highlights in 
the Dissertation as being remarkably uncharacteristic o f  hunter-gatherer 
society, would have been evident to him on reading the Fragments alone. 
There, warriors follow their leader to war, but not joyfully: they take their 
leave with sorrow; and although like Lodbrog, they do not shy away from the 
idea o f dying for the cause, they do not embrace the idea with his vim and 
vigour. Lodbrog states:
But this [his imminent death] makes me always rejoice that in the halls o f  our 
father Balder [or Odin] I know there are seats prepared, where, in a short 
time we shall be drinking ale out o f the hollow skulls o f  our enemies. In the
71 Blair, Critical Dissertation, pp. 349-52.
72 Blair, ibid., p. 349.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
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house o f the mighty Odin, no brave man laments death. I come not with the 
voice o f despair to Odin’s hall.75
By contrast, warriors in the Fragments worry about their reputation after 
death, worry about those they leave behind when they go to war, then tend to 
meet their death on home ground after all; and whether death is honourable 
or not, so many haunt the area in which they lived or died, that those still 
alive anticipate the spectral appearance o f the dead; while some Ossianic 
spirits, such as Vinvela, go so far as to worry about the living. The warriors 
cannot be described as mannered however -  they are motivated too often by 
high-running passion to merit this epithet.76 Although we do not know what 
the women in Lodbrog’s life felt about his warrior status, so cannot make a 
strict comparison, we do know that the women in Ossian’s tales -  Crimora, 
for example -  would have been less than enthusiastic to hear their men 
declaim like Lodbrog that ‘He who aspires to the love o f  virgins, ought 
always to be the foremost in the roar o f arm s.’ Blair sums up the character o f 
an Ossianic hero as one which exhibits magnanimity, generosity and true 
heroism. And for Blair this is problematic.77
Equally problematic are the ghosts themselves -  it is not merely the 
sensitivity and sociability o f their nature that needs explanation but their 
presence at all, for the simple reason that they come without the trappings o f 
any kind o f religion. The fact that the Ossianic poems are devoid o f 
reference to any religion is problematic, prima facie because, in order to 
explain Ossian’s poetic refinement, Blair has taken recourse to the bardic 
connections with Druidism, explaining that the bardic tradition was sustained 
through ‘the changes o f [the Celts] government and manners, even long after 
the order o f the Druids was extinct and the national religion altered’ because
70
the Celts’ love o f poetry was so strong. Blair does not explicitly state that 
the Ossianic ghosts are anomalous, but his explanation o f the supernatural in
7Q
the poems lacks conviction. Ossian’s descriptions o f  ghosts are regarded as 
being vivid enough for Blair to praise them as being drawn ‘with all the
75 Ibid., p. 349.
76 Ibid., p. 354.
77 For reasons outlined on pp. 181-2, above.
78 Ibid., p. 350.
79 Ibid., pp. 365-70.
271
particularity o f one who had seen and conversed with them, and whose 
imagination was full o f the impression they had left upon it’.80 They have 
the advantage of being independent o f a ‘local and tem porary’ set o f 
superstitions.81 On the other hand, Blair also surmises that Ossian ‘found the 
tales o f his country full of ghosts and spirits’, that it is likely that he believed 
them; yet Blair concludes somewhat weakly that ‘Ossian’s mythology is, to 
speak so, the mythology o f human nature; for it is founded on what has been 
the popular belief, in all ages and countries under all forms o f  religion, 
concerning the appearances o f departed spirits.’ On one hand, this remark 
is at odds with the degree o f sophistication introduced into the culture by the 
Druids as it attributes to Ossian a set o f beliefs so primitive as to accord with 
Blair’s earlier comments on the lack o f evidence o f general concepts in 
Ossianic thought. On the other hand, it can be understood as implying that 
Ossian’s thoughts have progressed intellectually beyond those o f Druidism. 
The latter interpretation makes B lair’s wish that Ossian had demonstrated 
belief in a ‘supream Being’ less out o f place, but it then undermines his belief
1 in the efficacy o f linguistic analysis in dating compositions o f  ancient
I
| peoples. Ossian’s human mythology becomes conceptually closer in
| generality to a belief in a ‘supream Being’; and a belief in the latter is
I presumably to be thought o f as developing by abstraction from beliefs about
| identifiable spirits o f the dead.
6 S m ith ’s theory  of language origin and developm ent
In section 5, I concentrated on showing that, given B lair’s faith in the 
conclusions about the stage o f  development that Ossian’s society can have 
reached, yielded by an analysis o f the grammatical constructions used in the
80 Ibid., p. 366. Blair’s discussion o f Ossianic ghosts is so fulsome in its 
praise that one is left with the distinct impression that he had to add the much 
remarked-upon qualification ‘Notwithstanding the poetical advantages which 
I have ascribed to Ossian’s machinery, I acknowledge it would have been 
much more beautiful and perfect, had the author discovered some knowledge 
o f  a supream Being’ (p. 370), largely to remain respectable, given his 
position as a Moderate minister o f some importance.
Ibid., p. 368; they also have the advantage over Hom er’s gods o f  being 
well behaved enough to refrain from ‘indecent squabbles’.
82 Ibid., pp. 365, 368.
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poems, there would have been enough in the Fragments to merit his 
enthusiasm for the text as a relic o f ancient poetry. I also showed that B lair’s 
grammatical analysis is dependent on a stadial theory o f  conceptual 
development within a society. Blair’s conclusions posed a problem, however: 
namely that o f reconciling the kinds o f concepts he found in the poem which 
he associates with a primitive hunter-gatherer society83 with the artful, 
regular stylistics o f the compositions, and with the tenderness o f the 
sentiments the poems express.
Blair’s explanation o f Ossian’s stylistic refinement by reference to a long 
and convoluted bardic pedigree is unconvincing, but he fares even worse 
with regard to the sentimental content o f the poems: ‘the bravery and 
generosity o f heroes, the tenderness o f lovers, the attachment o f  friends,
• JMparents and children’. O f Ossian’s capacity to convey such sentiments in 
ways that ‘capture and melt the heart’, Blair comments: ‘This is indeed a 
surprising circumstance, that in point o f humanity, magnanimity, virtuous 
feelings o f every kind, our rude Celtic bard should be distinguished to such a 
degree, that not only the heroes o f Homer, but even those o f  polite and
Of
refined Virgil, are left behind by those o f Ossian.’ Blair concluded that 
Ossian was naturally endowed with an exquisite sensibility; and that he 
would have been exposed to the songs and poems o f professional bards from 
childhood, which will have ‘had influence in propagating among [Celtic 
warriors] real manners nearly approaching the poetical’. In short, B lair’s 
explanation o f the sentimental nature o f Ossian’s poetry is that the society 
with which they were associated was not as backward in matters o f  sentiment 
as might have been expected for a society in the first stage o f development; 
and that they were written by an exceptionally and naturally poetically gifted 
individual who moreover had privileged access to the Celtic bardic 
traditions.87
83 Ibid., p. 353.
84 Ibid., p. 357.
85 Ibid., p. 358; that Ossian should outstrip even Homer in this regard is 
surprising to Blair, given that ‘Homer lived in a country where society was 
much farther advanced’ than Ossian’s (p. 357).
86 Ibid., p. 351.
87 Ibid., p. 352.
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The kernel o f Blair’s conclusions is that Ossian is an anomaly. He does 
not fit neatly into the framework which Blair uses to establish the antiquity o f 
the poems. We are told that this framework is stadialist, and glean both that 
Blair assumed that stadialist predictions apply to the language o f  experience 
and associated concept-formation, and that in these respects Ossian’s poems 
are as expected from a warrior poet belonging to a hunter-gatherer society: 
consistently founded in sense impressions. Ossian’s anomalousness stems 
from his failure to conform with Blair’s expectations concerning moral 
sentiments. It seems that he regarded these as characterised by, or perhaps 
characterising a society; and that, like language and economics, they progress. 
B lair’s difficulty seems to be that the content o f the Ossian poems does not 
cohere with predictions given by a stadial theory, about a society’s moral 
sentiments.
Blair had a precedent for making a stadialist connection between a 
society’s language, religion, literature and codes o f conduct in the various 
writings on each subject by Smith.
Sm ith’s account o f the origin and development o f  language, 
Considerations concerning the First Formation o f  Languages, was initially 
published 1761 in English in the translation o f a selection o f essays from 
French Academy of Belles-Lettres, and later appeared as an appendix to the 
third edition o f the Moral Sentiments (1767).88 As noted above (p. 235-6), 
Sm ith’s lectures on language influenced Blair. Unsurprisingly, there is 
consonance between Smith’s description o f  the origin o f nouns and Blair’s 
conclusion about the level o f  development o f a society, the language o f 
which lacks abstract nouns.
Eighteenth-century theories o f language were constructed before the 
discovery o f Sanskrit, and so without a conception o f  language families. 
Grammar was understood to be a set o f prescriptive rather than descriptive
88 Berry takes Smith’s essay to have first been published as the M oral 
Sentiments appendix in 1767 (Berry, ‘Adam Smith’s Considerations on 
Language’, p. 130), but it was published in May 1761 in The Philological 
Miscellany, the only volume o f  a projected twice-yearly journal (J.C. Bryce, 
‘Introduction’ to Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 
(1762/3), ed. J.C. Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 1-37; p. 27). 
Sm ith’s stadial account o f language is also found in LRBL, Lecture 3.
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rules, and Latin grammar the paradigm for all language.89 The syntactic 
categories o f language were explained predicatively, in accordance with 
A ristotle’s Categories. In the Categories, Aristotle distinguished eight 
different predicate types:
Kind (e .g . a man)
Quality (e.g . pale)
Quantity (e.g . ten feet)
Relation (e.g . smaller th an  )
Location (e.g . in Arcadia)
Time and date (e.g., fourth century AD)
Action (e .g . laughs)
Undergoing (e.g . being poisoned).
M ost predicate types have corresponding abstract nouns:___ laughs!laughter,
 pale/pallor. Kind terms, however, do not have corresponding abstract
nouns.90 For example, in the grammatically acceptable string The moon is a 
heavenly body, body is the kind term; however, creating an attribute from the 
predicate results in the string *The m oon’s heavenly bodyhood  which is at 
best marked, so in the main unacceptable. This is because bodyhood  is not 
recognised as an abstract noun. Aristotle’s kind terms can be thought o f as 
modified by the other 7 types.91
Two questions preoccupied eighteenth-century linguisticians: which came 
first -  language or society? And (the question which interested Smith): how 
can the different parts o f speech be accounted for? The first issue derives 
from empiricist epistemology; while the second circumscribes a problem for 
an empiricist explanation o f linguistic evolution, because o f  the need to
89 LRBL, Lecture 6.
90 These are also referred to as count nouns; although the epithet is rendered 
inadequate by mass terms (e.g. coffee) and plurals (army); terms which cause 
untold problems for formal representations o f natural languages.
91 Aristotle -  and presumably also Smith et al. -  obviously had never come 
across an ergative language e.g. Basque, in which, semantically, verb phrases 
are modified by noun phrases.
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eschew any explanatory dependence on abstraction in order to avoid vicious 
circularity. The general theme of Smith’s essay is that o f accounting for the 
evolution o f parts o f speech without needing abstraction.
Smith’s solution is to make the same kind o f analytic moves as he makes 
in his construction o f the definition o f the sympathy relation (see above, pp. 
133-6), a solution to which the Aristotelian approach lends itself. He takes 
abstract nouns to be definable in terms o f iteration; pallor  is understood as 
that which is common to all o f which ... is pale  can accurately be predicated. 
One is regarded by Smith to learn the meaning o f pallor  by recognising and 
abstracting what is common to all o f  which it can correctly be said He/she/it 
is pale.
For Smith, the first step in the evolution o f  a language, then, has to be the 
development o f names denoting objects, which he regards will initially 
function as proper nouns, which (temporally and psychologically) later are 
used as general terms. Sociability is coeval with, and in fact necessary to, 
this first stage in the development o f language:
Two savages, w h o  had never been taught to speak, but had been bred up 
remote from the societies o f men, would naturally begin to find that language 
by which they would endeavour to make their mutual wants intelligible to 
each other, by uttering certain sounds whenever they meant to denote certain 
objects. Those objects only which were most familiar to them, and which 
they had most frequent occasion to mention, would have particular names, 
assigned to them. The particular cave whose covering sheltered them from 
the weather, the particular tree whose fruit relieved their hunger, the 
particular fountain whose water allayed their thirst, would first be 
denominated by the words cave, tree, fountain, or by whatever appellations 
they might think proper. Afterwards, when the more enlarged experience o f 
the savages had led them to observe, and their necessary occasions obliged 
them to make mention o f other caves, and other trees and other fountains, 
they would naturally bestow upon each o f those new objects, the same name 
they were first acquainted with. ... And thus, those words which were 
originally the proper names o f  individuals, would each o f them insensibly 
become the common name o f a multitude.92
92 Adam Smith, Considerations Concerning the First Formation o f  
Languages, and the Different Genius o f  Original and Compounded 
Languages (1761), in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762/3) 
(hereafter FFL), ed. J.C. Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 201-26, 
pp. 203-4.
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Language begins with naming particular objects within a narrow sphere o f 
shared social experience; the proper names so devised become common 
nouns as a result o f  the scope o f shared experience becoming wide enough to 
embrace more o f the same kinds o f objects initially denoted. The progression 
is natural -  Smith refers to a child’s natural tendency to denote ‘every person 
who comes to the house its papa or m am a’ (FFL, p. 204). According to this 
model o f linguistic development, logically, adjectives are dependent on the 
prior categorisation o f objects under nouns, because they modify kinds. 
Psychologically, adjectives arise in response to the necessity o f 
distinguishing between objects with a common denotation. They do not 
require abstraction so much as the discernment o f ‘peculiar qualities [of a 
specific object]; or ... the peculiar relation which it stood in to some other 
things’ {FFL, p. 205). In effect, adjectival modification is taken by Smith to 
function initially in the same way as proper nouns. He writes: ‘the words 
green tree, for example, might serve to distinguish a particular tree from 
others that were withered or blasted’ (ibid.). In other words, initially, green  
tree functions as a definite description. The abstract noun greenness is a 
second-order term, considered psychologically to be the result o f 
generalising across noun categories (leaf, grass, (for Ossian) ghost, etc.), 
which requires not only being able to recognise what might be loosely if 
strictly inaccurately, referred to as leafhood, grasshood, ghosthood, in order 
to sort objects nominally, but also being able to discern a cross-category 
similarity between green leaves and red leaves; green grass and brown grass, 
green ghosts and grey ghosts, and abstracting from this the idea o f the quality 
that all green things share: greenness. In short, the idea o f greenness is not 
derived directly from experience because it is only ever experienced as a
93quality o f an object.
93 FFL, pp. 206-7. Smith follows Locke in this regard; cf. Locke, Essay 
concerning Human Understanding, II.8. See Sm ith’s remarks on Virgil’s use 
o f concrete iterative definition, mentioned above, p. 171. This kind o f 
explanation of meaning has been used in a useful study o f  the mechanism o f 
metaphor: Lakoff and Johnson argue that at a certain denotational level, 
language comprises largely dead metaphors: George Lakoff and M ark 
Johnson, Metaphors We Live By  (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1981).
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The evolution of relation terms is more problematic because relations are 
deemed more abstract than qualities, although Smith’s explanation o f their 
origin is o f the same kind as that for qualities. Prepositions are developed in 
order to distinguish between objects denoted by the same common noun, 
resulting in definite descriptions: the brook on the p la in ; the cave under the 
tree. Genitive o f  appears to be taken as associated originally not with 
possession, but with definite descriptions: the hill o f  winds, and so once again 
can be regarded as explicable by reference to its use in the modification o f 
references to concrete, and hence, perceivable objects (FFL, pp. 210-11).
Smith’s argument for this model o f language evolution depends heavily 
on the grammar o f Latin. Aside from a rather thin explanation o f the 
evolution o f verbs according to which inflection for number etc. is logically -  
because psychologically -  a qualification o f originally impersonal verbs,94 
the bulk of his essay is an argument for the model by reference to the Latin 
case system, although he also explains the relationship between the antiquity 
and purity of a language, and between syntactic simplicity and linguistic 
impurity (FFL, pp. 222-6). However, what is o f  relevance here, is the 
connection Smith assumes between the kinds o f nouns and noun phrases used 
by a people, and their level o f intellectual development. The more abstract 
the nouns and noun phrases, the more developed the language, and so 
thought, o f the speakers, where intellectual development is understood in 
terms of the direction o f dependence o f the ideas denoted by the noun 
phrases. Proper nouns denote particular objects o f  experience; common 
nouns denote experienceable categories; adjectives denote experienceable 
qualities; but abstract nouns denote the result o f comparing, contrasting and 
abstracting from ideas gained from experience; they are initially second- 
order -  ideas derived from ideas. It is now clear why Blair regarded O ssian’s 
use o f definite descriptions and concrete tropes and similes as indicating 
categorically that the poems were the product o f  a poet belonging to a 
community in the first stage o f societal development; and it is also clear the
94 FFL, pp. 215-16; according to Smith’s theory those languages which 
exhibit PRO-drop, such as Italian, will be regarded as retaining the most 
archaic of verb forms.
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extent to which Blair relied on Smith’s theory and empiricist psychology in 
his assessment o f the authenticity Ossian poems.
Smith uses the idea o f ordering the complexity o f  concepts on a 
concrete/abstract axis throughout his writing. It underpins his theory o f the 
development o f religion -  and explains why he, in common with all 
Enlightenment thinkers, regarded polytheism to be the first form o f 
religion.95 It also explains why he, and subsequently Blair, regarded poetry 
to be the most ancient kind o f composition; and casts light on Smith’s 
extraordinary comment that while poets were the first historians, ‘the next 
species o f Historians were Poets in every respect except the form o f the 
Language. Their language was prose but their Subject altogether Poeticall’ 
(LRBL ii.46). The poetical is the child o f the imagination;96 it is effectively 
descriptive, not explanatory, because the ideas tend to be concrete and not 
abstract, and because descriptive, it is void o f causal explanation and hence 
cannot educate, only entertain. Poetry engages the reader by seeming to 
provide experiential immediacy, and hence engages the reader’s imagination 
rather than his reason.97 The axis o f ideas also underpins Smith’s articulation 
o f stadial history, and his theory o f moral sentiments.98 Since Ossian’s 
anomalousness is in respect o f his failure to fit neatly into the former theory 
because he exhibits sentiments o f  too great a refinement, it is worth exploring 
the connection a little more deeply.
7 Blair’s Ossian puzzle revisited
Blair’s problem is that he is unable to contain Ossian within the rude, and 
barbaric hunter-gatherer stage o f  society, o f which Lodbrog is a prime 
candidate for membership. One question raised by Blair’s struggle to place 
Ossian raises is that o f  why he is unable to settle for the idea o f Ossian’s
95 See Smith, HA III. 1-2; Smith’s theory is articulated and discussed in 
Christopher J. Berry, ‘Rude Religion: The Psychology o f  Polytheism in the 
Scottish Enlightenment’, in Paul Wood (ed.), The Scottish Enlightenment: 
Essays in Reinterpretation (Rochester, N Y : University o f  Rochester Press, 
2000), pp. 315-34.
96 Blair, Critical Dissertation, p. 346.
97 LRBL ii 44—7; 73-80.
98 Berry discusses the stadial theory in terms o f  conceptual development in 
Social Theory, pp. 93-4.
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society being that o f hunter-gatherers who are more refined socially than 
those in Lodbrog’s society. The problem with that suggestion seems to be 
that it fails to cohere with the language o f the Ossian poems. This implies 
that Smith’s stadial history accords the concrete language found in Ossian’s 
poems to hunter-gatherer societies generally. And this is indeed the case. So, 
just as the limited experience o f day-to-day life o f  a hunter-gatherer fails to 
give rise to a need for more than common nouns and definite description; so 
his experience will fail to give rise to complex property law s."
It is important to pinpoint exactly what Blair’s problem with Ossian 
comprises. It is not so much the sorrowful scenes in the poems that are 
problematic, as that Ossian chose to dwell on these, to accord them the 
honour of bardic celebration; and, according to Blair, that he depicts them in 
such a way as to leave no doubt how these scenes affected him. 100 
Considering this more closely reveals that, contra Dwyer, Blair’s response to 
the poems, far from indicating a break with Sm ith’s theory o f moral 
sentiments, relies on it, because an explanation o f his perception o f  Ossian as 
remarkable presupposes Smith’s stadial theory o f the development o f  moral 
concepts.
Sm ith on the tender sentiments
The theme throughout the Fragments almost consistently centres on romantic 
love. Smith does not say a great deal about romantic love in the M oral 
Sentiments and what he does say can appear unnecessarily scathing; for 
example:
The passion appears to everybody, but the man who feels it, entirely 
disproportionate to the value o f the object; and love, though it is pardoned in
99 See above, pp. 10-12; see also Smith’s argument that conceptual 
development o f moral concepts is circumscribed by social experience, 
discussed above, pp. 181-2.
100 Ossian’s attitude towards the impetuous lovers is exactly that which Smith 
ascribes to those who are bought up to live in civilised societies. O f these 
Smith wrote: ‘if  they allow themselves to be overcome by love, or 
discomposed by anger, they are easily pardoned’ (V.2.10). ‘Overcome by 
love’ and/or ‘discomposed by anger’ describes almost all the protagonists o f 
the Fragments.
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a certain age because we know it is natural, is always laughed at, because we 
cannot enter into it. (I.ii.2.1)
This, and similar remarks by Smith (for example, I.ii.2.5), have been 
understood by Dwyer as indicating that Smith ‘probably did not know a great 
deal about the opposite sex’, and that while he accepted a strong instinct to 
love was perfectly natural and more easily pardonable at a certain age, Smith 
suggested that ‘overly “serious and strong expressions o f  [love]” would not 
meet with much sympathy’. This interpretation invites the conclusion that 
Smith considered the ‘abject lover’ as ‘typically a figure o f ridicule; if  the 
lover wanted the approval o f others, he had to learn to laugh at h im se lf .101 
This is grossly at odds with an interpretation which takes seriously Sm ith’s 
definition o f propriety. Smith discusses romantic love and the propriety o f 
talking about the beloved in the context o f a general discussion ‘o f the 
degrees o f the different passion which are consistent with propriety’ (I.ii 
section title). Propriety being defined in terms o f mutual fellow feeling, 
Sm ith’s point is that the degree to which it is acceptable to express or 
withhold one’s natural reactions to an ‘object’, is determined by the extent to 
which an independent observer can be expected to sympathise with -  that is 
replicate -  those reactions. Passions which ‘take their origin from the body’ 
are hard for a spectator to sympathise with (I.ii.I l .l)  -  we can sympathise 
with the distress o f ‘excessive hunger’ but not with the hunger itself, for 
example (ibid.). It is in this context that Smith remarks on the impropriety o f 
what he refers to as ‘the passion by which Nature unites the two sexes’ 
(I.ii. 1.2). Dwyer in discussing Smith’s account o f romantic love, comments 
on this remark as follows:
As far as Smith was concerned, the love bond itself was not analytically 
significant; if anything it was vulgar, distracting and ethically suspect. ‘The 
passion by which Nature unites the two sexes’, is the ‘most furious’; and all 
‘strong expressions’ o f it were ‘indecent’. Despite its fury, however, Smith
did not believe that love played, or should ever play, anything like the
102dominant role in human motivation.
W hat this remark fails to acknowledge is that Smith differentiates between 
lust, romantic love (being-in-love), and what, for want o f a better term, can
101 Dwyer, Age o f  Passions, p. 83.
102 Ibid., p. 84.
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be referred to as mature love.103 The passion which is ‘the most furious o f all 
passions’ is a bodily passion of which Smith remarks that ‘all strong 
expressions o f it are upon every occasion indecent’, even between those 
‘whom its most complete indulgence is acknowledged by all laws’ (I.ii. 1.2). 
Regardless o f whether one agrees or not with Sm ith’s notion o f  inappropriate 
pillow talk, it is true -  even in the current climate -  that the notion o f 
‘appropriate’ applied to public expressions o f lust differs from that o f  public 
expressions o f romantic love. Smith’s explanation o f this is that lust, being a 
physical passion, is extremely difficult for an impartial spectator (and here 
‘impartial’ has to be given full force) to sympathise with -  replicate -  just as 
it is difficult for a spectator to replicate another’s hunger.
Does Dwyer’s dismissal o f Smith’s views on romantic love fare any better 
when it is actually applied to Smith’s views on romantic love? The answer is 
no. Dwyer wrote:
Despite its fury, however, Smith did not believe that love played, or should 
ever play, anything like the dominant role in human motivation.
Smith wrote, in a section en tit led  'O f  those Passions which take their origin 
from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination’:
There is in love a strong mixture o f humanity, generosity, kindness, esteem; 
passions with which, o f all others, for reasons which shall be explained 
immediately, we have the greatest propensity to sympathize, even 
notwithstanding we are sensible that they are, in some measure, excessive. 
(I.ii.2.5)
His objection to romantic love is that it is ‘extravagantly disproportioned’ to 
the ‘value’ o f its object. He also believes that ‘in the one sex it necessarily 
leads to the last ruin and infamy; and though in the other, where it is 
apprehended to be least fatal, it is almost always attended with an incapacity 
for labour, a neglect o f duty, a contempt o f fame, and even o f common 
reputation’ (ibid.). Taken out of context, Smith’s remarks do indeed suggest 
that he considered romantic love to have little to recommend it. However, 
Smith’s intention, here, is to show that differences in codes o f  conduct are 
founded in differences between the potential for spectatorial sympathy under
103 Cf. Smith’s objections to Mandeville (VII.ii. 1.40).
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certain conditions, one being that o f  sympathy with an agent’s romantic love 
for another, because: ‘Our imagination not having run in the same channel 
with that o f the lover, we cannot enter into the eagerness o f  his emotions’
(I.ii.2.1). With regard to romantic love his point is that, since generally, 
romantic love is exclusive, for an impartial spectator, an overwhelming but 
impartial enthusiasm for another’s beloved tends to be difficult, if  not 
impossible to replicate and so sympathise with (I.ii.2.2). Smith is not 
relegating romantic love to the level o f office politics in stating that the same 
kind o f considerations apply in this case as render appropriate ‘a certain 
reserve’ when ‘we talk of our own friends, our own studies, our own 
professions’ (I.ii.2.6); he is explaining that one cannot expect the same 
degree o f enthusiasm from others as one feels towards objects which are o f  
specifically personal interest. Had he been writing now, his reasoning could 
be used to explain the exasperation and boredom o f an evening devoted to 
looking at a stranger’s photos o f his wife and children. It is difficult to see 
how from Dwyer’s discussion he is able to conclude that Smith regarded love 
to have no part to play in human motivation, given Smith’s comments about
i the concomitant feelings o f generosity and kindness. In fact, a few
paragraphs later, Smith writes approvingly o f love:
I
i
| The sentiment o f love is, o f itself, agreeable to the person who feels it. It
I soothes and composes the breast, seems to favour the vital motions, and to
promote the healthful state o f the human condition; and it is rendered still
more delightful by the consciousness o f the gratitude and satisfaction which 
it must excite in him who is the object o f it. (I.ii.4.2)
Love between friends is o f such value that Smith refers to ‘sowing dissent 
among friends’ as an atrocity; and he becomes positively lyrical in describing 
love between family members:
With what pleasure do we look upon a family through the whole o f  which 
reign mutual love and esteem, where the parents and children are 
companions for one another, without any difference than what is made by 
respectful attention on one side, and kind indulgence on the other; where 
freedom, and fondness, mutual railllery and mutual kindness, show that no 
opposition o f interest divides the brothers, nor any rivalship o f favour sets the 
sisters at variance, and where every thing presents us with the idea o f  peace, 
cheerfulness, harmony, and contentment. (Ibid.)
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Dwyer’s discussion o f Smith’s account o f love is important because it is 
one o f the few that gives weight to the role the passions played in 
Enlightenment thought about the nature o f man. However, his thesis is 
diametrically opposed to that put forward here. He argues that there is a 
break in eighteenth-century thought about the nature o f the moral sentiments; 
that Smith valued Stoicism and self-command over the more sociable virtues; 
and that the enthusiastic reception o f the Ossian poems indicates that the 
emphasis was less on civic virtues than on family values, and followed not 
Smith, but M illar.104 His discussion gives the impression that the Ossian 
poems are antidote to Smith’s M oral Sentiments.,05 However, the argument 
here is for the claim that, like The Man o f  Feeling , The Poems o f  Ossian 
trades on Smith’s ideas.
Smith states that while a spectator cannot sympathise with another’s love 
for a particular person, per se, if he has experienced a similar passion, then he 
can sympathise with the emotions resulting from that passion: ‘Though we 
do not properly enter into the attachment o f the lover, we readily go along 
with those expectations o f romantic happiness which he derives from it’
(I.ii.2.2). It follows that while expressing one’s romantic attachment to 
another lacks propriety, expressing the emotional reactions one has as a 
consequence o f falling in love, is acceptable. Smith explains that another’s 
crush on someone is o f interest to an impartial spectator, not because o f the 
lovers’ feelings towards each other, but because the situation has the 
potential to generate disappointment and melancholy for the lovers: ‘The 
happy passion ... interests us much less than the fearful and the melancholy. 
We tremble for whatever can disappoint such natural and agreeable hopes
104 See Dwyer, Age o f  Passions, ch. 4. Dwyer remarks: ‘The cultivation o f 
“honourable love” became the explicit mission o f many members o f the 
Scottish literati. ... Henry Mackenzie described it in novels like Julia de 
Roubigne and essays like The Story o f  La Roche’ (ibid., pp. 6 -7). Dw yer’s 
reference to ‘novels like Julia de Roubigne’ is puzzling, given Mackenzie 
wrote only three novels, none o f which is overtly similar to any other in form 
or content, and the overriding impression one is left with after reading Julia  
de Roubigne (1777) is not that it is about honourable love, but about the 
dangers o f isolation -  that, when passions run high, one’s conscience needs 
the help o f a physically present impartial spectator
105 See for example his outline o f  the differences between Smith and 
Macpherson, Age o f  Passions, pp. 8—11.
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[i.e. those caused by hopeful live]: and thus enter into all the anxiety, and 
concern and distress o f the lover’ (ibid.).
The Fragments can be considered as a collection o f  textbook illustrations 
o f Smith’s theory. Consider Fragments I and II: from the first sentence we 
learn that the poem is something to do with a pair o f lovers. Vinvela opens 
with: ‘My love is a son o f the hill.’ We learn that Vinvela expects to come 
across Shilric: ‘let me approach my love unperceived and see him from a 
rock’. But then she, and we, learn that (a) Shilric is not on the hill; and not 
only (b) has he gone away to war; but (c) neither he nor Vinvela foresee 
much chance o f his survival. Here indeed is a case in which we can tremble 
in sympathy for the lovers, as it appears that all hope for happiness is 
undermined by the prospect o f Shilric’s death in action. But, Fragment II 
proves this set o f expectations wrong. Shilric has survived, and although 
naturally very depressed after what appears to have been a particularly 
harrowing experience, involving not merely combat, but finding him self the 
sole survivor o f his race, and then burying every one o f  his fellow warriors, 
including all his friends, he is very much looking forward to seeing Vinvela 
again. And he, and we, expect Vinvela to welcome him back, dispel his 
solitude, and grieve with him over the loss o f their friends. The immediate 
prospects for the couple are not happy, but they are not as bleak as they were 
at the end o f Fragment I. However, Shilric is denied even these morsels o f 
comfort. Vinvela is dead. This is particularly shocking because the last time 
he, and we, had any communication with her, she was fit and well, and 
rambling the hills. Although there is some consolation for Shilric in having 
proof in her death, o f the depth o f her love for him, this is more than 
countered by her having died as a result o f misinformation. The fact that 
Vinvela’s ghost is fully apprised o f her mistake only compounds the misery.
The reader is not expected to engage with the passion o f either o f the 
lovers for the other. It would actually be difficult to do so; o f  Shilric we learn 
only that he is a hunter, has dogs, and is tall and handsome; while Shilric’s 
description o f Vinvela is even less useful: she moves beautifully, has long 
hair, and, in ways left largely unspecified, resembles a rainbow. It is 
Shirlric’s situation to which the reader responds; a situation no one would
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wish on their worst enem y;106 and a situation in which he is behaving awfully 
well, under the circumstances, so one with which we as impartial spectators 
can sympathise fully.
The fact that we can sympathise with the situations o f characters 
described by Ossian is what made Ossian seem anomalous to Blair. In order 
to be able to describe the situation in a way that prompts a sympathetic 
response from the reader, Ossian has to be considered to have been able to 
report as an impartial spectator and so to have been able to have experienced 
situations as an impartial spectator. In most o f the Fragments, Ossian as 
narrator is invisible. In Fragments I and II he has picked out those 
circumstances which enable us to see what has caused Shilric’s sadness, but 
according to stadial history, this is an intellectual move he is not supposed to 
be able to make. To be an impartial spectator, one has to be able to generate 
the emotions one would have if one were in the agent’s situation, and then 
judge whether the agent’s reaction is consonant with one’s own, and hence 
appropriate. This is a capacity which an individual acquires by experience 
and induction, which he learns by experience o f others’ reactions to the way 
in which he expresses his feelings, yet Ossian describes the situation in a way 
which is consonant with the approval of, among others, o f  Blair, an 
eighteenth-century enlightened Scots minister. Ossian’s poems elicit 
emotions, and describe situations that are sad with a relentlessness, but he is 
not merely expressing emotion, which is what hunter-gatherers are supposed 
to do; he is describing situations in a way which causes an emotional reaction 
and so has picked out those elements o f the circumstances which have caused 
him to feel sympathetic sorrow; and hunter-gatherers aren’t supposed to do 
that, because that requires reflection and abstraction. It is in this way that 
Ossian creates an anomaly for Blair. It is also this aspect o f the efficacy o f 
the Ossian poems which links Macpherson with Mackenzie and Smith.
8 ‘For indeed it is no more a history than it is a serm on’
I have argued that the theory o f conceptual development which underpins 
B lair’s critique o f  the Ossian poems is that which underpins Sm ith’s theory
106 Well, no one except Lodbrog.
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o f moral sentiments, and further that the considerations which are tacitly 
presupposed in B lair’s characterisation o f Ossian as remarkable, are familiar 
from Smith’s M oral Sentiments. I have argued in chapter II that it is this 
theory which structures M ackenzie’s The Man o f  Feeling. There are other 
links between the M ackenzie’s novel and M acpherson’s Ossian poems; 
several o f which are immediately obvious; one o f which is not. This last, 
however, explains M ackenzie’s choice description o f  The Man o f  Feeling  as 
‘no more a history than it is a sermon’ (MF, p. 4). More interestingly, it 
serves to provide another link between Macpherson and Smith.
I argued above (pp. 74-5) that Mackenzie’s decision to present The Man 
o f  Feeling as an incomplete manuscript had the didactic purpose o f  focussing 
the reader’s attention on each o f  Harley’s adventures, enabling them to 
function individually either as exercises in sympathy, or as complete morality 
tales. Doubtless this format was suggested by that o f the Ossian poems 
generally, and, given M ackenzie’s specific use o f chapter fragments, almost 
certainly in particular by M acpherson’s Fragments. Blair commented that 
the ‘[Ossian] poems require to be taken up at intervals, and to be frequently 
reviewed; and then it is impossible but his beauties must open to every reader 
who is capable o f sensibility. Those who have the highest degree o f  it, will 
relish them the m ost.’107 In the same way M ackenzie’s choice o f  structure 
for The Man o f  Feeling encourages the reader to return to the incidents in the 
book, because they are isolable.
In addition to replicating the fragmentation o f the Ossian poems, The Man 
o f  Feeling contains other tributes to the poems. The book as a whole is 
framed as an Ossianic fragment. The story o f Harley is prompted by the 
sight o f a ‘venerable pile’ swathed in melancholy which turns out to have 
been Harley’s house (MF, pp. 3-4). This is reminiscent o f  Ossianic tombs 
and graves, and like its equivalent in the poems, it prompts a sorrowful story. 
The monument comes replete with a maiden, whom we eventually learn is 
Miss Walton, and who passes between trees in the manner o f grief-stricken 
Ossianic maidens, or ghosts o f  maidens, whose cause o f  sorrow is one with 
which Ossianic maidens would be familiar; in fact the description o f  the fate
107 Blair, Critical Dissertation, p. 357.
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o f the lovers in The Man o f  Feeling  suggests that like so many o f  the 
Ossianic couples, Harley and Miss Walton embrace only in the grave: when 
Harley died, ‘Miss Walton screamed at the sight -  His aunt and the servants 
rushed into the room -  They found them lying motionless together’ {MF, 
p. 130). The book ends in a typically Ossianic setting, described in typically 
Ossianic terms: the vicinity o f  H arley’s grave, which is shaded by a lone tree 
(cf. the description o f Connal’s grave in Fragment V), and it is evident that 
the graveyard is a location that Harley visited often enough for the narrator to 
be able to conjure up his friend when alive, as with many o f  the Ossianic 
locations. Further, and, like Ossian, the narrator’s seat when visiting a 
memorial to a lost friend, is the hollow o f a tree {MF, pp. 132-3). There is 
also a gesture towards it being the haunt o f Harley as an Ossianic ghost, in 
the reference to Harley waving like the tree swaying in the wind, on the last 
occasion he and his biographer visited the cemetery together. The book ends 
on a note o f despondency which is Ossian’s trademark: regret about the 
passing o f an individual hearkening from a world infinitely more virtuous 
than the present {MF, p. 133).
While one couldn’t even at a stretch describe Harley as in anyway 
reminiscent o f a warrior, his story has several o f the motifs which recur 
throughout the Fragments. The story begins when Harley leaves his family 
and his beloved for what his family considers to be a dangerous mission in 
London, in the manner o f  Shilric’s departure for the wars o f Fingal, for 
example. He survives the treachery o f the metropolis only to die from causes 
entirely independent o f his crusade shortly after he returns, with time 
between return and demise for the kind o f amorous jealousy which prompts 
Ossianic warriors to the lengths which all too often prove their downfall. 
Although nursing Edwards through a fever does not have quite the panache 
o f championing a maiden, none the less, it causes Harley’s death which, in 
ways familiar from the Fragments, thwarts love.
One aspect o f the M oral Sentiments which fails to receive mention in 
most, if  not all commentaries, is that Smith uses two different methods o f 
description in his examples. On some occasions he details minutely a 
person’s mental or emotional state; on other occasions he describes a
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person’s behaviour. For example, Smith goes to great lengths to describe the 
ideas which provoke sympathy with the dead:
It is miserable, we think, to be deprived o f  the sun; to be shut out from life 
and conversation; to be laid out in the cold grave, a prey to corruption and 
the reptiles o f the earth; to be no more thought o f in this world, but to be 
obliterated, in a little time, from the affections, and almost from the memory, 
o f their dearest friends and relations.108
Throughout Smith is describing actual sensations. By contrast, when he 
describes the experience o f entering a house in which ‘jarring contention’ 
prevails, he does not describe the discomfort felt by a visitor, but the causes 
o f that discomfort:
Amidst affected smoothness and complaisance, suspicious looks, and sudden 
starts o f passion betray the mutual jealousies which bum within them and 
which are every moment ready to burst out through all restraints which the 
presence o f the company imposes[.] (I.ii.4.3)
In the first example Smith is concerned to establish what we feel in grieving 
for the dead; and in the second why we feel uncomfortable. Although on the 
face o f it, Ossian’s poems are the outpourings o f a primitive soul shooting 
‘wild and free’,109 they are not; if  they were, their content would be more like 
that o f the first o f  the examples from the M oral Sentiments. The structure o f  
the fragments is not so much an outpouring o f feelings as a list o f  reasons for 
O ssian’s gloom. In effect, Macpherson gives structurally what Smith would 
refer to as a ‘history’ o f the protagonists for whom Ossian is mourning.
The design o f historical! writing is not merely to entertain; ... besides that it 
has in view the instruction o f the reader. It sets before us the more 
interesting and important events o f human life, points out the causes by 
which these events were brought about and by this means points out to us by 
what manner and method we may produce similar good effects or avoid 
Similar bad ones. {LRBL ii. 17)
The Historian ... can only excite our affection by the narration o f  the fact and 
setting them in as interesting a view as he possibly can. ... [he] may excite 
grief or compassion but only by narrating facts which excite those feelings. 
{LRBL ii.40)
1081.i. 1.13. Smith’s list o f the effects o f thoughts o f  another’s death could 
have been written by Ossian.
109 This is Blair’s description o f the content o f ancient poetry: Critical 
Dissertation, p. 345.
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Prima facie, it seems implausible to suggest that the fragments each recount a 
history in Smith’s sense, but if one allows that, for Ossian at least, the most 
important event in a someone’s life is how they died (so to speak), then the 
fragments follow Smith’s format and follow Sm ith’s advice concerning the 
best way to portray heightened grief: ‘The best method in in such cases is not 
to attempt any indirect description o f the grief and concern [i.e. a description 
o f  the person’s conduct] but barely relate the circumstances the persons were 
in, the state of their mind before the misfortune and the causes o f their 
passion’ {LRBL, ii.7).
Why is Kirmor grieving (Fragment XI)? Because he ended up losing both 
children and his daughter’s beloved, all on the same night.
How did this happen? Earch was bent on revenge for his brother’s death at 
the hands of Armor.
Cause: He persuaded Armor’s beloved, Daura, to sail to a particular rock, by 
telling her she’d find her love Armor there. Arindel set out to rescue her and 
was killed by accident by Armor, who drowned in his attempt to rescue 
Daura. Daura, unrescued, died from grief.
Kirmor gives only a list of events, i.e. the series o f  causes leading up to the 
disaster. There is no explanation about why this list o f  disasters provokes 
grief, that connection has to be made by the reader.
In The Man o f  Feeling, each catastrophe or state o f affairs is ‘explained’ 
by reference to the events leading up to it, as in the fortune-telling beggar’s 
explanation o f his current plight (see above, p. 58). This analysis o f the 
efficacy o f the Ossian poems in promoting sympathy yields the same 
explanation o f how The Man o f  Feeling  can act as an aid to the development 
o f morality (see pp. 72-3 above). There is a difference between the two texts 
in this regard, however, in that Ossian, as narrator announces the reaction to 
be provoked at the outset, while in The Man o f  Feeling, Harley initially 
demonstrates the appropriate response, and later guides the reader towards it 
-  albeit sometimes only eventually; also, unlike The M an o f  Feeling , the 
appropriate reactions to the Ossian poems are uniformly sorrowful.110
110 The fact that, unlike the Fragments, episodes in The M an o f  Feeling  are 
intended to produce a range of responses (and some episodes are intended to
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Another similarity between the two texts lies in the overarching import o f 
both the poems and The Man o f  Feeling', and again follows an analysis given 
by Smith. In each case we learn about the characters o f  Ossian and Harley, 
less from their actions than from their reactions to others, although 
Mackenzie initially follows Smith’s rules for describing a character -  by 
narrating ‘the different circumstances o f [his] past Life, [his] Education, and 
the advances or declining State o f [his] fortunes’.111 So, while the events 
recounted within each o f the texts can be considered histories in Smith’s 
sense, the overarching nature of each is a description o f  a character.
This explains M ackenzie’s description o f The M an o f  Feeling  as neither 
history nor sermon. According to Smith, we cannot be regarded as reading 
Harley’s history, because we are not, strictly, given the causes o f his 
character. It is described; we are told how he reacts, and what he is 
responding to. In the main, there is little argument in The M an o f  Feeling, 
Harley’s conversation with Ben Silton in the homeward-bound coach, aside. 
This precludes it from being classified as a sermon, as a sermon ‘consists o f 
two parts, the proposition which we lay down and the proof that it is brought 
to confirm this’ {LRBL, 1.14). The alternative to didactic and oratorical 
writing, both o f which according to Smith are characterised by their intended 
import (to prove some proposition {LRBL, ii.12)), is historical narrative: ‘in 
the narrative Stile there is only one Part, that is, the narration o f  facts’ {LRBL, 
ii.14).
However, Smith adds another condition for a text to quality as a history: 
‘we should never leave any chasm of Gap in the thread o f  the narration even 
though there are no remarkable events to fill up that space’ {LRBL, ii.36). 
According to Smith’s criteria, Mackenzie has indeed produced no more a 
history than a sermon.
Conclusion
Mackenzie makes a subtle reference to the problem created by Sm ith’s 
stadial history for B lair’s interpretation o f the moral character o f  Ossian, in
provoke disapproval) might explain the curate’s complaint that he could 
‘never find the author in one strain for two chapters together’ {MF, p. 5).
111 LRBL, i. 199; Cf. MF, ch. XII, pp. 10-14.
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the course o f Edward’s tale. While in the army in the East Indies, Edwards 
had let a prisoner -  an old Indian -  escape, and in consequence, had been 
court-martialled for negligence while on duty and sentenced to a flogging 
and dishonourable discharge. Edwards had allowed the Indian to escape 
because the dictates o f his conscience overrode those o f his military superiors, 
despite the inevitable ignominy o f military dishonour -  a sign that he is one 
o f  Smith’s men o f virtue.
The Indian prisoner had provoked Edwards’ compassion. He was being 
flogged daily solely because Edwards’ officers believed him to be 
withholding information about the location o f hidden hoard o f  treasure, 
despite his denial that he had any. The Indian bore his torture silently, 
showing great self-command, as would be expected from one o f  Sm ith’s 
savages (see above, pp. 181-2), but could not hold back tears o f  shame, 
which show him to be a man o f feeling. After his escape and Edwards’ 
discharge, he seeks out Edwards, and gives him gold in gratitude for 
Edwards’ intervention, so enabling Edwards to make his way back to Britain; 
declares him to have the spirit o f an Indian and departs leaving Edwards to 
continue his long journey home.
Simpson has described the Indian as the earliest o f M ackenzie’s noble
119savages. McQueen has described the Indian as intrinsically if  crudely 
good.113 It also seems possible to describe him as fulfilling Blair’s criteria 
for an Ossianic warrior: he exhibits magnanimity, gratitude and (given he 
seeks out Edwards within only a mile o f the soldiers’ billet), heroism (p. 271, 
above). The problem is that Edwards also fulfils the criteria for an Ossianic 
warrior -  that they are similar in matters o f virtue, despite coming from 
societies o f  markedly different stages o f civilisation.
The conundrum is compounded by the fact that although the Indian does 
not behave like one o f Smith’s barbarians, he is treated as one by Edw ards’ 
officers. As explained above, Smith argues that the savages’ lifestyle 
precludes the development o f  the amiable virtues -  generosity, gratitude, an
112 Simpson, The Protean Scot, p. 145.
113 John McQueen, The Enlightenment and Scottish Literature, vol. II: The 
Rise o f  the Historical Novel (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1989), p. 
23.
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ability to sympathise with another’s distress and so on (pp. 181-2). Savages 
excel in self-command, to the extent o f being able to withstand being roasted 
over a fire without revealing signs o f pain or distress, and during a temporary 
respite from such torture, despite being ‘scorched and burnt, and lacerated in 
all the most tender and sensible parts’, are likely to mingle with their 
torturers catching up on news o f their country; their savage captors, 
meanwhile are unaffected by the distinctly horrible appearance o f  their 
victim, and unmoved by the torture process itself, looking at the victim only 
when lending a hand with the torture, and otherwise smoking or occupying 
themselves in similarly mundane ways (V.2.9). According to Smith the 
emphasis on self-command and the concomitant need to conceal all passions, 
means that savages easily develop the habit o f deceit:
Barbarians, ... being obliged to smother and conceal the appearance o f  every 
passion, necessarily acquire the habits o f falsehood and dissimulation. It is 
observed by all those who have been conversant with savage nations, 
whether in Asia, Africa, or America, that they are all equally impenetrable, 
and that, when they have a mind to conceal the truth, no examination is 
capable o f drawing it from them ... The torture is incapable o f making them 
confess any thing which they have no mind to tell. (V .2.11)
It is evident from the officers’ refusal to believe that the Indian is not 
withholding information -  by the fact that they assume that if  they persist in 
flogging him daily, he will eventually give in -  that they assume his silence 
is just the inevitable savage reticence.
An analysis o f the encounter between Edwards and the Indian 
demonstrates that Mackenzie was aware o f the difficulty Ossian caused for 
B lair’s stadialism -  that is, that he understood that Blair’s perception o f  
Ossian as remarkably refined given his primitive background is both 
dependent on, and undermines, Blair’s use o f stadially motivated, linguistic 
analysis o f the texts.
The overriding evidence that Mackenzie was able to meld the influence o f 
Smith and Macpherson, and so that Macpherson did not break away from 
Sm ith’s theory o f  moral sentiments but used it, is given by M ackenzie’s 
choice o f demise for Harley. Harley’s death is paradigmatic o f  both an 
Ossianic interpretation o f spectatorial joy o f grief -  the course o f  true love 
thwarted by death -  and Smith’s Newtonian theory o f spectatorial sympathy.
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We can be invited to feel sympathy with Miss Walton for having her love 
snatched away when love is declared, with Smith’s approval; and we can feel 
sympathy for Harley again with Smith’s blessing; and we can explain the 
cause o f  Harley’s untimely end by reference to the psycho-physiological ill- 
effects o f surprise -  just that emotional reaction which man seeks to avoid by 
finding causal explanations which yield the predictions that keep novelty at 
bay, and which enable a society to progress.
In conclusion, then, it is impossible to regard Mackenzie as being 
influenced by either Smith or Macpherson, but not by both, because as 
B lair’s critique unwittingly reveals, and Mackenzie recognised, the 
sympathetic efficacy o f  the Ossian poems is dependent on just those elements 
o f Sm ith’s theory o f moral sentiments which give The M an o f  Feeling  the 
content and internal logic required for its didactic purpose.
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IV Conclusion
Scott wrote o f  Henry Mackenzie: ‘No man is less known from his writing, 
We would suppose a retired, modest, somewhat affected man with a white 
handkerchief and a sigh ready for every sentiment. No such thing. H. M. is 
as alert as a contracting tailor’s needle.’ 1 Certainly, if  one thinks o f 
M ackenzie as resembling the protagonists that people not just The M an o f  
Feeling, but his fiction generally, then the disparity between the creator and 
his characters will be startling. On first reading, it is very tempting to dismiss 
The M an o f  Feeling  as a collection o f saccharine tales, written by a man with 
a marked penchant for pathos, in response to a rather strange eighteenth- 
century cult favouring melancholic sentimentality. However, the argument in 
chapter I is to the conclusion that The Man o f  Feeling  was written in 
response to contemporary concern over the effect o f  widespread 
opportunities for increasing personal wealth and o f the dissemination o f 
London values, on the moral fabric o f Scotland. I argued further that 
Mackenzie relied heavily on theory o f moral concept-formation put forward 
by Smith in his Theory o f  M oral Sentiments, and that M ackenzie used the 
theory both to structure the novel and to supply its content.
On first reading, the fragmented nature o f The M an o f  Feeling  makes it 
appear to be a collection o f moral tales, not dissimilar to those Mackenzie 
later wrote for the Mirror and the Lounger, periodicals published in 
Edinburgh during the 1780s. In chapter I, I argue that if, instead o f focussing 
on the events in the book, we consider the reactions o f  the protagonist, 
Harley, to those events, then Harley’s moral development will be seen as 
giving the text a linear, progressive internal dynamic. Although, until Harley 
meets Miss Atkins, the prostitute, there appears to be no causal ordering to 
H arley’s encounters in London, they form a series o f  experiences for Harley 
which require increasingly complex moral judgement
The main thesis o f  chapter II is that the notion o f moral complexity which 
orders events in The M an o f  Feeling is that which Smith puts forward in his 
M oral Sentiments. This connection between Smith’s and M ackenzie’s texts
1 W alter Scott, The Journal o f  Sir Walter Scott (1825-32), ed. W.E.K. 
Anderson (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1998), p. 33.
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depends on a revisionist reading o f the M oral Sentiments, according to which 
the text is a strictly empiricist, hypothetico-deductive theory o f  moral 
concept-formation, the content and structure o f  which is heavily influenced 
by N ew ton’s gravitational theory.
A hypothetico-deductive approach to scientific explanation o f  a given set 
o f  phenomena is a two-step form o f explanation, involving first, an analysis 
o f  those concepts which are intuitively recognised to be associated with the 
phenomena, into irreducible constituents and a demonstration to show that by 
manipulating the irreducible primitive concepts in formally stated, 
predictable ways, the theory can adequately reconstruct the familiar concepts. 
This step demonstrates the plausibility o f the theory, by showing that the 
theory will generate all and only those concepts identified as familiarly 
associated with the phenomena under investigation. The second step is to 
use the theory -  the primitives and axioms, or rules governing the 
manipulation o f  concepts, to generate abstract, highly complex concepts 
which are associated with the field under investigation and which require 
explanation.
In chapter II, I argue that Smith follows this approach in the M oral 
Sentiments. He first demonstrates the plausibility o f his theory by showing 
how simple moral concepts such as gratitude and remorse, are derived from 
the morally atomic relation o f sympathy together with a handful o f 
inductively derived generalisations about human behaviour; then he goes on 
to establish the completeness o f his theory by showing that it will generate all 
and only the abstract, complex concepts making up our notion o f  morality -  
such concepts as justice, virtue and judgem ents o f conscience.
Sm ith’s theory o f  moral sentiments can be stated quite simply: men 
approve morally o f  another’s behaviour in a given situation if, on imagining 
themselves in the same situation, it gives rise to the same emotions in them 
as those they see it has caused in the person in question. For moral concepts 
drawn from personal experience, such as gratitude and remorse, complexity 
is determined by the nature o f  the associated sympathy relation. One will feel 
sympathy for another’s pain, if  when imagining oneself in the situation 
which is causing his pain, one feels the same sorrow at the pain as that which 
prompts the agent’s behaviour. This is a one-to-one sympathy relation
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between spectator and agent. By contrast, on Smith’s theory, gratitude, for 
example, requires that the spectator feels sympathy with both the benefactor 
causing the gratitude as well as the grateful recipient. The nature o f  sympathy 
in this instance is more complicated, as it is a one-m any relation. Sympathy 
with another’s bereavement is more complicated still, since, according to 
Smith, we sympathise with the dead, imagining the emotions we imagine 
would feel had we died under the same circumstances. Sympathy for the 
bereaved involves both imagining their loss and imagining both the feelings 
o f  the person who has died and the feelings the bereaved imagines the person 
who has died is experiencing. The sympathy relation here is one-m any, with 
components which are themselves one-m any sympathy relations.
Sm ith’s theory applied at an experiential level yields a notion o f  moral 
complexity which is determined by the number and kinds o f factors that have 
to be taken into consideration by a spectator in order to achieve a sympathy 
relation with the moral agent. Using this idea to analyse the situations in 
which Mackenzie places Harley in The Man o f  Feeling , shows there is a 
progression in the events in the novel -  the sympathy relations necessary for 
moral judgem ent to be possible become increasingly more complex. This 
interpretation also shows Harley’s role in the book to be that o f moral mentor. 
Initially he demonstrates the appropriate moral response (usually tears); and 
later he guides the reader towards the moral judgem ent which will spawn the 
appropriate response. The discussion o f  the epistemic theory underpinning 
Sm ith’s theory in chapter II, leads to the conclusion that the nature o f this 
pedagogic element in the book conforms with Smith’s empiricist account o f 
the acquisition o f knowledge.
The analysis o f Smith’s M oral Sentiments in chapter II provides 
justification for M ackenzie’s assumption that The M an o f  Feeling  could 
contribute to the moral education o f the reader -  an assumption common to 
all eighteenth-century writers o f  improving sentimental literature. The M oral 
Sentiments is shown to be a thoroughgoing empiricist account o f  moral 
concept-formation. Since empiricism entails that moral concepts are 
crucially formed through experience, it follows that the ability to make moral 
judgem ents is learned behaviour -  according to Smith it is dependent on the 
exercise o f reason to determine whether the causal history o f  an agent’s
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situation warrants his reaction to it. Reason helps to modulate the 
sympathetic response. This modulation is necessary because there is an 
imbalance between a spectator’s responses to a situation and an agent’s 
responses: the spectator can only imagine the feelings that would arise were 
he in the same situation as the agent, and, according to both Hume and Smith, 
ideas which are rooted in imagination are less vivid than those which have 
their source in the world. Both agent and spectator aim to achieve full 
sympathy -  that is complete parity o f  their emotion responses. To achieve 
this, the spectator must heighten his reactions as far as possible while the 
agent must subdue his.
The empiricist account o f moral concept-formation is potentially 
problematic in that moral judgement-making requires practice; specifically, 
since a comprehensive moral education will require practice both in the 
assessment o f an agent’s response, and in suitably modulating one’s response, 
it will also have to incorporate opportunities to assess and respond to an array 
o f causal histories. Throughout The Man o f  Feeling, the reader is confronted 
with scenarios which will test her ability to judge appropriately, particularly 
with regard to kinds o f non-standard situations with which the reader would 
not be expected to encounter -  such as meeting a virtuous prostitute.
The Man o f  Feeling can be seen to augment an education in virtue. Moral 
progress is understood in terms o f the acquisition o f increasingly complex 
moral concepts, where moral complexity is defined by reference to Sm ith’s 
account in the Moral Sentiments o f the relationship holding between moral 
concepts and their associated judgements.
In chapter I, I suggested that in The Man o f  Feeling  M ackenzie is 
responding to the general concern in the eighteenth century about the 
detrimental effects o f an improved economy which led to more personal 
wealth for a larger proportion o f the population than ever before. I also 
suggested that the causes for M ackenzie’s concern were peculiar to Scotland, 
and he put proposed a specifically Scots solution: namely that o f  encouraging 
absentee landowners to return to their estates, and live there. It transpires 
that an analysis o f the problem together with the general solution adopted by 
Mackenzie is given by Smith in the course o f his discussion o f  conditions 
which catalyse change in a society’s mores. According to Smith, trends set
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by ‘men o f rank and distinction’ are associated in the imagination o f the 
populace with the ideas o f gentility and magnificence. This connection is the 
result o f prior associations between rank and gentility -  associations so 
strong that, according to Smith, even when conditions demand rebellion 
against the mores o f men o f rank, people will find it impossible not to defer 
to them. A society is vulnerable to corruption when virtue is connected with 
the wrongs kinds o f social trends, a situation which is engendered in an 
improving economy, because society is attracted by displays o f wealth and 
almost as a matter o f course, gives its approval to the rich and wealthy who 
command a high profile. The problem is that what is socially acceptable 
gains the approval o f the impartial spectator, or the majority o f a society, and 
since the populace is by nature attracted to the wealthy, it follows that this 
element o f society will gain the approval o f the majority, and hence whatever 
the wealthy do will become morally virtuous. If the most conspicuous 
elements o f society adopt a scurrilous or superficial value system, this will 
almost inevitably become the value system for the society in general. 
M ackenzie’s solution is to exhort the men o f rank -  the conspicuous stratum 
-  to return to their estates, and reinstate, and so promulgate by example, the 
lifestyle o f their predecessors; and to educate their children in these mores in 
order to promote them through the generations.
According to the analysis in chapter II, Smith understood social mores to 
be the identifiable general behavioural trends in a society, derivable by 
inductive inference. They can be used either in a descriptive role -  to 
describe what is considered socially acceptable behaviour in the society; or in 
a prescriptive role to ensure an individual’s conduct accords with what is 
socially approved of. In chapter II, I argued that this notion o f inductively 
derivable rules o f conduct underpins Smith’s stadial o f history and moreover 
that it is his stadialism which gives content to the literati’s concept o f 
improvement. In chapter II, I showed how Smith’s stadial concept o f  social 
development is a concomitant o f his theory o f concept-formation generally 
and moral concept-formation in particular; and in chapter III I argued that the 
anomalousness o f Ossian and o f his poetry, lauded by Blair in his discussion 
o f the Ossianic corpus in his Critical Dissertation o f  M acpherson’s poems is 
the result o f  applying the notion o f improvement which derives from stadial
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thinking to the question o f the linguistic development o f a society. I also 
show how this approach enabled Smith to rank written texts as showing more 
or less evidence o f improvement according to their function; and finally 
show how Smith’s stadial theory links M acpherson’s work with M ackenzie’s 
novel -  a link which to date has been established only by reference either to 
the fragmented nature o f The Man o f  Feeling echoing the form o f the 
Fragments; or through exploring the extent to which Mackenzie is indebted 
to Macpherson for the cult o f melancholy which pervades his novel.
The temptation is to dismiss Smith’s M oral Sentiments and so, by 
implication, The Man o f  Feeling , as propounding a context-specific 
reactionary normative ethics, constructed in response to the fear, frequently 
articulated in print by the literati, that Britain, and more pertinently Scotland, 
will submit completely to the lure o f increased wealth and luxury, and so 
suffer the fate o f Rome. While the key to The M an o f  Feeling  is to discount 
M ackenzie’s characterisation o f his work, the key to Smith’s M oral 
Sentiments is to take his description o f his work seriously, and look for the 
reasons why he chose to refer to his discussion o f  moral sentiments as a 
theory o f such sentiments. This is the purpose o f  chapter II. The outcome is 
the discovery that Smith’s Moral Sentiments, far from being an exposition o f 
reactionary ethics, is a rigorous, tightly argued, empiricist theory o f  m an’s 
moral conduct, founded in scientific observation, building on and improving 
H um e’s theory o f understanding, heavily influenced by N ew ton’s theory o f 
gravitation and his use o f hypothetico-deductive methodology, and tackling 
head on the difficulty o f reconciling the empiricist requirement that 
explanations are founded in the observable with the essentially private nature 
o f experience. Given this intellectual heritage for The M an o f  Feeling, it no 
longer seems surprising that its author proved to be as sharp as a contracting 
tailor’s needle. Nor is it surprising to learn that, when asked by M ackenzie if  
he would be willing to contribute to the Mirror, the essays for which are 
similar to the episodes comprising Harley’s adventures in London, Smith
300
declined on the grounds that his ‘manner o f writing [would] not do for a 
work o f that sort; it runs too much into deduction and inference’.2
The purpose o f The Man o f  Feeling would have been served had 
M ackenzie chosen to write it as a series o f essays in the manner o f those he 
wrote, at a later date, for the Mirror and the Lounger. His decision instead to 
emulate the Ossian poems and present the book as if  the edited version o f  an 
incomplete manuscript might be explained in part by the popularity o f the 
poems, but it is equally possible that he was influenced by Blair’s comment 
in his Critical Dissertation that ‘[Ossian’s] poems require to be taken up at 
intervals and to be frequently reviewed: and then it is impossible but his 
beauties must open to every reader who is capable o f sensibility.’3 The 
actual or created fragmentation o f the poems encourages this kind o f 
approach by a reader. As argued in chapter III, Mackenzie framed The Man 
o f  Feeling  after the manner o f the frame for the Ossian poems; and, as 
concluded in chapter III, Mackenzie was familiar with both the content of, 
and the rationale behind, Blair’s critique o f the poems.
One o f the most persistent features o f eighteenth-century thought is the 
idea that society develops stadially. Often stadialism is taken to be a 
characteristic only o f eighteenth-century causally interpreted history. 
However, by juxtaposing a reconstruction o f Smith’s theory o f  moral 
sentiments with evidence o f its use in The M an o f  Feeling  and with B lair’s 
grammatical analysis o f the Ossian poems in his Critical Discussion , as is 
attempted in chapter III, it becomes evident that the stadial model pervades 
all fields o f inquiry connected with the study o f  m an’s nature; that it cannot 
be equated with, or considered to be founded in, a particular subject matter; 
and that rather than denoting a form o f analysis, per se, it is an heuristic for 
the causal analysis o f social phenomena generally. Smith’s use o f the model 
in his account o f the origin and development o f language, and Blair’s 
reliance on Smith’s theory o f language and his theory o f moral sentiments in
2 Quoted by Drescher in his introduction to Mackenzie, Letters 1766—1827, 
pp. 27-8.
Hugh Blair, A Critical Dissertation on the Poems o f  Ossian (1763; revised 
edn 1765), repr. in James Macpherson, The Poems o f  Ossian and Related  
Works (1760-73), ed. H. Gaskill (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1996), pp. 345-99; p. 357.
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his analysis both o f the Ossian poems and o f the nature o f  Ossian himself, 
emphasise the fact that for the literati the overarching purpose o f  enquiry into 
the nature and causes o f social phenomena -  language, history, morals, law, 
religion -  is the study o f man’s capacity for conceptual development. 
Observable social facts are treated as evidence o f intrinsically private 
phenomena: ideas, emotions, reasoning processes.
Even today, the possibility that almost every aspect o f m an’s behaviour is 
accessible to scientific enquiry gives pause for thought. When revealed 
religion fell from the ascendant, leaving all manner o f subjects open to new 
interpretation, the idea will have seemed simply astonishing, and 
overwhelming. The appeal during the eighteenth century, o f  empirical 
enquiry, together with what appeared to be the infallibility o f Newtonian 
methodology in these contexts, is now impossible to imagine, as we are too 
used to the idea that most fields seem to yield to scientific inquiry. A final 
conclusion that can be drawn from this exploration o f  the intellectual 
ancestry o f The Man o f  Feeling , and another outcome o f the discussion in 
chapter III is that, during the second half o f the eighteenth century, the literati 
regarded scientific endeavour as essentially an applied science. This in itself 
is not unexpected. Fundamental to an empiricist analysis o f  social 
phenomena is the idea that man comes into the world equipped to reason, but 
devoid o f conceptual information. It follows from this that m an’s nature is 
fleshed out and modified by experience, and this in turn invites the idea that 
social phenomena can be regulated to some extent by controlling experience. 
In The Man o f  Feeling, Mackenzie constructed a way o f  developing a 
reader’s virtue which accords with Smith’s theory o f moral sentiments.
The Man o f  Feeling can now be seen to be very much a product o f  its time. 
Given that enthusiasm for sentimental fiction flared and died relatively 
quickly, it appears that its time was very short. Just how short is indicated 
by Lady Stuart’s discovery that while she had wept over the book at 14, she 
‘perceived a sad change in it’, when, as an adult, she read the book aloud to 
friends: ‘the effect altogether failed. Nobody cried, and at some o f  the
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passages, the touches I used to think so exquisite -  oh dear! They laughed.’4 
None the less, the slender, seemingly bland, uneventful novel encapsulates 
many o f the most important elements o f eighteenth-century Scottish thought. 
The swiftness of its fall from literary grace, and the richness o f  the context 
within which it has to be taken to be appreciated fully, do not undermine its 
value as an indication of the cultural preoccupations o f the literati during the 
second half o f the eighteenth century; rather these aspects o f  the book testify 
against the plausibility o f broad generalisations about Scottish culture during 
the century after the Union; and the same time indicate the fertility o f  that 
culture during the eighteenth century.
4 From a letter from Lady Louisa Stuart to Sir W alter Scott, 1826; quoted in 
Brian Vickers, ‘Introduction’ to Henry Mackenzie, The M an o f  Feeling  
(1771), ed. Brian Vickers (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. v ii-  
xxiv, p. viii.
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